
АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКОЕ
НАСЛЕДИЕ
КАК КОНСТИТУИРУЮЩИЙ
ЭЛЕМЕНТ
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ
РАЦИОНАЛЬНОСТИ



ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН
ЦЕНТР АНТИЧНОЙ И СРЕДНЕВЕКОВОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ И НАУКИ



ИНСТИТУТ ВСЕОБЩЕЙ ИСТОРИИ РАН
ЦЕНТР ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНОЙ ИСТОРИИ
ЦЕНТР ГЕНДЕРНОЙ ИСТОРИИ

ГУМАНИТАРНЫЕ НАУКИ
В ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯХ И ПЕРЕВОДАХ
VII



А К В И Л О Н

2017

RAS INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
CENTRE FOR ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE



RAS INSTITUTE OF WORLD HISTORY
CENTRE FOR INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
CENTRE FOR GENDER HISTORY

**THE LEGACIES OF ARISTOTLE
AS CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT
OF EUROPEAN RATIONALITY**

PROCEEDINGS OF THE MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARISTOTLE

RAS INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY,
OCTOBER 17–19, 2016

Edited by Valery V. Petroff



А К В И Л О Н

ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН
ЦЕНТР АНТИЧНОЙ И СРЕДНЕВЕКОВОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ И НАУКИ



ИНСТИТУТ ВСЕОБЩЕЙ ИСТОРИИ РАН
ЦЕНТР ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНОЙ ИСТОРИИ
ЦЕНТР ГЕНДЕРНОЙ ИСТОРИИ

**АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКОЕ НАСЛЕДИЕ
КАК КОНСТИТУИРУЮЩИЙ ЭЛЕМЕНТ
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ РАЦИОНАЛЬНОСТИ**

МАТЕРИАЛЫ МОСКОВСКОЙ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ
КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ПО АРИСТОТЕЛЮ

ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН,
17–19 ОКТЯБРЯ 2016 г.

Под общей редакцией В.В. Петрова



А К В И Л О Н

УДК 1/19
ББК 87.3
А 81

*Конференция организована и проведена при поддержке
Российского научного фонда (РНФ). Проект № 15–18–30005
«Наследие Аристотеля как конституирующий элемент
европейской рациональности в исторической перспективе»*

•
*Издание подготовлено при поддержке
Российского научного фонда (РНФ). Проект № 15–18–30005
«Наследие Аристотеля как конституирующий элемент
европейской рациональности в исторической перспективе»*

Рецензенты

Доктор философских наук *А.Л. Доброхотов*
Член-корреспондент РАН, доктор исторических наук *Л.П. Репина*
Доктор философских наук *В.К. Шохин*

Аристотелевское наследие как конституирующий элемент
европейской рациональности. Материалы Московской
международной конференции по Аристотелю. Институт философии
РАН, 17–19 октября 2016 г. / Под общ. ред. В.В. Петрова.
М.: Аквилон, 2017. – 708 с. + xii, с илл. (Гуманитарные науки
в исследованиях и переводах [Т. VII]: изд. с 2010 г.)

Книга представляет собой сборник материалов Московской международной конференции «Аристотелевское наследие как конституирующий элемент европейской рациональности», прошедшей в Институте философии РАН 17–19 октября 2016 г. в год празднования 2400-летнего юбилея Аристотеля. В книге собраны работы отечественных и зарубежных ученых, исследователей Аристотеля и специалистов в смежных областях знания, рассматривающих многообразные аспекты учения самого философа, а также особенности усвоения его учения в последующей традиции. Дается анализ теорий и идей самого Аристотеля, рассматривается отношение его взглядов к предшествующим учениям. В ряде публикаций исследуется рецепция и трансформация аристотелизма в последующей интеллектуальной, философской, научной традициях: западноевропейской латинской, византийской, ренессансной, нововременной. Особый раздел книги составили работы, исследующие влияние аристотелизма на естественные науки. В составе авторов — ученые из России, постсоветских государств, дальнего зарубежья.

Научное издание

ISBN 978–5–906578–29–7

© Коллектив авторов, 2017
© В.В. Петров, общая редакция, составление, 2017
© Издательство «Аквилон», 2017

*Репродуцирование (воспроизведение) данного издания любым способом
без письменного соглашения с издателем запрещается.*

Valery PETROFF

ARISTOTLE'S TEACHING ON GROWTH AND GROWING AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY OF A HUMAN BODY*

Aristotle's teaching on growth and growth, as it was formulated in his *On Generation and Perishing*, is original and self-sufficient. In this essay, however, we are going to explore the fate of this doctrine in the posterior tradition, namely its use in the discussions about the bodily identity of the individual. As we will argue, Aristotle's reasoning was adopted and transformed both by pagan commentators and by Christian theologians. We are going to outline the development of the relevant views on the εἶδος or corporeal form of the growing body. The problem of the identity of a living human being was raised already by Epicharmus (c. 540 – c. 450 BC) who wondered whether a man who inevitably changes from minute to minute still stays the same or whether he constantly becomes a different person¹. Plato who speaks on the bodily changes in his *Symposium*², mentions Epicharmus and, perhaps, borrows from him. Epicharmus' paradox was developed by the Sophists into the so called "Growing argument" according to which a growing being always becomes something else.

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle did not study specifically the problem of identity and identification, but in his various writings discusses a number of issues that somehow relate to it³. His *On Generation and Perishing* I, 5 is devoted to "growth" (Περί

* The study is sponsored by the Russian Science Foundation under the Project (# 15–18–30005) "The Legacy of Aristotle as a constituting element of European rationality in historical perspective" (Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Science).

¹ *Epicharmus*. Fr. 170, 7–18 (Kaibel).

² *Plato*. *Symp.* 207d–208b.

³ Cf. *Lloyd A.C.* Aristotle's Principle of Individuation. P. 519–529; *Furth M.* Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances. P. 624–46; *Petroff V.* Aristotelevskaja tradicija o tekuchesti... P. 82–92; *Idem.* Elementy aristotelevskoj doktriny o roste i rastushhem...P. 117–130.

αὐξήσεως)⁴. Aristotle begins by asking “in what growth (αὐξησις) differs from the coming-to-be and alteration (γενέσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως)» (320a 8). He begins with the growth in its metrical aspect, meaning by it the quantitative change (320 a 14-15). “Growth is an increase... of the magnitude which is there already” (τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις) (320b 30-34).

According to Aristotle, if speak of growth, three basic characteristics must be preserved: (i) any and every part of the growing magnitude is made bigger. If flesh grows, every particle of the flesh gets bigger, (ii) by the accession of something, and (iii) in such a way that the growing thing is preserved and persists” (321a 17-22)⁵.

Aristotle puts stress on biological issues. What is relevant to our investigation here is his view that while the matter of the body is fluid and receives additions and subtractions, it is the form (εἶδος) of the body that preserves its identity, varying only in quantity (321b 22-28).

Besides, and this is important, Aristotle states that such bodily εἶδος is a kind of power immersed in the matter. He compares it with *elastic duct* (αὐλός) which imposes form on the water flowing through it. Depending on the amount of water the duct can expand and contract, but retains the distinctive features of its visual shape, thus providing the identity of that body of which it is a form (322a 28-31).

Further Aristotle apparently implies the drying of the body with aging. If the εἶδος of an organic body weakens over time (a continuous flow of water through it, as it were, dilutes its strength and formative ability). Although εἶδος keeps recognizability, it decreases in size⁶.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

Unfortunately, Alexander's commentary on GC has been lost. However, Alexander's arguments are available from his other works, as well as from Philoponus' commentary on GC, which sometimes is a paraphrase of Alexander's discussion⁷.

Alexander reformulates Aristotle's arguments in the last chapter of his *On Mixture and Growth*. He renders it in a more technical language, making the opposition between εἶδος and matter sharper:

⁴ *Arist.* GC I, 5, 320a 8 – 322a 33. In presenting the teachings of Aristotle on growth, I rely on work: *Rashed M.*, “Introduction”. P. xi-clxxxvi.

⁵ *Ibid.* GC 321a 17–22.

⁶ *Ibid.* GC 322a 31–33.

⁷ See *Kupreeva I.* Alexander of Aphrodisias on Mixture and Growth // Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. 2004. № 27. P. 297–334.

“When we say that the flesh is continuously flowing..., we say that the flesh is undergoing all this in relation to the matter. On the other hand, when we say that the flesh remains (μένειν) the same, we take it in relation to its εἶδος and speak this about the εἶδος... Although something from the substratum (ὑποβεβλημένης) matter is taken away, and something is added, there is the εἶδος that does not change in itself (μένον ἐν αὐτῷ). Εἶδος prevents flesh from complete disappearance in a series of changes”⁸.

So, Alexander says that the flesh is fluid in relation to matter, but it remains the same as applied to the εἶδος (ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους) and according to the εἶδος (κατὰ τὸ εἶδος). In the alterations of the matter that the living body undergoes, the “εἶδος of the flesh” remains unchanged. Thus it is the essence of the flesh.

Continuing to explain the mechanism of nutrition and growth of the body, as well as the stability of the characteristic features of the growing body, Alexander illustrates this in the following way. If Aristotle spoke of the *elastic duct* (αὐλός) and matter, comparing the duct with wine, and the matter with water⁹; Alexander transforms the “duct” into a “hose”, and calls the liquid that flows through it “wine” (οἶνος), then “water” (ὕδωρ), then simply a “liquid” (ὕγρον).

As a hose (ὁ σωλήν), through which the fluid flows, preserves the same shape (σχῆμα), while shrinking or expanding according to the amount of the fluid flowing through it, so the matter flows through a living being, and depending on its quantity the εἶδος can decrease or increase, always keeping its shape (i.e. identity)¹⁰.

What increases is not a substratum (the water) because water has no identity. On the contrary, the form is stable, keeps its identity and allows expansion and contraction (i.e., it may be increasing). Similarly, Alexander continues, what increases in a living being is its εἶδος¹¹.

JOHN PHILOPONUS

In his commentary on Aristotle’s GC, John Philoponus (c. 490 – c. 570) expresses the same Aristotelian doctrine in terms of later philosophical tradition, saying that

⁸ Alexander. De mixtione 235, 21–33.

⁹ Arist. GC 322a 28–33.

¹⁰ Alexander. De mixt. 237, 28 – 238, 10.

¹¹ Petroff V. Aristotel’ i Aleksandr Afrodisijskij o roste i rastushhem P. 394–402.

“...each of enmattered things (ἕκαστον τῶν ἐνύλων πραγμάτων) is spoken in two ways: either in relation to the matter (κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) or in relation to the εἶδος (κατὰ τὸ εἶδος)”¹².

The terminology is remarkable because τὸ ἐνύλον belongs to vocabulary of Alexander and Plotinus; Aristotle himself does not discuss opposition “in relation to the matter” / “in relation to the εἶδος” openly.

Like his predecessors Philoponus says that

“It remains, therefore, for the εἶδος to be the thing which grows (τὸ εἶδος εἶναι τὸ αὐξόμενον), since this is the only thing which remains... not without the matter (τὸ μόνον ὑπομένον οὐ χωρὶς ὕλης), for this is impossible, but always being kept the same in relation to matter (περὶ τὴν ὕλην) which comes to be larger and smaller and different at different times, some flowing away and some being assimilated”¹³.

Here he clarifies:

But when we say that the εἶδος is that which grows (τὸ αὐξόμενον), do not think that the εἶδος itself undergoes change (μεταβολήν) in respect of its eternal and substantial definition (κατὰ τὸν οὐσιώδη καὶ αἰδίων λόγον), for in its own definition εἶδος is incorporeal and sizeless (ἄσώματον τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἀμέγεθες), but in respect of quantity (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν); for it is this which also signifies growth. Εἶδος is said to change in respect of quantity in that it comes to be in more or less matter (τῷ ἐν πλείονι ἢ ἐν ἐλάττωι ὑποκειμένῳ γίνεσθαι). This is the way in which a hand or a face *appears* to grow (φαίνεται αὐξόμενον), not because the form of the face or the hand has changed (τοῦ εἶδους μεταβάλλοντος)”¹⁴.

Thus, according to Philoponus, the enmattered εἶδος is unchanged, but turns out to be in a substratum that differs in quantity. It forms this substratum, which *appears* larger or smaller, but retains its geometric shape and proportions.

Then Philoponus adds that if both the matter and the εἶδος do not stay numerically the same, their combination (Socrates) would surely not be the same either (οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν αἰεὶ κατ’ ἀριθμόν). By referring to Socrates Philoponus introduces in his discussion an echo of a related discussion about the preservation of the identity of the changing living body. According to Philoponus, the εἶδος considered with respect to growth is what defines the being of the living body, and is

¹² Philoponus. in GC 103, 26-27. Cf. *Arist.* GC 321b 19-22, a так же *Alexander.* De mixt. 235, 21-33.

¹³ Philoponus. in GC 104, 20-23.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 104, 24-31.

the essence of this body¹⁵. Here Philoponus makes an important differentiation, distinguishing the substantial εἶδος from the εἶδος in the sense of the figure and shape. It is not matter but the εἶδος that stays numerically the same, be it “the substantial form (as the form of Socrates) or the form in the sense of *shape* and *figure* (τὸ τε οὐσιῶδες καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφήν)¹⁶.”

Here the substratum (ὑποκείμενον) is a synonym for matter. Paradoxically, the substratum, which by etymology should be something stable, in this approach represents fluidity, although further Philoponus says that some “lumps” of it retain their identity throughout the life of the individual.

Philoponus continues by providing three examples, consistently comparing the εἶδος

— with a sack (ὁ θύλακος) into which things (τὰ ἐμβαλλόμενα) were thrown¹⁷;

— with a hose made of skin (ὁ σωλήν δερμάτινος) through which the fluid flows¹⁸;

— with a shadow (σκιά) cast by a solid body on the surface of a flowing river¹⁹.

Each of the examples has its own flaw. The sack completely contains the objects thrown in it, but it cannot really be called their shape. The hose does affect the shape of the fluid flowing through it, but does not contain it.

Finally, the shadow on the surface of the river does not physically interact with the stream. Here the body that cast a shadow over the river represents a true being or separated εἶδος, while its “shadow” presents a sensible shape (geometric εἶδος); and “the stream or river” is the matter which is flowing through the hose. If we remember that human being was also compared to a stream or river, the analogy is complete.

The Neoplatonic understanding of the relationship between the incorporeal and the body presupposed a stronger connection. Porphyry, although he believed that the incorporeal is present in bodies not hypostatically, like water or air in a wineskin (ἄσκός), suggested the existence of some disembodied disposition (διαθέσει ποιῶ) and addiction (προσπαθείας) in relation to bodies²⁰. Nemesius of

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 105, 2-9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 105, 15-18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 105, 18-21.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 105, 21-26.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 106, 11-17.

²⁰ *Porphyry*. Sent. 27: «The actual presence (ὑπόστασις) of body constitutes no impediment at all to that which is incorporeal in itself from being where it wishes and as it wills... It is therefore by reason of a definite disposition (διαθέσει ποιῶ) that it is to be found where it is (δίακειται)»; *Ibid.* 28: «No body can enclose and embrace [the incorporeal] in the way that a sack might contain some liquid or air (ὡς ἄσκος ὑγρὸν τι ἢ

Emesa described this as a connection “according to a relation” (κατὰ σχέσιν). In any case, equally Plato, Porphyry and Nemesius considered this attitude as an emotional attachment.

On the contrary, in Philoponus the connection is completely speculative and ghostly. The shadow does not form any water over which it is stretched; and the shaded part of the flowing water can not affect the body that throws its shadow on it. The image of the εἶδος “stretching” (ἐφαπλοῦσθαι) over the substratum also most likely implies the imagery of a shadow cast over something not connected to it.

Finally, Philoponus implies that in his discussion he deals with *quantitative* and not *qualitative* change. He illustrates this with the case of a statue (ὁ ἀνδριάς) whose limbs had been replaced piece by piece with the limbs of different shape, so that

“...in time the whole (ὅλον) statue comes to be numerically different (ἄλλον ἐξ ἄλλου), not only in respect of its matter, the bronze, but also in respect of its individual shape and figure (κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ἄτομον καὶ τὴν μορφήν)”²¹.

On the contrary, substitution of the matter in the body resembles a continuity of a stream, in which there are no pieces and gaps:

“...the whole river itself as a whole (ὅλος ὡς ὅλος) is *continuous* with itself (αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ συνεχῆς ὑπάρχει). The parts of the water succeed each other *continuously* (κατὰ συνέχειαν) and without a break (ἀδιακόπως) fill up again the place of that which has flowed away, leaving no gap (διάλειμμα) between them”²².

Remarkably, the example with a statue was introduced by Aristotle in his “Physics”. But there it was used in the opposite context, namely, within the framework of reasoning not about *quantitative* growth but about the generation of being, the examples of which Aristotle saw in the remaking of a statue and the change in the matter, which resulted in a *qualitative* change²³.

πνεῦμα)... An what loses [the incorporeal] is not the body when it is shattered and destroyed, but when it [the incorporeal] has turned itself away from its attachment (προσπαθείας) [to the body]». Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 81c, e.

²¹ Philoponus. in GC 106, 18-23.

²² *Ibid.* 106, 28-31.

²³ *Arist.* *Physica* I, 7, 190b 5–9: «Things which come to be (γιγνόμενα), come to be... by *change of shape*, as a statue (τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίζει, οἷον ἀνδριάς), by addition, as things which grow (τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, οἷον τὰ ἀξάνόμενα);... by [qualitative] alteration as things which ‘turn’ in respect of their material substance (τὰ δ’ ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην)».

Alexander of Aphrodisias supports this view in his “On the Soul” :

“For shape (σχῆμα) functions as a part by conferring on the statue a *qualitative* (εἰς τὸ ποιόν) rather than a *quantitative* (εἰς τὸ ποσόν) perfection, and as a part moreover that cannot continue to function in separation from its material counterpart, [the bronze]²⁴”.

For our reasoning, it is important that Alexander unambiguously associates the “shape” (σχῆμα) with the *qualitative* form, but not, as Philoponus believes, with the *quantitative* form. Remarkably, the Christian theologian Methodius of Olympus (died c. 311) in his polemics with Origen developed the same line, considering the sensually perceptible shape of the body to be a *qualitative* form, ποιὰν μορφήν (see *below*).

In contrast to Aristotle, who suggests that the εἶδος eventually loses its strength and ability to impose a form on the matter, Philoponus thinks that *it is the matter* which becomes weary and fatigued:

“It must not be thought that the whole of the matter as a whole (ὅλην καθ’ ὅλην) replaces itself over time... so that there is no <bit of> body in us when we have grown old <which was part> of the matter that was in us at the time of our original framing (τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συμπήξεως ὑποκειμένου ἐν ἡμῖν). For if that were so, it would be possible for animals to be immortal, their matter always being at its peak (τῆς ὕλης ἀκμαζούσης). As it is, however, the matter is not able to keep its form throughout its whole extent (δι’ ὅλου), since it becomes weary (κάμνειν) with time, the parts that have been fitted together (τῶν συναρμοσθέντων) being incapable of preserving throughout the harmony and correct mixture (ἁρμονίαν καὶ σύγκρασιν) as a result of their being affected by the contrary powers”²⁵.

Philoponus now speaks about the peak of the matter, as earlier he spoke about the peak of the flesh: they are synonymous for him.

In addition to the continuity of the material change, Philoponus rejects the idea of his predecessors concerning the *complete* changeability of the matter in the living body and insists on the presence of some “lumps” of matter that are resistant to erosion and dissipation. This is illustrated by the example of scars:

²⁴ *Alexander*. De anima 18, 17–23 (Fotinis). Cf. V. Caston’s translation: “For the shape of the statue is a part, though not in a way that contributes something to its size — it contributes to its character instead — and not as something that can persist in separation from the matter.”

²⁵ *Philoponus*. in GC 107, 3–10.

“...not all the matter is dissipated (διαφορεῖσθαι) but the more solid parts (τὰ στερεώτερα) of it particularly remain always numerically the same (τὰ αὐτὰ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν). This is why we also see the scars of wounds (ἐκ τραυμάτων οὐλάς) which may chance to have been received in youth, remain in flesh and bones until death. So for this reason too the εἶδος also must remain numerically the same”²⁶.

It is plausible, that the example with the scars belonged to Alexander’s commentary, since it is also used by Origen (see below).

SIMPLICIUS

The tradition of reasoning about growth and growing continued to exist in the Neoplatonic tradition, which absorbed both Aristotelian and Stoic elements. A contemporary of Philoponus, Simplicius (c. 490 – c. 560) writes in a commentary on Aristotle’s “Categories”:

“Although the matter continuously flows (ῥέη συνεχῶς), and someone would agree with this, and the bodies undergo additions and subtractions to infinity, but similarly there is something that obviously remains (τὸ μένον), whether (1) the *second substratum* (τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον), as it is called by some, (2) or *individually defined* (τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν), as others say, (3) or the substance related to the species (ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία), (4) or individual and composite substance (ἢ ἄτομος καὶ σύνθετος οὐσία), or (5) something like that, which preserves stability through the changes and remains recognizable (γνωρίζεται) from beginning to end. We are speaking about the visible things and not of the things invisible that produce disputes”²⁷.

It is noteworthy that Simplicius mentions the Stoic concept ἰδίως ποιόν, which had been most actively used in the debates between the Stoics and the Platonists in regard to individual identity and its preservation through changes. It can be concluded from Simplicius’ list that ἰδίως ποιόν, τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, and σύνθετος οὐσία are identical.

In the final section of his commentary on Aristotle’s “Categories”, Simplicius again refers to the same substratum, accompanying it with an interesting illustration. He applies the concept of growth to numerically different entities which have different substratum. These entities are only “homonymous” but possess the same “εἶδος”. Simplicius writes:

²⁶ *Ibid.* 107, 10-14.

²⁷ *Simplicius.* in Categ. 140, 25-31.

“It must be thought that an object remaining the same in relation to figure (μορφή) and quality (ποιότητα) can grow by acquiring only difference in size, for example, the εἶδος of Alexander [the Great] was in the ring frame and belonged to the colossus of Alexander, shaped (σχηματισθέντι) on Mount Athos²⁸. Therefore, they say that a certain *individually defined* (ὁ ἰδίως ποιός) remains (διαμένειν) the same from infancy to old age under changing quantity (τοῦ ποσοῦ ἀμειβομένου), retaining the εἶδος. Conversely, if the magnitude remains the same, nothing prevents a change in quality (μεταβάλλειν κατὰ ποιότητα), such as fermented wine has changed its quality, but stays the same in quantity (τῷ ποσῷ)”²⁹.

Obviously, “individually defined” is understood by Simplicius with recognizability and uniqueness of the characteristic features of the image, but not with identity in substance or substratum.

As can be seen, Simplicius, while making allusion to the discussion on growth and growing, associates the “*individually defined*” with recognizable and unique features of shape, but not with the identity in matter (ὑποκείμενον) which underlies the εἶδος.

ORIGEN

Many concepts developed in the field of classical philosophy, were later borrowed and transformed by early Christian theologians who adapted them to their own needs. The same happened to the reasoning concerning the identity of the individual body³⁰. The question of how the living body can preserve its iden-

²⁸ According to Vitruvius, a Macedonian architect Dinocrates created a plan to shape Mount Athos into the figure of the statue of Alexander the Great. Cf. *Vitruvius. De architectura* II, Proem. 2, 3 – 3, 1.

²⁹ *Simplicius. in Categ.* 430, 4.

³⁰ It is worth mentioning that the notion that matter passing through a hose does not take any qualities from it, too has been used in Christological disputes. Cf. *Greg. Nazianz. Ep.* 101, 16, 2–5 (Gallay, SC 208): «If anyone says that Christ went through the Virgin as through a hose (διὰ σωλήνος διαδραμεῖν), and was not formed in her both in divine and human manner... this one is godless too»; *Eriphanus. Panarion* 396, 9–12: «[Valentinus and his followers believe that] the body of Christ, which descended from above, passed through the Virgin Mary like water through a hose (διὰ σωλήνος), and nothing took away from the virgin womb, and that He had a body from above, as before»; *Joannes Damascenus. Dialectica* LVI, 10–12: «The Holy Virgin gave birth not to a simple man, but to a true God, not naked [God], but the Incarnate one, who did not take the body from heaven and did not slip through Her as through a hose (διὰ σωλήνος παρελθόντα)»; *Idem.*,

tity from beginning to end, together with the problem of the succession and identity between this human mortal body and the body of resurrection was discussed by Origen (184 / 185–253 / 254) in his early treatise *On the Resurrection*, written in Alexandria. This work has not survived, but most of it is available in a paraphrase by Methodius of Olympus, who in his own *On the Resurrection* criticizes and quotes Origen at length³¹. The Christian dogma demanded that the risen body and even the flesh was identical with the earthly body. Apparently, Origen accepted only the identity of the “body” but not the “flesh”, rejecting the “vulgar” interpretation of those who believed that the same bones, flesh and veins would be resurrected³². Origen seems to develop the Pauline statement “It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body” (1Cor 15:44) into a physical theory. For this he uses arguments from the reasoning about growth and growing developed in the Aristotelian tradition, combining it with the Stoic concept of the seminal logos (λόγος σπερματικός), which he identifies with the substantial εἶδος. In addition, his approach to the problem — since he presupposes the existence of the εἶδος separated from the body and the existence of the subtle body of the soul — bears a clear imprint of Platonism.

At some point of his dissertation Origen silently turns to Alexander's arguments concerning the εἶδος of the growing living body. He develops a concept of an individual “corporeal eidos” (εἶδος σωματικόν), which ensures the identity of the earthly body to itself and to the risen body³³:

“By nature no body ever has the same *material substratum* (ὕλικὸν ὑποκείμενον)... Thus the body has not inaptly been called a river. For strictly speaking, the *first substratum* in our bodies is scarcely the same

Expositio fidei III, 12 (56), 12: «The Virgin gave birth not to a simple man, but to a true God... who did not bring the body from heaven or passed through Her as through a hose but adopted from Her the flesh consubstantial with us».

³¹ Methodius' dialogue “Aglaophon, or On the Resurrection” came to us completely only in the Slavonic translation. The Greek text of the part of the dialogue (I, 20-II, 8 Bonwetsch) is available in Epiphanius of Cyprus' “Panarion” (Heresy 64). A selection of excerpts from the Greek text is also contained in Photius' “Library” (codex 234). The third book of Methodius' treatise was entirely preserved only in the Slavonic translation. For the complete work of Methodius see Bonwetsch's edition in GCS 27.

³² *Meth.* De resur. I, 24; = *Epiph.* Panar. II, 64, 5–6. S. 426, 13–18.

³³ The analysis of Origen's doctrine of the bodily εἶδος, see in Chadwick H. Origen, Celsus, and the Resurrection of the Body. P. 83–102. H. Crouzel believed that Methodius misunderstood Origen's concept of the corporeal εἶδος, cf. Crouzel H. Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian. P. 155–157. See also Hennessey L.R. A Philosophical Issue in Origen's Eschatology: The Three Senses of Incorporeality. P. 273–280, according to which Origen did not identify the corporeal εἶδος and the bodily appearance.

for two days, even though, despite the fluidity of the nature of a body (ρευστή ἢ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος), Paul's body, say, or Peter's, is always the same. (Sameness does not apply only to the soul, the nature of which is neither in flux like our [body's], nor ever susceptible of addition.) This is because the εἶδος which characterizes the body is the same (τὸ εἶδος τὸ χαρακτηρίζον τὸ σῶμα ταῦτόν εἶναι), just as the features (τύπους) which represent Peter's or Paul's corporeal quality (ποιότητα σωματικῆν) remain the same; according this quality such characteristics as scars (οὐλαί) remain on the body from childhood, as also such peculiarities as moles (φακοί), and any others besides.

This bodily εἶδος (τὸ εἶδος τὸ σωματικόν), according to which Peter and Paul receives form (εἰδοποιεῖται), encloses the soul once more (περιτίθεται πάλιν τῇ ψυχῇ) at the resurrection, being changed (μεταβάλλον) for the better one — but this does not happen at all to the substratum built according the first [flesh] (οὐ πάντως τότε τὸ ἐκτεταγμένον τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ὑποκείμενον).

For as the εἶδος is < the same > from infancy until old age even though the features (χαρακτήρες) appear to undergo considerable change, so we must suppose that, though its change for the better will be very great, our present εἶδος will be the same in the world to come.

For a soul which is in bodily places must have bodies befitting the places. And just as, if we had to become water creatures and lived in the sea, we would surely need gills and the other features of fish, so, as we are to inherit the kingdom of heaven and live in places superior to ours, we must have spiritual (πνευματικοῦς) bodies, however, not such that the former εἶδος is destroyed, but that there is a change (αὐτοῦ ἢ τροπῆ) to a more glorious one, just as, at the Transfiguration, the εἶδος of Jesus, Moses and Elijah did not become different from what it had been³⁴.

Therefore, according to Origen only the substratum changes at the resurrection but the εἶδος remains the same:

“Therefore do not be offended if someone should say that the first substratum (τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον) will not be the same (ταῦτόν) then... In a similar way this will be maintained in the case of the holy <body> by that [εἶδος] which previously gave form to the flesh³⁵ —

³⁴ *Meth.* De resur. I, 22; = *Ephiph.* Panar. 64, 14, 2-9. S. 423, 11 – 424, 11.

³⁵ Here F. Williams translate: ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰδοποιούντος ποτε τὴν σάρκα, as “by Him who gave form to the flesh.” I see no reason in reference to Christ in this technical reasoning and modify the translation. It is from the εἶδος that the substratum or flesh receives its

which is flesh no longer, but whatever was once characteristic in the flesh (ἐχαρακτηρίζετο ἐν τῇ σαρκί) the same will be characteristic in the spiritual body (τοῦτο χαρακτηρισθήσεται ἐν τῷ πνευματικῷ σώματι)³⁶.

Remarkably, Origen's εἶδος is separable from the substratum and, therefore, the substantial one. However, it does not coincide with the soul. Origen rejects the interpretation of the simple minds who believe that the same bones, flesh and veins will rise:

“...the bodily form (τὸ σωματικὸν εἶδος)... being by nature mortal (τῇ φύσει θνητὸν ὄν)... will itself be changed from a ‘body of death’... and from < fleshly > become spiritual... It is also clear that the first substratum will not be raised (τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἀναστήσεται)³⁷.”

His views, set forth in the treatise “On the Resurrection”, Origen calls the “physicalistic reasoning about the εἶδος and the first substratum of the body”³⁸. The process of preservation of the εἶδος Origen illustrates with the example already familiar to us (but instead of Alexander’s “hose” he refers to a “wineskin”):

“You have surely seen an animal skin, or something else of the sort, filled with water in such a way that, if it is emptied of a little of its water and then filled with a little, it always shows the same εἶδος; for the container’s contents must receive the shape (σχηματίζεσθαι) of the container. Well then, suppose the water is leaking out. If one adds an amount of water equal to that which is spilled and does not allow the skin to be entirely emptied of water, unless that occurs the added water must look like the water which was there before, since the container of the inflowing and the outflowing water is the same.

Now if one chooses to compare the body to this, he will not be put to shame. For what is brought in by the food in place of the flesh which has been eliminated will likewise be changed *into the shape of the εἶδος* which contains it (εἰς τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ περιέχοντος εἶδους μεταβαλοῦνται). And the part of it that is dispersed to the eyes looks like the eyes, the part that is dispersed to the face looks like the face, and the part that is dispersed to the other members looks like them. Thus everyone looks the same, though there is no flesh in them of the

form (εἰδοποιεῖται).

³⁶ *Meth.* De resur. I, 23; = *Epiiph.* Panar. 64, 15, 1–4. S. 424, 12–23.

³⁷ *Meth.* De resur. I, 24; = *Epiiph.* Panar. 64, 16, 5–6. S. 426, 13–18.

³⁸ *Meth.* De resur. I, 24; = *Epiiph.* Panar. 64, 16, 4. S. 426, 10–11.

first substratum (τῶν πρῶτον ὑποκειμένων), but that of the εἶδος according to which what is brought in receives form (εἰδοποιῶνται τὰ προσγγόμενα).

Now if we are not the same in body even for a few days but are the same by the εἶδος in the body (τῷ εἶδει τῷ ἐν τῷ σώματι) — only this remains from its generation — all the more, neither will we be the same in the flesh then, but we shall be the same according the εἶδος which now < and > always is preserved and remains in us. And what is ‘skin’ there, is εἶδος here, and what in that analogy is ‘water’, is here the addition and subtraction [of the flesh].

Therefore, like now, although the body is not the same but its specificity (χαρακτήρ) remains the same since it has the same form (αὐτὴν μορφήν), so then, though the body will not be the same either, its εἶδος grown (τὸ εἶδος ἀξηθέν) into more glorious state, will be manifest in no longer perishable, but in an impassible and spiritual body as Jesus’ was at the Transfiguration when he ascended the mountain with Peter, and as were the bodies of Moses and Elijah who appeared to Him³⁹.

The formula τὸ εἶδος ἀξηθέν here is an echo of Alexander’s arguments about what exactly changes in size in the living growing body. Moreover, the entire excerpt cited is a summary of Alexander’s reasoning concerning nutrition and growth.

When εἶδος gives form to the first matter, it thereby transforms it. It is no accident, that the εἶδος is compared by Origen to a seminal logos of the Stoics, which by its own forces changes the qualities of matter:

“For if we have understood the illustration (παράδειγμα) properly, we must hold that when the seminal logos (σπερματικὸς λόγος) in the grain of wheat has laid hold of the matter which surrounds it, has permeated it entirely <and> has taken control of its εἶδος, it imparts its own powers to what was formerly earth, water, air and fire, and by prevailing over their characteristics (ποιότητες) transforms them into the thing of which it is the creator. And thus the ear of grain comes to maturity, vastly different from the original seed in size, shape (σχῆματι) and complexity⁴⁰”.

The two concepts — εἶδος σωματικόν and λόγος σπερματικὸς — thus describe two aspects of one reality, postulating the principle of existence inherent in each body, which at all stages of life imposes an individual imprint on the

³⁹ *Meth. De resur.* I, 25; = *Eriph. Panar.* 64, 17, 6–10. S. 428, 4 – 429, 6.

⁴⁰ *Meth. De resur.* I, 24; = *Eriph. Panar.* 64, 16, 7–9. S. 426, 19 – 427, 4.

substratum, on ever changing matter, creating a structure out of the substratum. Since this εἶδος survives the death of the earthly body it must be imprinted on a subtle pneumatic body which the soul never loses⁴¹.

CRITICISM OF ORIGEN'S THEORY
BY METHODIUS OF OLYMPUS

Origen's doctrine of the risen body and especially the doctrine of the bodily εἶδος were strongly criticized by Methodius of Olympus († 312). In general, Methodius closely follows Alexander of Aphrodisias. Methodius argues that the εἶδος of which Origen told was not the *substantial* but the *qualitative* form and even an external shape of the body⁴². Alexander argues:

“The εἶδος and matter are parts of the body not in the sense [that they can be separated from it], but they are like bronze and shape (μορφή) of a statue (τοῦ ἀνδριάντος)... For the figure (σχῆμα) of the statue is a part, though not in a way that contributes something to its size (εἰς τὸ ποσὸν) — it contributes to its *quality* (εἰς τὸ ποιόν) instead — and not as something that can persist in separation from the matter”⁴³.

Alexander, as a peripatetic, believes that the material form does not exist in separation from the substratum and that the soul and body are linked as εἶδος and matter, like the shape (σχῆμα) of the statue and the bronze from which it is made. Methodius agrees with this:

“The εἶδος of the flesh will be destroyed first like the shape of a melting statue (τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ ἀνδριάντος) is destroyed before the whole is disintegrated, because the *quality* cannot be separated from matter by existence (καθ' ὑπόστασιν)”⁴⁴.

If Methodius could have known the illustration which Simplicius would have suggested later, the illustration comparing Alexander the Great engraved in a signet-ring and Alexander represented by a colossus, he would find it very appropriate. For Methodius this is the *qualitative* εἶδος and as such it cannot guarantee the identity of the earthly and resurrected body.

Probably because of these counterarguments Origen, who understood the bodily εἶδος as a substantial one, strengthened his reasoning with a Stoic theory of seminal *logos*. It seems that the concept of the ἰδίως ποιόν could also offer interesting solutions to the participants of our discussion.

⁴¹ When Origen speaks about “body” he usually means only the earthly one.

⁴² Meth., *De resur.* III, 3; = Photius, 299a, 37 – 299b, 6.

⁴³ Alexander. *De anima* 18, 17–23.

⁴⁴ Meth. *De resur.* III, 6; = Photius, 300a, 17–26, p. 103.

GREGORY OF NYSSA

Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335 – c. 395), who was a follower of Origen, seems to repeat his arguments:

“For neither *what is ours* (τὸ ἡμέτερον) is altogether subject to flux and change (ἐν ῥύσει καὶ μεταβολῇ) — since surely that which had by nature no stability (στάσις) would be completely incomprehensible (ἄληπτον) — but according to the more accurate statement some of our constituent parts stay (τι ἔστηκε) while the rest goes through a process of alteration (δι’ ἀλλοιώσεως πρόεισιν): for the body is on the one hand altered (ἀλλοιοῦται) by way of growth and diminution like clothes (ἱμάτια) that are changed during the succession of the life periods, while the εἶδος, on the other hand, remains in itself unaltered (ἀμετάβλητον) through every change, not separated from the marks (σημείων) once imposed upon it by nature, but appearing with its own peculiar marks (ιδίων γνωρισμάτων) in all the changes which the body undergoes”⁴⁵.

Elsewhere Gregory refers to the discussions about the nourishment of the changing human body, a wineskin filled with liquid, and its εἶδος:

“It is fitting... to consider the physiology (φυσιολογίαν) of the body... The nature of our body, taken by itself, possesses no life in its own proper subsistence (ὑποστάσει), but that it is by the influx of a force (δυνάμει) from without that it holds itself together (συνέχει ἑαυτήν) and continues in existence (ἐν τῷ εἶναι μένει), and by a ceaseless motion that it draws to itself what it lacks, and repels what is superfluous? When a wineskin (ἀσκός) is full of some liquid, and then the contents leak out at the bottom, it would not retain the shape (σχῆμα) that depends on the bulk unless there entered in at the top something else to fill up the vacuum; and thus a person, seeing the circumference of this vessel (ἀγγεῖον) inflating to its full size, would know that this circumference did not really belong to the object which he sees, but that what was being poured in, by being in it, gave shape (σχηματίζειν) and roundness to the bulk. In the same way the mere framework of our body (κατασκευὴ ἴδιον) possesses nothing belonging to itself that is cognizable by us, to hold it together, but remains in existence owing to a force that is introduced into it. Now this power or force both is, and is called, nourishment (τροφή)...

⁴⁵ *Gregorius Nyssenus. De officio hominis* 225, 42-52.

Those things by being within me became my blood and flesh, the corresponding nutriment by its power of adaptation being changed into the form (εἶδος) of my body”⁴⁶.

Surprisingly, Gregory's reasoning is much more Aristotelian than that of Origen. According to Gregory this is not the εἶδος that defines the form of the liquid, but it is the liquid (τὸ εἰσρέον ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενον), which determines the form of the bulk (σχηματίζειν τὸ περιέχον τὸν ὄγκον). Most plausibly, here Gregory follows Alexander of Aphrodisias (or Galen), who thought that the changes in the bodily mixture affect the soul:

“The body and its blending (κρᾶσις) are the cause of the soul's coming-to-be (γενέσεως) in the first place. This is clear from the difference between living creatures in respect of their parts. For it is not the souls that fashion their shapes (διαπλάσσουναι τὰς μορφάς), but rather the different souls follow on the constitution of these being of a certain sort (τῆ τούτων ποιᾷ συστάσει), and change with them. For the actuality (ἐντελέχεια) and that of which it is the actuality are related reciprocally... Difference in soul follows on a certain sort of blending in the body (τῆ ποιᾷ κρᾶσει τοῦ σώματος)”⁴⁷.

In the “On the Making of Man”, while speaking of the mechanism by means of which the soul gathers the dispersed elements of its former earthly body in the time of resurrection, Gregory combines “Platonic” and “Aristotelian” views. He starts by emphasizing the importance of the bodily εἶδος:

“Now that which clings (προσφύεται) to the God-like element of our soul, is not that which is subject to flux by way of alteration and change (ἀλλοιωθεῖ καὶ μεθιστάμενον) but this stable and unalterable element (τὸ μόνιμόν τε καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον) in our composition (συγκρίματι)”⁴⁸.

But immediately Gregory explains that the bodily εἶδος itself is defined by the somatic mixture:

“Since qualitative differences of somatic mixture (αἱ ποιαὶ τῆς κρᾶσεως παραλλαγαὶ) transform varieties in the εἶδος (τὰς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος διαφορὰς)... and because the εἶδος remains in the soul (τῆ ψυχῆ

⁴⁶ *Gregorius Nyssenus*. Oratio catechetica magna 37, 42–60.

⁴⁷ *Alexander*. De anima libri mantissa 104, 28-34. Cp. *Idem*. De anima 24, 3-4: “Soul itself comes into being as the result of a certain unique combination or blending of the primary bodies” (Fotinis).

⁴⁸ *Gregorius Nyssenus*. De officio hominis 228, 5-8.

παρამείναντος) as the [impression] of the seal in the wax (ἐκμαγεῖω σφραγίδος), it is necessary that the soul is not unable to recognize the things, which had engraved their imprint (τύπον) on the seal⁴⁹.

Gregory seems to imply that during the earthly life the changes in somatic mixture transform (μεταμορφοῦσιν) the distinctive features of the εἶδος (τὰς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος διαφορὰς). After the death of the earthly body, the bodily εἶδος remains beside the soul (perhaps, being imprinted on the soul's subtle body) like a seal (σφραγίς) beside the imprint (for what ἐκμαγεῖον stands here remains a question⁵⁰). In the resurrection, when the soul begins to gather the scattered elements of its former body to build a risen body, she refers to the marks (τύποι) once engraved by these elements on the bodily εἶδος / “the seal” (τὰ ἐναπομαζάμενα τῇ σφραγίδι τὸν τύπον) in order to recognize what is hers. If this is so, the ἐκμαγεῖον should denote those scattered material elements, which once left their impression on the εἶδος / the seal. The εἶδος then serves as a target picture by referring to which, the soul picks the pieces of the puzzle⁵¹.

As our study shows, Aristotle's theory of growth and growing holds a significant place in the history of philosophical polemics regarding the identity of the human living body. Each of the following authors — Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus, Simplicius — had its own set of sources and contexts. Each theory had its own logic, its complexities and its inconsistencies. As we saw, Philoponus introduced into Aristotelian tradition Neoplatonic influences, Simplicius referred to the Stoic concept of ἰδίως ποιόν. Of particular interest is the transfer of the questions under consideration to the field of theology, since the theories of theologians are usually considered separately from the doctrines of philosophers. It was Origen who first applied Alexander's arguments concerning the preservation of the identity of a living body to the question of the identity between the earthly body and the body of resurrection. As the analysis of Origen's reasoning shows, he combines the Aristotelian discourse about growth

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 228, 8–15.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Philo.* Quod deus sit immutabilis 43, 1 – 44, 1: φαντασία δὲ ἐστὶ τύπωσις | ἐν ψυχῇ ὧν γὰρ εἰσήγαγεν ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὥσπερ δακτύλιός τις ἢ σφραγίς ἐναπεμάξατο τὸν οἰκείον χαρακτῆρα· κηρῷ δὲ εἰκῶς ὁ νοῦς τὸ ἐκμαγεῖον δεξάμενος ἄκρως παρ' ἑαυτῷ φυλάττει, μέχρις ἂν ἡ ἀντίπαλος μνήμη τὸν τύπον λεάνασα λήθῃ, “And imagination is an impression in the soul. After each of the outward senses has brought it in, the imagination like a signet-ring or a seal imprints its own character. And the intellect, being like a wax, having received the image (ἐκμαγεῖον), keeps it carefully in itself until forgetfulness, the enemy of memory, has smoothed off the imprint,” transl. by C.D. Yonge.

⁵¹ *Petroff V. Theoriae of the Return in John Scottus' Eschatology.* P. 527-579; *Idem. Eriugena on the Spiritual Body.* P. 597-610; *Idem. Origen i Didim Aleksandrijskij o tonkom tele dushi.* P. 37-50; *Idem. Uchenie Origena o tele voskresenija.* P. 577–632; *Telo i telesnost' v eshatologii Ioanna Skotta.* P. 633–756.

and growing with the Stoic concept of seminal logos, assuming at the same time, as Platonists do, that the bodily εἶδος can exist separately from the disintegrated material substratum (the subtle body of the soul serves as the carrier of the εἶδος in this case). Origen's critic Methodius of Olympus who mostly thinks in Aristotelian terms, identified the bodily εἶδος with the qualitative form, similar to the shape of a statue. As we point out, Gregory of Nyssa too used disparate elements of the theories in question, mechanically combining them. He reveals Alexander's or Galen's influence, suggesting the dependence of the εἶδος's characteristics on the qualities of the somatic mixture. Our review, if necessary brief, nevertheless demonstrates the existence of a powerful and heretofore untraced tradition that applied the Aristotelian doctrine on growth and growing to the problem of identity of an individual human being.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

- Alexandri Aphrodisiensis De mixtione // Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (CAG, suppl. 2.2) // Ed. I. Bruns. Berlin: Reimer, 1892. S. 213–238.
- Alexandri Aphrodisiensis De anima / Ed. I. Bruns // Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2.1). Berlin: Reimer, 1887. S. 1–100.
- Alexandri Aphrodisiensis De anima libri mantissa (= De anima liber alter) / Ed. I. Bruns // Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2.1). Berlin: Reimer, 1887. S. 101–186.
- The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias: a Translation and Commentary by Athanasios P. Fotinis. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America 1979.
- Alexander of Aphrodisias*. On the Soul. Part 1: Soul as Form of the Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and Perception / Transl. with an introd. and comm. by V. Caston. London et al.: Bloomsbury, 2012.
- Alexander of Aphrodisias*. Supplement to "On the Soul" / Transl. by R.W. Sharples. New York: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Aristoteles*. Physica / Transl. by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye // The Works of Aristotle. Transl. into English under the editorship of W.D. Ross. Vol. II: Physica. De Caelo. De Generatione et Corruptione. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1930.

- Aristoteles*. De Generatione et Corruptione / Transl. by Harold H. Joachim (1922) // The Works of Aristotle. Transl. into English under the editorship of W.D. Ross. Vol. II: Physica. De Caelo. De Generatione et Corruptione. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1930.
- Aristote*. De la génération et la corruption. Texte établi et traduit par Marwan Rashed. Paris: Les Belles lettres, 2005.
- Epiphanius*. Band II: Panarion. Haer. 34-64 / Hrsg. von K. Holl. (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller 31). Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1922. [Haer. 64, §§ 12–62. S. 421–499].
- The *Panarion* of Epiphanius of Salamis. Books II and III. *De Fide* / Transl. by Frank Williams. 2nd, revised ed. (Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 79). Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013.
- Fragmenta Epicharmi / Hrsg. von G. Kaibel // Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta. Bd. 1.1 (Poetarum Graecorum fragmenta. Bd. 6.1). Berlin: Weidmann, 1899.
- Gregorius Nyssenus*. De opificio hominis // Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca / Ed. J.-P. Migne. T. 44: S. Gregorii episcopi Nysseni Opera. T. 1. Paris, 1863. Col. 124–256.
- Gregory of Nyssa*. On the Making of Man / Transl. with notes by H.A. Wilson // A Select library of Nicene and post-Nicene fathers of the Christian church. Second series. Vol. 5. Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. P. 387–427.
- Gregorius Nyssenus*. Oratio catechetica magna // The Catechetical Oration of Gregory of Nyssa / Ed. by J.H. Srawley. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903. P. 1–164.
- Gregory of Nyssa*. The Great Catechism / Transl. with notes by H.A. Wilson // A Select library of Nicene and post-Nicene fathers of the Christian church. Second series. Vol. 5. Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. P. 471–509.
- Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis libros de generatione et corruptione commentaria / Hrsg. von H. Vitelli (CAG 14.2). Berlin: Reimer, 1897. S. 1–314.
- Methodius*. De resurrectione // Methodius / Hrsg. von N. Bonwetsch (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller 27). Leipzig, 1917. S. 217–424.
- Philoponus*. On Aristotle On Coming-to-Be and Perishing 1.1-5 // Transl. by C.J.F. Williams. Introd. by Sylvia Berryman. London: Duckworth, 1999.
- Photius*. Bibliothèque. T. 5 (“Codices” 230–241) / Ed. R. Henry. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967. P. 83–107.

Porphyre. Sentences / Éd. sous la responsabilité de Luc Brisson, avec une traduction anglaise de John Dillon. T. 1-2. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2005.

Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium / Hrsg. von K. Kalbfleisch (CAG 8). Berlin: Reimer, 1907. S. 1-438.

Vitruvius. On Architecture / Ed. and transl. by F. Granger. Vol. 1 (The Loeb Classical Library 251). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955.

Secondary Literature

Chadwick H. Origen, Celsus, and the Resurrection of the Body // Harvard Theological Review. 1948. № 41. P. 83–102.

Crouzel H. Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian / Trans. by A.S. Worrall. London: Harper and Row, 1989. P. 155–157.

Furth M. Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances // The Journal of Philosophy. 1978. № 75. P. 624–646.

Henessey L.R. A Philosophical Issue in Origen's Eschatology: The Three Senses of Incorporeality // Origeniana Quinta. Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress / Ed. R.J. Daly. Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1992. P. 273–280.

Kupreeva I. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Mixture and Growth // Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. 2004. № 27. P. 297–334.

Lloyd A.C. Aristotle's Principle of Individuation // Mind. 1972. № 79. Issue 316. P. 519–529.

Petroff V. *Theoriae* of the Return in John Scottus' Eschatology // History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time. Proceedings of the 10th Conference of the SPES, Maynooth and Dublin, August 16-20, 2000 / Eds. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne. Leuven: University Press, 2002. P. 527–579.

Petroff V. Eriugena on the Spiritual Body // American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 2005. № 79, 4. P. 597–610.

Petroff V. Origen i Didim Aleksandrijskij o tonkom tele dushi // Dialog so vremenem. 2005. № 15. C. 37-50 (= Origen and Didymus the Blind on the Soul's Subtle Body // Dialogue with Time. 2005. № 15. P. 37–50).

Petroff V. Uchenie Origena o tele voskresenija v kontekste sovremennoj emu intelektual'noj tradicii // Kosmos i dusha. Uchenija o vselennoj i cheloveke v Antichnosti i v Srednie veka (issledovanija i perevody) / Obsh. red. P.P. Gajdenko i V.V. Petrov. M.: Progress-Tradicija, 2005. S. 577–632 (= Origen's Teaching on the Risen Body in His Contemporary Intellectual

- Context // *Cosmos and Soul: Teachings on the Universe and Man in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (essays and translations)* / Eds. Piama P. Gaidenko and Valery V. Petroff. Moscow: Progress–Tradition, 2005. С. 577–632). [in Russian]
- Petroff V. Telo i telesnost' v eshatologii Ioanna Skotta // Kosmos i dusha. Uchenija o vselennoj i cheloveke v Antichnosti i v Srednie veka (issledovanija i perevody) / Obsh. red. P.P. Gajdenko i V.V. Petrov. M.: Progress-Tradicija, 2005 (= Body and Corporeality in John Scottus' Eschatology // Cosmos and Soul. Teaching on the Universe and Man in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Essays and Translations) / Eds. Piama P. Gaidenko and Valery V. Petroff. Moscow: Progress-Tradition, 2005. P. 633–756). [in Russian]*
- Petroff V. Aristotel' i Aleksandr Afrodisijskij o roste i rastushhem (= Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Growth and Growing) // ΣΧΟΛΗ. 2015. № 9 (2). P. 394–402. [in Russian]*
- Petroff V. Aristotelevskaja tradicija o tekuchesti i preemstvennosti vечно izmenchivyh zhivyh tel individov (=Aristotelian Tradition on Flow and Continuity in the Ever-Changing Living Bodies of Individuals) // Dialog so vremenem (= Dialogue with Time). 2015. № 52. P. 82–92. [in Russian]*
- Petroff V. Elementy aristotelevskoj doktriny o roste i rastushhem u Origena, Mefodija Olimpijskogo i Grigorija Nisskogo (= Elements of Aristotelian Doctrine of Growth and Growing in Origen, Methodius of Olympus and Gregory of Nyssa) // ΣΧΟΛΗ. 2016. № 10.1. P. 117–130. [in Russian]*
- Rashed M. Introduction // Aristote. De la génération et la corruption. Texte établi et traduit par Marwan Rashed. Paris: Les Belles lettres, 2005. P. xi–clxxxvi.*

New World autochthon populations. One of the examples of such an interrogation can be seen in an intensive philosophical and juridical work during the Conquista in order to define what (and whom) did the conquistadors meet in the Americas and what would be an adequate Spanish monarchs' reaction. The most notorious case of the discussion based on the Aristotle's "Politics" interpreted in two quite opposite ways is the Disputation in Valladolid between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550–1551: what kind of barbarians are American Indians, are they natural slaves and can the "just war" be afflict to them. Another example studied in the article refers to the Portuguese America. An Aristotelian root will be shown on the base of the Portuguese authors' frequent formula "no faith, no law, no king" in the descriptions of the Brazilian Indians, that became quite a *topos* in the late 16th – first quarter of the 17th centuries.

Keywords: Aristotle, Politics, New World, Indians, Las Casas, Sepúlveda, Portuguese America, aldeamento.

Valery PETROFF

ARISTOTLE'S TEACHING ON GROWTH AND GROWING AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY OF A HUMAN BODY

Aristotle has formulated his views on growth and growth in the *On Generation and Perishing*. This essay explores the fate of his doctrine in the posterior tradition. As our study shows, Aristotle's theory of growth and growing holds a significant place in the history of philosophical polemics regarding the identity of the human living body, being adopted and transformed both by pagan commentators and by Christian theologians. In doing this, they developed his concept of the enmattered εἶδος or corporeal form of the growing body. Each of the following authors — Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus, Simplicius — had its own set of sources and contexts. Each theory had its own logic, its complexities and its inconsistencies. As we demonstrate, Philoponus introduced into Aristotelian tradition Neoplatonic influences, Simplicius referred to the Stoic concept of ἰδίως ποίον. Of particular interest is the transfer of the questions under consideration to the field of theology. Origen was the first to apply Alexander's arguments concerning the preservation of the identity of a living body to the question of the identity between the earthly body and the body of resurrection. As the analysis of Origen's reasoning shows, he combines the Aristotelian discourse about growth and growing with the Stoic concept of seminal logos, assuming at the same time, as Platonists do, that the bodily εἶδος can exist separately from the disintegrated material substratum (the subtle body of the soul serves as the carrier of the εἶδος in this

case). Origen's critic Methodius of Olympus who mostly thinks in Aristotelian terms, identified the bodily εἶδος with the qualitative form, similar to the shape of a statue. As we point out, Gregory of Nyssa too used disparate elements of the theories in question, mechanically combining them. He also reveals Alexander's or Galen's influence, suggesting the dependence of the εἶδος's characteristics on the qualities of the somatic mixture. Our review, if necessary brief, nevertheless demonstrates the existence of a powerful and heretofore untraced tradition that applied the Aristotelian doctrine on growth and growing to the problem of identity of an individual human being.

Keywords: Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus, Simplicius, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, growth, identity, risen body, corporeal form.

Maya PETROVA

THE RECEPTION OF ARISTOTLE'S TEXTS IN LATIN PLATONISM OF LATE ANTIQUITY

The article discusses the reception of Aristotle's texts in Latin Platonism of Late Antiquity by means of the analysis of Macrobius' Commentary on the 'Dream of Scipio' (II, 14-16) and Saturnalia. It is shown, how Macrobius used Aristotle's texts while describing the views of the Platonists concerning the immortality of the soul, which he borrowed from Aristotle when he deals with the various theories of natural science. The article analyzes the textual and doctrinal content and parallels between Aristotle and Macrobius; it shows how Macrobius transforms Greek knowledge and discusses if he transmits and exposes it accurately. The conclusion is drawn that Macrobius' knowledge of Aristotle's texts is not a direct one.

Keywords: Greek knowledge, Aristotle, perception, the Latin tradition, influence, text.

Alexander PIGALEV

THE ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND OF THE "NOMINALIST REVOLUTION" AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN RATIONALITY

The purpose of the paper is to expose and to analyze both the Aristotelian context of the rise of nominalism in the later Middle Ages and the peculiarities of its influence on designing the philosophical foundations of European rational-

АВТОРЫ

АЛЫМОВА Елена Валентиновна — к.ф.н., доцент, Институт философии Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета.

АФОНАСИН Евгений Васильевич — д.ф.н., профессор, Новосибирский государственный университет (Новосибирск).

БАЛАЛЫКИН Дмитрий Алексеевич — д.мед.н., д.и.н., профессор, Первый Московский государственный медицинский университет им. И.М. Сеченова.

БЕРЕСТОВ Игорь Владимирович — к.ф.н., с.н.с., Институт философии и права СО РАН (Новосибирск).

БИРЮКОВ Дмитрий Сергеевич — д.ф.н., в.н.с. Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (Пермь).

БЛАУБЕРГ Ирина Игоревна — д.ф.н., в.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).

БОБРОВА Ангелина Сергеевна — к.ф.н., доцент, Российский государственный гуманитарный университет (Москва).

ВОЛКОВА Надежда Павловна, к.ф.н., н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).

ВОЛЬФ Марина Николаевна — д.ф.н., в.н.с., Институт философии и права СО РАН (Новосибирск).

ГВЕРИЗОЛИ Родригу — доктор, профессор, Федеральный университет Рио-де-Жанейро (Бразилия).

ГЕРАСИМЕНКО Инна Александровна — н.с., фонд «Центр гуманитарных исследований» (Москва).

ГОРЮНОВА Татьяна Александровна — к.ф.н., доцент, Вятский государственный университет (Киров).

ГУРЕВИЧ Павел Семёнович — д.ф.н., д.филол.н., проф., г.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).

ДАДЛИ Джон — доктор философии, Центр Де Вульфа и Мансьона, Католический университет Лёвена (Бельгия).

- ДАРОВСКИХ Андрей Александрович* — к.ф.н., Университет штата Нью-Йорк в Бингемтоне (США).
- ЕРОХОВ Илья Алексеевич* — к.полит.н., с.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- ЗВЕЗДИНА Юлия Николаевна* — к.искусствоведения, с.н.с., Музеи Московского Кремля (Москва).
- ЗУБЕЦ Ольга Прокофьевна* — к.ф.н., с.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- КАРАБАЕВА Светлана Викторовна* — к.ф.н., преподаватель медицинского колледжа №3 (Санкт-Петербург).
- КИСЕЛЕВА Марина Сергеевна* — д.ф.н., профессор, г.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- КРАВЧЕНКО Виктория Владимировна* — д.ф.н., профессор, Московский авиационный институт (Национальный исследовательский университет) (Москва).
- КУТТИНИ Элиза* — доктор, Ph.D., Падуанский университет (Италия).
- ЛЕЧИЧ Никола Добрикович* — к.ф.н., Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (Москва).
- МАМЧУР Елена Аркадьевна* — д.ф.н., профессор, г.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- МАРИАНИ Эмануеле* — Ph.D., Лиссабонский университет (Португалия).
- МЕСЯЦ Светлана Викторовна* — к.ф.н., с.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- МЕШКИТА Антониу Педру* — Ph.D., доцент, Лиссабонский университет (Португалия).
- Насыров Ильшат Рашитович* — д.ф.н., в.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- ОКУНЕВА Ольга Владимировна* — к.и.н, с.н.с., Институт всеобщей истории РАН (Москва).
- ПЕТРОВ Валерий Валентинович* — д.ф.н., г.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- ПЕТРОВА Майя Станиславовна* — д.и.н., г.н.с., Институт всеобщей истории РАН (Москва).

- ПИГАЛЕВ Александр Иванович* — д.ф.н., профессор, Волгоградский государственный университет (Волгоград).
- САВЕЛЬЕВА Марина Юрьевна* — д.ф.н., профессор, Национальная академия наук Украины (Киев).
- СЕРЁГИН Андрей Владимирович* — к.филол.н., с.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- СЕРЕГИНА Анна Юрьевна* — д.и.н., в.н.с., Институт всеобщей истории РАН (Москва).
- ТАНАБЭ Сусуму* — Ph.D. in Mathematics, профессор, Университет Галатасарай (Стамбул).
- ТЕЙШЕЙРА Да Мата Жозе Вериссимо* — M.A. in Philosophy, независимый исследователь (Бразилия).
- ТИХОНОВ Андрей Владимирович* — к.ф.н., Институт философии и социально-политических наук, Южный Федеральный Университет (Ростов-на-Дону).
- ТОНОЯН Лариса Грачиловна* — к.ф.н., доцент, Институт философии Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета.
- УСАЧЕВА Анна Вячеславовна* — к.филол.н., постдокторант, Орхусский университет (Дания).
- ФАЙЗИХОДЖАЕВА Дилбар Иргашевна* — к.ф.н., доцент, Национальный Университет Узбекистана (Ташкент).
- ФОМИН Антон Львович* — к.ф.н., Философский факультет МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова (Москва).
- ШАЛАК Владимир Иванович* — д.ф.н., в.н.с., Институт философии РАН (Москва).
- ШАНГ Фабьен* — постдокторант, Университет штата Парана в Маринге (Бразилия).
- ШИЯН Тарас Александрович* — к.ф.н., Православный Свято-Тихоновский гуманитарный университет (Москва).
- ШОК Наталия Петровна* — д.и.н., профессор, Первый Московский государственный медицинский университет им. И.М. Сеченова (Москва).
- ЯКОВЛЕВ Владимир Анатольевич* — д.ф.н., профессор, МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова (Москва).

ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ

ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ.....	9
------------------	---

УЧЕНИЕ АРИСТОТЕЛЯ

<i>С.В. МЕСЯЦ</i> Три определения цвета у Аристотеля.....	13
<i>Н.Д. ЛЕЧИЧ</i> Аристотель о поверхности и цвете у пифагорейцев.....	31
<i>А.В. СЕРЕГИН</i> Счастье и неморальные ценности в этике Аристотеля.....	43
<i>О.П. ЗУБЕЦ</i> Μεγάλοψυχος Аристотеля и понятие морального субъекта.....	61
<i>Е.В. АЛЫМОВА, С.В. КАРАБАЕВА</i> Дискуссии «О благе»: ранний Аристотель vs Платон.....	76
<i>А.В. ТИХОНОВ</i> Степень платонизма у Аристотеля: вопрос о добродетели и богоподобии.....	85
<i>И.А. ЕРОХОВ</i> Политическая наука Аристотеля: теория гражданского благоразумия.....	96
<i>Marina VOLF</i> The Inquiry Problem in Aristotle.....	112
<i>И.В. БЕРЕСТОВ</i> Бесконечный регресс в <i>Met. Z</i> , 17 и проблематичность единства составного объекта.....	121
<i>А.Л. ФОМИН</i> Τὰ μαθηματικά в философии Аристотеля.....	138
<i>И.А. ГЕРАСИМЕНКО</i> Форма-морфе в «Метафизике» Аристотеля: в поисках утраченного концепта.....	154
<i>John DUDLEY</i> Aristotle's Three Teleologies.....	175

<i>Т.А. ГОРЮНОВА</i> Свойства языка и сущего в учении Аристотеля.....	187
<i>П.С. ГУРЕВИЧ</i> Антропологическое учение Аристотеля.....	201

НАСЛЕДИЕ АРИСТОТЕЛЯ ВО II–XVI ВЕКАХ

<i>Н.П. ВОЛКОВА</i> Аристотель и Плотин о единстве ума и умопостигаемого как части психологической теории.....	218
<i>Anna USACHEVA</i> The Body of Nous: Gregory Nazianzen's Concept of the Human Mind in the Context of Peripatetic Philosophy.....	233
<i>Eugene AFONASIN</i> Aristotle and Theophrastus on theoretical and methodological foundations of meteorology.....	249
<i>Maya PETROVA</i> The Reception of Aristotle's Texts in Latin Platonism of Late Antiquity.	262
<i>Dmitry BALALYKIN, Nataliya SHOK</i> The Significance of Aristotle's Works in the Development of Ancient Greek Rational Medicine.....	276
<i>Andrey DAROVSKIKH</i> The Power of Semen: Aristotle and Some Galen's Fallacies.....	294
<i>Д.С. БИРЮКОВ</i> Перипатетические линии в учении Григория Нисского о едином человеке.....	314
<i>Valery PETROFF</i> Aristotle's Teaching on Growth and Growing and the Problem of Identity of a Human Body.....	326
<i>И.Р. НАСЫРОВ</i> Аль-Кинди и его трактат «Краткое изложение учения о душе из книг Аристотеля, Платона и других философов».....	347
<i>Elisa CUTTINI</i> Ethics within the Framework of Venetian Aristotelianism: Francesco Piccolomini and Sebastiano Venier.....	355

АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКАЯ ЛОГИКА

<i>António Pedro MESQUITA</i>	365
Relations in Aristotle.....	
<i>Rodrigo GUERIZOLI</i>	
The Question of the Plurality of Definitions in two Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's «Topics».....	373
<i>Т.А. ШИЯН</i>	
Буквенные обозначения Аристотеля и возникновение формальной логики.....	381
<i>В.И. ШАЛАК</i>	
Обманчивая простота логики Аристотеля.....	399
<i>Л.Г. ТОНОЯН</i>	
Предпосылки учения Аристотеля о гипотетических силлогизмах и развитие этого учения в Античности.....	408
<i>Emanuele MARIANI</i>	
<i>Zurück zu Aristoteles: Trendelenburg and the Aristoteles-Renaissance</i> in 19 th Century Germany.....	418
<i>Fabien SCHANG</i>	
From Aristotle's Oppositions to Aristotelian Oppositions.....	430
<i>José Veríssimo TELXEIRA DA MATA</i>	
Aristotle and Frege on Foundations of Logic.....	446
<i>А.С. БОБРОВА</i>	
Силлогизмы Аристотеля и анализ диалога.....	454

АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ В РОССИИ

<i>Ю.Н. ЗВЕЗДИНА</i>	
Образ Аристотеля в России середины XVI и второй половины XVII века.....	467
<i>М.С. КИСЕЛЕВА</i>	
Риторика в трудах Стефана Яворского: европейская традиция и российская рецепция.....	477
<i>В.В. КРАВЧЕНКО</i>	
Аристотелевские идеи в творчестве М.В. Безобразовой.....	488

Д.И. ФАЙЗИХОДЖАЕВА

Трансформация теории силлогизма Аристотеля в классификации выводов М.И. Каринского.....	505
--	-----

АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ В НОВОЕ И НОВЕЙШЕЕ ВРЕМЯ

А.Ю. СЕРЕГИНА

Аристотелевская традиция и концепт «меланхолии» в английской католической мысли конца XVI века.....	517
--	-----

И.И. БЛАУБЕРГ

Феликс Равессон и его «Опыт о ‘Метафизике’ Аристотеля».....	531
---	-----

Е.А. МАМЧУР

Аристотелевский «topos» и современная физика.....	545
---	-----

А.И. ПИГАЛЕВ

Аристотелевский фон «номиналистской революции» и философские основания европейской рациональности.....	555
---	-----

Сусуму ТАНАБЭ

Понятие рода Аристотеля и картезианский метод научного исследования.....	572
---	-----

М.Ю. САВЕЛЬЕВА

Парадокс времени в философии Аристотеля.....	587
--	-----

В.А. ЯКОВЛЕВ

Энтелехиальная причинность в метафизике Аристотеля и целесообразный рационализм в современной науке.....	599
---	-----

О.В. ОКУНЕВА

Аристотель и формирование представлений о коренных народах Нового света у европейских авторов XVI века.....	615
--	-----

ПЕРЕЧЕНЬ СЕССИЙ И ДОКЛАДОВ.....	631
CONTRIBUTORS.....	643
ABSTRACTS.....	646
CONTENTS.....	674
АВТОРЫ.....	678
АННОТАЦИИ.....	681
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ.....	703

АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКОЕ НАСЛЕДИЕ
КАК КОНСТИТУИРУЮЩИЙ ЭЛЕМЕНТ
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ РАЦИОНАЛЬНОСТИ

МАТЕРИАЛЫ
МОСКОВСКОЙ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ПО АРИСТОТЕЛЮ.
ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН, 17–19 ОКТЯБРЯ 2016 Г.

●
Общая редакция и составление
В.В. Петрова

Утверждено к печати Ученым советом
Института философии РАН

Утверждено к печати Ученым советом
Института всеобщей истории РАН

Дизайн обложки *И.Н. Граве*
Корректор *М.М. Горелов*

Подписано к печати 08. 11. 2017
Формат 60х90/16

Гарнитура Times. Печать офсетная
Усл. печ. л. 55. Тираж 600 экз.

Издательство «Аквилон»
Тел.: +7 (968) 924–97–30
e-mail: aquilopress@gmail.com

Отпечатано с оригинал-макета в типографии
Onebook-ru ООО «САМ ПОЛИГРАФИСТ»
Москва, 109316, Волгоградский пр., дом 42, Технополис МОСКВА
Тел. +7 (495) 545–37–10
Электронная почта: info@onebook.ru
Сайт: www.onebook.ru

ISBN 978–5–906578–29–7



9 785906 578297