

Theorem about "back of the head" *

Introduction

Scientific doctrine of the worlds description, which replaced “aristotelized” scholastics in 16-17 centuries, required not only the new concept of the world Being, but full accordance to it’s new epistemological principles. Since Galileo science’s goal is achieving such knowledge of natures processes, which is free of any “prejudices”, born by subjective perception of reality. Physics-cosmological principle, which B. Carter much later called the “Copernicus principle” becomes a maxim. According to this principle, human being has no privileged place in the universe¹. This means that nature’s processes and laws should be free not only of anything “human”, but even free of existence of the human being as an observer itself.

But if one develops this way, he will face the question, how can human being make any description or explanation of anything in observed nature? And then, how can one *propose the equivalence of content of his notion of process with the content of the process themselves?* Or, in brief, what can be the reason for human to represent in mind something external to this mind? In fact, this is the main fundamental question of epistemology and new-age epistemology especially: how to justify the objectiveness (i.e. independence from the consciousness) of the contents of the consciousness?

The tradition in epistemology and its breach

* Content of the article is largely based on results, acquired by me early in 1993-1994 years. (See.: Pavlenko A.N., Being at its Threshold// Human Being,- Moscow, 1994, № 2-3(In Russian).

¹ See: Carter B., Combination of Big Numbers//Cosmology: Theory and Observations.- Moscow, 1978 (In Russian).

We should admit, that in case of positive answer to the last question there is world tradition, from which we will take several examples. The Plato assumed the existence of some independent – from both human being and cosmos – area of ideas (proto-images) of the contents of which Demiurge makes both human mind and external world participated (Phaed. 83 b; Parm. 132 c).

The same explanation can be met in Christian Middle ages. Anselm of Canterbury (11-12 cent.) supposed that *sentence* as a form of revealing the world is given to human being by God. "Truth of the expression" is provided namely by its possibility "to be an expression", which it has there and then, when "everything, that exists is true, because it exists in Highest Truth"². The whole world, according to Anselm, by its true, "substance" part exists in God. There is "likening" (similitudo) between God's and human expression, and the truth is given to human in the ranks of this likening.

Traces of the same answer to the last questions can be even found among some creators of the new European science. Rene Descartes supposed that the "ideas of clearness and distinctness" are placed into human consciousness by some upper being! Descartes creates the logical chain very similar to the Anselm's one. Consciousness and (its ability to doubt) is the base for making conclusion about its existence. This way Descartes found out that he is "substance, whose whole essence or nature consists in thinking"³. The developing of this idea leads Descartes to accept the presence of "creature higher than me" in his consciousness. But this idea has no deductive base, so he has nothing to do, but to "assume that this idea is put into my consciousness by someone, whose nature is more perfect than mine..."⁴. This means that Descartes also uses collateral (to his consciousness) argument-assumption about *perfect being* to approve the absoluteness, and in this case objectiveness, of his own substance – consciousness,

² Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi. Opera omnia. Stuttgart, 1968, T.1, P.185.

³ Descartes R.. Works, Moscow, 1989, - T.1, P.269 (In Russian).

³ Ibidem.

⁴ Ibidem, P.272.

and not only of consciousness, but of external world also. Thus God is the main guarantor of objectiveness of Descartes' consciousness. And the Descartes' God is very same to Plato's and Anselm's ones.

So, we can find some common ideas in mentioned authors' works, considering discussed topic. All of them admitted independent existence of some "third party" in relations between two: human being (his mind) and the external world. Namely this "third party" was making the human's possibility to perceive the world adequately.

But in the 19-th century the new school of science appeared, called "positivism", which called above-mentioned approach as "metaphysics" and banished the existence of the "third party" itself! From that very moment epistemologists face arch-complex problem: *to justify the objectiveness of the consciousness' contents without help of the "third party"* (God, absolute spirit, world soul, external experience etc.). The consistent developing in this way, in fact, denied the science from formulating the laws for theories, made unexplainable the effectiveness of mathematics among natural sciences etc. Such doctrines as pragmatism, empiricism, functionalism and conventionalism appeared at that time, and every of that doctrines bore elements of *skepticism*.

In such situation philosophy had no right to deal with "world" and accomplished subordinate to the science and secondary functions. It analyzes and specifies the concept of science itself, checks the logical side of the argumentation etc. But even inside of this mainstream there appears a group of researchers, which tries to find the way out of this dead end, even under the ban of the "third party". And eventually the 20-th century brings us new – in terms of positivism – attempt to justify *the objectiveness* of human consciousness and contents of perception. This attempt was undertaken by Edmund Husserl. His ideas still has some adherents in the Western tradition. From the most prominent philosophers we should mark Carl O. Apel and his followers.

Husserl's conception, as the conceptions of his followers, is very simple in understanding of its essence and extremely complicated in realization. It

says: we should justify *the scientific character* (in this case – the objectiveness, more frequently – overall importance and intersubjectivity) of the consciousness' clauses *not exceeding its boundaries*. They speak, of course, of scientific or science-philosophic thought.

We can see that this state of question is typically new-age and not basing on the idea of the “third party”. We can find some traces of Aristotle’s “vaccination” here, because Husserl also considers philosophy as science or at least feels it scientific. But if « In idealer Vollendung gedacht, *wäre sie* (the Science. — A.P.) *die Vernunft selbst, die neben und über sich keine Autorität mehr haben könnte* (italicized by me – A.P.) ». ⁵ And considering that Husserl’s new philosophic science – phenomenology – should have the same widely accepted status as every natural science, “Ihren Siegeslauf wird nichts hemmen”- ⁶ almost prophetically proclaims Husserl. So Husserl tries to justify the scientific thought which has no need in “higher or equal authorities”. Let’s see whether he succeeded or not.

The Edmond Husserl’s program of justifying the thought without authorities

In his program work “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” Husserl openly shows his main intention - *to raise philosophy to the level of science*. How? To find and develop the features which bring together philosophy and science. Which features are they? Husserl thinks it *to be objectiveness*. If natural science is objective because it deals with *corporeal things, given in space and time* i.e. is pointed to the knowledge of *existing*, then philosophy – in the image of phenomenology – is objective due to the pre-postulated correlativeness of “consciousness” and “Being” and then to the ability of the “strictly scientific philosophy” reveal the generic and specific essence of being built on this basis. The spoken essence in contemplation, according to Husserl, does lead to wished

⁵ Husserl E., Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, - Frankfurt am Main, Td. Vittorio Klostermann, Zweite Aufgabe, -.1965,- S.16.

⁶ Ibid.

result: “ DaЯ die im Wesensschauungen gefaЯten “Wesen“ sich in festen Begriffen, in sehr weitem Umfange mindestens, fixieren lassen, und damit Mцglichkeiten fцr feste, ihrer Art objektiv und absolut gцltige Aussagen abgeben, ist fцr jeden Vorurteilslosen selbstverstцndlich”⁷.

But the very first approach to Husserl’s theory reveals some unjustified suggestions. First of them is suggestion of *equivalence of being and thinking* – because if the theory of thinking tries to explore the problems of being and thinking correlation then “ ... so kann sie (the theory – A.P.) nur Sein als Correlatum von Augen haben, als bewuЯtseinsmцЯig “Gemeintes”..”⁸. Husserl’s statement “*it (the theory- A.P.) can consider the being only as a correlation of consciousness*” in essence is equal to Plato’s “harmonium”, Anselm’s “similitudo” and Descartes’ “admission of God”. When starting to justify his “strong scientific phenomenology” and continuously blaming naturalistic psychology that it is poorly thought-out considering the need to justify its own initial principles and methods of research, Husserl presents the admission of the equality being-thinking without any proper justifying. Taking this for initial principle he then turns to creating the method of building the phenomenology – analyzing the essence of consciousness “perceived in direct contemplation” and expressed in notions. Thus he leaves unanswered at least two questions: “What are the base for equaling being and thinking?” and “How do we justify the postulate, that direct contemplation gives us the unity of essence?” Or, simplifying: “How do we justify the semantic unity of notion?”

In fact, not the consciousness correlate with being due to the stability of notions (at least the notions of such correlation), but on the contrary, notions as representatives of “unity” of essence are stable due to the fact that “consciousness correlate with being” having its base in it.

Appealing to the “direct contemplation of essences” based on the “obviousness” doesn’t seem convincing, because has a scent of psychologism. The

⁷ Ibidem, S. 39.

⁸ Ibidem, S. 21.

thing, obvious for one person, may not be obvious to another. To get rid of such blames Husserl tries to exceed the boundaries of “subjectiveness” so as to stay the area of *transcendental*.

Husserl's intersubjective program of thinking's justification

In the question of justification of thinking Husserl rests some places upon *intersubjective justification* of transcendental Ego. Intersubjectiveness acts for Husserl as some ideal society - Gemeinschaft, which later would be developed by K.-O. Apel into “communicative Society” - Kommunikationsgemeinschaft. This ideal society is for Husserl transcendental condition for possibility of communication among real subjects. And as Husserl shows, the “multitude of subjects” can be not only real multitude, but even one subject “in the multitude of subjective states” – for example in the youth, maturity and old age. Husserl creates a model of *transcendental Community*⁹. Transcendental intersubjectiveness in the attitude to the empiric multitude of the subjects, which form “society”, here acts as something like “ideal body” in the attitude to the “empiric body”. But why did Husserl need intersubjectivism? It is clear, that Husserl rests his hopes on it with only one goal – to overcome *the subjectivism* as an antagonist to the required objectiveness. He wanted, in fact, to justify the equivalence of the “intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness”.

The metaphysic nature of the intersubjectivism can be best revealed analyzing the notion of the “intersubjectively understood truth”. In fact, if the truth is the result (value) of the checking the contents of judgment by many subjects, than it cannot be taken even as *a reference* i.e. as the correlation between content of subject's judgment and content of the reality, which is judged. On the contrary, in the terms of intersubjectivism truth is specifically correlation *between content of subject's judgment with the contents of another subjects' judgments*. More correctly, we are speaking already about “correctness” but not about “truth”. This

⁹ Husserl E., *Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, - Den Haag, 1973, - T.2, S. 189.

means, before the judgment is proved to be true in reality, it should be proved so among other subjects' judgments. Intersubject turns to be the same subject, just more "powerful".

But feeling danger here, "intersubjectivist" can try to make the things out and probably will say, that the nature of intersubjective truth is rooted not in the convention of many (majority) of subjects of convention. It is rooted in the fact, that the contents of judgments of the spoken majority are equal, not considering the time or place, they are present at. This fact Husserl insists when he speaks of transcendental intersubjectivity.

This means that contents of judgments are equal and independent of psychical, historical or material conditions. Independent just because it is the truth of ideal things as in Husserl's example: " $2 \times 2 = 4$ ". In the second part of second volume of his "Logical Studies", while speaking about truth in § 39, Husserl admits: „...so ist die *Wahrheit* als Korrelat eines identifizierenden Aktes ein *Sachverhalt*, und als Korrelat einer deckenden Identifizierung eine *Identität: die volle Übereinstimmung zwischen Gemeintem und Gegebenem als solchem*“¹⁰ This accordance can be understood really: “Übereinstimmung, die erlebt als Evidenz....»¹¹ .. But Husserl can not bear this, and he supposes to change “obviousness as the experience of the truth” with the strict definition of obviousness – “adequate perception of truth”. But this doesn't bring wished stability in the understanding of truth. In this relation Husserl inclines to rest upon *the ideal moment of truth*, which is free from “uneven soil” of its psychological experience. If sensual and psychical dates cannot bear wished *objectiveness*, which makes philosophy as a science, then we should search for it *in the area of ideal*. Husserl still believes that being acts as correlate of thinking and reality, still believes that something correlates in reality *to the ideal images of thinking*. So the

¹⁰ Husserl E. Logische Untersuchungen. Dritte, Unveränderte Auflage, - Hallea.d.S.,1922, - Bd. 2, Teil II, S.122.

¹¹ Ibidem,

truth is revealed as “..als Idee gefaßte Wesen des empirisch zufälligen Aktes der Evidenz, oder die Idee der absoluten Adäquation als solcher»¹².

Here the intersubjective epistemology faces the paradoxical fact. To reveal this let's build an epistemological model, which will help us to show the limited nature of the intersubjective program in justification of thinking.

“Enarch” as a model of intersubject

The model will be as follows. Let's suppose that in the world there are not of millions and billions of differently, in various times and conditions, perceiving subjects, but is *only one perceiving subject*¹³. The only one subject, not getting older or changing in the formal states of his thinking. Lets call him “Enarch”, because he is “one” and has “beginning” (ἀρχή) in itself. He has all the abilities of Husserl's phenomenologist: judge in judgments, revealing the phenomena of his thinking, making conclusions, etc. It is surprising that Apel is afraid of constructing such subject, when he says that “Man kann sich allenfalls als ein Ich, das schon die Kommunikationsgemeinschaft voraussetzt...»¹⁴.

So if we admit such subject then we pose well-known question: how can this Enarch prove the truth of his mind's judgments, saying that “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ”, “the sum of triangle's angles equals 180° ” and “the green thing is not red”? If intersubjectivism in person of its followers would say that it needs multitude of subjects not for *convention*, but only for *demonstration* that any chosen to front subject is not false even *one*, if his judgments are true – in that case intersubjectivism would be frank. Speaking about mentioned Husserl's axioms Apel marks: “Diese phänomenologisch-erkenntnisanthropologische Feststellung gründet sich auf jemeinige Anschauungsevidenz angesichts der individuellen

¹² Husserl, S.123.

¹³ For the first time the model of Enarch was proposed by me in 1994 : See.: Pavlenko A.N., Being at its Threshold// Human Being,- Moscow, 1994, № 2-3(In Russian).

¹⁴ Apel K.-O., Die Kommunikationsgemeinschaft als transzendente Voraussetzung der Sozialwissenschaften//Dialog als Methode, Neue Hefte für Philosophie,- Göttingen, 1972, Hf.2-3, S.4.

Phänomene; eben deshalb reicht sie indessen nicht aus, um die *a priori intersubjektive Geltung* der euklidischen Geometrie und der Farbsätze zu begründen”¹⁵. That means, if the quantity of subjects – one or many – doesn’t matter for nature of intersubjectively understood truth, the intersubjectivism is not quite fair, because for ideal as is doesn’t care about how many minds it is present in: one or billion. It is ideal just because it is not influenced by the specific contents of any subject’s mind, and of *one subject’s* mind as well. But if it is not influenced by the specific contents of any subject’s mind, then the question arises: what is the main reason of the appearing of intersubjectivism? Does it wish to prove firstly the *truth* of it’s own mind, or wish to *prove* firstly the truth of it’s own mind? Apel supposes that the way from the Kant’s “transcendental idealism” and Husserl’s phenomenology should lie through “language games” of subsequent Wittgenstein and Charles Peirce’s “indefinite Community of Investigators” - to his Apel’s “transcendental pragmatics”. Here the essential notion of truth expressed as follows: “Erst jetzt ist die *jemeinige Bewußtseinsevidenz* durch sprachliche Verständigung in eine *a priori-Geltung von Aussagen für uns* umgesetzt und kann daher im Sinne der Konsens-Theorie der Wahrheit als a priori verbindliche Erkenntnis gelten»¹⁶.

So, let’s ask one more time: what is the base for appearing of the being of the intersubjectivism itself – doubting the *truthfulness* of its own notions of ideal or the need of *checking*? Enarch’s example shows, that making in his mind such judgments as “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ” and “the green thing is not red” – he would have them as true self-equal judgments which don’t need *any proof* by different (many) subjects. I.e. if *ideal content of the judgment* is independent from the contents of thinking of the subject at all, then it cannot have *any chosen* subject’s mind (Peter’s or Paul’s) as its nature. But if *the number of subjects* which form the proposed intersubject – Enarch, is not the nature of ideal in every *particular case*, then it is not ideal *in the whole*. “Something” cannot be created from many “nothing”.

¹⁵ Ibidem, S.2.

¹⁶ Ibidem, S.3.

What conclusion can we make? It is important for us to mark, that if the nature of ideal does not root in human mind in general, then it has nothing to do neither with single human mind nor with the minds of multitude. Therefore not the ideal, as the condition of equal truth, finds its foundation in *intersubjectivism*, but on the contrary intersubjectivism tries to find itself a base in the being of ideal.

But if intersubjectivism (its thinking) and ideal (its truthfulness) interchange their places as reason and consequence, then *intersubjectivism preserves all the vices of subjectivism*. And only to avoid them it uses phantom, as we see now, help of *the inter-subjective proof*. The need of such proof itself has underneath the psychological nature of *unproved-ness* of the contents of the mind of this subject. Heidegger in his Marburg's lectures of winter term 1926-1927 discussed Husserl's philosophy and reminisced Natorp's remark about "Logical Studies", made in 1901: "...daЯ sie, die Marburger, nicht allzuviel htten lernen knnen von dieser Kritik des Psychologismus ¹⁷". "Das ist, - resumes Heidegger – in der Tat richtig".

In fact, something which needs to be proven cannot be the truth' parent. The judgment is not true because it is intersubjectively proved, but because it is capable of such proof, which contained truth of the ideal content, present before any act of proving. Thus we see, that the nature of truth is rooted not in the proof of many subjects but somewhere else.

So, we can admit historical "importance" of intersubjective approach. The being of genuine, totally retreated from the human, understood as subject led *the human to be the only genuine reality for himself, and firstly his thinking and consciousness*. Thus, consciousness of the subject (many subjects or many states of one subject) is the first and ultimate reality where he can prove himself and his consciousness.

Here it is necessary to point clearly that when Husserl appealed to such notions as "essence", "identifying acts", "correlation of thinking and being" in the same time he already demanded the refusal of "authorities higher or equal to the

¹⁷ Heidegger M., Logik. Der Frage nach der Wahrheit//Gesamtausgabe,- F.a.M., 1976, - Bd.21, S.51.

mind". Doing this he already entered the area of skepticism which led to the baselessness of the intersubjective program of justifying the theoretical judgments of thinking. Preserving this collapse Husserl has not yet dared to throw away *the ideal* specifically formed in "transcendental intersubjectiveness" from his philosophic baggage.

But much more radical thinkers have followed him. They denied not only sensual data, but even mental images (judgments in mind) in ability to have correlation in external reality. "Acts of identification" and "correlation of thinking and being" themselves were doubted. In this relation let's consider the Putnam's argument.

Putnam's argument "brains in a vat"

The crisis of European scientific rationality, which it survived in 20-th century left its trace upon the methods of thinking's justification. The consequent applying the positivistic program to get rid of the "any external authorities" in scientific thinking resulted in the collapse of the "scientistic hopes" and somewhat like renaissance of the skepticism. Works of K. Popper, T. Kun, P. Feyerabend, R. Rorty and many others seemed to finally uncrown "prejudices" about the existence of the "universalias". But even inside of that "skeptical space" one can hear the sober voice which *finds courage to be skeptic towards skepticism itself*. One of these "sober skeptics", in my opinion is American philosopher Hillary Putnam. Let's turn to the arguments, he uses for justification of thinking.

For demonstrating the lack of base of clear skepticism Putnam offered argument, which took place in the history of analytical philosophy under the name "brains in a vat". Not quoting all his argumentation, which can be found in his original work¹⁸, we will briefly remind of the main features.

Putnam argues as follows: if sensual images – signs – cannot represent anything "themselves", then how can mental forms do that? This question is

¹⁸ Putnam H., Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, -1981, P.1-21.

addressed in fact to Husserl and his followers: how “identification acts” are possible? For example how can the mental image of “green” be transparent phenomenologically from one mind to another? Finally, the specific wavelength and frequency of wave is not “the green” but only its numeric projection. That’s why Putnam asks: « How can thought reach out and ‘grasp’ what is external»¹⁹. Contemporary philosophers, just as Putnam himself, think that “mental images”, which are present in human consciousness, are connected with their carriers only contextually, randomly, conventionally. To prove this Putnam uses the example, borrowed from Wittgenstein, about the “mental image” of the “tree” accidentally transported to another inhabited planet. Its inhabitants will see nothing familiar in the “tree”.

Lets stay on it. In such attitude towards “signs” and “names” dashes in the word “salt” are connected with the “saltiness” no more than in the same way “mental representation” of *salt* with real salt. «Mental representations, - sad Putnam, - no more have a necessary connection with what they represent than physical representations do. The contrary supposition is a survival of magical thinking»²⁰. The reason why the mental representation is not equal to its object is absence of the uniform criteria of objects recognition! For Husserl such criteria was “unity of the thinking and being”, which made “essence” unite.

Then Putnam reconstructs the next step of the skepticism: not only “mental images” such correspondence but also “names” (words). “Thought words and mental pictures don’t inner represent the things they are pointing at” – makes Putnam a conclusion. What follows from this point of view? Follows that the whole world, which is present and given to us through perception is nothing greater than some *conventionality*. And overwhelming majority don’t even think about its nature. And some, who do, have to admit, that *convention* and *accident* are the main base of everything.

¹⁹ Ibidem,P.2.

²⁰ Ibidem, P.3.

Speaking clearer, the main conclusion of skepticism is – *the hole world is just an illusion.*

This made skeptic Putnam doubt this radical conclusion. By his own confession, he has been thinking for many years²¹ and finally found an argument against. This argument was called “brains in a vat”.

Putnam offers to admit that

- 1) There is a possibility (moral, anthropological, technical, etc.) to build such artificial object as “brains in a vat”, which are able to
- 2) accomplish all functions (physiological, mental, etc.) of human brain which every human being possesses. If this is true then we can admit that
- 3) the whole world observed, heard, thought, etc. by us is nothing more than “brains in a vat”.

After making such admission Putnam asks, if there is no difference between human brain and “brains in a vat”, isn’t everything we see around us just a gigantic illusion? In this case he makes an assumption: «It can not possibly be true, because it is, in certain way, self-refuting»²². Putnam’s argument which refutes the statement that “we are brains in a vat” is as follows: brains in a vat “... cannot (I claim) refer to what we can refer to. In particular, they cannot think or say that they are brains in a vat (even by thinking ‘we are brains in a vat’) »²³. The reason why the “brains in a vat” cannot do this is that they lack *reference*. I.e. they have nothing which they can point as the “brains in a vat”, according to the skepticism’s admission that there is no accordance between mental image (the meaning of the name “brains in a vat”) and its object. Putnam assumes that “brains in a vat” cannot point at anything external for it.

After that Putnam makes his final conclusion: the hypothesis about “brains in a vat” – world as an illusion – is self-refuting i.e. controversial and hence wrong. «So, -finished Putnam, - if we are brains in a vat, then the sentence

²¹ Ibidem, P.7.

²² Putnam,P.7.

²³ Ibidem,P.8.

‘We are brains in a vat’ says something false (if it says anything). In short, if we are brains in a vat, then ‘We are brains in a vat’ is false. So it is (necessarily) false»²⁴.

Thus Putnam brakes skepticism from *inside*, pointing at its non-strictness and hence non-universality. But still, achieving the result - “we are brains in a vat ” is false judgment – he leaves us in indefinite condition. From false statement *follows anything*. This means that Putnam showed us *where we shouldn’t go*, but didn’t show us *where we should*.

If we are not the “brains in a vat”, who are we then? Below I will try to show with the help of little bit transformed model of Enarch, that we can gain more radical conclusion, and show that consequent skepticism is much stronger then we can presume.

Theorem about “back of the head”

It is very important for me to demonstrate here, that elimination of the “third party” in fact makes skepticism invulnerable from the point of view of “unremovableness” of *its nature*, i.e. of *its initial source*. I believe that it incapable of being broken *from the inside*. And we can only ban the lame form of its expressing, but its source – the absence of the “third party” remains untouched. I will try to show it using the argument “*theorem about “back of the head”*”.

So let us return to the model of Enarch and make several admissions:

- 1) As intelligent creature, Enarch possesses *mind*;
- 2) Enarch has no organs except *head*;
- 3) He has no means of reality which let him take a look at himself (mirrors, Enarch-like creatures, any formed bodies, etc.);
- 4) Enarch’s visual sector equals 240° of 360° possible.

Now we can formulate *epistemological axiom*:

²⁴ Ibidem, P.15.

According to points 1-4 Enarch possesses the “back of the head” which sector has 120° .

In this relation let's ask a question: *can Enarch justify the presence of his “back of the head”, not leaving his mind's boundaries?* He has no limbs and cannot touch it. His mind doesn't have the “sense of the back of the head”. This leaves him only one possibility: to prove the existence of his “back of the head” by means of his mind. But he is *alone* and *has no historical experience*. The Enarch's “transcendental Ego”, as Husserl would call it, had the range of 240° in the past just as it has in the present. Thus he has nothing in his past to tell him about the presence of his “back of the head”.

On the other hand there is no such hints in his mental world. He has this “back of the head” only as some negative value. He, for example, can know, that the circle has 360° . Let's assume that he can derive from this, that his visual sector is much smaller, and hence there is 120° difference. But is it true? We can consider the visual sector “absolute everything” given to Enarch. As it is “everything”, then it is the named 360° . For sure let's place Enarch in the chamber with “homogeneous and isotropic radiation”, as it is called by modern cosmologists, where there is no formed shapes, which could tell him of visual lack from right or left. Homogeneous and isotropic light environment deny him of such possibility. And right is equal to left.

So isn't “the back of the head” just an illusion the same to “brains in a vat”? How we can prove this? We see, that Enarch's mind has no arguments to prove “the back of the head” presence. Skepticism led itself to a dead end.

Now we can formulate the *epistemological theorem*:

Enarch cannot prove himself the presence of “the back of the head”, by means of his physiological vision and mind.

This theorem, literally speaking, shows us *pure “ 120° skepticism”*. The main question, in relation with this theorem is: *which right has Enarch to judge anything if he cannot even prove his “the back of the head” presence?*

Conclusion

We see, that theorem shows the complexity of the discussed problem, but first of all, that *skepticism has real base in completely secularized mind of the Human Being in the New Time*. Thus skepticism is not just a whim of people disappointed with life, as it is often offered to consider. On the contrary, *it is strictly logical doctrine, consequent in its boundaries*. Not to understand this means to stay skepticism's prisoner.

That's why the main goal of the theorem about "the back of the head" – to reveal the absurd, the dead end, which skepticism finds in its attempts to get rid of the "external authorities". It is only illusion that it is easy to see this absurd – we can view Enarch from *outside*. We had him as something *external*. Enarch himself has no such possibility. Putnam showed that.

Arguments, given in relation with Enarch and his "back of the head" show as, first, that intersubjective program of getting out of the dead end doesn't solve the problem and lead out. And this means that the main contemporary forms of being and applying of this program – Apel's *Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*, communicative societies, various "dialogs of sciences", "dialogs of cultures", etc. – have in some sense – illusory status. Something *impossible in principle* can not be present in particular case. And second, objectively force the researchers to search for the exit on other programs.