

Institute of Philosophy (Russian Academy of Sciences)
Tibetan Culture and Information Center in Moscow

International Conference Buddhism and Phenomenology

Moscow, November 7–8, 2016

KEY SPEAKERS

Geshe Thupten Jinpa



On three fundamental features of consciousness (subjectivity, intentionality, and reflexivity) in Buddhism

Buddhist scholar, principal English translator to His Holiness the Dalai Lama since 1985. Director of the Institute of Tibetan Classics. He has translated and edited more than ten books by the Dalai Lama including *The World of Tibetan Buddhism* (Wisdom Publications, 1993), *A Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings of Jesus* (Wisdom Publications, 1996), and the New York Times bestseller *Ethics for the New Millennium* (Riverhead, 1999). He received traditional Buddhist education (Geshe degree is corresponding to PhD) as well as Western education (bachelor's degree in Western philosophy and PhD in religious studies - both obtained in Cambridge, UK). He is a visiting researcher at the Stanford Institute for Neuro-Innovation and Translational Neuroscience, Stanford University, USA.

Among his publications:

Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Thought: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle View.
Routledge Curzon, 2002.

K.L.Dhammajoti



**Adhimukti and subjectivity in cognitive experience.
The Abhidharma and Yogācāra Perspective**

In my presentation, I shall discuss the gradual ascendance of the doctrinal importance of the concept of adhimukti (resolute receptivity or affirmative mentality) from Early Buddhism, through the Abhidharma doctrines, to Yogācāra, examining in particular the contribution of such a concept to the development of the vijñaptimātratā doctrine of the Yogācāra. In this way, I hope to bring out the Buddhist understanding of subjectivity in cognitive experience from the Abhidharma and the Early Yogācāra perspectives.

Buddhist scholar, Buddhist monk originally from Malaysia, a distinguished Professor of Hong Kong University (who also taught in Sri Lanka and Thailand). The principal authority on Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma school, as well as an expert on early Yogācāra. Works with the sources in Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese, Sinhalese, and other languages of Southeast Asia, as well as with Tibetan texts. The founder of the *Journal of Buddhist Studies* at the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka. Author of such fundamental works as *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Centre of Buddhist Studies, 3rd edition 2009), *Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception* (Centre of Buddhist Studies, 3rd edition, 2007), *Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine* (Centre of Buddhist Studies, HKU, 2nd edition 2008).

Dan Zahavi



Transcendental phenomenology, intentionality and subjectivity

What do phenomenologists have to say about subjectivity and why are they interested in it, in the first place? What are the methodological moves, the descriptive findings and the systematic motivation? In exploring these questions, I will engage critically with certain Buddhist attempts to deny the first-personal character of consciousness, and also consider the relation between philosophical reflection and contemplation.

Director of the Center for Subjectivity research, Professor of Philosophy at University of Copenhagen, phenomenologist interested especially in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and philosophy of mind. In his writings, he has dealt extensively with topics such as self, self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and social cognition. He is a co-editor of the journal *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*. Zahavi's work has been translated into 25 languages. The author and co-author of 10 books.

Among his publications:

Self-awareness and Alterity. Northwestern University Press 1999.

Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford University Press 2003.

Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. MIT Press 2005.

The Phenomenological Mind. 2nd Edition (with Shaun Gallagher). Routledge 2012.

Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. Oxford University Press. 2014.

Zahavi is also the editor of more than 10 volumes, including: *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology*. Oxford University Press 2012.

His papers could be found at <https://ku-dk.academia.edu/DanZahavi>

Cristian Coseru



Consciousness, Personal Identity, and the Self/No-Self Debate

Given that all Buddhists give universal scope to the no-self view, accounts of self-knowledge in Buddhism cannot rest on an egological conception of self-consciousness. Without a conception of consciousness as the property, function, or dimension of an enduring subject or self, how, then, do mental states acquire their first-personal character? How is self-knowledge possible? These questions are at the heart of a long intramural Buddhist debate about the nature and character of consciousness and self-consciousness. In pursuing these questions, I will trace the genealogy of key concepts of consciousness and personal identity in Buddhism, their role in articulating specific accounts of self-knowledge, and their relevance to contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of mind about the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness.

Associate professor of philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the College of Charleston. He works in the fields of philosophy of mind, Phenomenology, and cross-cultural philosophy, especially Indian and Buddhist philosophy in dialogue with Western philosophy and cognitive science.

He is the author of *Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), which offers a defense of phenomenological naturalism in comparative philosophy of mind; he is currently completing another book manuscript on phenomenological and analytic philosophical perspectives on consciousness.

His papers on the subject of our conference:

"Buddhism, Comparative Neurophilosophy, and Human Flourishing," *Zygon* 49 (1): 208-219.

"Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology is Inescapable," *Philosophy East and West* 65 (3).

"Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

"Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach," *Asian Philosophy* 19/3 (2009).

His papers could be found at <https://cofc.academia.edu/ChristianCoseru>

Michel Bitbol



From the phenomenological epochè to meditation

Phenomenology has obvious affinities with contemplative inquiry, as it has been recognized long ago by the creators of phenomenology themselves. For instance, Husserl acknowledged in 1924 a deep connection of attitude and method between Phenomenology and Buddhism. The connection between Phenomenology and Buddhism will then be documented and developed. It will be mostly established through the basic act which allows the phenomenological inquiry, namely the epochè (i.e. the suspension of judgment about nature beyond the experience of it). Indeed, according e.g. to Sartre, the epochè occurs as a relaxation of the effort that consciousness makes in order : (i) to escape itself towards its own objects, and (ii) to project itself into an ego. But stepping back from this twofold effort, and reaching a pristine state of experience upstream this twofold tension and reification, is likely to be the main scope of Buddhist contemplative practice.

Directeur de recherche at CNRS, previously in the Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée (CREA) of École polytechnique (Paris, France), member of Archives Husserl, Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris, France). Interested in the philosophy of mind and consciousness. Collaborated with Francisco Varela on this subject. Participated in the “Mind and Life” conferences to promote a dialogue between science and Buddhism.

His publications related to the topic of our conference are:

La conscience a-t-elle une origine?, Flammarion, 2014,

“Science as if situation mattered”. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science*.1.2002: 181–224.

“Ontology, matter and emergence”. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science*. 6. 2007: 293–307.

“Is Consciousness primary? Moving beyond the “hard problem”. *NeuroQuantology*, vol. 6, n°1, 2008: 53-72.

“A Defense of Introspection from Within” (with Claire Petitmengin) in *Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations*, vol. 8, N°3. 2013: 269-279.

“Neurophenomenology, an Ongoing Practice of/in Consciousness”. *Neurophenomenology Constructivist Foundations* vol. 7, N°3. 2012:165-173.

When “altered” states of consciousness become fundamental. Review of *Waking, Dreaming, Being : Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy*. Evan Thompson. New York : Columbia University Press, 2014, 496 p. Published in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 36, 101-112,2015.

His papers could be found at <http://michel.bitbol.pagesperso-orange.fr>

Joel Krueger



Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, and the Relational Self in Buddhism and Phenomenology

Buddhism famously denies the existence of a fixed, permanent, or enduring self. What is not always appreciated, however, is that this no-self view does not entail a denial of subjectivity, or the first-person character of consciousness; nor does it entail a denial of intersubjectivity, or a relational view of the self. Drawing upon Buddhist and phenomenological resources, I consider various ways of understanding subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the relational self that are, I suggest, consistent with a Buddhist no-self view. I focus in particular on these themes as developed in the work of Japanese Kyoto School philosophers like Kitarō Nishida, Keiji Nishitani, and Tetsurō Watsuji, whose comparative approaches draw heavily on Mahāyāna Buddhism, the pragmatist philosophy of William James, and phenomenology.

Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Exeter. He works on various issues in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science, with a particular focus on embodied cognition, emotions, and social cognition. He also works on topics in Asian and comparative philosophy, pragmatism, and philosophy of music. Some of his papers on the subject of our conference include:

Krueger, J. (2015). The Affective “We”: Self-regulation and Shared Emotions. In T. Szanto & D. Moran (Eds.), *Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the We*. New York and London: Routledge.

Krueger, J. (2013). The Space between Us: Embodiment and Intersubjectivity in Watsuji and Levinas. In L. Kalmanson, F. Garrett, & S. Mattice (Eds.), *Levinas and Asian Thought* (pp. 53–78). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Krueger, J. (2013). Watsuji’s Phenomenology of Embodiment and Social Space. *Philosophy East and West*, 63(2), 127–152.

Krueger, J. (2011). The Who and the How of Experience. In D. Zahavi, E. Thompson, & M. Siderits (Eds.), *Self, No-self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions* (pp. 27–55). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Krueger, J. (2011). Extended cognition and the space of social interaction. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 20(3), 643–657.

Krueger, J. (2008). Nishida, Agency, and the “Self-Contradictory” Body. *Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East*, 18(3), 213–229.

His papers could be found at <https://exeter.academia.edu/JoelKrueger>

Pradeep P. Gokhale



Mindfulness Meditation and Phenomenological Approach

According to the Suttas such as Satipaṭṭhānasutta, and Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta the Buddha introduced four-fold mindfulness as a unique way for destruction of suffering, for the purification of beings, for the attainment of wisdom and for the realization of Nibbāṇa. While developing mindfulness one is supposed to conduct a presupposition-less inquiry into the nature of reality by bracketing one's belief in the soul substance as well as material substance. This brings mindfulness meditation close to the phenomenological approach to reality. However mindfulness meditation differs from phenomenological approach in some important respects. Whereas phenomenological method is a reflective exercise with regard to essences of things, mindfulness meditation proceeds by bracketing substantial or essential character of things. Phenomenological exercise is an intellectual pursuit in epistemology whereas the Buddhist exercise in mindfulness is meditational and soteriological. The paper deals in detail with similarities and differences between the two inquiries into the nature of reality.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Research Professor in Central University of Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (Varanasi, India), where he has been working since 2012 after teaching and research experience of 31 years at the Department of Philosophy, SP Pune University, Pune (India). He is the author of *Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic* (1992), *Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti: The Logic of Debate* (1993), *Hetubindu of Dharmakīrti: A Point on Probans* (1997), (All published by Indian Books Center, Delhi) and *Lokāyata/Cārvāka: A Philosophical Inquiry* (OUP, New Delhi, 2015). He has co-edited *Studies in Indian Moral Philosophy: Problems, Concepts and Perspectives* (2002) and edited *The Philosophy of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar* (2008) (both published by IPQ Publication, Pune). Major areas in which his research articles are published are Classical Indian Philosophy, Indian Epistemology and Logic, Indian Moral Philosophy, Social Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion.

The present article can be found on www.academia.edu with the title “Working of Mind in Mindfulness Meditation: Some Issues and Perspectives”.

Arkady Nedel



Buddhism and Phenomenology: Theory of Consciousness as Soteriology

One can find numerous similarities and differences between Buddhist philosophy and phenomenology; one can discuss whether it is rightful to compare the theories split by an historical distance about one thousand and five hundred years; one can also refer to linguistic differences, etc. However it is impossible to deny that both Buddhism and phenomenology tried to construct a complete and coherent theory of consciousness capable to place the knowing subject at the radically new level of knowledge-of-himself. It was not only an epistemological goal but also or first of all the soteriological one: to know the true state of affairs – no matter how we interpret the expression “state of affairs” – means to achieve immortality.

Lecturer of philosophy at the University Paris 1, guest professor at the University of Peradeniya (Kandy, Sri Lanka), guest lecturer at the University of Ca' Foscari (Venice, Italy). His academic interests include phenomenology, Indian philosophy, comparative philosophy and the philosophy of language. He writes his articles and books in Russian, English, French, German, Italian, and Hebrew.

Among his publications:

"On Intentional Consciousness: Constitution, Pattern, and Behavior" // *Philosophy Today*, Fall, 1997; *Husserl et la phénoménologie de l'immortalité*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008.

"Philosophy Manifesto" // *Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics*, XXXV, 2012.

Husserl, Cantor, Hilbert: La grande crise des fondements mathématiques au XIXème siècle, Cornell University Library, arXiv, 2013.

How Language Learned to Think: Some Basic Elements in Language and Thought of Ancient Civilizations// *Voprosy Filosofii* 8, 2016. (In Russian)