Marxist Philosophy and the Problem of Value

O. G. Drobnitskii

To cite this article: O. G. Drobnitskii (1967) Marxist Philosophy and the Problem of Value, Soviet Studies in Philosophy, 5:4, 14-24

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RSP1061-1967050414

Published online: 20 Dec 2014.
MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE*

In recent years, the question has been posed of the attitude of Marxist philosophy to what is termed the problem of value. The point is not only that bourgeois axiology, which has been developing for three-quarters of a century, has to be critically analyzed. Central to the question is whether a Marxist axiology is possible. In that connection the following is instructive. Authors who, with envious consistency, ignore the history of philosophy and begin to build a theory of value on the basis of direct generalization “of all the known facts” often pose the problem of value precisely as it was formulated as early as the end of the 19th century.

As we see it, the lesson of bourgeois axiology is not to be forgotten. It is more desirable to begin examination of this problem not merely with a statement of value phenomena and their definition, but with analysis of how the problem arose historically. No one will challenge the fact that things and phenomena in the world constituting man's environment have been endowed with such characteristics as worth, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice. Doubtless, the phenomena of social consciousness act in some aspect as “spiritual values,” i.e., they partake of the character of valuation norms. Finally, all these phenomena may be combined under the single common notion of value. The question is how to approach the analysis of values: to take the fact of their existence as a point of departure for theoretical reasoning, or to attempt to discover the mechanism of their origin; to take the standpoint of value consciousness and to describe the world as it looks from that point of view, or to attempt to clarify the relationship of that consciousness to reality, to determine to what degree it is capable in itself of disclosing the nature of the things it evaluates. We shall attempt to demonstrate that criteria of value consciousness are fundamentally unacceptable to a science engaged in rigorously objective study of reality.

*This article is published in the context of discussion.

The author is a staff member of the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Genesis of Bourgeois Axiology
Questions of the nature of various phenomena,
which it is now customary to term values, have been discussed in philosophy since ancient times. But the problem of value as one of the fundamental aspects of philosophy (and axiology) arose only in the second half of the 19th century. Is it accidental that this problem was absent in classical bourgeois philosophy, although even Hume and Kant had noted certain of its prerequisites? On the contrary, we are able to say that that trend in modern philosophy within which axiology arose took shape in many respects as antithesis to the leitmotifs of classical bourgeois philosophy and, above all, to the ideas of the Enlightenment.

In this context, let us trace the manner in which the problem of human activity and world view was regarded by the French materialists. Man is a part of nature and, consequently, a natural being. His nature is such that adequate expression of his essential forces — rationally directed interests — reveals complete harmony with the universal laws of nature. Therefore, study and practical assimilation of the external subject of nature as a whole are theoretically identical with the self-knowledge and self-discovery of man. Translated into the language of social science, this means that proper effectuation of the personal interest of each leads to the attainment of the common welfare. It follows that the solution of all social problems assumes an objective knowledge of the nature of man and the world. Man must find all the root principles of social orientation within himself. True, such a situation is attained only in a rational society, but it must be built on the basis of the objective of free development of the actual nature of man. Universal enlightenment and explanation to people of their own interests must become the principle of social upbringing. But in that case no special problem of value arises. Questions of world view, of social program, of choice of life goals and ideals, and of human freedom and happiness are resolved by “natural” science and the “natural” morality resting thereon.

As we know, Kant and Hegel criticized this naturalist view of man. Pointing out that spontaneous natural interest is not yet an adequate expression of universal necessity (reason), Hegel nonetheless did not rule out the possibility that individual subjectivity might rise to the objectivity of the universal. Moreover, scientific cognition and becoming accustomed to the logic of universal necessity coincide, in Hegel, with human freedom. In his ethic, Kant proceeds from the identity of free will and its rationality, but reveals a total disconnection between “natural passions” and universal necessity, which is above nature. Therefore, in him, man appears to be internally cloven into the sensory, unfree being we see in empirical reality, and the rational free being who has perceived, a priori, the unchallengeable moral law and stands counterposed to the world of natural (and social) relationships of man. This law, naturally, cannot be validated by empirical science and does not carry within itself guarantees of practical embodiment in empirical history. The moral viewpoint (later called that of value) proved to be detached from science and social experience.

The further development of bourgeois thought on the question under discussion follows the course forecast by Kant and not that anticipated by Hegel. The actual historical development of life under capitalism does not fit into the conception of the organic unity of the universal (the integral) and the individual, the universal necessity of the universe and human subjectivity, whether it is thought of as given by nature or as effected in a historical process of ascent. The subsequent development of bourgeois civilization, particularly in the era of monopoly capitalism, revealed that the mode of activity inherent in capitalism is remote from the universality ascribed to it. In this connection the problem of man’s life activity demanded reinterpretation, and the principles of naturalism and historicism were rejected.

We may direct our attention to two basic factors of life under capitalism as recorded by the bourgeois mentality. On the one hand, the agent of activity is transformed from the “free entrepreneur,” implementing his own interests, into an executor of the goals assigned him from without. Correspondingly, the motion of economic, political, and other interests in society now comprises not a disclosure of the internal nature of man but merely a manifestation of expediency.
External to him. Therefore the view is confirmed that the laws of social activity are incapable of revealing the sense of human existence as such, and that it is necessary to seek them somewhere outside social practice. (This idea has been most clearly expressed in neo-Protestantism.)

On the other hand, the bourgeois attitude toward nature is not universal but one-sided: utilitarian. The transformation of nature is by no means a comprehensively creative activity implementing the development of the world in accordance with its immanent laws. Nature appears only as a passive substrate to be processed in production. "Technical civilization" does not reproduce but ravages nature, taking its resources and making only partial use of them for purposes of economic competition, often contradictory to the laws of the organic development of nature.

Therefore this nature appears to the irrationalist philosopher as inanimate material to be cut up and carved again in accordance with utilitarian needs (Bergson). In essence, the positivist sees the same thing, but from the other side. The laws of nature, given in experiment, are capable of serving only as external limitations upon the arbitrariness of subjectivity, but do not include in themselves the universal logic of the world order. In this case the "objectivity" of science may consist merely in describing atomary facts and their external ordering with the aid of the general laws of uniformity and sequence. The question of the essence of the universe, however, becomes a forbidden matter to this "rigorously scientific" positivist thought, which verifies all its conclusions.

The orientation solely upon external, present reality came to obtain not only in the natural but in the social sciences. The positivist theoretician of the 20th century is no longer able to associate the laws of contemporary civilization with those of the process of world history and with man's determination of essence. This loss of the sense of history and of "human meaning" had the result for sociology that it proved capable of describing only the empirically given, the "facts" of social life, their external connections and laws of mass recurrence, but it was not able to say anything whatever about the general direction or "meaning" of history. The latter is capable of being detected by a fundamentally different mode of thought, "above science": the philosophy of history, which is the opposite of sociology.

These contradictions of capitalist reality and theoretical consciousness, which became historically mature, later became the point of departure for the antitheses, neopositivism and irrationalism, but had earlier found interpretation in neo-Kantianism, where they served as the foundation for posing the problem of value. The Baden school advanced the question of the possibility of theoretical examination of the problem of the sense and meaning of human existence and of the historical process, which subsumed the inclusion of each individual phenomenon in the whole in such fashion as not to cause it to lose its uniqueness and irreplaceability. In the opinion of the neo-Kantians, these problems were capable of solution only if one abandoned the method of generalization practiced by the natural and by certain of the social sciences (such as sociology, law, and psychology), a method that disclosed general and abstract regularities, and if one adopted the individualizing method of referring to values. And while Rickert, for example, held this latter method to be just as scientific as that of the natural sciences, this pertains only to empirical history, which describes the events that have occurred purely as description of facts. But the interpretation of the historical process in its integrity and internal unity which, as he assumes, is a prerogative of the philosophy of history, has to proceed within the confines of thought above experience, postulating absolute, transcendental values of culture, outside time. Thus, even in neo-Kantianism, the value-system view of the world is described, in some sense, as the antithesis of the scientific method. Later, however, the problem of values took on an increasingly explicit irrational sense.

Let us attempt to identify the key problems around which axiology was built. In the first place, it was found that descriptive science, identifying the object of knowledge only as something in conflict with the subject in an experiment detached from the universal logic of the natural order and cleansed of human subjectivity, and
therefore having a "neutral" relationship to the object ("neutrality" became a synonym for objectivity), is incapable of telling us anything about man himself. In terms of this type of science, social experience appears to be merely an external condition, a means of equipping it technically and finding utilitarian application of its data. The product of this science, to the degree that it possesses social meaning, places in man's hands powerful means of activity, but does not incorporate any of the goals of life. These means (technology, automation, atomic energy, and an abundance of material goods) may be employed either for or against the interests of man. Contrary to the ideal of the Enlightenment, in accordance with which science is supposed to help man not only to master nature but also to organize his own social life in rational fashion, the thesis is propounded that the truth of science must be supplemented by the truth of value (morality, religion, etc.), which is confirmed in entirely different fashion.

When such a science studies man, it considers him, by analogy to nature, as an external object, a faceless specimen of the race, and chops him up into mutually isolated spheres of action of laws of natural necessity. However, man's "real" being, in its integrity and uniqueness, as not concretized, possessing meaning and freedom, can be understood in a way contradictory to the scientific; and it is only on this level of examination that human life acquires value in itself and becomes the creation of all values. This idea, which had only been suggested in neo-Kantianism, was developed further in contemporary irrationalism (by Karl Jaspers, for example), with which axiology proceeds, at least up to that point, along a single line.

Thinkers of liberal orientation, who accuse science of dehumanizing the personality, see in it the reason for man's having been transformed into a robot, into an appendage of automated production or a bureaucratic-technocratic machine, into an object of all-round functionalization and "mass-scale manipulation." To the "faceless rationalism" of society and science they counterposed a critical moralizing that appealed to the ideals of free enterprise or the medieval commune, taking as its point of departure the humanist anthropology that regards man as an autonomous subject standing in contrast to the world of tangible relationships. The philosophy of "activity" seeks to find the "genuinely human" in activity of a kind that could be wholly defined as a free project of the individual and would not be concretized in external results not belonging to man (Sartre's point of view in his book Being and Nothingness).

It is characteristic, however, that not only irrationalist philosophers, but apologists for "rigorous science" themselves, often arrive at an irrational view of human activity. Applied science — the sociology of labor and consumption, of public opinion and advertising — which has the function of "rationalizing" behavior and the means of controlling it, has increasingly frequent recourse to techniques of psychological manipulation, subliminal suggestion, and cultivation of illusions among the masses. Taking experiences in this connection as a point of departure, the theoreticians of the mass mind criticize the conception of the social development of human nature put forth by the ideologists of the Enlightenment, who held that man's behavior is governed by rational motivations, and that the technique of conditioning must represent an explanation to him of his own interests. The theory of psychomanipulation has found philosophical synthesis in neopositivist meta-ethics, asserting that moral judgments (ideological values in general) carry no information about reality but represent hidden imperatives and means of influencing the behavior and convictions of men by the employment of emotions and will. From this standpoint, values have no relationship to facts, and value-norm propositions do not relate to scientific ones.

In conditions in which the bourgeois mind is losing its "sense of the historical," it is possible for an understanding of the unity of the historical process as one of law-governed progressive development, the determination by man of his relationship to existing social systems, and solution of the question of his socio-political orientation to be based purely on a passively assimilated dogma or psychological inclination, but not at all
upon a rational understanding of historical laws. In line with such views, the fact of the existence of two opposing systems is capable of being explained only as proof of a "pluralist" social reality, but not as a manifestation of a distinctive transition period from capitalism to communism on a world scale. Any contention that science can draw a conclusion as to which form of society the future must adhere to is regarded by the proponents of these views (from the neo-Kantians to the neopositivists) as an impermissible confusion of the standpoints of "scientific description" and "value positions."

Finally, the problem of value arises as a means of resolving certain traditional questions in the theory of knowledge associated with the socio-historical nature of knowledge. Even Kant, taking as a point of departure the incomplete nature of empirical knowledge at each concrete moment in history, replaces the notion of the infinity of universal human knowledge by the idea of a regulative principle, a transcendental ideal that makes it possible to imagine the infinity of the universe as an entity and guides the development of cognitive reasoning. This notion of Kant was picked up by his disciples of the Badan school who sought to reduce the Kantian Ding an sich to a value notion. Husserl employed the concept of value (moral necessity, obligatory norm) to attempt to express the nature of all scientific knowledge as objectively necessary, as directed to some tangible subject. But man's activity with tangible things, and its historically law-governed development, are considered solely as a psychological phenomenon, i.e., in the transformed form in which they emerge in a single cognitive act and are perceived by the individual subject.

The whole complex of problems with which the bourgeois theoretician finds himself confronted and seeks to decide with the aid of the value concept is founded, it would appear, upon a single general, root problem — the problem of the assimilation of the culture of society by the individual active agent. The individual, limited in his existence by factors of class and caste, occupation and corporative organization, and performing only fragmented operations in societal activity, is not capable of rationally mastering the laws of the life of society as a whole, of its culture, and the movement of the general historical process of cognition. This system of social division of labor in contemporary capitalist society has the tendency to become a many-sided functionalization of activity, in which the individual is incorporated into the ongoing motion of the social whole as a passive executor of the role assigned him, subordinate to a system of rigid regulators.

Under these conditions, man's social nature confronts him as something fundamentally alien: an external necessity with which he must coordinate his actions, but the meaning of which he is unable to divine; as a socially useful activity assigned him from without, the ends of which have nothing in common with his "strictly human" goals, which do not enable him to acquire material and intellectual riches, which he employs only in proportion to his direct needs, and as a normative law of "uni-versally binding" logic and "universally accepted" data of science. In consequence, the assimilation of the individual into the culture occurs in a fashion external to his own life activity. This is nothing but rote schooling in generally accepted principles of behavior, mastery of the formulas of science, productive work, and moral behavior in undeciphered form, and their canonization as unassailable dogmas and absolutes, or the elaboration of corresponding stereotypes of emotion and psychology. This "familiarization" with culture, not revealing its historical genesis and human significance, inevitably occurs in the form of the building of a "scale of values" performing the function of social orientation of the personality in an irrational world.

Called upon to resolve this fundamental problem, axiology becomes the central component of bourgeois philosophy and lays claim to becoming the true subject matter of philosophy. Even Nietzsche held that solution of "the problem of values" is the principal task of philosophy. And no matter from what aspect the bourgeois theoretician approaches the problem, he regards its solution as being outside the confines of science or even of rational thought in general. The
value approach seems to him to be a different way of seeing the world than scientific "description," "generalization," or "neutral" representation of reality. In opposition to the positivist view of science that detaches it from social experience, and to "pure knowledge" deprived of meaning with respect to world view, axiology appears, which introduces "human problems" into philosophy by the back door.

How is the nature of the value itself to be understood in this case? Here we approach the concrete content of bourgeois axiology and the classification of the trends found in it. Without going into detailed analysis of them, we note only two tendencies here. Inasmuch as the problem of value arises on the basis of the antithesis between the objectivity of natural history and human subjectivity, appearing in the most diverse forms (social necessity and personal freedom, historical law and ideals, social expediency and "human" goals, the rigorous necessity of scientific knowledge and individual creativity), it is pregnant with an antinomy from the very outset. In his understanding of the nature of value, an axiologist must choose between objective and subjective idealism. In the former case, value is treated as a phenomenon in the realm of transcendental essences outside space and time, which lie outside tangible reality, such as absolute moral duty that assigns norms of evaluation and behavior to man from without (the phenomenological value theory of N. Hartmann and M. Scheler, the intuitivist ethics and esthetics of G. Moore, D. Ross, and E. Carritt, neo-Thomism, the neo-realism of Santayana). In the latter case, on the contrary, value is understood as the purely subjective attitude of man to an external object, as a projection of an emotional disposition upon the world, as a product of arbitrary human decision not subject to rational analysis (neopositivism). In both cases we find that the value standpoint cannot logically be correlated with the data of scientific knowledge or rationally validated.

(1) These are some of the lessons that derive from analysis of bourgeois axiology.

Is a Marxist Axiology Possible?

In order to give an answer to this question, it is necessary to understand what it was that Marxism introduced into philosophy that was fundamentally new and that resolved the problems listed above in an utterly different way. Marx revived the concept of classical bourgeois philosophy on the unity of subject and tangible world, but conceived of this unity in a fashion entirely different than the Enlighteners or Hegel. Man is not merely a part of nature or a stage in development of the universal necessity of the universe. In his relationship to the world, man behaves as a being of practical activity who transforms nature for his specifically human purposes, doing so in accordance with the laws of nature itself. This identity of the subjectively human and the objectively natural is possible only thanks to the universality of human activity which is, however, not a characteristic of that activity given at the outset, but one that comes to realization only historically, in the process of building a "humanized" nature and human society. Every stage in historical progress that is implemented by man's creation of his special tangible world is at the same time an awakening of new natural forces to life and the self-development of man himself. It is precisely for this reason that man is capable of cognizing the world in its immanent laws, and himself as a social being engaged in practical activity. His acquisition of knowledge coincides with self-knowledge. The development of the human world also proceeds in accordance with the objective laws of natural science. These laws do not merely comprise external limitations imposed from without upon subjective activity, but are the internal principles of activity of man himself. Therefore, as Lenin said, goal-setting activity is itself a "form of the objective process" although "it seems to man that his goals have been chosen outside the world, and are independent of it ('freedom')" (Works [Soch.], Vol. 38, pp. 179, 180).

In essence, these propositions contain the key to overcoming the difficulties which face axiology. A rigorously objective science, natural and social, must necessarily provide answers to all questions pertaining to the world view, societal orientation, and subjective motivations of human activity. Comprehensive knowledge of an entity
based upon mastering it in practice in every possible way discloses not only the material obstacles to or the media through which human activity occurs, but also its final objectives, inasmuch as this entity provides not only something required to satisfy needs but also produces that which is a component part of man's social nature. Acquisition of knowledge of the objective laws of history clarifies the interests of man that are of the essence; contrariwise, the definition by man of his subjective attitude to existing society and its historical change is a factor in the working out of the objective necessity of history.

When the problem is posed in this manner, no room remains for any special value-system aspect of reality or for the examination of reality from this axiological standpoint. However, the difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that the universality of human experience, the unity of necessity and freedom, of the individual and society, are yet to be attained in the course of historical development. Marx proved able to resolve this problem in theory because he foresaw the onset of communist society. On this basis we are able to say that the theory of scientific communism is not only a conclusion from Marxist philosophy but one of its theoretical prerequisites. This "circular logic" is capable of solution only by the witness of history and the experience of building a new society.

Let us examine typical arguments in favor of the creation of a "Marxist axiology." (2) The most inclusive formulation was propounded by V. P. Tugarinov. It resolves to the following.

The value problem arises at the point of contact between theory and practice. Science studies a thing "as it is in itself" (the theoretical approach to an entity — "cognitive, contemplative, explanatory"), independent of man. In his practical activity man employs the useful properties of the entity. Discovery of these useful properties and evaluation of the entity constitute the task of the value approach, which comprises "a special attitude toward reality." Thus, the value approach (studied by axiology) is "a necessary stage in passing" from theory to practice (see ibid., p. 9).

The "sequence" thus depicted has nothing in common with the actual process whereby man interacts with the world of things. In reality, the theoretical relationship of man to the world is a factor in his practical activity. A man's ability to see an entity "in itself" is not an attribute of the contemplative approach, but rests upon the universality of human experience. It is precisely because practice (understood as socio-historical activity, and not as the isolated act seen by the intuitive mind, as Tugarinov understands it) reproduces and masters a thing in the entire richness of its content that it contains within itself objective knowledge of that thing. However, if practice is understood only as the employment of the useful in an entity, we would have to disregard the objective content of the latter. Then we would find, on the one hand, the entity "in itself" as studied by science and, quite separately, its "human" (consumer, economic, political, ideological, moral) significance, which would be studied by axiology.

The untenability of this separation of scientific knowledge and valuation is distinctly visible in the following argument by the proponents of Marxist axiology. Historical scholarship, which studies the objective laws of development of society, is capable of providing us with an advance notion of the future communist society as a necessity. But discovery of this necessity leaves aside the question of the subjective attitude toward it of the rank-and-file participants in the historical process, an attitude manifested in their ideals and strivings. It bypasses the problem of the meaning of human life, etc. This type of reasoning is based upon a counterposing of objective law and the subjective motivations of social necessity and personal activity. Historical materialism, containing nothing but scientific knowledge, needs no supplementation by valuation precisely because these human goals are included in the very structure of the historical process. The interpretation of history by its participants (even if it occurs in the value form of ideals, notions of good and evil, etc.) is conditioned by the laws of social development and itself comprises a factor therein and does not arrive from somewhere beyond.

Under the conditions of socialism the problem of shaping convictions is specific in nature, and
the task of goal-oriented education of the rank-and-file participant in the building of communism arises. How is that task to be resolved? Tugari-nov poses it as follows: "It is insufficient merely to understand what socialist society is: one must value the blessings which that society provides to us" (ibid., p. 7). In itself that formula would call forth no objections if it had not been given the meaning of a methodological principle pointing the way to the manner in which education is to take place. From this point of view, the development of a scientific world view and of rationally founded convictions with respect to the nature of our society must be supplemented, further, by the cultivation of a distinct attitude toward society: one that is valuational and essentially emotional. Along with the task of "enlightenment" we are also offered that of "cultivation of feelings."

One can hardly conceive of these as separate tasks, each having its specific goals and merely supplementing each other, if only because the emotional attitude of man to social reality and his sensory convictions do not include any content fundamentally different than that of rational persuasions, but are only a form of expression of the same ideological content, a means for the psychological assimilation of the same social data. Because of this we do not find any distinct "secret" of man's behavior and of the influence of society upon him from without in his emotions. Attempts to find such a secret would lead us in the final analysis to quests for means of persuading people subconsciously in regard to what they cannot perceive by rational thought. This technique, resting upon the theory of psychological manipulation, is unacceptable as a matter of principle as a means for resolution of the tasks of education for communism.

The path to be followed in education in the broadest sense, as understood in the axiological presentation of the problem, rests in its essence upon the idea that understanding of the nature of socialist society is merely knowledge of some "thing as it is in itself" external to man and not dependent upon his activity. Such a concept has, in fact, nothing at all in common with a real understanding of the nature of socialist society. Either one is thinking of a dogmatic memorizing of meaningless formulas in no way associated with the personal persuasions of man, or what is understood is not socialist society but some other. The sole possible course for truly social, communist education in the broad sense is the involvement of each individual in the process of building the future society, and involving him in such fashion that he will regard this task as his own and himself as an active party to history, not as an object to be acted upon from without, not merely as a consumer of the blessings provided him by society but as a creator of that society, for which he bears collective and personal responsibility. In these circumstances, knowledge of the nature of society will coincide with perception of the meaning and purposefulness of his own life activity. And then it will not be necessary "to supplement" a scientific world view with a value perception of social activity, and societal "enlightenment" will coincide in principle with the shaping of activist motivations.

We now see that the problem under discussion touches not only upon questions of philosophical theory, but upon the most pressing matters of practical methodology. Moreover, solution of these problems rests, in the final analysis, upon the question as to whether it is possible to distinguish a special theoretical discipline (or special aspect in Marxist philosophy) that regards values as a distinct field of activity. What does that field comprise? The proponents of axiology point to the fact, quite obvious in itself, that the individual does apply values to each specific object of his consideration. In this connection, that object is to him not merely something that is factually present, but good or evil. The need for the existence of that object does not follow from the fact that it is causally conditioned, but from moral duty. The object is regarded not from the standpoint of the entire wealth of its own content and internal structure, but merely as an object external to the interest directed upon it. A paper by O. M. Bakuradze, O. I. Dzhioev, and N. Z. Chavchavadze proves an essentially true characterization of this valuational attitude, which they see as the subject matter studied by axiology:
"It is that which constitutes, in the overall, the distinctive characteristics of this mode of perception of the world, and the aspect of reality disclosed by the mediation of that mode, that comprises the subject matter of Marxist axiology" ("Symposium," p. 15).

The question arises as to whether any such valuational aspect of reality actually exists, and how one may discover it. Inasmuch as it is revealed only through the medium of valuational consciousness, it can be pinned down only if the thinking of a theoretician moves within the confines of that consciousness. Where this is the case, axiology becomes mere description of valuational consciousness. However, the further judgment of axiologists shows that the nature of a value, when so described, remains an unexplained, mysterious "x." The consciousness of values suffers from certain illusions in this regard, and the elimination of such illusions by a theoretician leads him merely to the negative characteristics of value. For example, "the value of an object disclosed by valuation consciousness...is perceived as a distinctive property of the object," while in fact "the value of any object differs in principle from its definable real attributes," and it is not a "factual accident" of the entity as "substance" is (ibid., pp. 15-16).

Here axiology falls into the sphere of unreal and therefore insoluble antinomies. On the one hand, not only is the value itself unreal, but "the existence of a value is not determined by the reality or unreality of its carrier. The value of absolute justice, for example, is not diminished by the fact that it has not yet existed in the world"; but on the other hand "the value of an unrealized good depends to a certain degree upon its realizability." In affirming that a value appears to man "as the object of his needs and strivings," the authors immediately qualify this: "This does not mean that value is possessed only by goods that are means for satisfying human needs" (ibid., pp. 16-17). Attempts to resolve these antinomies and to reinstate value phenomena, which are "strange" and "supernatural" in character, lead the authors to the need to go outside the bounds of pure description of them.

And here we face two possibilities. One of them consists of analysis of social culture as a special world of man's ties and connections to entities, in addition to the world of nature. The other lies in an attempt to treat values as distinctive definitions of existence in general, going beyond the bounds of "empirical" historical reality. The authors cited hold that, in addition to values defined by the historically developing needs of man, there are "absolute values—goals that man faces as categorical demands," for "the value of a need itself requires validation." Dzhioev distinguishes between values that are determined by "that which the human race empirically has in common" and "absolute values" that "relate not to that which men empirically have in common, but to the characteristics of man as a category." "Value is that which benefits the place of man in the world." Chavchavadze, however, sees the roots of the objectivity of values in "ontological objectivity"—existence and "concordance with it." "The goal-oriented, morally imperative nature of values is a reflection, in the form of consciousness of values, of the trends and directions of existence in its dialectical development" (ibid., pp. 18-20).

In formulations of this type, the distinctively social nature of values is entirely erased. An insufficiently consistent application of the principle that things must be considered in historical context, and attempts to "correct" the relativism that allegedly derives from the latter, irresistibly carry with them efforts to find absolute values independent of history, ontological in significance. Never mind the consequences of such an approach to the problem in terms of general philosophy; it presupposes a quest for what are essentially moral criteria for evaluation of the historical process itself (from the standpoint of "what befits the place of man in the world"). For this intention to be brought to reality would mean that rigorously scientific analysis of socio-historical laws and the process whereby all valuations, including those of a moral nature, are derived from these laws would be replaced by moralizing from the standpoint of a priori ethical postulates.

It must be noted that the authors shore up this ontology of values by a considerable number of
qualifications to the effect that values are phenomena of social culture. For us here it is important to establish something else — that the definition of the nature of values is impossible in principle so long as we remain within the confines of description of valuation consciousness. And once this is so, the very subject matter of axiology, which lays claim to becoming a separate discipline within philosophy, disappears. There remains to us only one means of studying values: the sociological, which explains the mechanism of their genesis and reproduction. What field of research this is, what its subject matter is, what the methodology of examination of values must be, and what their nature is: these are the three principal questions facing us and requiring further investigation. Here we shall confine ourselves merely to a cursory outline of the problems arising in this connection, and of preliminary hypotheses.

***

We take as a point of departure that a valuation attitude toward an entity (within which attitude it appears to us as a value) is only a particular aspect of the many-faceted practical attitude of man toward the reality he masters and transforms. The fact that an entity appears as object of a need directed to it is merely an external fact requiring scientific derivation in terms of social history. Consequently, we need not only a mere description of value phenomena but analysis of social culture, a theory of activity going far beyond the bounds of axiology. The technique employed in such investigation cannot be axiological, for that presumes the examination of reality only from the standpoint from which valuation consciousness sees it. The value orientation taken as point of departure for the thinker introduces intuitive moralizing as a criterion in theory, whereas science must study its subject matter in rigorously objective fashion in the investigation of the value aspect of the social mind as in everything else.

But if the valuational attitude is excluded from theory, this does not mean that it is "abolished."

After all, what is the valuational attitude? In our opinion, it is merely a transient aspect of the relationship between human need and its object. A need includes the means of satisfying it and is realized in the act of consumption (of production) or by intellectual assimilation. But an object emerges as valuable precisely as a need not yet realized, as an entity external to man that is yet to be assimilated. For example, a moral need (norm, ideal) exists only insofar as its universal fulfillment has not yet become a form of behavior taken for granted by all, and its implementation by the individual is conceived of as a moral value, a good. The object of consumption becomes a value because an unsatisfied need for it exists; it is not given man directly as a natural attribute of his, but must be produced and reproduced. It appears as an entity for acquisition and normed distribution, i.e., it confronts need as something external to it, subject to attainment or possession.

Thus, the phenomenon of value arises under conditions of contradiction (capable of being overcome at each given moment or historically) between a need that has already matured, an arisen need, a problem posed, a possibility opening in the immediate or remote future, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, present reality that does not yet at the immediate moment permit these problems to be resolved entirely and at once. It is the fact that value thus is of the nature of a "problem" that distinguishes it from all objects of consumption, of whatever nature. Moreover, a value performs the role of a mediator between a thing and man, who has not yet discovered the nature of that thing in all its richness. In this connection a value may compensate for the inadequacy of knowledge possessed by society or the individual, a sign or symbol of the as yet unrevealed content of the object. Man, who has not assimilated the entire riches of social culture, is compelled to orient his activity to one or another degree with the aid of regulative norms — moral requirements, memorized techniques for operating with unknown data, generally accepted valuations and formulas. The problem of transforming intuitive into scientific knowledge, of the normative into the creative, of passage from
activity regulated from without and in purely external fashion, to free self-directed activity, is usually associated with this.

But is it possible, in this case, to speak of overcoming the valuational attitude in some future time? From our viewpoint, no. This attitude is constantly reproduced in the process of development of social culture and of the separate individual. The transition from partial to complete mastery of an object always occurs both on the socio-historical and on the individual plane. Man masters, in increasingly universal fashion, the culture already accumulated by society, but its continually accelerating development demands that new standards constantly be introduced. It is not only the separate individual, but the collective societal entity that must inevitably, in the course of mastering ever new entities, pass through the phase of a normative valuational attitude toward them. And therefore this relationship is constantly reproduced.

Moreover, alongside the scientific there also exists the intuitional consciousness characterized not only by a lesser degree of cognitive mastery of the subject, but by the fact that that assimilation proceeds in a distinctive form. In the minds of the masses of the people, the scientific world view becomes clothed in the form of emotionally colored concepts (ideals, notions of happiness, good and evil). Here values act as abbreviated "denotations" of theoretical content in the form of a psychological stereotype or image. This is why the problem of value retains its significance as a field of social psychology. But it can be resolved only by discovering the rational content of "spiritual values," by uncovering the internal logic of the entity reflected in intuitional consciousness in the form of some "value." This does not eliminate the value form of consciousness, but causes it to be regarded only as an external form, a psychological expression of a content in the realm of world view.

Herein lies, we are convinced, the fundamental difference between elevating values to a fetish and a viewpoint that permits us to pose the question of the shaping of convictions in each man that are truly scientific (in content but not necessarily in form).

Footnotes

1) In bourgeois axiology there is also a third trend, the naturalist, which would appear to be an exception in this regard. As an example of this we may cite the value theory of R. B. Perry, according to which value judgments are founded in judgments of facts. But here value phenomena are considered only in their psychological aspect — as a manifestation of "interest" (desires, attractions, inclinations). According to this conception, this type of manifestation of "interest" may be construed as an empirical fact, but cannot be derived with the rigor of scientific necessity. Thus, the antithesis between science and axiology remains: it is merely "driven inside" and transferred from the realm of empirical description of facts to that of discovery of their essential regularities.

2) Reference is to the viewpoints put forth at the USSR Symposium on the Problem of Value convened in Tbilisi in October 1965, to the proceedings of which (Simpozium po probleme tsennostei v marksistsko-leninskoi filosofii, Tbilisi, 1965) we shall be making reference hereafter.