

## SUMMARIES OF RUSSIAN ARTICLES

**Gholamhossein Ibrahimī Dīnānī**

### THE WORLD OF IMAGINATION

Muslim philosophers call the border separating material things and purely separated ones “the Isthmus” (*barzakh*) or “the World of Image” (*‘ālam-i mīthāl*). Some philosophers — like Suhrawardī — treat it as the “Disjointed Imagination” (*khayāl-i munfaṣil*), while others — like Mullā Ṣadrā — as the “Connected Imagination” (*khayāl-i muttaṣil*). Regardless of this difference in opinions, the “Connected Imagination” is a stage of existence which is situated between the physical and intellectual worlds. Some philosophers believe that these three worlds correspond to three different kinds of perception: sense perception, perception through imagination and intellection.

The “suspended images” (*al-muthul al-mu‘allaqa*), whose existence was postulated by Suhrawardī, belong to the intermediate world of imagination. These images should not be confused with the “Platonic images”, which are the “lords of species” (*arbāb-i anwā’*) of all beings and constitute the latitudinal (*‘ardī*) aspect of the world of intellects.

Suhrawardī also (like Plotinus) believes in the existence of three kinds (or levels) of man: corporeal, imaginal and intellectual. In this tripartite hierarchy, each higher level relates to the lower one as the owner of the shadow relates to the shadow.

According to Suhrawardī, man’s faculty of imagination is only the locus of manifestation of imaginal forms, not their creator: these forms pertain to the world of Disjointed (Cosmic) Imagination, remaining there forever.

**Natalia Efremova**

### THE PROOFS OF GOD’S EXISTENCE IN *FALSAFA*

The *falāsifa* provide three important and well elaborated proofs of God’s existence: 1) from movement to the Unmoved Mover; 2) from the concepts of contingency and necessity; 3) from the finiteness of the chain of causes.

The first proof (which belongs to Aristotle; Ibn Rushd believes it to be the only indubitable one) is based on the two following premises: 1) everything that moves is moved by something else; 2) infinite succession of moved and moving things is impossible. From them it concludes to the (existence of the) first unmoved Mover.

The second proof, worked out by Ibn Sīnā, concludes to the existence of God as the Necessary Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) and the cause of existence. According to Avicenna, existence can be mentally divided into contingent (possible) and necessary (assumption of the non-existence of the latter leading to absurdity). The necessary existent, in turn, can be either necessary through the other or necessary through itself. But what is necessary through the other, must rest on the necessary through itself (hence, existence as such testifies to the existence of the Necessary through Itself or God).

The third proof also belongs to Ibn Sīnā. From the impossibility of the infinite succession of causes it concludes to the existence of the First (Efficient) Cause.

### Yanis Eshots

#### A FEW REMARKS CONCERNING THE IMAGE OF TEMPLE IN THE WRITINGS OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN SUHRAWARDĪ

There are several words meaning ‘temple’ in Arabic, among them — the word *haykal*. This word occurs in most of Suhrawardī’s writings and appears in the title of one of them — the *Hayākil al-nūr* (Temples of Light). In his commentary on the treatise, Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī refers to the practice of “the ancients” (apparently, the Sabeans of Harrān) to venerate the celestial luminaries as shadows and temples (*hayākil*) of the separated immaterial lights. For this purpose, they built special temples, in which they placed the theurgies of these luminaries, visiting them at particular hours and performing certain specific rites during these visits. In Davānī’s view, each of the seven chapters of Suhrawardī’s treatise also represents a locus of theurgy of a particular luminary, which, in turn, is itself a locus of theurgy of a certain separated light. Davānī’s hypothesis is confirmed by a good number of passages in Suhrawardī’s liturgic texts (*Al-wārīdāt wa ’l-taqdīsāt*).

In a nutshell, in Suhrawardī’s writings the word “temple” (*haykal*) refers to a universal principle, upon which the hierarchy of being rests, every lower level relating to the higher one as temple relates to the idol, whose locus of manifestation it is.

### Hamid Hadavi

#### THE TRANSCENDENT PHILOSOPHY OF MULLA SADRA: SOURCES AND INNOVATIONS

The article is devoted to the Transcendent Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, its sources and innovations. It consists of two parts. In the first part the innovations of Sadra’s philosophy are discussed. The author believes the most important of them to be the following: 1) introduction of the theory of the corporeal creation of the soul; 2) solution of the aporia of temporal creation of the world; 3) solution of the

problem of the relationship between the eternal and the temporal; 4) introduction of a new proof of God's existence (known as "Sadrian proof of the sincere"); 5) solution of the problem of mental existence; 6) introduction of a completely original theory of substantial motion; 7) solution of a number of minor aporias put forward by the earlier philosophers and theologians and 8) the removal of several major contradictions between the philosophers from one side and the Gnostics and theologians from another.

In the second part the major sources of Sadra's philosophical doctrine are examined. These are divided into traditional and rational. The first group is constituted by the Qur'an and the hadith; the second — by the works of ancient Greek and pre-Sadrian Islamic thinkers (philosophers, theologians and Gnostics).

### **Tawfiq Ibrahim**

#### **THE PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AND ONENESS IN THE *KALĀM***

A great number of proofs of God's existence were developed in the *Kalām*. However, the most important among them is the proof from temporal origination (*dalīl min al-ḥudūth*). According to this proof, all bodies are temporarily originated and, whatever is temporarily originated (*ḥādith*), needs an originator (*muḥdith*) (first, from the originatedness of bodies we conclude to the originatedness of the world as a whole; then, from the originatedness of the world to the Eternal (*qadīm*) Originator). Another well-known proof is the one from the permissibility of qualities. As stated by this proof, bodies are identical with each other in their reality (*ḥaqīqa*). Their particularization through specific qualities is permissible, but requires a particularizer. Yet another famous proof is the proof from aggregation (whose seminal form is attributed to al-Nazzām). In conformity with this proof, substances (in particular elements) with opposite qualities require an aggregator in order to unite with each other, forming a whole. Along with the three aforementioned cosmological proofs, the teleological one (developed by Ash'arī, from the meaningful intentional arrangement of the world it concludes to the (necessity of the) Intender and the Provider of meaning) must also be counted among the most important (although some *Mutakallimīn* treat the latter as purely inductive).

### **Zayn al-'Abidīn Ibrāhīmī**

#### **THE *SHAYKHĪ* TEACHING ON BODY, FLESH AND SPIRIT**

Among the eschatological teachings that spread among the *Shī'a* during the last two centuries, the doctrine of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsā'ī deserve a particular attention. Ahsā'ī holds that the elemental body, which consists of this-worldly accidents, does not go to the other world: the returned body, in his opinion, is the subtle body, which is situated inside this elemental body. In actual fact, explains Ahsā'ī,

nothing goes from this world to the other one: what is conventionally referred to as “return” and “restoration”, alludes to the cessation of paying attention to this world and turning it to the other one.

According to Ahsā’ī, the human being has two bodies (*jism*) and two fleshes (*jasad*) (however, some *Shaykhī* scholars, elaborating his teaching, talk of three bodies and three fleshes). The first flesh is made of temporal elements; the second, in turn, consists of the elements of *Hūrqalyā*. The first body is that in which human being lives in the paradise of this world or the Isthmus. The second body is that in which he is resurrected after Isrāfīl’s blowing the horn the second time. The human being possesses these two bodies already in this world — otherwise, reward and punishment would be meaningless.

### Muhammad Khājavi

#### HOW DID MULLĀ ṢADRĀ HIMSELF DEFINE THE “TRANSCENDENT PHILOSOPHY”?

In general terms, for Ṣadrā, true wisdom or philosophy (*hikma*) consists in the knowledge of God and His aspects or “tasks” (*shu’ūn*), that being the highest knowledge of the highest knowable thing. Giving attention to other sciences, to the detriment of this divine science, in his opinion, is choosing the mean instead of the lofty. Therefore, studying the particular or specific sciences (such as physics or medicine), which relate to the science of God as branches relate to the root, if not exactly blameworthy, is not worthy of the rank and aspiration of the divine sage. That said, Ṣadrā also believes his Transcendent Philosophy to be superior to philosophy in its common sense, because the former, unlike the latter, is based, along with the discourse (*baḥṭh*), on unveiling (=revelation) (*kashf*) and tasting (=intuition) (*dhawq*) as well. Moreover, when dealing with lofty divine problems, the discursive reason acknowledges its helplessness and the superiority of unveiling and tasting. However, the intuitively grasped truths cannot be transmitted otherwise than by means of discursive demonstration (*burhān*). Hence, knowing the things through the Transcendent Wisdom presupposes knowing them both intuitively and discursively.

### Seyyed Muhammad Khāmene’ī

#### TIME AND TEMPORAL

The issue of time and temporality is considered an important subject in Islamic philosophy and different ideas have been propounded in this regard. Most Muslim philosophers regard time as the effect of the motion of a thing (or things) whose essence is fixed but which enjoys a positional or spatial motion.

In general, Muslim philosophers can be divided into two groups concerning their theories of time. The first group consists of those philosophers who abstract time

from accidental and sensible motion of things. They believe that true time is limited to the ‘current moment’ or ‘instant’. The second group, in turn, consists of those thinkers who abstract time from the linear motions and changes due to the motion of the fluid and changing substance of things and consider moment a mental issue.

Each group regards a different kind of motion as the criterion for the reality of time: the first one holds it to be instantaneous motion (*ḥarakat-i tawassuṭiyya*) (whereby the present moment is considered the true time and continuous and conjunctive line of moments is viewed as an abstraction existing only in the mind); the second believes it to be continuous motion (*ḥarakat-i qat‘iyya*) (whereby the real time is considered the collection of points, states and moments of the motion (hence, the motion is drawn as a single line), while the moment is considered an abstract and mental issue).

**Andrey Lukashov**

### **THE PROBLEM OF HETERODOXY AND THE ONTOLOGICAL INTUITIONS OF MEDIAEVAL PERSIAN SUFISM**

In Sufi poetry the problem of heterodoxy is usually discussed in the context of reflection upon the pair of concepts “faith” (*īmān*) and “infidelity” (*kufr*), whereas ontological issues are, as a rule, considered in the context of cogitation on existence (*wujūd*; *ḥastī*) and non-existence (*‘adam*). The author draws a parallel between the two pairs of concepts, while examining a number of pieces of mediaeval Persian Sufi poetry. In particular, he analyses the relationship between existence and non-existence in Mahmud Shabistari’s (ca. 720/1320) *Gulshan-i rāz* (“The Rose Garden of Mystery”), coming to a conclusion that this relationship rests upon the principle of the “oneness of existence” (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). Importantly, in case of Shabistari, the “oneness of existence” means the unification of existence and non-existence (or the “inner” (i.e., the fixed entities)) and the “outer” (i.e., the created world)) in the Absolute Being or God. Like existence and non-existence (or the inner and the outer) are united in the Absolute Being, so is faith and infidelity united in God (“faith” meaning the awareness of the oneness of being and “infidelity” — ignorance of it).

**Karīm Mujtahidī**

### **MULLĀ ṢADRĀ IN HENRY CORBIN’S INTERPRETATION**

Wherever Corbin mentions the Shiite philosophy in his works, he means, first and foremost, the transcendent philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā. Henry Corbin’s opinion on Ṣadrā cannot be considered separately from his view on Islamic philosophy as a whole: he regards the sage from Shīrāz as a member of a large intellectual family — not only the heir of his predecessors and the guardian of their legacy but also the reviver of their teachings. According to Corbin, Ṣadrā’s thought is not confined to

the limits of political and social material history, but goes beyond them: only the thought which transcends the boundaries of history can be treated as a truly original one. Corbin regards Ṣadrā as an Illuminationist Avicennian who not only overcame the differences between Ibn Sina and Suhrawardī but gave his own highly original interpretation of the philosophy of *Ishrāq*. At the same time, he believes Ṣadrā to be greatly influenced by Ibn ‘Arabī’s mysticism. Moreover, Corbin remarks, Ṣadrā viewed philosophy itself as a spiritual perfectionery journey. It can be stated without an undue exaggeration that, to Corbin’s conviction, theosophy and philosophy at a certain period of its inner development in Islamic culture found the actuality of its substance and the crystallization of its essential form in Ṣadrā.

**Ishat Nasirov**

**THE WEST AND MUSLIM THOUGHT IN ZEKĪ WELĪDĪ TOGAN’S  
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL AND  
CULTURAL IDENTITY AT THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION**

The article deals with the thought of Zekī Welīdī Togan (1890-1970), the famous Orientalist and leader of the Bashkurt national movement in 1917-1921, focusing on his philosophy of history (as presented in his book *Tarihte usul* (“The Principles of Historical Research”). Togan’s ideas are considered against the background of the major trends of Muslim thought in the late Tzarist and early post-revolutionary Russia (which was significantly influenced by such figures as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muhammad ‘Abduh). Togan refuses to admit that the economic domination of the West over the Muslim world testifies to intellectual superiority of the Western civilization, arguing that the main reason of this temporary domination is the abandonment of the ancient land trade routes in favour of the new sea ones. Moreover, according to Togan, the Muslim East is historically a part of the Western (and not the Eastern (i.e., Chino-Indian)) civilization, the differences between them bearing a cultural — and not civilizational — character. On the other hand, Togan holds that two main characteristics of free creative thinking (artefact as the product of free creative spirit and not of imitation; attentiveness and carefulness in producing artefacts) have nothing to do with inborn racial superiority, but are implanted through instruction and education.

**Ishat Nasirov**

**RESEARCH ON CLASSICAL ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE POST-SOVIET  
RUSSIA (IN THE 1990S AND THE EARLY XXI CENTURY)**

The article provides a detailed picture of the state of research on classical Islamic philosophy in the Post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s and early XXI century. Through a thorough analysis of a number of research projects carried out during

the aforementioned period, the dominant research trends and the most common approaches to Islamic thought in general and certain philosophical schools and major philosophers in particular are established. The author argues that within the last twenty years Russian scholars have made a significant progress in studying the philosophical heritage of the Islamic civilization due to forsaking the materialistic and atheistic approach that prevailed in Russian philosophy during the Soviet era. The stereotype of Islamic philosophy as a more or less sophisticated commentary on ancient Greek thought was gradually replaced with the conception of Islamic philosophy as a genuine part of world philosophy, consisting of five self-subsistent components: *kalām*, *falsafa*, *tasawwuf*, Illuminationism (the Suhrawardian philosophy of *ishrāq*) and Ismailism.

**Gultekin Shamilli**

**THE ARCHITECTONIC OF CLASSICAL IRANIAN MUSIC:  
MEANING AND ITS BECOMING**

In modern theory of music term “architectonic” denotes the compositional integrity, which manifests itself as the unity of structural elements of a musical work. After the emergence of Asafyev’s theory of “musical form as process”, architectonic came to be interpreted as a fixed spatio-temporal continuum of musical construction, consisting of certain parts. According to this theory, both aspects — the architectonic and processual — are inseparable and complement each other.

In the current article I have attempted to demonstrate the becoming of *maqām* as meaning, hidden in the grammar of musical language, which (grammar) I treat as a constituent part of the universal logical and sense grammar of Islamic culture. This grammar determines the musical logic of classical Iranian (and Islamic in general) music. Assuming that the metacategories *zāhir* — *bātin* (‘inner — outer’) and *aṣl* — *far‘* (‘root — branch’) determine the organization of the most fundamental procedures of thinking and the culture of theoretical thinking in general, I argue that these categories organize not only structural units of the grammar of classical Iranian music but also the phenomenon of musical text as such, namely the architectonic elements in both theoretical and practical aspects of *mūsīqī-i dastgāh*.

**Andrey Smirnov**

**THE ARCHITECTONIC OF ISLAMIC ETHICS**

Islamic ethics can be called “Islamic” for two reasons: 1) because it is based on authoritative Islamic texts (the Qur’an, the Sunna and the works of Muslim scholars); 2) because its architectonic is peculiar to Islamic culture. This is due

to the second (and not the first) reason that it becomes an organic part of Islamic culture, resting on the same fundamental principles logic-and-meaning principles as its other segments.

Following Kant, I treat architectonic as a set of lines of force, along which moves the thought and which determine the integrity of the respective system of knowledge. In case of Islamic culture, these lines of force issue from two “poles” or metacategories — *zāhir* (‘outer’ or ‘manifest’) and *bātin* (‘inner’ or ‘hidden’). These two polar concepts are inseparable: instead of negating each other, they presuppose — or even demand — each other’s existence. Even more importantly, in this pair of concepts none governs the other (as this is the case with noumenon and phenomenon in European thought). The connection between *zāhir* and *bātin* is established and maintained by the third concept — the concept of the process of their transition into each other. In regard to Islamic ethics, I identify the *bātin* as *niyya* (‘intention’), *ḥāl* (‘state’) or *khuluq* (‘innate disposition’); *zāhir* — as *fi‘l* (‘act’) and the process that connects them — as *‘amal* (‘deed’).

**Leonid Syukiaynen**

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF *FIQH* AS  
THE LEGAL EXPRESSION OF ISLAMIC MORAL VALUES**

Many Islamicists and lawyers tend to use the terms *sharī‘a* and ‘Islamic law’ as synonymous. However, upon a more careful examination of the contexts in which these terms are used, a number of significant differences between them can be detected. In this article I argue that the exact relationship between both cannot be understood without recourse to *fiqh*, whose principles are of crucial importance not only to the proper legal interpretation of Islamic moral postulates, but also, wider, to the proper understanding of Islamic law as a relatively self-subsistent phenomenon.

The first section of the article deals with the definition, structure and characteristics of the moral imperatives of *sharī‘a*. The second discusses *fiqh* as a science and a universal system of social regulations. The third examines the ways, in which legal principles are expressed in *fiqh*. The fourth section discusses the general principles of *fiqh* as a link and intermediary between the *sharī‘a* and Islamic law. The fifth lists ninety-nine general principles of *fiqh* as given in the *Majalla* (*Mejelle-yi aḥkām-i ‘adliyye* — the civil code of the Ottoman Empire since 1869, derived mostly from the principles of the Hanafī school of law).