Every act of understanding, as the necessary con= dition of its possibility, presupposes in the individual an analogue of = what is to be later understood. In other words, understanding is impossi= ble without having at least something in common. Starting a dialogue, it= is not realistic to aim at the uniformity in understanding the meaning = of human existence and the norms of human behaviour. In the meantime it = is imperative to exert efforts in order to work out common approaches to= the issues of world order, the issues which determine the fate of manki= nd. There is a tradition from the prophet of Islam that says: “We = are all travelers on a ship; if one person pokes a hole in it, all of us= drown”.
It is not enough just to express willing=
ness to carry on the dialogue. We need to be capable to understand the c=
ultures which are different from our own. The difficulties are not so mu=
ch in overcoming the lexical differences as in grasping the meaning of t=
he notions, in particular those that make up the “back-bone”=
of the culture.
Every act of understanding, as the necessary cond=
ition of its possibility, presupposes in the individual, in he who under=
stands, an analogue of what is to be later understood: that is the initi=
ally posed comparability between the subject and the object (Wilhelm von=
Humboldt ). In other words, understanding is impossible without having =
at least something in common, some commonality between the two sides.
Some people reject altogether such commonality. Thus Richard Ro=
rty asserts: “There is nothing deep inside each of us, no common n=
ature, no built-in human solidarity”. Others, on the contrary, con=
sider, as David Hume did that: “There is a great uniformity among =
the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remai=
ns still the same, in its principles and operations. Mankind are so much=
the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing n=
ew or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the =
constant and universal principles of human nature”. The Humean uni=
versalism is partly shared by some of our contemporaries. Thus, for inst=
ance, the distinguished Indian philosopher Daya Krishna writes: “I=
f philosophy is an enterprise of the human reason, it is bound to show s=
imilarities across cultures to some extent and, similarly, as a human en=
terprise it is bound to be concerned with what man, in a particular cult=
ure, regards as the summum bonum for mankind”.
Commona=
lity, but also differences: the example of justice
But it may=
be supposed that Daya Krishna, while acknowledging the commonality of t=
he human nature, is fully aware of the significance of differences betwe=
en various cultures. Universals common for all peoples exist but nominal=
ly. They do not have meanings which are the same for all and everybody. =
A dialogue is possible only when and if its participants are capable of =
understanding those different cultural contexts which loom behind seemin=
gly uniform universals. Let us take for example a notion of justice. Tho=
se who consider justice to belong to the set of universal human values i=
n fact ignore existing differences in the interpretations of justice, an=
d thus succumb to illusions about the essential sameness of manners of i=
ts realization (democracy). The notion of justice, however, is always en=
closed within the framework of a particular value system. The traditiona=
l society differs in its approach toward the ideal of justice in at leas=
t four respects from the approach taken by the posttraditional society. =
1) The source of justice and the ultimate judge, ruling it, =
is not the people itself, represented by the elected members of parliame=
nt and the courts, but the system of ethical norms prescribed by the Tra=
dition that is by a corresponding religious belief (Islam, Hinduism) or =
by the local authoritarian moral system (China).
2) The realization=
of justice in traditional societies usually refers not to the present b=
ut to the future, by which is meant the life after death.
3)Justice=
is related to a certain “collective” to which an individual=
belongs. That could be a caste, a community, a class or a social stratu=
m, a religious confession. While in the West it is expected that everyon=
e should have an equal right to justice in full accordance with his or h=
er own deeds.
4) Justice is regarded rather in terms of duty than o=
f law.
The universals of Weltanschauung
Along wit=
h nominally all-human universals, each and every culture has a set of it=
s own universals which form its “spine” (or “backbone&=
rdquo;). In a culture, which is an intricately structured set of extra-b=
iological programmes of human behaviour, there are, among other things, =
the universals of Weltanschauung. They accumulate historically formed so=
cial experience, and it is in the framework of their system that the per=
son of a particular culture evaluates, makes sense of and experiences th=
e world, organises in a totality all the phenomena of the reality that i=
s encompassed by his or her activity. For Hindus the universals of this =
kind are the notions of Brahman, Atman, dharma, moksha, karma etc. The &=
ldquo;backbone” of Chinese culture is formed, in the first place, =
by such categories as Tao and Te, in-yang, Da tong, ren and li. No dialo=
gue with Indians and the Chinese would be possible, if the “other&=
rdquo; side do not have at least elementary knowledge about the key conc=
epts of their cultures, if it is not open to perceiving and interpreting=
these concepts.
Tensions or even conflicts between different=
cultures are often caused by ignoring the impact of time on a culture. =
In fact, time has always left its imprints even on what is habitually ta=
ken as dogmas. This statement is particularly true and topical when we t=
alk about the time of radical transformation of Oriental societies, of t=
heir “joining” modern post-industrial world. The destroying =
of traditional socio-economical and political structures in countries of=
the East brings about not just some “corrections”, not exte=
rior modernization, but basically new interpretation of accepted and est=
ablished ideas. But such an interpretation of the processes of change th=
at takes place in today's East, that is seeing in this process a potenti=
al towards reformation, arouses criticism both within the countries of t=
his region itself and outside it as well.
In the former case =
the criticism is voiced mainly by those who think that their culture, be=
ing based on a particular religious faith (for instance, Islam or Hindui=
sm), does not need any reforming, because any reforming threatens to des=
troy the culture in question and to bring about the loss of national ide=
ntity. Any reorientation guided by human understanding would mean the ac=
knowledgment of the supremacy of human reason over the omniscience of Go=
d. According to the Iranian philosopher S.H. Nasr, “in Islamic civ=
ilisation there is no interest in changes and adaptation”. This ci=
vilisation is symbolised not by a flowing river, but by “the cube =
of the Qa'aba, the stability, embodying the stable and immutable nature =
of Islam”. In the latter case, the potential for reformation in th=
e East is denied by those who share the conviction of Max Weber that tra=
ditional religions in Asia in principle do not contain any motives for r=
ational ethical modelling of the world, that these religions accept this=
world as given for the eternity, as the best of all possible worlds, wh=
ich belief is the insurmountable obstacle for the development of the cou=
ntries of the East.
Conservative and reformers
St=
atements along these lines, asserting, for instance, that a dialogue bet=
ween the mullahs of the “Islamic world” and the West is impo=
ssible, underrate dimensions of history. The history of Islam shows that=
from the very beginning in this religious tradition there were no perso=
ns like officially consecrated priests in Christianity. Nor was there an=
y single, and accepted by all believers, religious centre and organisati=
on. Mullahs have always been and remain the servicemen of the “cul=
t” who are not appointed from above, but are elected by a communit=
y of believers. Mullahs very often combine their religious service with =
mundane occupations, like trade, handicraft, agriculture etc. That way m=
ullahs are much closer to the masses of their coreligionists than Christ=
ian priests, Hindu Brahman-priests etc. It also means that mullahs are f=
ar from being homogenous in their social status and are capable of shari=
ng the feelings of Muslims belonging to different social groups. Mullahs=
are susceptible to the influences of time.
There are many ex=
amples of this. One of the most remarkable examples is the activity of M=
uhammad Abduh, called “a prophet of a new day for Egypt and Isalam=
”. When he was the mufti of Egypt (1898 - 1904), he interpreted th=
e dicta of the Shari a in the light of “the demands of the day&rdq=
uo;, issuing appropriate fatwa (for instance, a fatwa which admitted put=
ting money into a bank and getting interest on a capital). Muhammad Abdu=
h criticised dogmatically thinking Muslims, saying that they believe and=
then demand proof, but “only on condition that the proof shall ag=
ree with their belief”. The mufti himself thought the contrary way=
true and righteous: first prove and then believe. He rejected faith bas=
ed on blindly obeying an authority and urged the believers to base their=
belief on strong convictions in the truth of religious teachings.
It is not only possible, but indeed necessary to conduct dialogues with=
mullahs (as well as with the functionaries of other oriental religions)=
, taking into consideration their influence upon their coreligionists an=
d upon public opinion. Starting a dialogue, one must soberly evaluate it=
s prospects. It is not realistic (nor admissible) to aim at the uniformi=
ty of Weltanschauung, the uniformity in understanding the meaning of hum=
an existence and the norms of human behaviour. In the meantime it is imp=
erative to exert efforts in order to work out common approaches to the i=
ssues of world order, the issues which determine the fate of mankind. T=
he advisability and hopefulness of conducting dialogues in such a vein i=
s acknowledged and proclaimed both in the West and in the East. For exam=
ple, this position has been eloquently substantiated in the writings of =
Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945) from Iran. He is often called “Luther=
in Islam”, as he is the most remarkable representative of that re=
forming trend in Islam which was founded by the poet-philosopher Muhamma=
d Iqbal, the author of “The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in=
Islam”. The ideas of Sorush are evaluated as having a “univ=
ersal significance” transcending the limits of Islamic world.
Having started his public career as one of the top ideologists o=
f the Islamic revolution, Abdolkarim Soroush in ten years became an enfa=
nt terrible of the ruling regime. He criticises the political elite and =
particularly the Iranian clergy: “There is no question that cleric=
al government is meaningless have argued that no clergy, qua clergy, sho=
uld have worldly privileges, whether political or economic, over other c=
itizens”. As a result, Soroush is fired from the Academy of Philos=
ophy, deprived the right to teach, limited in his public pronouncements =
and in publications.
Today Soroush ardently supports the idea of in=
tercultural dialogue, being convinced that “There is a certain cat=
egory of phenomena that require universal participation. There is a trad=
ition from the prophet of Islam that says: We are all travelers on a shi=
p; if one person pokes a hole in it, all of us drown.” This is an =
excellent allegory, to see all the inhabitants of the globe as co-travel=
ers on a ship. We Moslems have two kinds of problem, local problems and =
universal problems that are the problems of humanity as a whole. In my v=
iew, right now, problems such as peace, human rights, and women's rights=
have turned into global problems”. To the list of such global pro=
blems should be added those which are connected with ecology and new tec=
hnologies. All such problems demand, for their solutions, collective eff=
orts, which can be undertaken only as a result of intercultural dialogue=
s.
Philosophy as a self-consciousness of culture
=
Philosophers can and should play an especially significant role in overc=
oming the above mentioned difficulties since more than anybody else from=
the humanities they are capable of bringing understanding between the r=
epresentatives of different cultures. When I say philosophers, I mean fo=
remost those of them who are involved in comparative philosophy studies.=
Genuine learning (free from any ideological burden and political purpos=
es as it happened so often in the past) about the philosophical traditio=
ns of the “other” culture opens a way to a better understand=
ing of its essentials taken into consideration that philosophy as such i=
s in some way the “self-consciousness of culture”. However t=
he achievements of the scholarly researches if they are shared just betw=
een the academics will not be truly helpful. They can bring changes in t=
he minds only by the means of the education which should become multicul=
tural. Knowledge and understanding have been always the best remedies ag=
ainst prejudices and stereotypes which feed tension and hostility.
=
Marietta Stepanyants is a member of the Russian Academy of Science=
s
Prejudice
All types of thought –also those of schola= rs and scientists – proceed according to established models, stere= otypes and prejudices.
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