ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН

АЗИАТСКИЕ ФИЛОСОФИИ: ИСТОРИЯ, МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ, МЕЖКУЛЬТУРНЫЙ ПОДХОД

II МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ НАУЧНО-ПРАКТИЧЕСКАЯ КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ

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INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY, RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

ASIAN PHILOSOPHIES: HISTORY, METHODOLOGY, INTERCULTURAL APPROACH

2nd ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

MOSCOW 2024

ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН

СЕКТОР ВОСТОЧНЫХ ФИЛОСОФИЙ

UNESCO

RAS INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Eastern Philosophies

UNESCO Chair "Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures"

2nd Annual International Conference

ASIAN PHILOSOPHIES: HISTORY, METHODOLOGY, INTERCULTURAL APPROACH

2024.10.28–2024.10.30

Moscow, 2024

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

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  (Chinese philosophy)

- **Oleg KOCHEROV**
  PhD in Political Science, Research Fellow, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Russia
  (Chinese philosophy)

October 28th

9.30 a.m. – 10.00 a.m.
    Registration of the participants

10.00 a.m. – 3.30 p.m.   **CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (IN RUSSIAN)**

host – *Stanislav Yu. Rykov* (PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of the Eastern Philosophies, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia)

1.   *Artem I. Kobzev*
   D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor, Head, Department of China
   RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia
   Yangminism as a Revolutionary Alternative to Marxism in China

2.   *Dmitry V. Kononchuk*
   PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, School of Arts and Humanities
   Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia
   On the issue of relationships with the spirits of *Shen* 神 in the Chunqiu era in the aspect of the origin of Chinese philosophy

3.   *Aglaya B. Starostina*
   PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of China
   RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia
   Wang Chong and Pliny the Elder on the fate of human beings after their death

4.   *Lyudmila L. Bankova*
   PhD in Philology, Associate Professor, Department of Chinese Language, Institute of Foreign Languages
   Moscow City Pedagogical University, Moscow, Russia
   On Religious and Philosophical Understanding of Trinitarity in Daoism and Eastern Orthodoxy

5.   *Andrey V. Gordienko*
   PhD student, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
   Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia
   Controversy between Mencius and Gaozi: definition of the concept of *xing* 性 in the treatise of *Mencius*

6.   *Valeria D. Teryaeva*
   PhD student
   Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia
   The concept of *de* 德 in the *Wenzi* 文子 ("[Writings of] Master Wen")

7.   *Pavel D. Lenkov*
   PhD in Historical Studies, Associate Professor, Department of History of Religions and Theology, Institute of History and Social Sciences
   Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
   The concept of time in Late Taoist texts: some observations

8.   *Diana D. Kotova*
   Assistant, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
   Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia
   Interpretations of *shi* 詩 "verses" in "Apocrypha to the verses" of *Shi wei* 詩緯: basic approaches and ideas

9.   *Anastasia D. Kirichenko*
   Tatishchev Gymnasium No. 108, Ekaterinburg, Russia
   ***Zhoushi san mu* 周室三母 (The Three Mothers of Zhou), a Part of the *Lienü zhuan* by Liu Xiang: An Analysis and a Russian Translation**

10.   *Nikolay V. Rudenko*
    PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of China
    RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia
    The Tale of the Eel and of His Helper Loach: a Taizhou Ode to Freedom

11.   *Denis A. Korolev*
    PhD student
    Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
    On the Role of Connotations in Understanding the Texts of Chinese Philosophy

12.   *Rinat M. Ziganshin*
    PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Comparative Cultural Studies
    RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia
    Understanding and Moralizing War at the Bing jia (School of Military Philosophy)

13.   *Oleg S. Kocherov*
    PhD in International Relations, Research Fellow, Department of Eastern Philosophies, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
    Associate Professor, State Academic University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia
    Ancient Chinese Concept of "Humanitarian Intervention" in the Context of the PRC Foreign Policy Views

October 28th

4.30 p.m. – 7.00 p.m.   **INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY (IN RUSSIAN)**

host – *Victoria G. Lysenko* (D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor, Head of the Department of Eastern Philosophies, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia)

1. *Sergey Y. Lepekhov*
   D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor, Chief Research Fellow, Center for Oriental Manuscripts and Woodcuts
   Institute of Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetological Studies, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulan-Ude, Russia
   Possible ways of development of modern philosophizing

2. *Tatiana V. Bernyukevich*
   D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor,
   Moscow State University of Civil Engineering (National Research University), Moscow, Russia
   Reception of the ideas of "Buddhist economics" and "non-Western" philosophy of technology in the context of issues of modern socio-economic and technological development

3. *Lev I. Titlin*
   PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of the Eastern Philosophies
   RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
   Two paradigms of culture through the prism of theories of the mental apparatus (India and Europe): is comparison possible in principle?

4. *Olga V. Popova*
   D.Sc. in Philosophy, Head, Department of Humanitarian Expertise and Bioethics
   RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
   Cross-cultural meanings of madness: from Nikolai Gogol's Notes of a Madman to Lu Xun's Notes of a Madman

5. *Nikolay Kostin*
   PhD student
   Pontifical University of John Paul II, Krakow, Poland
   Yuk Hui: concepts of "cosmotechnics" and "regional (local) ontology"

October 29th

9.30 a.m. – 10.00 a.m.

Registration of the participants

10.00 a.m. – 2.00 p.m.   **INDIAN COGNITIVE TAXONOMIES
IN INTERCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (IN ENGLISH)**

host – *Victoria G. Lysenko* (D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor, Head of the Department of Eastern Philosophies, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia)

1. *Madhumita Chattopadhyay*
    Professor, Department of Philosophy
    Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India
    Paradigm Shift in the Taxonomy of the Early Yogacara Tradition

2. *Shreekala Nair*
    Professor
    Shankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kaladi, Kerala, India
    Semiotics in Embodied Cognition: The Buddhist Insights

3. *Meenal Katarnikar*
    Professor, Department of Philosophy
    Mumbai University, Mumbai, India
    Three Paradigms of Perception: A Comparative and Critical Analysis

4. *Kuntala Bhattacharya*
    Ravindrabharati University, Kolkata, India
    Pramāṇavyavasthā: A unique Buddhist View

5. *Victoria G. Lysenko*
    D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor, Chief Research Fellow, Department of Eastern Philosophies
    RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
    Emotions and Feelings in Indian Classifications of Cognitive Processes: An Intercultural Perspective

6. *Lev I. Titlin*
    PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of the Eastern Philosophies
    RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
    Comparing Mental Terminology in Latin and Sanskrit Philosophy: Preliminary Considerations

October 29th

3.00 p.m. – 7.00 p.m.   JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY (IN RUSSIAN)

host – *Lyubov B. Karelova* (PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Eastern Philosophies, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia)

1. *Vladlena A. Fedianina*
   PhD, Associate Professor, Head, Department of Japanese Language
   Moscow City University, Moscow, Russia
   The Notion of Time and Space in Medieval Japanese Buddhism: Ideological Aspects

2. *Elena S. Lepekhova*
   D.Sc. in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of History and Culture of the Ancient East
   RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia
   A Comparative analysis of Buddhism and Christianity by Inoue Enryō

3. *Olga. V. Yazovskaya*
   PhD in Culturology
   Associate Professor of the Department of History of Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, Aesthetics and Theory of Culture Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, Ekaterinburg, Russia
   The Kyoto School Phenomenon in a Generational Perspective

4. *Lyubov B. Karelova*
   PhD in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Eastern philosophies
   RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
   Problems of Time in Philosophy of Tanabe Hajime

5. *Anton S. Romanenko*
   Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
   Pushkin Leningrad State University, Saint Petersburg, Pushkin, Russia
   The Role of Mathematical Concepts in the Development of the Nishida Kitarō's Doctrine of Pure Experience

6. *Elena L. Skvortsova*
   D.Sc. in Philosophy, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Comparative Cultural Studies
   RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Russia
   On the processes of national separatism in Japanese aesthetic science

7. *Anna S. Shimanskaya*
   PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor
   Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russia
   National symbols in the context of studying Japanese culture

8. *Anastasia S. Borisova*
   PhD in Philology, Senior Lecturer, Department of Japanese Philology
   Institute of Asian and African Countries, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
   Zen Philosophy and Japanese Dadaism

October 30th

9.30 a.m. – 10.00 a.m.
Registration of the participants

10.00 a.m. – 2.00 p.m.   INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (IN ENGLISH)
host – *Pradeep Gokhale* (Honorary Adjunct Professor, Department of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India)

1. *Muzaffar Ali Malla*
   Islamic University of Science and Technology, Jammu and Kashmir, India
   From Vāda to Saṃvāda: Some Methodological Insights from Indian Philosophy

2. *Raghuram Raju*
   Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
   Indian Institute of Technology Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh 517619, India
   Three affective trajectories in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya

3. *Danjel Raveh*
   Professor
   Jerusalem University, Israel, Jaipur
   Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya on Pātañjala-yoga

4. *Pradeep Gokhale*
   Honorary Adjunct Professor, Department of Pali and Buddhist Studies
   Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India
   The Doctrine of Karma: Some Critical Considerations

5. *Maxim B. Demchenko*
   PhD in Cultural Studies, Associate Professor, Department of Oriental Languages
   Moscow State Linguistic University, Russia
   Sociopolitical dimension of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta as Seen by Rāmānandī Thinkers

6. *Evgeniya A. Desnitskaya*
   PhD in Philosophy, Research Fellow
   RAS Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Saint Petersburg, Russia
   Yājñavalkya's Dialogue with Maitreyī: between Sāṃkhya and Vedānta

7. *Sachchidanand Mishra*
   Professor
   Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, India
   Contemporary relevance of Cārvāka thought

October 30th

3.00 p.m. – 7.00 p.m.   **INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (IN RUSSIAN)**

host – *Victoria G. Lysenko* (D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor, Head of the Department of Eastern Philosophies, RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia)

1. *Helena P. Ostrovskaia*
    D.Sc. in Philosophy, Researcher is Chief, Head of the South Asian Section, Department of Central Asian and South Asian Studies
    RAS Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Saint Petersburg, Russia
    Philosophy as a Wisdom Educative Program in Early Medieval Indian Buddhism

2. *Natalya A. Kanaeva*
    D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor
    National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
    Problems of conceptualization of "Indian Philosophy" in the light of non-classical epistemology

3. *Tatyana V. Ermakova*
    PhD in Philosophy, Leading Research Fellow
    RAS Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Saint Petersburg, Russia
    Philosophy and Religion in 1930's Russian-Indian contacts in Buddhist Studies

4. *Tatyana G. Skorokhodova*
    D.Sc. in Philosophy, Professor
    Penza State University, Penza, Russia
    'Tchaadaev's Paradigm' in Modern Eastern Philosophy as Comparative Perspective (based on an example of intellectual search in the Bengal Renaissance)

5. *Liliia A. Streltsova*
    D.Sc. in History, Department for Theory and Methods of Training in Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa
    Saint Petersburg University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
    The Specifics of Using J. Lacan's Structural Psychoanalysis in the Analysis of Nepali-Language Prose

6. *Sergey V. Lobanov*
    PhD student
    RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
    The concept of Īśvara in the commentaries of Śaṃkara and Abhinavagupta on the Bhagavadgītā

7. *Ivan E. Tolchelnikov*
    Student
    Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
    The history of philosophy of disciples: what Sureśvara says about himself as a disciple and what methodological conclusions can be drawn from this

ABSTRACTS

(all grammar and spelling have been left unedited)

Artem I. KOBZEV
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Yangminism as a Revolutionary Alternative to Marxism in China

ABSTRACT

Wang Yang-ming 王陽明 (Wang Shou-ren 王守仁, 1472–1529) was one of the greatest Chinese philosophers, the creator of an original doctrine in line with the "doctrine of the heart" (*xin-xue* 心學), an outstanding writer, military leader and statesman. During the life and after the death of its creator, right up to the present day, Yangminism has undergone dramatic ups and downs, ranging from spiritual leadership and canonization to prohibition and desecration. It formed the basis of all the most developed forms of Neo-Confucianism in China and neighboring countries, especially in Japan, where it became a symbol of modernization and the leading spiritual movement before the Meiji Revolution/Restoration (*Meiji yixing* 明治維新, 1868–1869) and continues to be perceived as a revolutionary philosophy alternative to Marxism. In its homeland, Yangminism largely stimulated the reform movements of the second half of the 20th century and the Xinhai Revolution (*Xin-hai ge-ming* 辛亥革命, 1911–1912), after which it claimed the role of the dominant ideology, but was defeated by the more radical Marxism. This victory was determined primarily by such factors as the denial of traditional culture caused by the collapse of the empire, the progressive pathos and international character of Marxism, which promised Westernized modernization and Western aid. After some attempts during the Republican period to combine Yangmingism with Marxism, it was recognized in the PRC as a dangerous competitor, a harmful relic of feudalism, and was subjected to sweeping criticism and silence, but with the onset of reforms and especially recently with the personal support of Xi Jin-ping, it has gained extraordinary popularity, and its founder has come to be considered one of the most outstanding representatives of Chinese culture, a statesman and educator who created an internationally significant teaching that inspired Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Ze-dong, i.e., ideologically uniting the entire Chinese world. Wang Yang-ming himself has transformed from a persona non grata into a cult figure extolled at the highest level, widely studied, and frequently published, with unique sacred places in memorials and research centers in his homeland of Shaoxing (in Zhejiang Province) and in Guiyang (the capital of Guizhou Province), where he served his exile. Behind this lies a general positive re-evaluation of traditional values and a specific search for a national idea to balance the Westernization and internationalism of Marxism in opposition to Western globalism.

Dmitry V. KONONCHUK

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On the Issue of Relationships with the Spirits of *Shen* 神 in the Chunqiu Era in the Aspect of the Origin of Chinese Philosophy

ABSTRACT

1. The Western Zhou crisis of the first third of the 8th century BC led to a gradual devaluation of the Zhou civilizational paradigm, the foundation of which was the belief in the good will of Heaven *tian* 天 towards people, as well as the patronage of ancestors and spirits *gui shen* 鬼神.

2. In the ensuing Spring and Autumn Period (770 – 479 BC), the relationship between people and spirits *shen* 神 was rethought in a socio-political aspect. *Zuo Zhuan* (circa 706 BC) conveys a conversation between the ruler of the state of Sui 隨 and the *dafu* Ji Liang 季梁, in which the latter instructed the lord that the commemoration of spirits with sacrifices should depend on the level of wealth of the people, since the disposition of spirits is not caused by generous sacrifices in themselves, but only by the situation when this generosity of sacrifices reflects the well-being of the people. During the conversation, Ji Liang uttered the following significant phrase:

"After all, the people are *zhu* 主 of spirits (*min shen zhi zhu* 民神之主), which is why the wisest wangs [of antiquity] first provided for the people, and then [already] made efforts to serve the spirits." (Zuo Zhuan 2.6)

What does the word *zhu* 主 mean here?

3. In the Russian translation of *Zuo Zhuan* by M.Yu. Ulyanov translates the phrase "夫民神之主也" as "But the support of the spirits is the people." We can agree with Ulyanov's translation (*zhu* 主 - "support") if we understand this translation option in the context of the Chinese commentary tradition. In the commentary of Du Yu (222 - 285), this fragment is interpreted as follows:

"The favor of ancestors and spirits relies (and 依) on the actions of people." (Chun qiu Zuo shi zhuan zhu shu 5.1.20)

4. At the same time, a number of English-language researchers, in particular, J. Pines, as well as the authors of the most authoritative commented translation of *Zuo zhuan* into English S. Durand, V. Lee and D. Schaberg, directly translate the word *zhu* 主 with its main meaning "master", as a result of which the beginning of the phrase in the translation sounds like "The people are masters of the deities". Can we agree with this English version of the translation of the word *zhu* 主?

5. Let us turn to the immediate context. In the *Zuo Zhuan* entry from 641 BC, the iconic phrase occurs again:

"Prayers and sacrifices are made for the people, the people are zhu 主 spirits." (Zuo Zhuan 5.19)

The word *zhu* 主 is used again in his speech by Ji Liang himself, who describes the current situation, in particular, as follows:

"Now everyone among the people has their own opinion, and the ancestors and spirits lack *zhu* 主."
(Zuo Zhuan 2.6)

It is especially characteristic that the word *zhu* 主 is used 10 times in *Zuo Zhuan* as a position at the altar of earth and grains *she ji* 社稷. In addition, the phrase *shen zhi zhu* 神之主 occurs in *Zuo Zhuan* once again, but in relation to the ruler (*jun* 君):

"After all, the ruler is the *zhu* 主 of spirits, the hope (*wang* 望) of the people." (Zuo Zhuan 9.14)

6. These examples of the use of the word *zhu* 主, especially the last ones, force us to suggest the Russian word "trustee" as an option for its translation. Thus, the meaning of the original phrase can be interpreted as "The people are the trustees of the spirits." Thus, acceptable options for the Russian translation of the use of the word *zhu* 主 in this context seem to be: a) the word "support" suggested by M.Yu. Ulyanov, b) the option that we would suggest - the word " trustee ". The Russian word "host" is also not completely inappropriate here, provided that we understand this word as a member of the antithesis "host – guest" with the semantics of "breadwinner."

7. This question may seem minor, but it is a very significant fragment of a large-scale picture of the gradual evolution of ideas about relationships with spirits in the Spring and Autumn Period. It illustrates one of the intermediate stages of this evolution. At this stage, while maintaining the formally high status of spirits, there is an attempt to incorporate spirits into socio-political realities, making the generosity of guardianship over spirits dependent on the real socio-economic situation. The final stage on this evolutionary path will be skepticism in the question of the very existence of spirits (*Zuo Zhuan* 9.14), which will prove to be significant for the emergence of a reflexive philosophical tradition in Chinese culture.

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Wang Chong and Pliny the Elder on the Fate of Human Beings after Their Death

ABSTRACT

The belief in the post-mortem existence of the soul and in the special world of the dead is universal, which cannot be said of the philosophical rationalisation of these elements of the mythological world view. Ancient Chinese ideas about the posthumous fate of human beings, which can be judged from early written monuments, are varied and somewhat vague.

Immediately after death, the soul still resides in a space that is temporal and accessible to mortals, but then moves to spheres where time seems to stand still and events are constantly repeated. Contact with the soul of the ancestor is made with the help of a sacrifice, in response to which the soul is given the opportunity to perform the actions desired by its descendants in our world. The beginning of the theoretical understanding of what happens after death to the soul in general (and not as a useful participant in the exchange of gifts), and to self-consciousness in particular, belongs roughly to the border between the Chunqiu and Zhanguo eras.

At the same time, despite the solid religious and mythological basis of ancestor worship, there has always been great resistance among Chinese philosophers to those who seek to assert the post-mortem preservation of individual consciousness. In Taoism, against the background of claims about the complete post-mortem dissolution of psychophysical unity and the fusion of the spirit with the heavenly pneuma, techniques for maximising the prolongation of physical life are intensively developed. The Confucians, beginning with Confucius himself, warned against excessive attention to post-mortem existence, forcing it out of discourse.

At the same time, in the West, philosophers from the Orphics and Pythagoreans to the Platonists who postulated the posthumous existence of individual consciousness and will also met with consistent resistance.

Both Wang Chong (27? - after 97) and Pliny the Elder (22 or 24-79) summarised several centuries of speculation about what happens to consciousness after death. They approach the subject from similar positions, and the differences in their approaches make it possible to understand some of the characteristics of the worldview of the inhabitants of the Roman and Han empires in the first century AD. Both Wang Chong and Pliny held the view that consciousness fades and disappears at the moment of death.

At the same time, both contemporaries use similar arguments in support of their view: they point out that no one talks about the preservation of consciousness in animals, which are not fundamentally different from humans; that if the souls of the dead continued to exist, they would accumulate to an immense number; they argue that after death a person returns to the same state he was in before birth.

Wang Chong's main target in this case seems to be the widespread belief in the posthumous malevolent activity of the souls of the dead in his day, while Pliny argues primarily against the hope of continuing life after the body has ceased to exist, which he believes prevents a calm and anxiety-free expectation of death.

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On Religious and Philosophical Understanding of Trinitarity in Daoism and Eastern Orthodoxy

ABSTRACT

The report is devoted to the analysis of the correlation between the religious and philosophical understanding of the number three in Chinese Daoism and the Orthodox teaching on the Holy Trinity.

According to the classical philosophical interpretation of the number three in the mainstream of Daoism, "The Dao (Way) gives birth to one, one gives birth to two, two gives birth to three, three gives birth to all things (lit. "ten thousand things")" ("Dao de jing", verse 42). The ability of three to give birth to all things is explained by the fact that the ancient Han divided the entire cosmos, the universe, into heaven, earth, man and called them "the three principles of worldview / worldview".

The number three is recognized as cosmologically important in Chinese culture. Religious Daoism, dating back to the end of the 4th century BC. e., considers the concept of 三清 (translation options: three higher manifestations of Dao, three pure higher worlds, three purities, Three Most Pure) to be a manifestation of the primordial cosmic energy qi (气). In the Daoist understanding of things, the Universe is controlled by three original forces that came into existence as a result of the interaction of Yin and Yang.

In the Chinese language, there is an abundance of classification formulas containing the numeral "three" as a structure-forming component, which indicates the importance of the concept of the number three for Chinese linguistic culture (three perfect sages; three joys; three types of sacrificial cattle, etc.).

The Daoist vision of the three is comparable to the Orthodox interpretation set out in the "Symbol of Faith". The unit, which is compared with the first hypostasis of the Holy Trinity – God the Father – is a product of Dao, while no one created God the Father, since he himself created everything that exists. The second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity – the Son of God Jesus Christ – is born of God the Father, and this is where the similarity between the two religious paradigms lies. The third hypostasis of the Holy Trinity – the Holy Spirit – comes from God the Father (i.e. the third hypostasis comes from the first), and this is also where the divergence can be traced, since in the Daoist understanding, three is generated by two. In turn, all things originate from three, literally called "ten thousand things". This thesis is duplicated in the "Historical Notes" of Sima Qian, where it is stated that "…numbers are formed by three". However, in the Orthodox understanding, all things originate from the first hypostasis of the Holy Trinity, God the Father. Thus, parallels can be drawn between religious and philosophical understandings of the three to a certain extent, but complete identification is not possible.

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Controversy between Mencius and Gaozi: Definition of the Concept of *Xing* 性 in the Treatise of *Mencius*

ABSTRACT

One of the most important tasks for clarifying the meaning of the concept of *xing* 性 in the treatise of Mencius is the interpretation of the statement of Gaozi from fragment 6.1.3: *sheng zhi wei xing* 生之謂性. The ambiguity of the word *sheng* 生 leads us to a problem: do the subsequent questions of Mencius argue with the definition of *xing* through *sheng*, or do they only deny the meaning in which Gaozi uses the word *sheng*? When interpreting this fragment, Sinologists who consider the concept of *xing* as the "nature", the "essence" of a thing, often choose the translation "life" instead of the obvious translation option of *sheng* "innate". This is due, in particular, to the need to explain Mencius's questions. After all, the assertion of the formal identity of "nature" as a phenomenon does not deny the real differences of the "natures" of animals, and the assertion of the real identity of "nature" does not presuppose a formal procedure similar to the allocation of *bai* 白 "white." But sheng "life" allows criticism as a judgment about "nature" that ignores the real differences of animals, since it turns out to be not a definition of *xing*, but a description of its manifestations. However, justifying Mencius's questions, the translation of *xing* and *sheng*, respectively, as "nature" and "life", does not explain Gaozi's confusion, since it makes the formal similarity of *sheng* as a manifestation of *xing* in animals so obvious that Mencius's first two questions can be considered only as an illustration, when in fact Gaozi's wrongness is asserted through the third question, where Mencius simply offers a different understanding of *xing* as including species differences. Either Gaozi and Mencius simply demonstrated, respectively, a formal and a real understanding of "nature," or the concept of *xing* itself presupposes only a real understanding, and then their divergence concerns the possibility of the real existence of a common animal *xing*. If we recognize the role of the vital center for it, then the description of *xing* in Mencius's treatise through *se* 色 "appearance" (*shi se* 食色 "well-fed appearance" in Gaozi (6.1.4) and *xing se* 形色 "outer appearance" in Mencius (7.1.38)) will testify to the duality of the meaning of sheng as a definition of *xing*: 1) living and 2) animating. Then Mencius's first question confirms the difference of views. Gaozi, who in all respects defends the identity of *xing* in all animals (6.1.1-4.6), agrees: *sheng zhi* 生之 "[thing] of a living [state]" is called *xing* in the same way that *bai zhi* 白之 "[thing] of white [color]" is called "a white [thing]". With the second question, Mencius specifies the method of proof. Gaozi asserts that the "white [color]" of one white object is "similar" (*yu* 猶) to the "white [color]" of another. Finally, a problematization follows. How can one derive the "similarity" of living objects from the "similarity" of a living state, if (this is a hidden premise) it is impossible to derive the "similarity" of white objects from the "similarity" of white color? Mencius emphasizes the logical aspiration of Gaozi's position to recognize the real existence of white as such, which is fundamentally separable from every white thing. *Xing* also turns out to be a vital center not in a descriptive sense, but a real viable center, which, again, is fundamentally separable from any animal. Consequently, such a vital center presupposes the unnaturalness of

something spontaneous, and therefore allows for criticism not only in a logical but also in a practical sense. But subsuming everything spontaneous under the viable and natural, when the reality of some animal in general is denied, legitimizes the conversation about the naturalness of all species traits for humans. Among them, Mencius immediately names the heart-*xin* 心, which, unlike animals, in humans is inclined to virtue. If in Gao-tzu *xing* is a thing that animates precisely because it is alive itself, then in Mencius *xing* is only "[a thing] of a vivifying [property]".

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The Concept of *De* 德 in the *Wenzi* 文子 ("[Writings of] Master Wen")

ABSTRACT

The philosophical doctrine of morality, also known as ethics, is one of the main areas of philosophy, and one of the fundamental categories of ethics is traditionally the concept of "virtue", which, however, throughout the history of thought has been understood and used differently in different philosophical traditions. A.I. Kobzev, G. Rosemont, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Du Wei-ming 杜維明, Feng Yu-lan 馮友蘭 wrote that for thousands of years ethics has been a constant problem for Chinese sages of various schools and trends of thought; it was not only of primary importance, but also ontologically, epistemologically, socially and anthropologically conditioned, permeating and accompanying in one way or another all spheres of public life and culture. The key role is played by the category *de* 德, which is traditionally recognized as the standard ancient Chinese equivalent of the concept of "virtue", therefore, the analysis of the interpretations of de 德 is essential and relevant for understanding the Chinese morality.

Current report is dedicated to the study of ideas about "virtue" (based on traditional Chinese *de* 德) in the philosophical and political doctrine set forth in the treatise *Wenzi* 文子 ("[Writings] of Teacher Wen"), as well as identifying its specifics.

The text *Wenzi* 文子 has a complex textual history and can be called quite problematic in scientific terms. Traditionally, this monument is considered one of the most ancient Taoist treatises, but at the same time it contains not only Taoist, but also Confucian, Mohist and Legalist ideas. As for the date of its creation, there are a number of problems, caused, among other things, by the presence of two different sources – the bamboo manuscript and the traditional text of *Wenzi* 文子. Some researchers consider them as two versions of one text, while others are convinced that these are two different texts that have little in common with each other. Sinologists attribute various dates to them, ranging from the 6th century BC to the 5th century AD. The question of who could have been their creator still remains open. In addition, the perception of *Wenzi* 文子 in Chinese culture has changed over the centuries. During the Tang Dynasty 唐 (618–907), *Wenzi* 文子 was revered as one of the ancient Taoist canons, in the 19th century, was criticized for borrowing from *Huainanzi* 淮南子 ([Treatise] of the Master/ies of Huainan), and after the discovery of the bamboo manuscript in 1973 and its publication in 1995, it was again considered authentic, and works began to appear refuting the information that the traditional text was fake. Perhaps this is why the text of *Wenzi* 文子 was underestimated in scientific Sinology and undeservedly ended up on the periphery of scientific discourse. Based on the historical and philosophical analysis of the source, it can be concluded that the treatise is an attempt to describe a social ideal. In *Wenzi* 文子, *de* 德 and *dao* 道 are the highest social ideal with the help of which it is possible to achieve harmonious relations between people, and therefore - to realize the ideal of social harmony in the state. In this regard, this study may be relevant for comparative social philosophy.

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The Concept of Time in Late Taoist Texts: Some Observations

ABSTRACT

The report is devoted to the concepts of time in Late Taoist texts, primarily in the texts of one of the schools of late Taoism — Quanzhen. The modern Chinese philosopher from Hong Kong, Yuk Hui, in his work "The Question Concerning Technology in China" argues that "Chinese culture does not develop the concept of time." He relies, among other things, on the works of Western sinologists — Granet and Julien, according to which in China there was no concept of linear time, but there were "cases" or "moments" (*shi*). We are talking about the "four seasons" and the calendar according to which the Chinese traditionally built their lives. Without disputing these observations, we note that although in Taoism, as in religious exoteric practice, the calendar plays an important role, at the same time, the concept of "reversibility of time" also emerged and became established in Taoist esotericism. This concept, which has its roots in the philosophy of "Dao De Jing", played a key role in Taoist esoteric practices (inner alchemy, *nei dan*)). In addition, in internal alchemy there was a specific terminology describing the dimensionality of alchemical practices, which actively used the "signs" (trigrams and hexagrams) of the "Yi jing". One of the key terms of this dimensionality has become the term "periods (modes) of fire" (*huo hou*), indicating periods of activity of certain internal processes during the performance of practices. Since the body of an adept was understood in Taoism as a microcosm — an exact likeness and a reduced copy of the world, this implied the transfer to the human body not only spatial, but also temporal representations of Taoist cosmology. In particular, we should talk about the anthropological correspondence to the process of unfolding Much from the One, as it is indicated in the "Tao De jing". Tao is understood in this text as the Innermost female (*xuan ping*), which generates Heaven, Earth and a multitude of things. Generation is the unfolding in time, which is understood as a distance from the mother's womb of the Tao, which means progressive alienation and degradation. This is related to the concept/image of the "reverse movement" (*ni xing*) in texts on internal alchemy, a movement that leads backwards, i.e. returns to the Tao. Quanzhen school has been characterized from the very moment of its inception by an attitude towards religious syncretism/synthesis, combining the principles and practices of Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Some Taoist thinkers, such as Wang Chang-yue (?-1680), interpreted Taoist concepts and images in a Buddhist way. For example, Wang Chang-yue understands "reverse movement" primarily as an action of consciousness: the reversible orientation of consciousness is its orientation towards itself. Nevertheless, it can be stated that the concept of time has become one of the distinctive, most peculiar features of Taoist thought and practice.

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Interpretations of *Shi* 詩 "Verses" in "Apocrypha to the Verses" of *Shi wei* 詩緯: Basic Approaches and Ideas
ABSTRACT

1. The commentary tradition around the Canon of Poems 詩經 *Shi jing* became the field in the Chinese philosophical tradition within which this canonical text was understood. The most famous commentaries are the version of the list of poems of the *Shi jing* called *Mao shi shi zhuan* 毛氏詩傳 "Poetry in the transmission [of the school] of Mr. Mao", compiled by the Han scholars and erudite Mao Heng and Mao Chang. However, commentaries related to the verses of the list of the Mao school are not the only ones that have survived to this day. Among such texts, we would like to especially note the apocryphal texts, the so-called S*hi wei* 詩緯 "Apocrypha to poems", little studied in both domestic and world Sinology. 2. *Shi wei* 詩緯 is one of the *chen* 讖, "fortune-telling texts", and is based on the records *Sheng ren gan sheng* 聖人感生 "Premonitions of the Birth of the Perfectly Wise", *Jun quan shen shou* 君權神授 "The Authority of the Sovereign, Granted from Above", as well as on various kinds of disasters and cataclysms. The apocrypha of poetry itself, according to *Hou Han shu* 后漢書, in addition to the text entitled *Shi wei* 詩緯, also includes such texts as *Tui do zai* 推度栽 "Prediction of Disasters", *Fan li shu* 氾曆樞 "The Emergence of Calendar Divisions" and *Han shen wu* 含神霧 "Deities Hidden in the Mist". These texts contain the main ideas through which the apocrypha's approach to:

1) what poetry is (*Tian di zhi xin* 天地之心 "The Center of Heaven and Earth"):

詩者，天地之心，君德之祖，百福之宗，萬物之戶也。孔子曰：詩者，天地之心，刻之玉版，藏之金府

"Poems are the center of Heaven and Earth, the source of the ruler's grace, the originator of life's happiness, the door to [the world] of all things. Confucius said: 'Poems is the center of Heaven and Earth, what is carved on the jasper tablet, what is kept in the treasury.'"
(translated by Kononchuk D.V., Kotova D.D.)

2) what is their function of poetry (*chi* 持 "bringing to harmony"):

詩者，持也，以手維持，則承負之義，謂以手承下而抱負之。在於敦厚之教，自持其心，諷刺之道，可以扶持邦家者也。

"Poems – they hold. [When something] is held by the hand, the meaning is to seize and take [it] upon oneself, [this] is called to seize the hand from below and press it to oneself. This contains the teaching of kindness, [the ability] to restrain one's heart, the art of satire, in this way the state is held.
They [poems] teach kindness, [help] to restrain the heart, can ridicule and thanks to them one can bring the state to harmony." (translated by Kononchuk D.V., Kotova D.D.)

3) what is the approach of the apocrypha to the interpretation of poems (*Shi wu da gu* 詩無達詁 "Poems have no precise interpretation"):

詩無達詁，易無達言，春秋無達辭。

"'Poems' have no precise interpretation, 'Changes' do not always speak about something, and 'Spring and Autumn' do not always tell the truth" (translated by Kotova D.D.)

3. Being an expression of the concept of the interpenetration of Heaven and man, some of the poems in the "Apocrypha" were associated with the numerological scheme of *tian gan di zhi* 天干地支 "Heavenly stems and earthly branches", as well as the movement of the forces of *yin* 陰 and *yang* 陽. This scheme, based on the concepts of *San ji* 三基 "Three Foundations", *Si shi* 四始 "Four Beginnings" and *Wu ji* 五际 "Five Frontiers", is combined into a single system, in which the verses of the "Canon of Poetry" are also correlated with *wu xing* 五行 "Five Elements", *liu qing* 六情 "Six Senses", *shi er liu* 十二律 "Twelve Modes" and the Chinese agricultural calendar. According to the logic of the authors of the apocrypha, this system can be used to predict what cycles the all under Heaven will live by. The verses that the Apocrypha correlates with the Four Origins illustrate the events that occur at these turning points:

大明在亥，水始也。四牡在寅，木始也。嘉魚在巳，火始也。鴻雁在申，金始也。

"Da Ming corresponds to the sign of Hai, gives birth to water; Si Wu corresponds to the sign of Yin, gives birth to wood; Jia Yu corresponds to the sign of Si, gives birth to fire; Hong Yan corresponds to the sign of Shen, gives birth to metal."

4. The Apocrypha is an interesting example of commentary on poems from the Han period. On the one hand, they continue the ideas laid down by the classical Han commentators of the Canon of Verses (description of political reality, the influence of poems on a person), and on the other hand, they adapt new forms and ideas criticized by traditional Confucianism (mysticism and astrology) into the form of commentary on poems.

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Zhoushi san mu 周室三母 (The Three Mothers of Zhou), a Part of the *Lienü zhuan* by Liu Xiang: An Analysis and a Russian Translation

ABSTRACT

The principal content of this paper is a Russian translation of *Zhoushi san mu* 周室三母 (*The Three Mothers of Zhou*) that is incorporated in the *juan* (chapter) *Mu yi zhuan* 母儀傳 (*Matronly Models*). This *juan* does belong to a collection of biographies titled, *Lienü zhuan* 列女傳 (*Categorized Biographies of Women*), and compiled by Liu Xiang (劉向, 77–6 B.C.).

Zhoushi san mu includes the life records of Tai Jiang 太姜 and Tai Ren 太任, the grandmother and mother of King Wen of Zhou 文王 (1099–1050 B.C.), as well as of Tai Si 太姒, the mother of King Wu of Zhou 武王 (1049/45–1043 B.C.).

The Three Mothers of Zhou is the most valuable part of *Lienü zhuan* as long as it represents *tai jiao* 胎教 (literally 'educating foetus [inside a womb]'), a concept of prenatal education, and the restrictions good-virtue mothers used to impose on themselves. Several points of *Zhoushi san mu* reflect Liu Xiang's deep interest for carrying and educating children, though the idea of decent motherhood and the very term *tai jiao* were introduced by Ru 儒 ethics before Liu's work appeared. Descriptions of preparation for childbirth and pedagogical thoughts represented in Liu's publication are certainly valuable for the researchers who study Ru ethics of Han era.

This study is a development of my previous contribution titled, *Tai jiao 胎教, a Concept of Prenatal Education As Reflected in Lienü zhuan by Liu Xiang*, which comments on the issues of understanding of the statements having the most distinct messages on ethics. I am convinced that my research outcomes would widen the field of study related to *Lienü zhuan* by the means of a translation of a whole set of biographies elaborating on achievements of the three mothers whose children and relatives ruled China in the eleventh century B.C.

As a rule, difficulties in translation of this set of biographies emerged from Liu Xiang's passion for breaking the limits of a simple moralisation-themed account intended to offer details on daily routine and its relations to standards of decent behaviour. In *The Three Mothers of Zhou*, Liu tells about his own pedagogical views onto prenatal childcare (*tai jiao*) and a mother's influence for her children. In addition, Liu Xiang makes some highly important proposals in relation to philosophical anthropology and natural philosophy, using a number of ancient Chinese philosophical terms that are usually considered extremely sophisticated, such as *duan* 端 (straightforwardness, consistency), 一 *yi* (unity), 誠 *cheng* (sincerity, authencity), 莊 *zhuang* (adamancy) etc.

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The Tale of the Eel and of His Helper Loach: a Taizhou Ode to Freedom

ABSTRACT

The speech will present the analysis of the philosophical content and problems of interpretation of not so well-known parable-like essay «Interpretation / Ode on the Loach and the Eel» («Yu-shan shuo / fu» 鰍鱔說/賦) by Wang Gen 王艮 (1483–1541), the founder of the Taizhou school of Wang Yangming 王阳明 (1472–1529) followers. This laconic narrative about the rescue of an eel by a loach clearly reveals typical features of Taizhou texts: syncretism of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, a humane and inclusive attitude towards the lower classes of society, an apology for personal freedom of action and judgment, the priority of horizontal connections over hierarchical ones, the general fictional nature of the presentation and an abundance of references to the previous textual tradition.

During the presentation, the first Russian translation of the essay will be presented for the auditory, including a poetic translation of the final poem. Also, allusions to philosophical classics will be highlighted and commented on, as well as there will be an attempt to answer why the eel and the loach were chosen as the main characters of the parable. Finally, using the example of the essay, the ideological component of Taizhou thinkers will be demonstrated, particularly that which were potentially destructive for the central government.

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On the Role of Connotations in Understanding the Texts of Chinese Philosophy

ABSTRACT

Turning to philosophical knowledge can be challenging. The first challenge is to overcome our everyday knowledge that dominates us in daily life. Even if someone with an understanding of scientific knowledge turns to philosophy, the specifics of philosophical knowledge may seem foreign to them.

Several additional challenges are added to this initial difficulty, related to what separates the text and the reader: time, culture, language, and more. In this regard, Chinese philosophy is separated from us by several barriers, and in my speech, I would like to focus on one of them - language.

Each language has its own relationship between signifier and signified, so any translation is a process of decoding in which other semantic fields inevitably appear in the translated text than those in the original.

Translation is, in the end, just an interpretation. A translation can only convey one idea, even though the original may contain many others that were not included in the translation (*Youlan Feng.* A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Simon and Schuster, 1948*).*

This is a common problem in translation, and a lot of research has already been done on it, so I would like to move on to discuss a separate aspect of it, namely the influence of connotations on the perception of key philosophical concepts.

The most interesting concepts here are those that have a neutral or positive status in the original language, but in the target language they are associated with negative connotations. In this presentation, I will focus on two such concepts: non-being (unlimited) and the inexpressible (nameless). I will analyze these concepts in the following order: first, I will describe the interpretation of these concepts in European philosophy, then their understanding in Chinese philosophy, and finally, I will give a linguistic analysis of connotations in the Russian language.

Let's start with non-being and unlimited.

Non-existence and unlimited.

In the European philosophical tradition, the idea of non-existence has been understood as the absence of being and therefore represents the absence of all things. However, in Chinese philosophy, this concept has a different meaning. Certain flaws and omissions (cf. Being is, but non-existence is not Parmenides' and Aristotle's Nature does not tolerate emptiness). Even cosmological representations have long been limited by these representations: scientists did not allow the fact that space can be empty and mentally filled it with elusive ether.

In Chinese philosophy, non-being does not act as a disadvantage at all, but as a basis, the beginning of things, and in this sense, it provides more possibilities, as it presupposes the idea of the unlimited.

From the point of view of language, any term containing the prefix "non-" already draws us to the perception of a negative phenomenon. Non-existence can be associated with death

and the end of existence, so it initially has negative connotations that need to be overcome when it comes to Chinese philosophical concepts.

Nameless and inexpressible.

European culture has always been a culture of words ("In the beginning, there was a word"). Even if there were disputes about words (for example, between realists and nominalists), they were only about the form of existence of words and concepts. The very existence and necessity of these words were never questioned.

The opening lines of *Tao te ching* seem to be the exact opposite of this: "The Tao that can be expressed in words is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be defined in words is not the name that never changes." However, Chinese philosophy, like European philosophy, uses words and texts to convey meanings. We are not talking about a complete rejection of speech. Rather, we are pointing out that some philosophical concepts can only be understood intuitively and cannot have a clear linguistic expression.

In terms of language, these concepts may have negative connotations, although they are not pronounced. Words like "nameless" and "wordless" may carry negative associations.

Silent initially carries a slight negative connotation, but at the same time, it can be correlated with traditions where the absence of words (or the absence of unnecessary words) is seen as a benefit. For example, "silence is gold" and "the thought spoken is a lie".

Therefore, some concepts in Chinese philosophy may be initially misinterpreted, leading to a misunderstanding of the philosophy as a whole. It is not possible to replace these terms, so the only way to avoid misunderstandings is to provide a detailed description of the concepts at their first mention or write separate works on their interpretation.

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Understanding and Moralizing War at the *Bing jia* (School of Military Philosophy)

ABSTRACT

The military thought of ancient China, along with traditional Chinese philosophy, poetry, medicine, and martial arts, has long been an achievement of all mankind. This is one of the best achievements of human thought in the military theoretical field. She is distinguished by her understanding of the internal, hidden laws of war. Consideration of war in its inextricable connection with nature and society in all its manifestations. As well as achieving political goals, mainly by non-military means. Its study reveals in its own way the nature and worldview of the ancient Chinese as an integral and integral part of their culture. It was only in China that military thought developed into an independent philosophical direction of bingjia (school of military philosophy). She created the doctrine of the art of war as one of the foundations of social regulation and the expression of general cosmic laws. This school is represented by the "Seven Books of the Military Canon" (academician N.I. Konrad puts it on a par with the Confucian "Pentateuch" and "Four Books"), which were finally selected under the Sung dynasty at the end of the XI century. They are joined by about ten more commentators. Almost all philosophical schools had a very strong tradition of commentating as a special kind of intellectual activity based on the canon.

There is a well-known orientation of Chinese philosophical schools in the moral and ethical plane, to give any meaningful phenomenon a moral assessment. Heaven, as the highest projection of the Tao on people, is already moral in itself. Taoists, Mohists, Confucians, etc., as a rule, condemn war, at best justify a defensive war. In Bingjia, authors and commentators also condemn the war following the most authoritative military classic, Sun Tzu. But he understood the war in a very broad sense – as a military, economic, political and cultural confrontation. He condemned the combat armed component of the war and considered it the worst, unprofitable and very costly war. According to V. M. Stein, for Sun Tzu, benefit is the same supreme principle as justice or humanity is for a Confucian. The best is when the enemy's plans are broken, his alliances are next, an armed clash is less appreciated, and the worst is when fortresses are besieged. Thus, Sun Tzu condemns armed struggle not for humane, but for economic reasons, as N.I. Konrad insists. Because the conquest of another country by cultural, economic, and diplomatic means is much cheaper in terms of material and human resources, and also because the country goes to such a "peaceful" conqueror not ruined, with all its wealth and resources.

At the same time, Sun Tzu, among all the qualities of a commander, emphasizes the moral side: "a commander who, speaking, does not seek glory, but retreating, does not evade punishment, who thinks only about the welfare of the people and the benefits of the sovereign, such a commander is a treasure for the state." At the same time, the independence of the commander from the ruler in making decisions concerning the military sphere is noted. Here the question arises of the need to carefully choose a commander. Ralph Sawyer emphasizes that in the future the ruler can no longer interfere in his decisions and actions because mistakes may be made that will put the army at risk, or opportunities are missed, as well as to prevent some subordinates from challenging the authority of the commander under the pretext of personal acquaintance with the ruler.

The principle of independence of the commander from the ruler has very deep conceptual and theoretical foundations in China and apparently goes back to ancient times. In ancient China, there was a strict separation of military and civil power. It has always been customary to separate them and consider them to be opposite principles. Wei Liao-tzu: "The civic principle is that by which one sees where there is benefit and where there is harm, distinguishes between well-being and danger. The military principle is that by which they reflect a strong opponent and make the offensive and defense powerful." The entry of the commander into office was accompanied by a special ritual, where the ruler, handing him a sword, among other things, said: "Cherish people and don't value yourself alone... Don't sit down yourself if your warriors haven't sat down yet. Don't take the food yourself if your warriors haven't started eating yet. Delhi has both cold and heat with them. In that case, your military leaders and soldiers will certainly give you all their strength."

I believe that Bingjia has had a much greater influence on traditional Chinese politics and diplomacy than Confucianism and other schools. And not only in China, but also on the political and military culture of Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. And now the ideas of Sun Tzu and the Bingjia classics have not lost their relevance, and their deep theoretical developments have even become more relevant.

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Ancient Chinese Concept of "Humanitarian Intervention" in the Context of the PRC Foreign Policy Views

ABSTRACT

One of the fundamental contradictions of modern international relations is embodied in the dichotomy of "order" and "justice". On the one hand, states agree that infractions of "justice" (large-scale extreme violations of human rights) should be stopped by the international community, their agreement formalized in the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) initiative. On the other hand, they are not ready to give up a significant part of their sovereignty in favor of any supranational organization, afraid that it will result in a loss of "order". This contradiction has resulted in an inability of the existing mechanisms for the legalization of military intervention (primarily the UN Security Council) to come up with an effective response to humanitarian crises due to the diverging interests of decision-makers. Attempts to unilaterally circumvent these mechanisms have largely only discredited the concept of "humanitarian intervention" and strengthened the non-interventionist camp.

In the context of contemporary China, the contradiction between "order" and "justice" is embodied in the clash of two identities: "the re-emerging power" and "the responsible power." The first is rooted in China's national trauma ("a century of humiliation") and determines its commitment to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. The second is shaped by the growth of China's power, Beijing's need to protect its overseas interests, and its desire to prove the viability of its project of more inclusive and equal international relations. While China's official rhetoric is still governed by the first identity, academic discourse is increasingly raising the issue of the need for a more flexible approach to non-interference.

Of particular interest in this regard is the fact that the Chinese tradition has its own analogue of Western ethics of war – the doctrine of the "proper [use] of military force" (*yi bing* 義兵), that produced different justifications for the proto-concept of "humanitarian intervention", as well as various criteria which allow to assess its legitimacy and – ideally – prevent unlawful recourse to intervention. The discourse of "humanitarian intervention" is already found in such ancient Chinese treatises as "Mozi", "Mengzi", "Xunzi" and "Lüshi Chunqiu".

Beijing's use of this tradition in intercultural philosophizing, while still limited in practice, might create a greater scope for legitimization of political actions that meet the interests and values of the PRC, raising the legitimacy bar of humanitarian intervention, and specification of the methods and mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution under R2P. The main aspects of the 'sinicization' of modern humanitarian intervention, taking into account the ancient Chinese ethics of war, can be an alternative conceptualization of political space, an emphasis on the morality of a legitimate actor, a criterion of popular approval, identification of *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum* as verifiers of *jus ad bellum*, the distinction between a regime change and a ruler change, a focus on intervention as the last means and rethinking the "ethics of just war" in the context of the "ethics of just peace".

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Possible Ways of Development of Modern Philosophizing

ABSTRACT

The ideas about what "philosophy" is, where and when it originated, have been formed in several European philosophical schools and in the faculties of the several European universities. There was no unambiguity and certainty in them, but they were accepted as a reference for many directions of thought. As for the Asian lines of thought, they have their own analogues to the European concept of "philosophy", but it is difficult to say about the complete identity. In fact, many areas of ancient Greek thought cannot be called "philosophy" either. Later, many European thinkers sought to replace this term with another one, for example, "study of science", etc. The world and European history of philosophy cannot allow us to identify the necessary minimum of such signs by which we can confidently separate philosophical lines of thought from the non-philosophical ones. The proposed presentation attempts to offer a slightly different model for the development of philosophical traditions, which does not proceed from the idea of the European one as a reference. One of the ways to present the picture of modern philosophizing is as follows: There are a number of lines of thought, each of that was created on the basis of a group of the texts that placed and resolved previously identified problems recognized by the philosophical community. The participation in each of these areas is conditioned by a number of socio-cultural factors, as: belonging to a certain language environment; the form of education; the presence of stable ties with the groups of colleagues; continual ties between teacher and student; links with the periodicals in this field; the availability of texts recognized by the philosophical community in the library associated with this particular scientific direction; the existence of an institutional framework that limits the problems being developed in this particular area; the existence of conditions that ensure recognition of the researcher's affiliation to this area (diplomas, degrees, publications, etc.). As a rule, compliance with all these conditions ensures the stable position of this trend in the philosophical community. The changes in such a stable existence occur if a competing trend appears with a large number of supporters, creating a more extensive library of texts, establishing a greater number of internal and external significant connections. The reason for the decline of this line of thought may also be the unlawful expansion of the boundaries of the problematic, ignoring the other lines of thought and their achievements. It is essential that cultural and historical conditions are completely unavoidable to assess the contribution of each of such direction, which makes the task of determining the necessary formal "minimum" ensuring the recognition of the direction by "philosophy" very difficult, if at all feasible. It seems that one of the indicators that could perform such a role is the presence of links in a certain line of thought with the other cultural and historical trends, among them the other regions. Each of the directions has at least one, and sometimes more unique features that distinguish it from all other ones. Accordingly, an attempt to identify the common features peculiar to all directions may lead to the fact that not the main ones will be highlighted, but only secondary features that, in fact, doesn't characterize the essential in philosophizing. It seems, therefore, that we cannot consider different directions as homogeneous elements obeying certain general laws. Thus, we are dealing with a networking inhomogeneous self-organizing structure. Unlike ordinary random networks, in which the distribution of the number of connections has a maximum of about the average value, there is no such one for the self-organizing networks. In these structures, there may be a small number of knots with a very large number of connections and a very significant number of knots with multiple connections. Moreover, the network configuration is not stable, and may change dramatically over time. Based on such ideas, it can be assumed that many areas of thought, including the Asian ones, will develop while preserving their identity, autonomy, following their cultural and historical traditions and interacting with the other traditions as necessary. The global library of texts created in such conditions, through interaction and translations, will allow to form a group of professional communication with mutual use of philosophical terminology inherent in various traditions.

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Reception of the Ideas of "Buddhist Economics" and "Non-Western" Philosophy of Technology in the Context of Issues of Modern Socio-Economic and Technological Development

ABSTRACT

The ideas of Eastern philosophy are currently attracting the attention of researchers involved in studying socio-economic and technological development. Complex social problems, social conflicts, environmental issues, economic development tasks and issues caused by the use of new technologies necessitate turning to ideas that have arisen within the framework of various worldview systems, including Asian philosophical traditions.

For example, attention should be paid to the possibilities of using Buddhist ideas in the economic sphere, in the formation of a modern management system at the regional, national and international levels. Modern researchers are familiar with the concept of "Buddhist economics" by Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, the author of the famous books "Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered" (1973) and "Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered. A Guide for the Perplexed" (1977). "Buddhist economics" in this context is a special "metaeconomic approach" that denies the gigantism of Western economic systems.

These ideas are relevant today for determining the strategy of spatial development of regions and countries. In his works, Schumacher advises to avoid gigantism in the creation of cities, and tries to define the best solution for their size, where the upper limit does not exceed half a million residents. Describing the concentration of population in three megalopolis areas of the United States (from Boston to Washington, around Chicago, and from San Francisco to San Diego), Schumacher notes that the rest of the country turns out to be practically unpopulated and represents abandoned provincial towns and agricultural lands, processed by giant tractors and combines and sprinkled with a huge amount of chemicals. [1]

The problem of matching large-scale economic projects with the need to maintain a comfortable environment for residents of small towns, including from the point of view of historical and cultural continuity, is also important for Russia. Thus, if we read the current "The Strategy of Spatial Development of the Russian Federation until 2025", despite the fact that its goal is declared as "ensuring sustainable and balanced spatial development of the Russian Federation, aimed at reducing interregional differences in the standard and quality of life of the population" [2], in the content itself we find certain features of "gigantism" manifested in relation to small towns. In this case, when forming the

foundations of the new Strategy, it would be useful to turn to the humanistic ideas of "Buddhist economics".

At the current stage of technological development, Schumacher's idea of "intermediate technology" or "appropriate technology" does not lose its relevance. It is interesting to compare them with the concept of "cosmotechnics" of the famous philosopher and scientist Yuk Hui, who studies the problems of digital technologies, media theory, cybernetics and "non-Western" philosophy of technology. [3; 4] These ideas correlate, for example, with the concept of biosphere compatibility of cities by an Academician of the Russian Academy of Architecture and Construction Sciences, Doctor of Technical Sciences V. A. Ilychev, within the framework of which the practical task of designing cities is performed: the harmonious "coexistence" of ecological and social systems in and around cities will be ensured. [5; 6]

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Cross-Cultural Meanings of Madness: from Nikolai Gogol's Notes of a Madman to Lu Xun's Notes of a Madman

ABSTRACT

The report will attempt to analyze the cross-cultural connotations of the phenomenon of madness based on a comparison of two works: "Notes of a Madman" by Nikolai Gogol and "Notes of a Madman" by the Chinese writer Lu Xun, who was strongly influenced by his work. In this context, the influence of Nietzsche's philosophy (in particular, his work "Thus Spoke Zarathustra") on the philosophical content of "Notes of a Madman" by Lu Xun will also be considered, and it will be shown that all three of the mentioned works are united by the image of a child, which in various forms opposes the traditional forms of "madness" of the adult world and is a figure reflecting the philosophical idea of rethinking values and redefining the criteria of socio-cultural norms.

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Two Paradigms of Culture through the Prism of Theories of the Mental Apparatus (India and Europe): Is Comparison Possible in Principle?

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the speech is to reveal the deep foundations of the two largest traditions of thought and culture – India and Europe, which differ in their practical, theoretical, cognitive, axiological and soteriological attitudes, by studying the terminological component of theories of the mental apparatus. The speech attempts to answer the question of whether interpenetration of philosophical understanding between these two completely different philosophical traditions is possible.

The main theses of the speech:

1. The study of terminology for describing models of the mental apparatus in India and Europe is key to identifying the basic attitudes of the culture and philosophy of these civilizations.

2. In India, there is a fundamental *gap* between the worldly subject and the higher world. And this gap cannot be overcome by worldly means.

3. In Europe, on the contrary, the subject is maximally close to the higher reality. The doctrine that "like is known by like" – already in Plato's Greece and in the philosophy of Cicero in Rome – says that man is fundamentally similar to the God, and, above all, in the intellect, with which man can comprehend God and approach God.

4. In Europe, intellect has always been associated with the comprehension of universals, categories, the world of ideas – and ideas are always in the Mind of God. Intellect is the key means of achieving the divine plane of reality ("*nemo intrat in celum nisi per philosophiam*" – John Scott Eriugena, M. Ficino proves the immortality of the soul by referring to the intellectual abilities that make us related to God). From this attitude, European science was subsequently able to arise.

5. For India, knowledge is only that which leads to liberation. At the same time, knowledge itself is understood fundamentally differently than in Europe, it has nothing in common with the European intellect (which was later replaced by "rationality"). It rather remained at the level of *mens*. The task and method of Indian philosophy appear to be non-intellectual and even anti-intellectual. Indian philosophers are not interested in the intellect, the cognition of "ideas," or the *ratio*. The means of achieving the highest level of reality in India ultimately come down to various variants of psychopractices.

6. Due to the above reasons, European philosophy turns out to be more speculative and theoretical, while Indian philosophy is more practically oriented (even Indian logic has an exclusively practical character and is not aimed at establishing the truth).

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Yuk Hui: Concepts of "Cosmotechnics" and "Regional (Local) Ontology"

ABSTRACT

This report will discuss several theoretical constructs by Yuk Hui and the prospects for their use in humanitarian research. Yuk Hui is a contemporary Hong Kong philosopher and theorist of technology, his area of interest includes the philosophy of technology, cybernetics, modern Western and Eastern (Chinese) thought. Relying on the rich toolkit of continental philosophy, he is engaged in the construction of a non-European model of philosophizing that would be competitive with the Western tradition (both continental and analytical) and adequate to the needs of modern humanities. The report consists of three interrelated parts. The first part of the report is entirely devoted to the description and theoretical understanding of two concepts that are most important for Hui's philosophical program: cosmotechnics and regional (local) ontology, where "cosmotechnics" is the basis from which all subsequent analysis follows. What is cosmotechnics according to Hui? He writes, starting from the universalistic Western understanding of technology as technology and $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\nu\eta$ as a philosophical category, that "one can arrive at an even richer concept of technology, connected with what I call cosmotechnics. The prefix 'cosmo-' implies that technology is conditioned by cosmology and acts as a mediator between the cosmos and the morality of the human world." In his works, in "On the Existence of Digital Objects" and, especially, in "The Question of Technology in China. An Essay on Cosmotechnics" he clarifies and argues this concept. Cosmotechnics is a special philosophical understanding of technology as a fundamental basis of culture in its connection with the mythological, religious and cosmological ideas of a particular civilization. He develops this concept exclusively using China as an example, but the formulation itself tells us about the possibility of a similar analysis using other cultures. Regional (local) ontology is logically derived from the concept of cosmotechnics. It is important to note that the interpretation of this concept is not classical – as is known, the authorship of the concept belongs to E. Husserl. But Hui understands and uses "regional ontology" to a greater extent within the framework of the interpretation of M. Heidegger (who had a significant influence on the Hong Kong researcher). Through Heidegger's idea of "regional ontology" as a "pre-scientific" grasp and systematization of knowledge, Hui speaks of an even greater concretization and materialization of the volume of "regionality". He writes, playing with the concept of M. Foucault: "for me this is a dispositif that in the context of modern technology can be reinvented on the basis of traditional metaphysical categories in order to reintroduce a form of life and reactivate locality." Thus, through the "reactivation of locality" on the basis of cosmological ideas, regional (local) ontology is possible, and through it it is closely linked with the project of cosmotechnics. The second part of the report is devoted to how the concepts of "cosmotechnics" and "regional (local) ontology" can be used and applied outside the Chinese civilization that Yu Hui talks about. A very non-trivial and striking example is Australia and the understanding of its cultural, geographical, ethnographic context. As a bearer of the most ancient continuous culture of mankind, Australia is a complex synthesis of Western culture and the polyphony of Aboriginal cultures. Without delving into the specifics and details of Australian reality, we will only show how ethnographic data of indigenous peoples serve as material for synthesis within the framework of theology and philosophy. And we will illustrate this using the example of the theoretical work of the Australian researcher Duncan Reed. The third part of the report is devoted to summarizing the information presented and drawing conclusions. How does the concept of technology allow us to study a specific civilization and enrich philosophical anthropology? How is non-European philosophical discourse possible? How and why should Eurocentrism be overcome not only in non-European but also in European cultures? (when overcoming does not mean deconstruction and destruction or denial). A possible answer and the need for further study are suggested for these questions.

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Paradigm Shift in the Taxonomy of the Early Yogacara Tradition

ABSTRACT

In the history of Buddhist philosophical thought a paradigm shift was noticed with the advent of Mahāyāna tradition. In the Theravāda tradition emphasis was given on the welfare of the individual himself through following the *dharma* and the *Vinaya* and making people aware of the *pudgala-nairātmya* only. On the contrary, in the Mahāyāna tradition the welfare of all rather than that of the individual himself was considered to be the ultimate goal. At the same time it was believed that what is necessary for this is not the knowledge of *pudgala nairātmya* but of *dharma- nairātmya*. In order to establish the notion of *dharma-nairātmya* and defend it against the criticism of the opponents, the Mahāyāna thinkers from their early stage relied mostly on logico-epistemological methodology which later on developed in the form of a new school of Buddhist epistemology and logic under the influence of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and in this respect/ regard the early Yogācāra thinkers went a bit ahead than their counterpart viz the Mādhyamika thinkers, in relating logic, epistemology, ontology together with the soteriological goal. That is, for them epistemology, logic, ontology and soteriology are not isolated but very much inter-related and together form a unitary whole. Though another school of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely the Mādhyamika one, founded by Nāgārjuna was established quite earlier than the Yogācāra one, this sort of unification was not observed. With the help of the *prasanga* method, Nāgārjuna in his *magnum opus Mūlamadhyamakaśāstra* had refuted the ontology of the Ābhidharmikas; and in the texts *Vigrahavyāvarttanī* and *Vaidalyasūtra*, he refuted the views of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The texts *Vigrahavyāvarttanī* and *Vaidalyasūtra* contain detailed analysis of the epistemological concepts of *pramā, pramāṇa, prameya.* Again, in the short texts like *Lokātītastava, Loka-dhātu-stava* and others we have the discussion on the ultimate reality. The problem with Nāgārjuna is that all these texts have separate areas to focus and none of them provide a comprehensive account of their inter-connections. However, when we turn our head towards the Yogācāra thinkers we find all the discussions regarding logic, epistemology, ontology, morality and soteriology interconnected. This kind of comprehensiveness can be observed in almost all the early texts of the Yogācāra tradition like *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, *Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Karikā*, *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, & others. For the sake of brevity of time, I will mainly confine myself to the discussion found in the text *Tattvāthapatala* which forms the fourth chapter of the text *Bodhisattvabhūmi* written by Asanga. A cursory glance at the preceding chapters reveals that after deciding the *gotra* or the status of the student and deciding their objective/purpose, the author concentrates on the explanation of what *tattvārtha* is. In this explanation, there is first a classification of knowledge into two levels – conventional or mundane and pure; then there is analysis of reality into *bhava* and *abhāva*, that is existence and non-existence. That which is free from being or existence as described earlier and the non-existence (stated presently) and from both existence and non-existence is the object or reality and falls within the characteristic of all *dharmas*/entities. Such object/reality is non-dual in nature. That which is non-dual is the Middle Path being devoid of the two extremes, is called unsurpassable (*niruttarā*). About such reality, the knowledge of the blessed Buddhas is to be known as absolutely pure. On the other hand, the knowledge of the Bodhisattvas is to be known as influenced by the path of training. In this way, in the first few sections of the chapter, the discussion that is found is mainly epistemological in nature. Then, there is discussion on what there is in reality, which is identified as *śūnyatā* and this *śūnyatā* is understood in a way different from that of Nāgārjuna. Thus in Asanga epistemology gets related to ontology. Proper realization of the true nature of such *śūnyatā* enables one to attain the highest stage. In this way it has been established by Asaṇga that epistemology, ontology and soteriology are inter-related and knowledge of such inter-relatedness is the stepping stone for realization of the *dharma-nairātmya,* the ultimate realization in the Mahāyāna tradition.

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Semiotics in Embodied Cognition: The Buddhist Insights

ABSTRACT

The embodied mind that replaced the computational theory of mind revised the notion of cognition in a significant way. Today cognition is that which brings out the phenomenal experience that include a sense of self, which though appears as a single abiding one, is dynamic, distributed in space and time, and is a collection of brain, the rest of the body and the environment. The view that understanding is profoundly embodied, and that our conceptualization recruit sensory, motor, and affective patterns to structure our understanding of our world brought revolution in cognitive science. It claimed that a realistic account of understanding must begin with the patterns of ongoing interaction between an organism and its physical and cultural environments, and must include both our emotional responses to changes in our body and environment and also the actions by which we continuously transform our experience. Consequently, embodied understanding is not merely a conceptual/propositional activity of thought, but rather constitutes our most basic way of being in, and engaging with our surroundings (Johnson M., 2015). For instance, with regard to the meaning of the object *chair*, apart from our visual experience of chairs and our motor programs for using them, it also includes various possibilities of reading it, such as objects to exhibit one's preferences, show of power or cultural factors, or even religious preferences. In other words, every objectival experience is a story the self creates, understands and enjoys (Johnson M., 2015). Barsalou has pointed out that the meaning of concrete physical objects is not merely some abstract list of properties that supposedly define that kind of thing, instead it is a kind of a skill for constructing idiosyncratic representations tailored to the current needs of the situated action (Barsalou, L.W,1999, pp. 577- 579).

These basic convictions of embodied cognition, interestingly has been shared by most of the Buddhist schools, but for the present purpose I choose to engage Svatantra vijnanavada school since it nurtures some of the theories that closely ally with the embodied convictions of cognitive science, such as lack of a continuing self, the phenomenal nature of cognition, effective handling of abstract concepts marking them as metaphysically inferior, defining perception as one causally efficacious, etc. In this paper I wish to explore the role of semiotics in Buddhist theory of embodied cognition, and proceed with the heightened roles semiotics comes to play role in ontological and religious discussions.

Dinnaga in his Magnum opus the *Pramanasamucchaya* viewes that both direct (perception) and indirect (inference) knowledge employ signs at one stage or the other, and thus drags knowledge away from truth. In perception, as long as the cognition is confined to the grasp of *svalakshana*, the unique particular, you are in the world of reality, but when it proceeds to imbibe the class characteristics to make it representational through linguistic signs it distances us from truth. Inference, on the other, starts with the use of sign and proceeds to arrive at knowledge that carry elements of the present, which, as Dharmakirti vows, is the sole value of it. In fact, they conceive inference as twice distanced from reality, since the knowledge it procures is arrived through a mark, which itself is a linguistic symbol, thus coming to employ double symbol. Even as he subscribes to the view that greater is the use of sign the further you move from reality, he did realize the crucial role played by signs in our knowledge acquisition, and hence undertakes a serious study on it. In fact, he converts inference as one centred around the notion of sign, and hence made multiple attempts to sharpen the inductive tool and raise the probability bar to heights almost touching certainty. First he redefined the *vyapti* relation, as *vyabhicarirahita sahacarisambandhah,* thus, incorporating a defeasibility condition in the vyapti relation, and second, he places his famous

trirupya hetu, the triple requirement for a valid sign, and together they form a strong basis for inferential argument. Similar efforts are made to explain the linguistic symbols, how they distance us from the reality, but at the same time aid us in constructing the *samvrta satya*, the pragmatic world. In brief, signs that are functional in representational knowledge, be it the linguistic sign in perception, or the inferential tool in indirect knowledge hijack us from reality, to a world of make believes. As early as in the Ornament sukta the Buddhists, following the theory of *vijnapti matrata,* have made it clear that there is no ultimate distinction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, though mind falsely makes this distinction, which in turn becomes the cause of our sorrow. And here we have the sign making its entry to the Buddhist ontology. Semiosis becomes pivotal in Buddhist ontology on the merit that it aids us to understand the meaning of the phenomenal world. Without them we cannot meaningfully speak of anything in the world, be it the perceptual cognition, inference or even communication.

A culmination of this ontological truth is in fixing signlessness as the goal of life. Buddhists of all streams speak of progressive ways in which signs can steadily be conceptually lightened, and finally reach to a point where nothing remains as *the other* to represent. In fact, there is a semiotic interpretation of Nirvana, where signlessness has been depicted as one entry point. The popular trisvabhava of early Yogacara school speaks about three types of reality, viz., parikalpita, paratantra and parinishpanna, referring to the imagined mental worldly experience, the empirical worldly experience and the perfected nature, the *tathata* respectively. Ornament refers to the three corresponding signifiers to these world of experience: the imagined signifier, the dependent signifier, and the perfected signifier; The *parikalpita lakshana* is born of the mental function of conceiving of an object in terms of language. The second type of sign born of *paratantra svabhava* is a dependent signifier described in terms of two aspects: the object aspect and the subject aspect. It represents a shift from the (imagined signifier's) trichotomy of name/ object/perception to the dichotomy of representation/consciousness. the very analysis on the function of signs and the semiotic process is to put an end to this process of signifying. When the seizing on things come to an end, the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena would prevail. The third and final type of sign is the perfected signifier (*parinispanna-laksana*); the text offers the two specific characteristics of the perfected signifier. First, a perfected signifier indicates the non-existence of the imagined nature of phenomena, and parallely indicates what actually exists, viz., reality itself. Second that it is not characterized by conceptual discrimination because it is free from conceptual proliferation. According to the *Ornament*, the perfected signifier is so complete that it entirely encompasses that which it signifies. Here, we should note that we are no longer dealing with a conventional conception of a sign that could designate some distinct object; rather here we have some sort of ultimate conception of an unlimited sign, one whose contours are not drawn where the signifier ends and the signified begins. The perfected signifier arrives at the singularity of immediacy: This transformation is specifically linked to the end of semiotic processes: the signless (*animitta*). Hence, the highest awakening entails the end of semiosis.

Recently all most all streams of Buddhism have been studied across the world to explore Buddhist contributions to semiotics. Literature on how Buddhists have effectively put an end to the issue of unlimited semiosis indicated by Charles Sanders Peirce has caused an oriental shift to semiotics. According to Peirce, three elements are necessary for semiosis to occur: sign, object, and interpretant. Regarding this last element, Peirce states, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again, this giving rise to an infinite series. While many argue that the Buddhists have put an end to the unlimited semiosis referred in Pierce's analysis how they achieved this is something debated. Do they achieve it by bringing in ultimate perfection of signs or accomplish it by the very cessation of signs are two positions still debated. If we choose to go by the *Mahayanasutralankara* (Ornament to the sutras of Mahayana), these two possibilities are non - different. The ultimate end of semiosis has been defined by Buddhists in terms of the soteriological goal, where semiosis has been raised to the realm of religious praxis. To experience the phenomenal is to engage signs; to embrace Nirvana we must transcend semiosis.

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Three Paradigms of Perception: A Comparative and Critical Analysis

ABSTRACT

Knowledge, a 'sine-qua-nun' of a human person, involves and is constituted by cognitive, rational, mental, logical as well as socio-religious dimensions of human existence, though its epistemic aspect is predominant in its analysis and taxonomy undertaken by the philosophical systems. In order to have an authentic grasp on the cognitive-epistemic taxonomies across the cultures, a discussion on perception, especially sense-perception or empirical perception can be a good case study.

This paper proposes to explore and analyse three paradigms of empirical perception expounded in the Classical Indian Philosophical tradition, viz. the Nyaya, the Buddhist and the Jaina paradigms.

According to the Nyaya paradigm, perception is that true, unmistaken and determinate cognition, which is obtained through the contact between sense-organs and the objects. Along with the other features, the emphasis of this theory is on determination of the object.

According to the Buddhist paradigm, the cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is perception. In addition to other important features, the fulcrum of this theory is sensation or indeterminate perception.

The Jaina paradigm offers a process analysis of sense-perception and, technically speaking, makes an attempt to reconcile the Nyaya and the Buddhist theories.

It is interesting to find that all the three theories understand sense-perception as the most direct knowledge and despite that, present diverse structures of perception. An intense understanding of the three reveals that these differences may be due to the different understanding and articulation of the Subject-Object-Knowledge interrelationship.

This paper ventures into problematizing the notion of perception on the backdrop of the mutual relationship between the Subject and the Object resulting in perceptual cognition.

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Perspective Pramāṇavyavasthā: A Unique Buddhist View

ABSTRACT

Orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy generally subscribe to the view that epistemology precedes and contributes towards building the ontological framework of a system (mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ). The nature of the grasped object does not generally determine the nature of the instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) which grasps it, but on the adventitious fact of its being immediate or not. In this view, a single pramāṇa can know different kinds of objects and different pramāṇa -s may have access to a single object.

Buddhist philosophers, on the other hand, are of the opinion that ontology dictates and shapes epistemology. There are only two pramāṇa-s - perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). This stance follows from two further assumptions – first, that there are only two kinds of objects, and second, that each pramāṇa has its own distinctive jurisdiction. Perception, for example, reveals only the unrelated, momentary and unique particulars known as svalakṣaṇa-s and these alone are real in the true sense of the term (paramārthasat). Inference, on the other hand, presents us with concepts, relations, names and other features which figure as qualifiers in a judgmental cognition. These are known as sāmānyalakṣaṇa- s and are constructions of imagination. Perception never reveals a sāmānyalakṣaṇa and inference never grasps a svalakṣaṇa. Thus, the difference between the two kinds of pramāṇa-s ultimately rests on the difference between their respective objects (viṣayabhedāt pramāṇabhedaḥ). This view is known as pramāṇa-vyavasthā in contrast with the former view which is called pramāṇa-saṁplava.

It is obvious that this doctrine is closely related to the Buddhist definition of pramāṇa as a cognition that leads to successful activity, on the elaboration of the process that leads to the substantial differentiation of mediate or immediate objects, or on the criteria that establishes the nature of the objects of knowledge independent of the pramāṇa-s. This paper attempts to briefly explain the Buddhist view of pramāṇa vyavasthā, evaluate the arguments offered in its favor and also find whether there any counterparts to it in other systems of philosophy.

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Emotions and Feelings in Indian Classifications of Cognitive Processes: An Intercultural Perspective

ABSTRACT

In terms of contemporary psychology, emotions and feelings are classified as different types of affective mental phenomena, differing in a number of criteria: 1) duration, 2) complexity, 3) level of consciousness involved, and 4) intensity of physiological manifestations. The differentiation between emotions as short-term, simple, and intense reactions, and feelings as longer-lasting, complex, and stable states of consciousness can represent an interesting object of cross-cultural research.

Indian civilization is renowned for its highly developed classificatory thinking, particularly in cultural and philosophical domains. While Indologists have begun to explore emotions in Indian thought, the distinction between emotions and feelings in this context remains underinvestigated.

In Indian theatrical aesthetics (nāṭya-śāstra), we find concepts analogous to the Western distinction between emotions and feelings: "bhāva" representing short-term emotional experiences, and "rasa" denoting more stable emotional states.

However, Sanskrit lacks a neutral, encompassing term for emotions. Instead, emotions are primarily viewed through a soteriological lens, often categorized as kleśas - obstacles to mokṣa or nirvāṇa. This perspective, which I term the "karmic approach," is fundamental to Indian civilization's understanding of human experience.

The karmic approach assumes that an action, when carried out, leaves an imprint or trace that can shape the character of an individual's future existence. Buddhism, on the other hand, has developed a mentally centered approach, arguing that intention (cetanā) plays a greater role than physical action. Buddhist practices aim to transform affective states from saṃsāric to saṃsāra-neutral or even trans-saṃsāric status. Buddhist Abhidharma offers detailed classifications of mental states (dharmas), categorizing them as saṃskṛta (conditioned) or asaṃskṛta (unconditioned). Though this and other Buddhist taxonomies were soteriologically oriented, they possess a certain "scientific value" for today's agenda, given their systematicity and origin from, so to speak, "personal experiment", consisting in the development of mindfulness practices (smṛti) as a clearly prescribed protocol of introspection (unlike spontaneous Western introspection). Here we can refer to modern concepts of embodied and enactive mind (F. Varela, E. Thompson, E. Rosch, et al.).

I argue that division into emotions and feelings according to the criteria we defined above (speed, duration, involvement of consciousness, etc.) loses all sense for karmically conditioned mental states. In the karmic approach, the distinction between emotions and feelings relates to different forms of karmic causation (e.g., anuśaya, vāsanā, karma-phala-vipāka, saṃskāra). The difference may lie in the actual or potential status of mental phenomena rather than in their duration or intensity.

Some Indian philosophical schools, such as as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, have developed an epistemological approach to liberation, along with a karmic one. In these traditions, emotional states are often seen as obstacles to proper cognition and, ultimately, to achieving moksha. In the Buddhist epistemological tradition (pramāṇavāda), which rejects the ātman, the emotional sphere belongs to the realm of manas (inner feeling). Emotions are also considered here as sources of cognitive delusions and behavioral deviations, and their mainly destabilizing role in cognitive experience is emphasized.

At the same time, the karmic-epistemological view of affective phenomena suggests using not only an actual, but also a potential sphere of experience that escapes direct observation (in the Western tradition, this is associated with the collective unconscious, Jungian archetypes). Thus, the karmic approach creates an alternative basis for understanding emotional experiences, challenging and complementing Western psychological approaches.

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Comparing Mental Terminology in Latin and Sanskrit Philosophy: Preliminary Considerations

ABSTRACT

1. There are two mainstream philosophical cultures in the world: the Western culture, which originated in Greece and was initially formed in the Greek language, but in the Renaissance was finally translated into Latin, with subsequent existence in the languages of the "new peoples," and the Indian culture, which was formed in different languages: Sanskrit, Pali, Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit, Prakrits (Middle Indian languages) etc. and, over time, in New Indian languages, but still has Sanskrit or Para-Sanskrit vocabulary at its base (the vocabulary of Sanskrit and Pali is almost identical, with the exception of phonetic differences; in other languages, the core of the philosophical terminological apparatus is still originally Sanskrit vocabulary).

2. In the Indian tradition there are many different terms to denote parts of the mental apparatus: *indriya, manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, vijñāna, cit, citta, mati* – thought, *anumāna* – conclusion, *sāṃkhya, tarka, antaḥkaraṇa*, and terms to denote the subject: *ātman, jīva, paramātman* (identical with brahman).

3. In Latin there is also a whole set of terms: *sensus, sensus communis, ratio, intellectus, mens, animus* and *anima, subjectum*, the verbs *intellegere* (*intelligere*).

4. Sanskrit, Latin, Greek are the key languages of the large Indo-European family, especially for philosophy. It can be said that in the Indo-European region, autochthonous philosophy arose only in Greek and Sanskrit. Often, in some external elements, these philosophies seem extremely similar: both have a theory of "universals," the concept of "substance," the problem of the "subject" and the immortality of the soul, the problem of knowledge, the soteriological problem, the problem of the actual existence of the external world, the problems of ethics, of the existence and capabilities power of gods etc.

5. It all seems like it could be possible to build a successful and effective intercultural philosophy, designed to finally solve all philosophical problems, at least in relation to the Indo-European cultural and ideological area, but in reality we have two different paradigms:

6. Intellect is the key means of achieving the divine plan of reality in Europe ("*nemo intrat in celum nisi per philosophiam*" – John Scott Eriugena, M. Ficino proves the immortality of the soul by referring to the intellectual abilities that make us related to God). Intellect in Europe has always been associated with the comprehension of universals, categories, the world of ideas – and ideas are always in the Mind (*mens*) of God. From this attitude, European science was subsequently able to emerge.

7. "*Sā vidyā yā vimuktaye*" – "only that which leads to liberation is called knowledge." The point here is not only the difference between *vidyā* and *jñāna* – sacred comprehension from ordinary knowledge of information. Achieving liberation inevitably presupposes some insight into another reality, which, although it begins with reasoning based on ordinary logic: in Vedanta with *śrávaṇa* and *manana*, but still ends with *nididhyāsana* on the great sayings (*mahāvākya*), in *Yogacāra* – on the practice of yoga, in Patanjali's yoga (*Pātañjalayoga*) – it is necessary to actually eliminate fluctuations of consciousness (*cittavṛtti-nirodha*), since its nature is fluctuation. That is, the elimination of consciousness itself is necessary, that is, we come to a mental practice that has nothing in common with intellectual comprehension.

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The Notion of Time and Space in Medieval Japanese Buddhism: Ideological Aspects

ABSTRACT

This study examines the notion of time and space in the medieval period in Japan and it analyzes related perspectives on governance in the country. The research is based on "My Humble Thoughts" (*Gukanshō)*, the ritual text praising Shotoku-taishi (*Kōtaishi godan tandoku*) and poems by the Tendai monk Jien (1155–1255). They provide us with a glimpse into the configuration of time and space in Japanese Buddhism of that period, namely the Buddhist chronotope (Maha Kalpa and the three realms/spheres described in the *Abhidharma-kośa*), enriched by specific Japanese features, namely the *sangoku mappō* construct ('The Three Countries in the Final Age of the Law').

Jien believed that the current age was a period of decline of the Buddhist Law (*mappō*). This perception was closely linked to the spatial concept of 'The Three Countries' (*sangoku*), India, China, and Japan. According to the *sangoku mappō* construct, Japan was viewed as a remote country far away from the place where Buddhism had originated. Japan's peripheral location was compensated for by the presence and influence of local deities, or kami.

A Buddhist configuration of time and space shapes Jien's interpretation of Japanese history. He describes Japan as a small country on the outskirts of the Buddhist world near the Southern Continent (Jambudvipa) in 'the desire realm,' in the deteriorating half of one of the small kalpas in 'the eon of evolution-duration'. The *sangoku mappō* construct provides Jien with a theoretical framework to elucidate the role of local deities, kami, in the Japan's history: the ancestral deities were seen as patrons of the country and its one and only imperial family.

In Jien's writings, the cosmological views of Indian Buddhism, complemented by Japanese concepts of deities *(kami)*, determine Japan's position in time and space and influence the country's historical narrative. It is inevitable decline and degradation with some periods of improvement. Jien in terms of *mappō*-belief outlines the history of Japan and its forms of governance, making forecasts for the future while invoking the deities.

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A Comparative Analysis of Buddhism and Christianity by Inoue Enryō

ABSTRACT

This study is devoted to a comparative analysis of Buddhism and Christianity in the works of Inoue Enryō 井上　円了 (1858-1919), one of Japanese leading philosophers, reformers and benefactors during the Meiji period (1868-1912). His scientific and philosophical activity coincided with a time of radical changes in Japan, caused by the transition from an isolated feudal society to the modern industrial state that was influenced by Western ideas, including philosophy. However, this process, stimulated largely by the Japanese elite, led to a reinterpretation and harsh criticism of traditional values, especially Buddhism. As the result, the emergence of Haibutsu Kishaku 廃仏毀釈 movement caused the destruction of Buddhist temples and persecution of clergy. Having lost the previous financial and legal support from the shogunate, and faced with a new ideological rival in the form of Christianity spreading in Japan, Buddhism was forced to develop a new strategy to preserve its original spirit. It's clergy took into account the changes that were happening in all spheres of Japanese society. Accordingly, a circle of Buddhist intellectuals was formed, seeking not only the way to revitalize the original spirit of Buddhism, but also to adapt it to the progressive modern Western culture. Inoue Enryō was one of the best-known representatives of this group. His critical views on Christianity became widely known in the scientific and philosophical circles of Meiji period. In one of his popular writings, "Shinri Kinsin" 真理金針 (The Golden Compass of Truth) (1886-1887), Enryō analyzes the main postulate of Christianity, describing it as a religion of revelation based on emotional aspects and characterized by a low level of intellectual development.

He compares Christianity with Buddhism, which is determined as a rational philosophical and religious system that corresponds with the Western philosophy, including theories of social Darwinism, evolution and natural science. As Enryō consider, Buddhism is the only reasonable approach to epistemology, basing on the idea of "only consciousness" and devoid of the notion of a personal god. According to him, Buddhism's emphasis on abstract thought makes it a suitable candidate for a new global religion based on empirical evidence for the modern world. At the same time, it should be noted that he sought an objective assessment of Christianity, noticing not only its shortcomings, primarily its inability to reproduce a picture of the world corresponding to modern scientific research, but also its progressive role in the history of Western countries. Enryō focused on the socio-political successes of Christian religious institutions and hoped that, due to this example, Japanese Buddhism would be cleansed of what he called "superstitions" and take on a new, progressive form. His views on Christianity and Buddhism, which were popular in the first half of the Meiji period, later were criticized by Ienaga Saburo and Suzuki Daisetsu. However, in the second half of XX century similar attempts of a comparative analysis of Christianity and Buddhism were made by Serikawa Hiromichi and Otsuka Hisao.

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The Kyoto School Phenomenon in a Generational Perspective

ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of the Kyoto school deserves a systematic examination from the point of view of the grounds on which the affiliation of certain authors to it is determined, as well as from the point of view of the historical stages of its development in the form of a change of philosopher's generations. The beginning of Kyoto School as a separate direction of philosophical thought in Japan is usually traced back to Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) - a scientist who worked at Kyoto University. The name of the school itself was later suggested by a student of Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), the Marxist philosopher Tosaka Jun (1900–1945), who criticized his teachers for promoting idealism and singled them out as representatives of bourgeois philosophy in Japan.

A number of contemporary scientists, such as Fujita Masakatsu and Takeda Atsushi, argue that the Kyoto School is largely an intellectual network of independent thinkers whose views are highly differentiated, and whose connections can be traced back to Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime, on a personal and/or academic level. John Maraldo offers a number of criteria by which scientists were included among the representatives of the Kyoto School. The key one is the position regarding the concept of Absolute Nothing.

Based on this criterion, Ōhashi Ryōsuke distinguishes several generations of the Kyoto school. The first generation includes Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime as two opposing thinkers. Both of them developed the concept of Absolute Nothingness in a philosophical vein. And if Nishida tried to understand history as the self-determination of Absolute Nothing, then Tanabe understood Absolute Nothing as a dialectical principle of existential practice, on the basis of which the philosophy of history is built.

The second generation begins with Zen Buddhist masters Hisamatsu Shinichi (1889–1980) and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990). The first was more oriented towards the practice of Zen, the second proposed the beginning of philosophizing in the form of the sorrow of life, which deepens in thinking in the form of nihilism. Through nihilism, negation is given, which leads us to Absolute nothingness, but at the same time, negation also leads to emptiness as an empty Great Sky, in which all that exists is contained. Also, it is suggested that the second generation include Kosaka Masaaki (1900–1969), Koyama Iwao (1905–1993), Shimomura Torataro (1900–1995) and a number of others.

The third generation, according to Ōhashi Ryōsuke, includes thinkers who strive to interact even more closely with the European philosophical tradition. Among them are Takeuchi Yoshinori (1913–2002), Abe Masao (1915–2004), Tsujimura Koichi (1922–2010), and Ueda Shijiteru (born 1926). Reflections on nothingness became for this generation a spiritual climate that creatively expanded interactions with European philosophy.

Bret Davis, in his article on the Kyoto School for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, also suggests speaking of a fourth generation of the school. He suggests including the above-mentioned Ōhashi Ryōsuke, who not only systematizes the tradition of the school, but is also an independent and interesting thinker himself. Davis also lists a number of other modern authors, not only Japanese, who can be considered continuers of the school's tradition: Hase Shoto, Horio Tsutomu, Omine Akira, Fujita Masakatsu, Mori Tetsuro, and others.

The presented generational perspective seems to us to be a significant vector of sustainable development of philosophical thought in modern Japan, as well as an indicator of growing interest in the Japanese philosophical tradition on the part of European philosophy.

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Problems of Time in Philosophy of Tanabe Hajime

ABSTRACT

Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) was a student and successor of Nishida Kitaro, the founder of Kyoto School, and at the same time his irreconcilable critic.

The paper aims to demonstrate on the example of Tanabe's philosophy the ideological continuity of the Kyoto School by highlighting the main provisions that were further developed, in addition to the idea of absolute nothingness, on which Heisig focused his research. It is supposed to consider the main ideas of Tanabe's concept of time, expressed in his works "Eternity, History, Action" (1940) and "Philosophy as the Path of Repentance" (1945). Having at first glance, a number of similar positions with the theory of time of Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe's philosophy of time is distinguished by its original approaches to them, as well as the formulation of previously undiscussed problems, in particular the problem of time reversibility. Creating the theory of absolute nothingness, Nishida in the same period proposed an interpretation of time as "self-determination of the eternal now." In Nishida's philosophy, an approach was formed in which the present occupies a central place, time was considered from the point of view of the present, which was associated with eternity. Tanabe Hajime, like some other philosophers of the Kyoto school, shared these ideas. He considers the instantaneous present as the basis of temporality. Tanabe was not satisfied with Nishida's position that the present is at the same time eternal. His position was that the present should be understood as a "cut" in duration. He considers the present as a transformative point where the past and the future confront each other and at the same time mediate each other. Tanabe rejected Nishida's characteristic idea of the chronotope, which he expressed in understanding the "present moment" as here and now. He criticizes the key position of Nishida's theory of time, "the self-determination of the eternal now", for the fact that it leads to the spatiality of time. Tanabe formulates his views on the problems of time in the context of his key concepts - total mediation and *metanoesis*. In the spirit of the idea of *metanoesis*, he substantiates the understanding of the present as a moment in which the denial of the past and the birth of a new state occurs, thereby affirming the transformative nature of the present.

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The Role of Mathematical Concepts in the Development of the Nishida Kitarō's Doctrine of Pure Experience

ABSTRACT

The empirical basis of the report is Nishida Kitarō's second major work, "Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness" (自覚における直観と反省, "Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei", 1917), in which the author develops earlier ideas that form the concept of pure experience.

The conceptual core of the discourse presented in the text is concept of "self-consciousness" (自覚, "jikaku") used by Nishida to indicate the fundamental form of reality. Nishida considers reality as a dynamic "self-conscious system" of experience which unfolds, as captured in the phenomena of consciousness, in the unity of intuition (直観, "chokkan") and reflection (反省, "hansei"). In self-consciousness previous activity of consciousness becomes the object of reflexion, as a result of which the subject of reflexion and the object of reflexion are distinguished in the flow of experience. Thus, there arise various epistemological and ontological oppositions that constitute the representation of reality ("subject/object", "matter/spirit", etc.). A moment of present consciousness, in which reality is not yet differentiated into subject and object, Nishida denotes as intuition.

A remarkable feature of the text is the abundance of mathematical concepts and other symbolic means of mathematical language (concepts, terms, symbolic constructions, etc.). A similar tendency will manifest itself in the Nishida's later works. In this context, the functional status of mathematics within the boundaries of the discourse presented in "Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness" is a relevant question.

The actualization of the concepts and symbols of mathematical language in the text is carried out in three ways. Firstly, Nishida refers to mathematics as a source of analogies and/or illustrative examples in the process of explaining the patterns of development of the self-conscious system. For example, when the philosopher explains the possibility of the mutual transition of different a priori unities serving as schemes for the unification of experience, he draws an analogy with the mutual transition of an ellipse and a parabola depending on the focal length of the conic section.

Analogy is based on some similarity or kinship of phenomena. In this case, mathematics is considered by Nishida as one of the phenomenal forms of the unfolding of experience as a self-conscious system. The second way in which mathematical conceptual units are used in the text is related to this circumstance - the consideration of mathematics as an object of explanation (or description). This way implies understanding mathematics: a) epistemologically - as a form of cognition (for example, from the point of view of its relation to logic); b) ontologically - as a form of reality unfolding (for example, from the position of the relation between quantitative and qualitative aspects of reality).

The third modus of actualization of conceptual units is the use of mathematical concepts as a language for describing reality. For example, the infinite process of self-consciousness is described as a continuum constituted by an unattainable and inaccessible to reflexion limit point considered as the true self.

In "Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness" Nishida uses mathematics as a system that appears both as an object of description and as a language of description. This situation is determined by the content of the concept of self-consciousness: any self-conscious system describes itself in reflexion by means of conceptual resources generated by it.

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On the Processes of National Separatism in Japanese Aesthetic Science

ABSTRACT

Major philosophers who define the face of modern aesthetics in Japan, such as Sakabe Megumi, Sasaki Kenichi, Amagasaki Akira and Iwaki Kenichi, have in recent years advocated a revision of the intellectual attitude to the thought tradition of the West, and with it to the 150-year history of their own aesthetic thought.

Speaking at the 15th International Congress of Aesthetics in Tokyo in 2001, Sasaki Kenichi made a scandalous statement: "in my opinion, the most important fact about Japanese aesthetics is that it does not exist," and it should be created anew, refusing from the theories of the West and relying on the "aesthetics of life", on what "can be perceived or felt, and not expressed in linguistic form".

The position of these scientists is shared by the representative of Western philosophical and aesthetic thought - Michele Marra (1956-2011), an outstanding American researcher of Italian origin, who taught at US universities and worked closely with Professor Sasaki in Tokyo for many years. The contribution that Marra, being a brilliant translator, of the works of Japanese authors from different historical eras, made to the study of the aesthetic heritage of Japan, can hardly be overestimated.

It was Marra who became the ideological inspirer of the separatist sentiments of his Japanese colleagues, directly stating that by "Japanese aesthetics" he understood speculation in the field of philosophy of art by professionally trained Japanese scientists, whose object of attention was Japan and the products of Japanese artistic creativity <...>Marra wrote about the artificial construction of the phenomenon of "Japanese aesthetics," which is the result of the hermeneutic efforts of Japanese scientists.

According to Marra, the phrase "Japanese aesthetics" is generated by philosophical agreements between Japanese thinkers and Western hermeneutics in the process of creating and developing the aesthetic image of Japan. He expressed especially acute hostility towards those Japanese aesthetic scientists who sought in Japanese thought an analogy to Western-style aesthetics, which saw in the artistic image a reflection of some Absolute spirit, some absolute will or other general idea, including the idea of matter.

Most Japanese scientists sought to bring a general idea under the motley scattering of national specifics of an aesthetic nature, trying to systematize and logically justify the sequence of changes in the aesthetic tastes of Japanese society over several centuries. At the same time, they relied on concepts formed in the process of numerous artistic practices, as well as on classical texts of writers and sages.

Note that Michele Marra's views were influenced by Gianni Vattimo, the author of the concept of "pensiero debole" or "weak thought" (1983). This concept is directly related to the crisis of humanities knowledge in the West, which consists in the fact that since the consequences of the implementation of "strong ideas" or "strong thought" (communism, colonialism, fascism, liberalism, multiculturalism and modern globalism) ended in collapse, we can conclude that history itself does not provide grounds for analyzing its events from the point of view of such "strong ideas". According to Vattimo, it is only possible to record a scattering of individual events, i.e. our very social and individual existence seems to be blurred in the streams of verbal description. As a result, being is considered as eternally actual, in which there are no significant or insignificant phenomena, there are no absolute criteria of truth, beauty and goodness.

The generation of Japanese aestheticians of the second half of the twentieth century fully shares the idea of "weak thought" declared by Vattimo, considering the Japanese language to be the determining factor in the development of Japanese culture. The readiness for mutual adaptation and enrichment of the ideas of East and West, which was replaced by a desire for isolation, emphasizing national characteristics, autonomy and intellectual independence and at the same time the concept of "weak thought" looks contradictory. The paradox is this: on the one hand, these aestheticians firmly oppose the "strong thought" of Western theories, against their strong statements, and on the other hand, they no less firmly assert the correctness of their uniqueness, which in fact rests not on "weak thought", but on a certain version of the same "strong thought" of nihilism and nominalism.

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National Symbols in the Context of Studying Japanese Culture

ABSTRACT

The concept of Y.M. Lotman considers culture as a certain code, or sign system, which implies the presence in its structure of a set of texts, represented both in terms of expression and content in the form of symbols. Accordingly, the study of culture is understood as decoding messages or uncovering the meanings and values contained in signs. The report proposes to consider some national symbols of Japan as a representative of a cultural sign, which are undoubtedly included in the cultural value system as one of the main categories.

Interest in Japanese culture and Japanese symbols, often appearing and being used not only in Japan but also far beyond its borders, has been growing rapidly recently. Various objects of the surrounding world in Japan have special meanings and values that are not always obvious and understandable to representatives of other cultural traditions. Therefore, without additional knowledge, it can be difficult to read the information that is included, for example, in the plots of plays and popular anime, ornaments and emblems on traditional Japanese clothing (kimono), names and even logos of world-famous companies.

In order to conditionally divide the variety of Japanese signs and symbols into several categories, it is necessary to pay attention to what surrounds a person in everyday life. And then, moving from the general to the particular, it is possible to consider more carefully and in detail the most basic concepts, which at one time or another were endowed by the Japanese with a special, additional or symbolic meaning. A knowledge of Japanese history, mythology, traditions, customs, beliefs, as well as an understanding of such important categories as seasonality, ephemerality, enchantment, and hidden beauty play a major role in the study of Japanese symbolism.

The study of national Japanese symbols seems to be an important and necessary condition for the most complete understanding of the general picture of existence, functioning and interaction of specific and original patterns of traditional and modern Japanese culture. As an example, the report will consider such basic symbols of Japan as the sun and the moon, mountain peaks, some kinds of plants ('Three Friends of Winter'), animals (deer, fox) and water element creatures (carp, octopus).

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Zen Philosophy and Japanese Dadaism

ABSTRACT

Buddhism has long influenced the development of Japanese poetry, with Zen playing a significant role in shaping entire poetic movements and aesthetic categories. Chinese poems from Chan monasteries, arriving in Japan, inspired both the poetics of contemplation and minimalism known as *wabi-sabi*, as well as the absurdist genre of haikai. The form of haikai was well-suited for the paradoxical preaching of monks and for achieving the state of *mu-shin* ("no-mind") and enlightenment, satori. Later, Zen themes and motifs were adopted by samurai and commoner authors and became dominant in the poetry of the Early Modern period.

Western literary avant-garde was warmly received in Japan, and dadaism, with its emphasis on simplicity of form, immediate perception of the world, rejection of rationalism and complex aesthetics, was closely aligned with medieval categories of Japanese culture shaped by Zen. After the critic Wakatsuki Shiran published an article in the newspaper Yorozu Chōhō in 1920 with a Zen interpretation of Tristan Tzara's "Dada Manifesto", the Buddhist interpretation of dadaism became predominant in Japan, and the concept of *dada* was equated with the Buddhist notion of *mu* – absolute negation of both existence and non-existence.

One of the most prominent representatives of Japanese dadaism, Takahashi Shinkichi (1901–1987), considered his literary work a form of Buddhist preaching and created a pseudo-mythology of dada inspired by Zen, eventually even becoming a priest. In his manifesto "Beliefs - Dadaist" and poetic texts, he referred to and interpreted such concepts as non-duality, enlightenment, and the universal nature of Buddha.

Tsuji Jun (1884–1944), a companion of Takahashi, attempted to combine Buddhist philosophy with Epicureanism and the ideas of Max Stirner. In both his literary work and lifestyle, he emulated wandering monks. He interpreted Western images and concepts in a Buddhist spirit; for example, he described Heraclitus' notion of *panta rhei* in the context of the Japanese concept of impermanence (*mujō*).

Anarchist poet Hagiwara Kyōjirō (1899–1938) used Buddhist imagery to critique society and offer a distinctive form of preaching. In Japanese Zen, particularly in its samurai interpretation, metaphors related to death, aggression, and destruction symbolize liberation from the shackles of samsara. The image of the poet as both a destroyer and simultaneously an enlightener and metaphysical liberator holds a significant place in Hagiwara's work.

Themes and motifs connected to Zen are represented in a variety of ways among dada poets, revealing a general tendency to reinterpret Western concepts in a Buddhist way. Critics, especially Ueda Makoto, noted the traditional characteristics of dadaist poetry in Japan, which distinguished Japanese dadaism from its Western counterpart.

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From Vāda to Saṃvāda: Some Methodological Insights from Indian Philosophy

ABSTRACT

The dialogical structure *(vada)* in classical Indian philosophy remains its crucial methodological distinction in contract to non-Indian philosophies. Be it face to face debates between philosophers or written arguments (*paksa*) and counterarguments (*purvapaksa*) between diverse Indian philosophers and schools, the dialogical structure reflects the crucial methodological core through which these debates and argumentations (*vadas*) have taken place. In this paper, my aim is to trace the history of *vada* in four stages; one the stage of *mantra-kala* (The Age of Revelation) with a focus on the Upanashidic debates. Second, the stage of *tarka-kala* (The Age of Arguments) with a focus on the Buddhist councils and debates. Third, the stage of *vistara-kala* (The Age of Diversification) with a focus on Al-Beruni's engagement with the Indian intellectual discourses. While these three stages are discussed by Radhavallabh Tripathi in *Vāda in Theory and Practice*, I extend the discussion to a fourth stage that begins in the modern period and culminates in the project of *samvada* initiated by Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege in the post-colonial Indian context. I argue that this fourth stage extends the scope of diversification initiated in the third stage to an widespread inter-cultural and global exchange of ideas within prevalent political contexts, be it the colonial onslaught of modern times or India's search for a living philosophical landscape in the post-independence era.

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Three Affective Trajectories in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya

ABSTRACT

The paper distinguishes three moods or affective trajectories in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's oeuvre. This is undertaken to establish some underlying connection between his writings. They are one, restating the classical Indian philosophies, notably Vedanta, Sankhya-Yoga, and Jainism, in a modern idiom, thus inheriting the past with responsibility. Two, this form of inheriting is related to his emotional response to colonialism that reverberates his famous talk Svaraj in Ideas. And three, after making a case for svaraj in ideas, the paper highlights the cognitive capacity of the self that is in slavery in his philosophical scrutiny of Kant. The overall thrust of the paper is to distinguish three moods and further relate them, thus creating a larger braid. This, the paper claims, brings more clarity to Bhattacharyya's philosophy in particular and modern Indian philosophy general.

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Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya on Pātañjala-yoga

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on K.C. Bhattacharyya's (KCB's) "Studies in Yoga Philosophy" (SYP), his hardly explored commentary to Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* (YS), which is based on a series of lectures delivered by KCB in 1937. KCB reads the YS as part of his broader freedom project which covers the spheres of knowing, willing, and feeling. In SYP, he develops his notion of willing, which he sees as the heart of the difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga and the soul of Pātañjala-yoga, i.e., the YS and its commentarial body. Interestingly, KCB's key concept, willing, has no precise Sanskrit equivalent in the YS text. In dialogue with KCB (who reads closely Patañjali's classical commentators and primarily Vijñānabhikṣu), I will examine the fivefold citta-vṛtti (modifications of consciousness) scheme, a cognitive taxonomy if you wish, expounded in chapter 1 of the YS, with emphasis on memory (smṛti), the fifth item of this scheme. I will also discuss the significance of the vairāgya (dispassion), as concept and experience (YS 1.12 and 15-16), which together with notions of pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the senses) and kaivalya (disengagement as freedom) constitutes what KCB sees as Patañjali's pyramid of "the will not to will". For Patañjali, KCB implies, freedom lies in the act of "unstitching". Knowledge (prajñā, in chapter 1 of the YS) is obtained just to be renounced. Powers (siddhis, in chapter 3 of the YS) are obtained just to be renounced. KCB takes issue with Patañjali's depiction of the siddhis as obstacles (*upasargā) on the way to samādhi (meditative absorption). For KCB, they are not obstacles but a necessary condition. Their abandonment (having been achieved) paves the way to samādhi. Therefore, Daya Krishna, another significant voice of contemporary Indian philosophy, describes KCB's philosophical move as "inverted Hegelian dialectic rooted in Sāṃkhya"*, consisting of thesis (willing), antithesis (the will not to will) and an attempt to go beyond these two, which is in fact a matter of going back to the origin, the source of both.

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The Doctrine of Karma: Some Critical Considerations

ABSTRACT

The doctrine of karma has been accepted by almost all the schools of Indian philosophy (with the notable exception of Cārvāka School). 'Karma' is a matter of popular religious belief of Hindus, Jainas and majority Buddhists. Karma doctrine is important from moral and religious point of view in that it is supposed to provide a ground for the justification of morality and religiosity. 'One ought to act morally' or 'One ought to follow the rules of the given ritualistic religion' - because if one doesn't, then, it is held, one will have to experience the painful consequences (fruits) according to the doctrine of karma. If, on the contrary, one does, one is bound to experience pleasurable consequences.

Different schools of Indian philosophy deal with the nature and types of karma, the nature and types of the fruits of karma and also the links between karma and its fruit in different ways. Diversity in their formulations of the doctrine of karma is due to the diversity in their metaphysical and soteriological positions. Since these schools debate with each other on their metaphysical and soteriological positions, these debates are also reflected in their formulations of the doctrine of karma.

The paper aims at presenting some critical considerations regarding the doctrine of karma as it is accepted in some of the schools of Indian philosophy. Having described the basic and essential features of the doctrine the paper brings out the problematics of the doctrine of karma. The main problem it raises is about the relationship of the karma-doctrine with freedom, where the notion of freedom is understood in its two forms: 'freedom to' and 'freedom from'.

The paper is divided in four parts. The first part deals with the basic and essential features of the doctrine. The second part examines the relation of karma doctrine with 'freedom to'. The third part examines it with 'freedom from'. The belief in Karma doctrine has influenced individual and social behaviour of people to a large extent. Hence the fourth part considers critically social implications of the doctrine.

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Sociopolitical Dimension of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta as Seen by Rāmānandī Thinkers

ABSTRACT

Unlike Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta has rarely been regarded by scholars as an engine of sociopolitical movements. The only exception is probably Rāmānujācārya's own image of a reformer who questioned casteism and untouchability at least within Vaiṣṇava communities. However in Rāmānandī movement, often left behind the scope of researchers of Viśiṣṭādvaita, an inquiry into potential social consequences of Viśiṣṭādvaitin perception of the world as one of unity in diversity, eternal relatedness to Parabrahman and inclusion of all living beings in his tattva, has been in vigiour since times of Rāmānandāchārya himself. The search for answers was boosted in the XXth century and inspiration is often being taken in Vedāntin commentaries on Śrī Rāmacharitānasa by Goswāmī Tulsīdās. Swāmī Bhagavadāchārya (1879 – 1977) made a valuable contribution to this discourse by giving a commentary to Puruṣasuktam that softens the idea of grades in the Supreme Person's manifestation from the topmost level (brāhmaṇas) to the lowest one (śūdras). He envisages elements of primeval "democracy" in the Rāmāyaṇa while his contemporary successors quote Vinayak Damodar Savarkar as saying "No dictator will be able to come to power in India while we have the Rāmāyaṇa" [Sharma, Hemant, Rām phir laute. Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2024, p. 37].

The role of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta in sociopolitical lore was acknowledged by the Government of India in 2022 when within the frames of Rāmānujācārya's Thousand Anniversary Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the ācārya's giant Statue of Equality proposed by South Indian Viśiṣṭādvaitin leader Chinna Jeeyar Swami. In this paper we will analyze some aspects of Rāmānandī Viśiṣṭādvaitin teachings in such fields as the structure of society, civil rights and freedoms, gender equality, war and peace, untouchability and others in respect of the way these ideas proceed from Vedāntin worldview in general and Viśiṣṭādvaitin in particular. We will pay special attention to writings of Swāmī Bhagavadāchārya as the cornerstone of the XXth century Rāmānandī movement.

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Yājñavalkya's Dialogue with Maitreyī: between Sāṃkhya and Vedānta

ABSTRACT

Yājñavalkya's dialogue with his wife Maitreyī is a famous narrative from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BAU). Yājñavalkya, a well-known representative of the tradition of Yajurveda, is a hero of several BAU narratives that mainly discuss the concept of Ātman. Ātman is also the main topic of the instruction that Yājñavalkya gives to his wife Maitreyī before leaving (becoming a wandering ascetic or dying). Remarkably, the dialogue is repeated twice (BAU 2.4 and 4.5), and since the text of the BAU is transmitted in two recensions, in sum there are four textual versions of the dialogue.

Appealing to different metaphors, Yājñavalkya explains to Maitreyī that Ātman is the basis of all phenomena and all cognitive processes. Like salt liquid, it has no external or internal parts and can be characterized as 'a mass of cognition' (vijñāna-ghana). Yājñavalkya concludes that there is no cognition (saṃjña) (BAU 4.5.13) after death. This statement puzzled Maitreyī, and the same can be said about modern readers. Yājñavalkya explains that Ātman is free from any duality which is a prerequisite of all cognitive processes. This explanation is, indeed, in line with the teaching of Advaita Vedānta, however, it contradicts the view on Ātman as 'a mass of cognition'.

Rasmus Reinvang and Joel Brereton in their studies of textual versions of the dialogue suggested that the object of some or even all of Yājñavalkya's comparisons (BAU 2.4.7-12, 4.5.8-13) was not Ātman but the 'great being' *(mahad bhūta).* They consider this expression in the text to denote not a characteristic of Ātman, but a distinct concept – the basis of all cognitive functions. Still, this concept hardly fits the doctrine of the early Vedānta with which Yājñavalkya's teaching is usually associated.

However, in the doctrine of Sāṃkhya *mahad bhūta* correlates to the tattva of *buddhi* – the first stage in the involution of Prakṛti that is the basis of material elements *(mahābhūta)* and cognitive functions. Similarly, Yājñavalkya noticed that the 'great being' as the source of cognition emerges from the elements *(bhūta)* and disappears in them. In some versions of Sāṃkhya, *buddhi* is even designated as *mahad,* which may be a short form of *mahad bhūta.* Interpreting Yājñavalkya's teaching in a Sāṃkhya style, Ātman appears similar to Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya – the Spirit that is entirely distinct from the material world.

In the view of the parallel between Yājñavalkya's teaching and early forms of Sāṃkhya, it seems reasonable to question whether his doctrine should be considered an early form of Vedānta, as the latter identification is mainly based on posterior Vedāntic commentaries.

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Contemporary Relevance of Cārvāka Thought

ABSTRACT

Cārvāka philosophy is one of the oldest philosophies of India. The traces of Cārvāka thought can be found in the Vedas also. However, the philosophy was not so popular; it was presented only as a kind of pūrvapakṣa, a prior position. It is nowhere presented as a final position (sidhānta) in the texts which are available to us. However, this philosophy is so unique and special that without it the picture of Indian philosophy would be one-sided and incomplete. The Contemporary time is the time of rise of scientific progress and science based on the materialistic thought. Cārvāka is a materialist system. Therefore, it is interesting to enquire how the Cārvāka thought can help us to understand the world.

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Philosophy as a Wisdom Educative Program in Early Medieval Indian Buddhism

ABSTRACT

The report is devoted to the explication of the genetic connection of Buddhist philosophical thought with the system of higher monastic education developed in early medieval Kashmir. This system is considered by the author based on the material of the treatise Vasubandhu (the 4th – 5th centuries) "Encyclopedia of [science] Abhidharma with commentary".

The Kashmiri Buddhist education system was focused on the training of arhats, that is, ascetics who realized the soteriological purpose of the Buddha's Teachings. An arhat loses the status of a disciple because the learning result has been achieved. His new state is "staying out of learning", associated with having the ability to do educational work for the benefit of other people.

The state of apprenticeship assumed the development of three components of education: teaching moral behavior, teaching the practice of concentration of consciousness, teaching wisdom as a correct understanding of the science of Abhidharma. The term "abhidharma" was interpreted in the highest sense as the ability to distinguish the characteristics of dharmas (elements constituting the flow of individual psychosomatic experience). But in the conventional sense, Abhidharma was named a set of seven canonical texts devoted to the theoretical interpretation of the Buddha's heritage (sermon talks and moral instructions).

Kashmiri teachers composed in the 1st – 2nd centuries the first program of teaching wisdom: "A big discussion on Abhidharma." It is now known only in Chinese translations. The text contains polemics of early Buddhist schools on key issues of understanding the Teachings of the Buddha.

Vasubandhu has revised a number of Kashmiri exegetical doctrines. His treatise "Encyclopedia of [science] Abhidharma with commentary" claimed to be an updated program for teaching wisdom. The thinker identified eight major topics that form the structure of Buddhist philosophy at the exegetical stage of its development: canonical classifications of dharmas, mental abilities of human beings, cosmology, theory of human activity and karmic retribution, affective and cognitive defilements of consciousness, praxiology and soteriology, knowledge, types of contemplation. The text of the commentary contains a study of the terminological apparatus of the Abhidharma and thematically relevant discussions between adepts of various Buddhist schools.

Vasubandhu defined the study of the science of Abhidharma as a professional intellectual activity equipped with special methods. First, it is the composition of various classifications of dharmas, equipped with numerical indexes. For example. 52 types of diamond-like concentration of consciousness. Secondly, it is a hermeneutic procedure for interpreting the meaning of metaphors used by the Buddha in preaching conversations with commoners.

Vasubandhu formulated a theoretical approach to the analysis of human actions. In addition, the thinker explained that the volitional intention of a person affectively attached to the desire world is always conditioned by a perverted understanding of reality. Such mental action is a phenomenon of ignorant self-will that strengthens the bonds of suffering. According to Vasubandhu, free will arises for the first time while listening to a sermon. When the listener understands the true causes of suffering, he voluntarily enters the path of salvation trodden by the Buddha.

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Problems of Conceptualization of "Indian Philosophy" in the Light of Non-Classical Epistemology

ABSTRACT

Despite the fact that the expression "Indian philosophy" has firmly established itself in philosophical communities around the world, its substantive meaning continues to be problematic, since representatives of different cultural traditions define it in the dissimilar ways. A handy illustration of this state of affairs can be a comparison of discourses on Indian philosophy in S. Radhakrishnan's monograph "Indian Philosophy" and in the article by V.K. Shokhin and M.T. Stepanyants "Indian Philosophy in historical retrospect" in the encyclopedia "Indian Philosophy" (2009). S. Radhakrishnan, expressing a common point of view in India, refers to philosophy (although with reservations) the ideas of the Vedas chanted during rituals, the epic poems "Mahābhārata" and "Rāmāyaṇa", the Upaniṣad-s, as well as scholastic (school) religio-philosophical teachings (Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 43-45). He attributes the origin of Indian philosophy to 1500-600 BC. – In the article of the encyclopedia, expressing the point of view common among Russian Indologists, the beginning of Indian philosophy is close to us by almost a thousand years, and the teachings of the śramaṇa-s critics of the vedico–brahmanical religion are called the first philosophical ones.

The noted discrepancies between the two interpretations of the term "Indian philosophy" are quite legitimate from the point of view of the philosophical approaches of postmodernism and transmodernism with their pluralism of truth and recognition of the normality of the drift of philosophical concepts. However, the discrepancies give rise to pragmatic difficulties and a number of questions. First of all, these questions relate to the identification of the primary sources of the Indian philosophical tradition: which texts from the sea of Sanskrit literature should be considered as philosophical? The solution of this issue determines both the methodology of research and the methodology of teaching Indian philosophy. In Western culture a resolution of the problem became the introduction of the concepts of *before-philosophy* and *pre-philosophy* as the forms of reflection. They not only substantiate the need to study before-philosophical, Vedic literature and pre-philosophical texts (Upaniṣad-s, epics, scientific writings) for understanding the distinctive characteristics of Indian philosophy, but they also provide the main criteria for identifying the signs that make the Indian sages' discourse on worldview problems as *philosophical*, namely. Such criteria are reliance on the experience of physical reality, and critical thinking, which is formulated theoretically.

Another important question is what to focus on when examining the texts of Indian thinkers: on the fact that they are "*philosophical*" – that is, on the similarities of worldview discourse in India and in the West, or on the fact that these texts are "*Indian*", and to focus on the originality of Indian worldview thought, on its incommensurability with Western philosophy?

Both strategies were used in the previous two centuries, and they are used today. The emphasis on similarities often leads to distortions of the image of Indian thought, to its tendentious interpretations. In this sense, two interpretations of Indian religio-

philosophical text of the Nyaya school – "Nyāya-sūtra-s" – are very representative: in the "Synopsis of Sciences from the point of view of Nyāya" (1852–1855) by the Scotchman J. R. Ballantine, and in the monograph "The Positive Sciences of the ancient Hindus" (1915) by the historian of Indian sciences Brajendra Nath Seal. Both authors explained "Nyāya-sūtra-s" in the scientific spirit (as a scientific text): they both saw in Akṣapāda's creation the outlets for all Western sciences known at their times: algebra, differential and integral calculus, geometry, formal logic, rhetoric, mineralogy and geology, botany, zoology, physics, chemistry and many others. The collective monograph "A Brief History of Science in India", edited by D.M. Bose (1971), shows the popularity of such interpretation of Indian religio-philosophical texts in India.

The second strategy (emphasis on differences, on the incommensurability of Indian and Western philosophical discourses) today, with the adoption of new interpretations of knowledge not as "true", but as "viable", as a tool of survival (Knyazeva E.N. Enactivism: a new form of constructivism in epistemology. P. 24), also looks irrelevant, especially in the context of intercultural philosophizing. Such a new strategy seems to be more productive, which is based on the modern understanding of knowledge in cognitive science, in non-classical epistemologies (evolutionary, naturalistic, social) and on the concept of enactivism. The new research strategy can be based not on the principles of a superficial comparison of the similarities and differences of local philosophical traditions, but on a comparison of the effectiveness of the functioning of philosophical knowledge in local cultures, to ensure their viability in different historical periods and in different historical environments. The results of such studies are invaluable for building an intercultural philosophy.

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Philosophy and Religion in 1930's Russian-Indian Contacts in Buddhist Studies

ABSTRACT

The report is devoted to the analysis of the origins and content of Russian-Indian contacts in the field of Buddhist studies in the 1930s. The study of the written heritage of Buddhist religious and philosophical thought by Russian school of classical Indology dates back to the XIX century, but only on the XX c.eve, on the basis of the Russian Academy publishing series "Bibliotheca Buddhica" in the context of the project of Th. Stcherbatsky on the study of basic philosophical texts, distinct vectors of international ties were formed: Europe and Japan. During the period of the Institute of Buddhist Culture (IBC) of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1928-1930), with a radical change in the program guidelines of academic researches, it was impossible to maintain the previous configuration in full, and a course was taken to develop relations with colleagues from the East. The report, based on published and archival sources, explicated the role of Th. Stcherbatsky in initiating scientific relations with the Indian journals "Indian Historical Quarterly" (IHQ) and " Journal of the Greater India Society", which actively involved European researchers to cooperation earlier. After the establishing of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1930) and the inclusion of IBC in its structure, these contacts were actively supported by Th. Stcherbatsky's yuang colleage and co-author E. E. Obermiller. An analysis of the topics of E. E. Obermiller's publications in the IHQ in correlation with archival documents showed for the first time that this was a form of implementing Th. Stcherbatsky's plans to publish and study texts of the Prajnaparamita circle. This material is of historical and scientific value for reconstructing the history of the St. Petersburg school of classical Indology in the 1920s–1930s. The report substantiated that the Indian vector of scientific connections in Buddhist Studies was a form of preserving religious and philosophical topics in the context of changing priorities in Indology.

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'Tchaadaev's Paradigm' in Modern Eastern Philosophy as Comparative Perspective (Based on an Example of Intellectual Search in the Bengal Renaissance)

ABSTRACT

The paper is the attempt to sum up the author's experience of juxtaposition intellectual heritage by Pyotr Tchaadaev and the Bengal Renaissance thinkers from Rammohan Roy to Rabindranath Tagore. It's results were embodied in the cycle of articles published in 2022–2024 and a new works to present the translations of meaningful text by Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore.

An idea of resemblance of the problematics and thinking paradigms by Pyotr Tchaadaev and Modern Eastern intellectuals had appeared in Russian Oriental studies at 1980th owing to Eugene B. Rashkovsky and Vladimir G. Khoros works. E. B. Rashkovsky had emphasized the Oriental, particularly Indological importance of the research in Tchaadaev's heritage and marked that 'the textologically reasonable comparison of worldviews both Tchaadaev and Rammohun Roy suggests itself". Studying history of the Bengal Renaissance for over twenty years, the author of the paper repeatedly noted the similarities of XIXth – early XXth centuries and Tchaadaev's heritage; finally, the author came to juxtaposition of his thought and his Indian contemporary, 'Father of Indian Renaissance' Rammohun Roy's works and to describe that phenomenon of analogy between Tchaadaev's philosophy and social thought of the epoch. Thus, there is the personality who equal to Russian philosopher both in a role of 'challenger' (A. J. Toynbee) and the power of thought in the Nineteenth century Bengal; there are the texts similar to the first *Lettre Philosophique* (1836) (lecture *On the Nature and Importance of Historical Studies* by Krishnamohun Banerjea (1838) and other). The conventional 'Tchaadaev's principle' is embodied in the text by intellectuals of the Bengal Renaissance. The concrete example of such parallelism confirms the methodological value of Tchaadaev's heritage for Oriental studies that dealing with Modern philosophical thought. The author sees the value in the thinking paradigm that had been created in *Lettres Philosophique* and other text by Tchaadaev; it is founded in different cultural areas of the East in the beginning of Modernization and the meeting of traditional societies with the West and, therefore, it could serve as the model of juxtaposition.

The Tchaadaev phenomenon on Russian intellectual history fits the concept cross-cultural thinker as well as many of Eastern thinkers of the period.

Tchaadaev paradigm originates from the thinking features in the in a space of society that was involved in the interaction with the West: religious character, correlation and understanding of Other in dialogue, a critical attitude towards the society's condition understood as a crisis. The first principle to indicate the paradigm is the strict anspiration to the truth to check all ideas and judgments. The base of Tchaadaev's philosophical approach is the principle of universality (catholicity) of spiritual and social world; owing to it the national (the Own – country, tradition, people, culture) is considered as one of special parts of universal whole – humanity. From the point, the question of ground differences between distinct societies is raised. These ones are the spiritual and cultural traditions of peoples in its development in history. They helps to explain the present condition of the Own, its features, and to predict its future.

The method of posing the problem is a correlation of the Own with the Other, 'our' with the 'universal', in East – West context. The special 'Tchaadaev's questions' are asked and the special themes are raised to discover the critical cognition of the Own in the process of correlation. There are two levels of philosophizing in the paradigm. The first is religious to ground the religious philosophical foundation of thinking based on native tradition. The second level is social philosophising based on understanding and interpretation of the Own such as tradition, history, people, its development in time and modern condition. The image of Own is created in self-cognition with clearly outlined advantages and disadvantages, values and ideas, a role and a place in world history, and the perspectives of future are defined.

The appearance and development of thought is illustrated by materials of history of the Bengal thought in the paper.

The possibility for identification of similar paradigm of thinking in history of different Eastern modernizing people is assumed. The main condition of success in the starting research proposed the proper degree of study the texts by Eastern intellectuals.

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The Specifics of Using J. Lacan's Structural Psychoanalysis in the Analysis of Nepali-Language Prose

ABSTRACT

This paper is based on an attempt of understanding Nepali research works which use provisions from Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory to analyze prose texts. The choice of such a methodology seems quite unusual, since most researchers turn to the legacy of Z. Freud and G. Jung. The paper is based on articles written by Nepalese researchers Rajani Dhakal, who analyzes the story "I am Jujuman" from the standpoint of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, and Durgibahadur Gharti, who examines modern Nepalese novels using various psychoanalytic approaches.

Rajani Dhakal's article focuses on the story "Gothale" by the famous Nepalese writer Govinda Bahadur Malla (1922-2010), the author of Nepalese psychological prose of the mid-20th century. This story centers on an internal conflict unfolding in the consciousness of the protagonist. Jujuman is a poor village shopkeeper who goes to the city to celebrate with his brother-in-law, a man of much higher social status. Throughout the story, Jujuman is acutely aware of his own alienation and inadequacy in the urban environment of Nepal in the 1950s. The Nepali-language study of this story is based on Lacan's idea that the human mind is guided by society and language. Because of this, there is always a conflict between the conscious and the unconscious. The author of the article argues that a close reading of this story based on Lacan's concept of the Imaginary shows how the state of society has influenced the formation of the dual character of the protagonist. The main conclusion of the study is that the story successfully demonstrates the transitional period of society through the mood of Jujuman.

Both articles deal with the theoretical explanation of psychoanalytic concepts and their adaptation for understanding by the Nepali-speaking reader. The sources are English-language psychoanalytic texts, so the Nepalese authors are forced to translate the terms into Nepali themselves. It is obvious that there is no Nepalese tradition of interpreting and translating Lacan's texts, so there is a disunity in the translations of even such key concepts as the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real. At the same time, there has been already developed tradition of translating Freud's works in Nepal, so there are no discrepancies in his terminology. The concept of the "mirror stage" formulated by J. Lacan and the role this stage plays in the development and formation of a person's own identity play a significant role in both articles. R. Dhakal also describes in detail the connection between the concept of the Imaginary and the formation of the Self at the stage of the "mirror stage".

Despite the fact that the authors of the articles claim to conduct a study of literary works from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, in fact, the analysis is carried out from the standpoint of Marxist criticism. The works invariably focus on the relationships between man and society, as well as class contradictions.

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The Concept of *Īśvara* in the Commentaries of Śaṃkara and Abhinavagupta on the *Bhagavadgītā*

ABSTRACT

The *Bhagavadgītā* is one of the most commented religious and philosophical texts of Hinduism. The serious metaphysical difference between the views of Śaṃkara and Abhinavagupta could not but be reflected in their commentaries. Therefore, when comparing the two systems under consideration, it will be quite justified to compare and analyze the ideas of these two great Indian philosophers using the example of their commentaries on the same (taking into account the differences between the commented reviews, of course) text – the *Bhagavadgītā*. No one has carried out a comparative study of these two commentaries in Russian scientific community earlier. One of the central themes of the Bhagavad-gītā is the definition of the role and place of *Īśvara* (literally "Lord", a term for the personal Deity), by whom the transition from the space-time continuum to eternity and vice versa is controlled. Commenting on the following *Bhagavadgītā* (verses 9.10, 7.14, and 18.66), Śaṃkara explains why *Īśvara* manifests Himself in the world and human life as *avatāra*. But how does the unchanging, transcendent, qualityless and inactive Absolute (Brahman) become *Īśvara*? In interpreting the *Bhagavadgītā*, Śaṃkara proceeds from the traditional notions of the Upaniṣads and Vedānta that the nondual Absolute (Brahman) can be experienced on two distinct spiritual levels, the empirical (*vyāvaharika*) and the metaphysical (*pāramārthika*). The Brahman of the *Bhagavadgītā*, with its active qualities of creation, sustenance and destruction, is certainly an Absolute "with qualities" (*saguṇa*), bearing little resemblance to the "qualityless" (*nirguṇa*) transcendental Brahman of the Upaniṣads.

According to Śaṃkara, however, the qualityless Brahman is not only implicitly present in the *Bhagavadgītā* but is also explicitly mentioned in a number of places in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The idea of any actual change (*pariṇāma*) in Brahman forcing him to become *Īśvara* is totally unacceptable to Śaṃkara, and for an explanation he postulates the principle of *māyā* – apparent change or becoming. In reality, the unchanging Brahman does not change in itself, and the changing *Īśvara*, the world, and the empirical individual (jīva) are essentially always one with him and only appear different from him because of the activity of *māyā*, which is neither real nor unreal to pure consciousness and appears real only to a consciousness clouded by illusion and not experiencing the unity of absolute Reality. Thus, in the stratification of the levels of reality, the concept of *Īśvara* and theism (*īśvaravāda*) have a lower ontological status for Śaṃkara than unconditional monism.

For Abhinavagupta, who synthesizes monism and theism, the supreme Brahman (*Parabrahma*) is the Śiva of Kashmir Śivaism, endowed with dynamic power and various qualities. Abhinavagupta regards all these qualities as inherent attributes of Śiva, who is simultaneously the transcendent Absolute and the immanent *Īśvara*. In accordance with the doctrine of *abhāsavāda*, according to which "external" matter, or energy, is the manifestation of consciousness, Abhinavagupta maintains that *Īśvara* performs activity through his infinite power (*svātantryaśakti*), realizing world-expression as a reflection outwardly of himself and therefore his activity does not limit, blind, or enslave him.

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The History of Philosophy of Disciples: What Sureśvara Says about Himself as a Disciple and What Methodological Conclusions Can Be Drawn from This

ABSTRACT

The paper was based on excerpts from «Naiṣkarmyasiddhi» and «Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika», in which Sureśvara speaks of Śaṅkara as a teacher and discusses the place of his own works in relation to Śaṅkara's heritage.

In the history of the advaita-vedānta Sureśvara is known as Vārtikakāra, as the author of commentaries to Śaṅkara's commentaries on «Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad» and «Taittirīya Upaniṣad». Vārtika is an unfolding of what was said in the commented text^ what was sufficiently explained (ukta), what was not explained enough (durukta) and what was not said at all (anukta). Similarly, we can consider the separate text of Sureśvara «Naiṣkarmyasiddhi», referring to «Upadeśa-sāhasrī» Śaṅkara.

Contrary to the nature of the vārtika comments, Sureśvara tries to dispel the suspicions of readers that something important in Śaṅkara's works is not expressed, is poorly expressed or stated without proper justification. He concludes that Śaṅkara has spoken all about the content of the Vedas, and from himself he cannot add anything to it (Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 1.5).

Against the reproaches in the lack of purpose or in vanity of his author's endeavours, Sureśvara makes two statements:

•   Writing his own text will allow him to «clear his understanding» of the Vedas and the teachings of Śaṅkara with the help of criticism from the «connoisseurs of Brahman» (Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 1.5).

•   Some thinkers prone to false speculations (kutarkika) argued against Śaṅkara's teachings after his death. Since there is no direct refutation of these arguments in the texts of Śaṅkara, the duty of such refutations falls on Sureśvara (Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika 1.2).

Thus, the stated goals of Sureśvara are exclusively educational both with regard to himself and to others. Sureśvara does not want to say something new, but wants to repeat in other words what Śaṅkara said previously.

Therefore, in the historico-philosophical work, whose subject is the texts of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, it is necessary to take into account the above-described goal of the latter as a foundation for building an research optics (or one of such optics). This goal establishes a special relationship between the texts of the teacher and the disciple.

R. Bart distinguishes three types of relations between signs that can be extrapolated to the texts as signs with an extremely complex internal structure, but still representing unity in expression of a certain meaning:

Consider the relation of the texts of the disciple and teacher (commentator and commented) symbolic means to assume that the commented author did not exhauste all the intended, while for Sureśvara it is clear that the object was exhausted by Śaṅkara in its entirety.

To consider the relation of the texts of the disciple and teacher syntagmatic means to assume that there is some other subject, speaking of which the disciple could continue the texts of the teacher. However, if Śaṅkara, in the opinion of Sureśvara, had said all that was necessary on really valueable topics (Brahman, liberation, etc.), any talk about other topics would have been meaningless.

The Sureśvara's aim is only met by the paradigmatic relation in consideration of Śaṅkara's texts and his own: in such an optics they are presented as two different signifier with one signified, and the choice of signifier depends exclusively on the audience to whom the message is addressed.

Thus, the history of the advaita vedanta, if it takes into account what aims the studied thinkers have set for themselves, will be a history of different ways to say the same thing or, under another angle of consideration, a history of the practices of education and self-education. This statement probably may be extended to studies on other schools of Indian philosophy.