II. METAETHICS OF THE 20th CENTURY
(SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY)

1. Bruce A. Ackerman

2. Robert Ackermann

3. E. M. Adams

   EMA complains that Ayer and Stevenson do not adequately analyse approbation, failing properly to distinguish it from mere liking. If we do analyse it we find it involves a cognitive element in the form of a judgement of rightness. So it is incoherent to analyse judgements of rightness in terms of approval.


   "Mr Hare on the Role of Principles in Deciding" in *Mind* 65, 1956.


   "Ought Again" in *Philosophical Studies* 8, 1957.


   "The Subjective Normative Structure of Agency" in Regis, Gewirth's *Ethical Rationalism*.


4. Robert Merrihew Adams
   "Motive Utilitarianism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 73, 1976


5. H. D. Aiken
   "Emotive Meaning and Ethical Terms" in *Journal of Philosophy* 61, 1944


   "Evaluation and Obligation: Two Functions of Judgments in the Language of Conduct" in *Journal of Philosophy* 47, 1950


   "Definitions, Factual Premises and Ethical Conclusions" in *Philosophical Review* 61, 1952.


   "Moral Reasoning" in *Ethics* 64, 1953.


6. Carlos E. Alchourron
   "Logic of Norms and Logic of Normative Propositions" in *Logique et Analyse* 12, 1969.


   "Para una Logica de las Razones Prima Facie" in *Analisys Filosofico* 16, 1996.

7. Carlos E. Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin
   "The Expressive Conception of Norms" in Hilpinen, *New Studies in Deontic Logic*

   "Normative Knowledge and Truth" in *Gracia, Philosophical Analysis in Latin America*

8. Carlos E. Alchourron and Antonio A. Martino
   "Logic Without Truth" in *Ratio Juris* 3, 1990
A & M urge that Jorgensen’s dilemma - given that norms lack truth-values either the notion of inference is inapplicable to them or it can be characterized without reference to truth - be resolved in favour of the latter horn. (various alternatives are characterized and rejected.) For philosophical motivation they appeal to Wittgenstein’s doctrine of meaning as use. They propose taking an abstract notion of consequence, which they characterize, as primitive. They then propose that the rules for the standard connectives be given, Gentzen-style, with reference to their introduction and elimination rules. For deontic logic the following basic rule is proposed:

\[ \text{OA1,...,OA}_n \vdash \text{OB} \]

A & M then show that the more standard axioms of deontic logic are derivable in terms of this rule and vice versa.

9. Henry Allison
   "Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis” in Philosophical Review 95, 1986
   Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
   “On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical Imperative” in Philosophical Topics 19, 1991

10. David Alm
    "The Legacy of Emotivism" in MacDonald and Wright, Fact, Science and Morality.

11. J. E. J. Altham
    "Evaluation and Speech” in Casey, Morality and Moral Reasoning
    "Reflection and Confidence” in Altham and Harrison, World, Mind and Ethics

A suggestive and intelligent critique of Williams’ metaethical views, Williams has suggested that reflection on our thick concepts can destroy the ethical knowledge they embody but confidence in their practical deployment may remain possible even then. But when ethical reflection leads us to just drop some thick concept, we simply drop it and there is no residual role for confidence. If, on the other hand, the reflection takes the form of a metaethical critique it is hard to see how the damage can be limited only to some thick concepts. If reflection can destroy ethical knowledge it will, Altham suggests, destroy all of it. If the destruction is limited, we should deny that what has been destroyed was ever knowledge.

12. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison

13. William Alston
    "Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements” in Nous 2, 1968

14. Alan Ross Anderson
    "The Logic of Norms” in Logique et Analyse 1, 1958
    "Some Nasty Problems in the Formal Logic of Ethics” in Nous 1 1967

Anderson maintains that .It is obligatory that p. is equivalent to .If Op then V. where V is some bad state of affairs obtaining. But what kind of conditional is signaled here by .if.? Not material implication certainly as we could then infer O(p) from p. Strict implication is also an unsatisfactory reading as it is not being proposed that V is a logical consequence of Op and we in any case do not want to be able to infer O(p) from "Necessarily p". Anderson suggests that the most satisfactory reading is in terms of a notion of relevant implication he goes on to define and explore.

15. Elizabeth Anderson
    Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1993)
    "Reasons, Attitudes, and Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper,” in Ethics 106, 1996
    "Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods” in Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason

16. Julia Annas
    "Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge” in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001

17. G. E. M. Anscombe
    Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957)
    "On Brute Facts” in Analysis 18, 1958
    "Modern Moral Philosophy” in Philosophy 33, 1958

18. Louise M. Antony

A clear and rich discussion of Nussbaum’s attempt to defend a grounding role in ethical theory for a form of Aristotelian essentialism from Williams, critique of any such idea. The basic problem is that accounts of human nature are either external, confining themselves to scientific fact, in which case they seem to have limited potential to yield ethical conclusions, or internal, explicitly normative articulations of our self-conceptions, which yield substantive ethical conclusions only because they are heavy with normative presuppositions and do not speak to those who do not share these presuppositions. In her exegesis Williams, Nussbaum makes out this external/external distinction in terms of a descriptive/normative distinction. But in her critique external accounts are assimilated to the kind of external realism she follows Putnam in rejecting. But this is to confuse independence from human values with independence from all forms of human conceptualization and to misdiagnose opposition to essentialism as opposition to metaphysical realism. The real but
limited truth in essentialism is that external accounts of what humans are like point to commonalities that offer us the normative common ground we need in order successfully to address one another’s internal moral self-understandings.

19. Lennart Åqvist
   *Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987)

20. Steven Arkonovich

21. Horacio Arlo Coasta, John Collins and Isaac Levi
   "DEsire-As-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference" in *Analysis* 55, 1995, pp. 2-5.

22. Leslie Armour
   "The Origin of Values" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

23. Richard Arneson

24. Hilliard Aronovitch
   "Reflective Equilibrium or Evolving Tradition?", *Inquiry* 39, 1996.

25. Nomy Arpaly


26. Robert Arrington

27. R. F. Atkinson

28. Robert Audi


   "Intending. Intentional Action and Desire" in Marks, *The Ways of Desire*


   "Ethical Reflectionism" in *The Monist* 76, 1993.


   "Intuitionism, Pluralism and the Foundations of Ethics" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge*


   "Moral Judgement and Reasons for Action" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

   *Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)


29. Bruce Aune
   "Castaneda's Theory of Morality" in Tomberlin, *Hector-Neri Castaneda*

30. A. J. Ayer

31. Carla Bagnoli
   "Value in the Guise of Regret" in *Philosophical Explorations*, 2000.

32. Annette Baier
   *Postures of the Mind* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985)

   "Extending the Limits of Moral Theory" in *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 1986

   *Moral Prejudices* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1994)

33. Kurt Baier
   "Objectivity in Ethics" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1948

   "S. Hampshire: Fallacies in Moral Philosophy: a Note" in *Mind* 59, 1950

   "Decisions and Descriptions" in *Mind* 60, 1951

   "Doing My Duty" in *Philosophy* 26, 1951

   "Good Reasons" in *Philosophical Studies* 4, 1953.

   "Proving A Moral Judgment" in *Philosophical Studies* 4, 1953
"Moral Blindness" in Australian Journal of Philosophy, 32 1954

The Meaning of Life (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957)


"Fact, Value and Norm in Stevenson's Ethics" in Nous 1, 1967.

"Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Comparability" in Philosophical Studies 24, 1973


Baier objects to prescriptivism's understanding of practical discourse as imperative. His central argument is that it can make perfect sense to say both "I know that you ought to do X but please don't" and "I know I ought to X but I won't".

"Rationality and Morality" in Erkenntnis 1977


"Moral Reasons and Reasons to be Moral" in Goldman and Kim, Values and Morals.


"Rationality, Reason and the Good" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth.

"Justification in Ethics" in Nomos 27, 1986.


The Rational and the Moral Order (La Salle: Ill: Open Court, 1995).

"Comments" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society

34. Kurt Baier and Stephen Toulmin

"On Describing" in Mind 61, 1952.

35. Thomas Baldwin

"Ethical Non-Naturalism" in Hacking, Essays in Analysis

36. Stephen W. Ball


Ball argues that the OQA is is not successfully rebutted by such critics as Harman and Putnam. The objection that it is invalid as parallel reasoning might undermine such identities as that water is H2O is met by noting, firstly, that the OQA is supposed to apply primarily against analytic identities between moral and natural properties. Secondly, Ball suggests the OQA can be effective even against such property identities more generally for it offers strong evidence for the thought that we cannot establish such identities on linguistic grounds and we may appeal to supplementary arguments familiar from elsewhere in metaethics to question whether there are, in this case, the sort of extra-linguistic reasons to claim such identities as we find in science. The objection that OQA is circular can also, Ball suggests, be sidestepped if we see it as appealing not, question-beggingly, to the conceptual fact that X has property P but is not good is not self-contradictory but to the psychological fact that such a possibility seems open to ordinary users of moral concepts. Such an appeal to linguistic intuitions is not logically compelling but has the status of a strong piece of evidence against analytic naturalism.


37. Renford Bambrough

Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979)

The Roots of Moral Reason" in Regis, Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism

38. Stephen J. Barker

"Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?" in Analysis 60, 2000

"Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 299-317.

39. W. H. F. Barnes

"A Suggestion About Values" in Analysis 1934.

40. Marcia Baron


41. Jonathan Barrett


42. Christine Battersby

"Morality and the Ick" in Philosophy 53 (1978)

43. Bernard H. Baumrin

"Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?" in American Philosophical Quarterly 5, 1968.

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44. Michael Bayles
"Intuitions in Ethics" in *Dialogue* 23, 1984

"Mid-Level Principles and Justification" in Pennock and Chapman, *Justification*

45. **R. W. Beardsmore**

46. **Lawrence Becker**

47. **Roger Beehler**

48. **Ruth Benedict**

49. **Stanley Benn and R. S. Peters**
*Social Principles and the Democratic State* (London: George Allen, 1959)

50. **Jonathan Bennett**

51. **Fred R. Berger**

52. **Frithjof Bergmann**

53. **Luther J. Binkley**
*Contemporary Ethical Theories* (New York: Citadel, 1961)

54. **Robert Binkley**
The Ultimate Justification of Moral Rules" in Welsh, *Fact, Value and Perception*

55. **Rudiger Bittner**

56. **Gunnar Björnsson**

Björnsson takes emotivism as an empirical hypothesis identifying moral opinions with a certain kind of desire or optation. He then seeks to address the Frege-Geach problem by offering a rough general characterization of negative, conditional etc thoughts in terms of their functional role in reasoning and seeking to show what purposes can be served by optation-involving thoughts that play these functional roles.


57. **Max Black**


*The Labyrinth of Language* (Britannica Perspectives Series, London: Pall Mall, 1968) (esp. chap. 5 on emotivism)

58. **Robert Black**

59. **Simon Blackburn**

"Truth, Realism and the Regulation of Theory" in *Midwest Studies* 5, 1980

"Rule-Following and Moral Realism" in Holzman and Leich, *Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule*, pp. 163-187.,


This is a textbook in the philosophy of language. However the discussion of realism in chapters 5-7 is largely focused on the case of ethics and became the classic presentation of ethical realism in the 1980s. Blackburn sees evaluative properties as projections of sentiments and sets out to describe the quasi-realist project of explaining the realist character of the way we speak on the assumption that this projectivism is true. Central aspects of his sketch in chapter 6 of how this can be done include his influential treatment of the Frege-Geach problem, construing evaluative conditionals as expressive of second-order attitudes, and his ingenious attempt to make good projectivist sense of the matter of moral mind-independence. He also attempts to construct a notion of truth applicable to evaluations. The question, of how, if this quasi-realist project can give legitimate application to such realist language, the contrast with more robust realism should be made out, is addressed in chapter 7 in terms of the relevance of the subject matter of an area of discourse to the causal explanation of our beliefs in that area. Chapter 5 contains brief but interesting remarks on thick concepts, reductionism and the "speech act fallacy".

"Errors and the Phenomenology of Value" in Honderich, *Morality and Moral Reasoning* and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, pp. 149-165.

Considering Mackie's error theory, SB imagines that the error theorist might seek to engage in a form of practical thinking freed of metaphysical error - in *shmoralizing*. The error theory is undermined, however, if, as the quasi-realist expects, shmoralizing turns out to be just like moralizing. Hence the quasi-realist seek to accommodate the phenomenological aspects of value that the realist is apt to emphasize such as mind-independence. This is consistent with quasi-realism, however, as we can read the counterfactuals that state it as expressing first order moral commitments rather than as espousing metaethical realism. The analogy, pressed by McDowell, between values and secondary qualities, is questioned and, in the final section, SB suggests an affinity between projectivism and consequentialism.
"Supervenience Revisited" in Hacking, Essays in Analysis and in Essays in Quasi-Realism.


"Morals and Modal"s in MacDonald and Wright, Fact, Science and Morality and in Essays in Quasi-Realism., pp. 52-74.

"How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist" in Midwest Studies 12, 1987 and in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 166-181.


SB here revisits the Frege-Geach problem and seeks to improve on his STW approach. The general desideratum of any logic of attitudes is, he suggests, that our goals should be consistent. Taking adeonically perfect world to be one where every proposition we "hurrrah!" is true and taking "H!p" where p is some proposition to express commitment to some goal to be realized in every deontically perfect world, "B!p" to rule p out of any such world, and "T!p" admit p to at least some deontically perfect worlds, we can understand the consistency of a set of attitude sentences in terms of whether they together commit us to a goal that can be consistently realized in some deontically perfect world. If this is not true we will say that the set of sentences is unsatisfiable. Negated attitudes can, SB suggests, be systematically read as attitudes to negated propositions, e.g. not-H!p = T!not-p. He understands conditionals and other basic embedded contexts in terms of what we are committed to when we accept something, adopting the method of semantic tableau or trees to capture this notion. The commitment I express by e.g. "(H!p v H!q)" is one that involves tying myself to a tree. I tie myself, commit myself, to either accepting H!p or accepting H!q. The validity of an argument then consists in the joint unsatisfiability of the sentences we commit ourselves to in accepting the premises and denying the conclusion.


Blackburn sets out to debunk thick concepts arguing that the moral attitudes expressed in their use is typically carried by non-lexical features like tone, a matter of passing rather than priori theory. He stresses the flexibility of our language with respect to the evaluations we convey by it and our failure to talk past each other - at least as much as "thickies" should predict - when we bring contrasting sensibilities to the way we use our words.


"The Land of Lost Content" in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality

"Realism- Quasi or Queasy?" in Haldane and Wright, Reality, Representation and Projection, pp. 365-383.

"The Flight to Reality" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Virtues and Reasons.


"Practical Tortoise Raising" in Mind, 1995

"Dilemmas, Dithering, Plumping and Grief" in Mason, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory


"Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge

"Has Kant Refuted Parfit?" in Dancy, Reading Parfit


"Trust, Cooperation and Human Psychology" in Levi and Braithwaite, Trust and Governance, pp. 28-45.


Objects to Wright's version of minimalism that there may be normative regimes for the acceptance/rejection of sentences that are nothing much to do with truth conditions. The proper moral to draw, SV argues, from the relvant work of Ramsey is that we need not a 'sorted notion of truth' but a sorted notion of truth-aptitude, one that recognizes functional differences. We can anyway rule out such distinctions in advance only if, unlike Wright but like Rorty we are accepting of an indefensibly quietist 'blanket minimalism'. The second half of the paper is a critique of Wright and Boghossian's anxieties about the supposedly (and only supposedly, thinks SB) contagious character of irrealsim about semantics. "Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?" in Inquiry 42, 1999, pp. 213-228.

The quasi-realist is not greatly threatened by the freshman relativist.. The existence of alien and different moral views like those of the Talibani do not threaten it, do not deprive us of the conceptual resources to say, and say rightly, that such people are simply wrong (while granting to the freshman that there are other, very different viewpoints which we should be more tolerant of or from which we can even learn). It is rather quasi-realism.s rivals that are at risk from such a worry, given the likelihood of plural modes of human flourishing, plural ways in which people might constitute their practical identities and plural ways in which (à la McDowell/Cavell) our organisms might conceivably whirl. As for objectivity, it is a virtue, being sensitive to the right aspects of the situation, and in the right way and its opposite is bias, a vice the Talibani amply exemplify.


"How Emotional is the Virtuous Person?" in Goldie, Understanding Emotions

"Anti-Realist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism" in Copp, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, pp. 146-162.

"Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?" in Dreier, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 144-159.

60. William T. Blackstone

"Objective Emotivism in Aesthetics" in Methodos 10, 1958.


"Can Science Justify an Ethical Code?" in Inquiry 3, 1960
61. Brand Blanshard
   Reason and Goodness (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)
62. Paul Bloomfield
63. Lawrence Blum
64. Paul Boghossian
65. Paul Boghossian and David J. Velleman
   "Colour as a Secondary Quality" in Mind 98, 1989
66. Sissela Bok
67. E. J. Bond
   Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
68. E. J. Borowski
69. Luc Bovens and Dalia Drai
70. Norman E. Bowie
   (ed.) Ethical Theory (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1983)
71. Dwight R. Boyd
72. Richard Boyd
   "How to be a Moral Realist" in Sayre-McCord, Essays on Moral Realism, pp. 181-228.
   This marvellous tour de force is the core paper of so-called Cornell Realism. Suppose we are homeostatic consequentialists. Suppose, that is, we identify goodness with a cluster of properties, conducive to the satisfaction of human needs, tending to occur together and with a tendency to promote each other (or to be promoted by the same sorts of things). If this theory is right, goodness is a natural property and as amenable to observation as any other. The role of heavily theory-laden intuition and culturally transmitted presuppositions need not debunk, just as in science it need not debunk. Indeed, in science, such things can be seen as favouring realism - we can argue that heavily theory-dependent revisions of scientific knowledge can only contribute to scientific progress if the theories in question are approximately true enough not to lead us astray. Analogously, if there is grounds to believe moral reasoning starts out approximately true, we can legitimately view the presupposition-heavy method of reflective equilibrium as one of discovery and not merely construction. And there is, argues RB, such ground: human needs are accessible to empirical study; indeed, he suggests, much moral progress has arisen from experiments of a political or social kind. And indeed our capacity to cognize our needs is highly apt for evolutionary explanation. As a natural kind term, "good" stands, on this view, in no need of any reductive, analytic definition. And as a term picking out a homeostatic cluster property we can predict failures of bivalence that can be explanatory of the intractability of moral "hard cases". What it would take to determine that this is what "good" meant would be grounds to believe this was the property that causally regulated our use of the word and Boyd thinks there may be such reasons - when for example we reflect on our we identify moral terms in foreign languages. Moreover externalism is true - we can, in principle, be well-informed about the moral facts and left indifferent to them. But the dual role of sympathy, as a cognitive aid to appreciating the needs of others and as a source of motivation makes this tend not to be the case. RB does not directly argue that homeostatic consequentialism is true. His aim is rather to use it for the illustrative purpose of characterizing how moral realism very plausibly might be defended.
73. Joseph Boyle
   "Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
74. Michael Bradie

75. **M. S. Brady**

"How to Understand Internalism", Philosophical Quarterly 50, 2000

76. **Robert Brandom**

"Action, Norms and Practical Reasoning" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 12 1998

77. **R. B. Brandt**

"An Emotional Theory of the Judgment of Moral Worth" in *Ethics* 52, 1941

"The Significance of Differences of Ethical Opinion for Ethical Relativism" in PPR 4 1944.

"Moral Valuation" in *Ethics* 56 1946.


"Some Puzzles for Attitude Theories of Value" in Lepley, *The Language of Value.

"Blameworthiness and Obligation" in Melden, *Essays in Moral Philosophy.

**Ethical Theory** (Prentice-Hall, 1959).

"Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language" (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1963).


"Act Utilitarianism and Metaethics" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics.


78. **Jan Bransen**


79. **Jan Bransen and Marc Slors**


80. **Michael Bratman**

"Intention and Evaluation" in Midwest Studies 10, 1986


"Practical Reason and Acceptance in a Context. in Mind 101, 1992, pp. 1-14 and in Faces of Intention.

"Identification, Decision and Treating as a Reason" in Philosophical Topics 24, 1996, pp. 1-18 and in Faces of Intention.


"Valuing and the Will" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 14, 2000, pp. 249-265.


81. **J. M. Brennan**


82. **J. Brice**

(ed.) *Freedom and Morality* (University of Kansas, 1976)

83. **M. H. Brighouse**


84. **David O. Brink**


"Moral Realism Defended" in Pojman, *Ethical Theory*


This is the only book-length exposition of what has come to be known as Cornell Realism. Brink thinks the anti-realist has the burden of proof in debate given the realist surface syntax of moral language, the realism he takes to be implicit in common sense morality and the fact that realism promises a "straight solution" to moral scepticism. He defends motivational externalism - the view that moral judgements motivate only contingently - by appealing to the possibility of the amoralist who views the moral facts with indifference. Moreover the coherence of the amoralist's sceptical challenge - that we give him a reason to care about morality undermine, he urges, the distinct form of internalism whereby wherever there is a moral requirement there is a reason. So arguments such as Harman's against moral realism which depend on such internalism about reasons fail. Realism can make better sense than its rivals not only of the amoralist but also of moral disagreement, moral expertise and the possibility of an esoteric moral truth that, on moral grounds, it would be wrong for us to know. Brink
defends a coherentist account of moral epistemology. He urges that we may, consistently with naturalism, agree with the claim of the 'Is'-"Ought" Thesis that there are no entailments between nonmoral statements and (nonvacuous) moral statements by rejecting what Brink calls the Semantic Test for Properties whereby terms designate the same property only if they are synonymous. This is false as familiar examples of synthetic property identities make clear. Given concerns about multiple realizability, moral naturalism is to be understood as a claim that moral properties are constituted by natural properties, not that they are identical to them. But there is nothing queer about constitution and because natural facts constitute the moral facts the latter are neither queer nor explanatorily impotent. Indeed Brink argues that moral facts do explanatory work in their own right not reducible to any lower-order explanations at the subvenient level. In a long final chapter Brink defends a version of objective utilitarianism. There are also several appendices of which the most interesting is a quite substantial discussion of Rawls' constructivism.

"A Puzzle About the Authority of Morality" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
"A Reasonable Morality" in Ethics 104, 1994
"Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Legal Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals
"Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics" in Inquiry 42, 1999
"Realism, Naturalism and Moral Semantics" in Social Philosophy and Policy 18, 2001
85. C. D. Broad
"On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics" in Ethics 1915.
Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, 1930)
"Is "Goodness" a Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?" in P.A.S.S., 1933-4.
"Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics" in P.A.S. 45, 1945
Ethics and the History of Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1952)
"Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore
86. Dan Brock
87. Baruch Brody
"Intuitions and Objective Moral Knowledge" in The Monist 62, 1979
88. John Broome
""Utility"" in Economics and Philosophy, 7 1991
"Rationality and the sure-thing principle", in Meeks, Thoughtful Economic Man
"Can a Humean be moderate?", in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality
An important paper on practical reason. The extreme Humean claims there can be no rational constraints on preferences. The moderate Humean holds they are constrained only by coherence as modelled in the axioms of decision theory. However it is always possible to make any pattern of choice conform to these by fine-tuning the individuation of its objects, so, unless something constrains such fine-tuning, moderate Humeanism collapses into extreme Humeanism. This constraint, Broome argues, is provided by rational principles of indifference but to admit these is to leave Humeanism behind. The argument is backed up by remarks on the epistemology of preferences which is claimed essentially to involve judgements of the relative goodness of their objects.
Instrumentalism is false as it implies, absurdly, that if I want something I ought to want it. Rejecting instrumentalism, Broome suggests that reason can get us to conclusions about what we ought to do, to belief in normative propositions. But can it explain, and explain, in the right way, our coming to act on these propositions? Here Broome proposes we simply invoke a natural disposition to do what we believe we ought to do. Some might find this unsatisfying, objecting it does not explain our motivation in the right way, that it implies that "motivation is external to reason". But perhaps, Broome suggests, we should nonetheless accept this. At least unless some better account of practical reason - perhaps a noncognitivist account - can be found.
"Extended preferences", in Fehige and Wessels, Preferences
Sometimes in virtue of some fact p one ought to do something, a strict relation we could write as: p oughts q. Sometimes a fact gives one a reason to do something, a slack relation: p reasons q. And sometimes a fact normatively requires one to do something: p requires q, another strict relation. If p and p oughts q then you ought to see to it that q. If p and p reasons q then you have a reason to q. But if p and p requires q it does not follow that you either ought or have a reason to see to it that q. Indeed normative requirements do not allow the detachment of a normative conclusion. Examples: believing that p normatively requires that I believe anything p entails; believing you ought to do something normatively requires doing it; and having an intention and a belief about the necessary means to realize it normatively requires intending
the means. Instrumental reasoning then does not provide one with a reason to take the means the means to one's ends but merely requires it. So the argument of Korsgaard's "Normativity of Instrumental Reasons" fails.


Bruce Brower

"Dispositional Ethical Realism" in Ethics, 103, 1993

Erik Brown


A. Buchanan

E. Bulygin, G. L. Gardies and I. Niiniluonto (eds.) Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985)

John A. Burgess

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"Thick Concepts Revised" in Analysis 57, 1992

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C. A. Campbell
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Jay Campbell

Richmond Campbell

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"Socially Generated Moral Justifications" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification


Claudia Card
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George R. Carlson

Thomas L. Carson
"Gibbard's Conceptual Scheme for Moral Philosophy", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992

Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2000)

Thomas L. Carlson and Paul K. Moser
"Relativism and Normative Nonrealism: Basing Morality on Rationality" in Metaphilosophy 27, 1996, pp. 277-295..

Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet

John Casey
(Ed.) Morality and Moral Reasoning (London: Methuen, 1971)

Hector-Neri Castaneda
"On the Logic of Norms" in Methodos 9, 1957.

"Imperatives and Deontic Logic" in Analysis 19, 1958.

"Imperative Reasonings" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21, 1960

"Imperatives, Decisions and Oughts" in Catneda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct


Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975)


Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (eds.) Morality and the Language of Conduct (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963)
Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

111. **Robert W. Chandler**

112. **Ruth Chang**

113. **T. D. J. Chappell**
   "The Incomplete Projectivist: How to be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 48, 1998.

114. **David Charles and Kathleen Lennon**

115. **Roderick Chisholm**
   "Contrary to Duty Imperative and Deontic Logic" in *Analysis* 24, 1963.

116. **Paul M. Churchland**

117. **Stephen R. L. Clark**

118. **David Charles and Kathleen Lennon**

119. **Ruth Chang**

120. **T. D. J. Chappell**
   "The Incomplete Projectivist: How to be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 48, 1998.

121. **L. Jonathan Cohen**
   "Three-Valued Ethics" in *Philosophy* 26, 1951.

122. **Rachel Cohen**

123. **Mark Colby**

124. **John Collins**
   "Belief, Desire and Revision" in *Mind* 97, 1988, pp. 333-342.

125. **Sarah Conly**

126. **David E. Cooper**

127. **Neil Cooper**

128. **David Copp**

129. **John Collins**
   "Belief, Desire and Revision" in *Mind* 97, 1988, pp. 333-342.

130. **Sarah Conly**

131. **David E. Cooper**

132. **Neil Cooper**

133. **L. Jonathan Cohen**
   "Three-Valued Ethics" in *Philosophy* 26, 1951.

134. **Rachel Cohen**

135. **Mark Colby**

136. **John Collins**
   "Belief, Desire and Revision" in *Mind* 97, 1988, pp. 333-342.

137. **Sarah Conly**

138. **David E. Cooper**

139. **Neil Cooper**

140. **L. Jonathan Cohen**
   "Three-Valued Ethics" in *Philosophy* 26, 1951.

141. **Rachel Cohen**

142. **Mark Colby**

143. **John Collins**
   "Belief, Desire and Revision" in *Mind* 97, 1988, pp. 333-342.

144. **Sarah Conly**
129. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman

130. Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielsen

131. H. H. Cox

132. Roger Crisp
"Naturalism and Non-Naturalism in Ethics" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

133. Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker

134. Garrett Cullity

"Practical Theory" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

135. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut

136. Terence Cuneo

"Are Moral Qualities Response-dependent?" in *Nous* 35, 2001


137. Jonathan Dancy
"Supererogation and Moral Realism" in Dancy, Moravcsik and Taylor, *Human Agency*
"Intuitionism" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*


139. Norman Daniels


Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics" in *Philosophical Studies* 37, 1980

"Can Cognitive Psychotherapy Reconcile Reason and Desire?" in *Ethics* 93 1983

"Two Approaches to Theory Acceptance in Ethics" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*

140. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson


"Sentiment and Value" in *Ethics* 110, 2000, pp. 722-748.

"The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (or, Anti-Quasijudgementalism)’ in Hatzimoysis, *Philosophy and the Emotions*.


Sensibility Theory and Projection” in Copp, *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*
141. Stephen Darwall
"Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Actions" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, 1978

In this rich and interesting exploration of a Kantian approach to practical reason in general and moral reasons in particular, Darwall sets out first of all to loosen the supposed links between reasons and desires. Desires as such do not furnish us with reasons. Reasons must be capable of motivating us all right but what can be a reason for me depends not on my present desires but on my motivational capacities in a broad sense. Reasons, Darwall maintains, are facts reflective awareness of which would move us to action. Where preferences conflict we face a problem of integration, one that demands we adopt a standpoint distinct from that internal to any individual preference, a reflective standpoint whence we may dispassionately adjudicate among preferences. The unity of agency we can thereby attain is made possible by our taking preferences to be criticizable in the light of reasons. Some of our reasons comprise objective considerations, considerations that make no reference to the agent as such. A preference is impersonally basable if it can be motivated by objective considerations. Reasons are intersubjective when they involve considerations that might ground impersonally basable perference for all members of some community. It is a fact about us - and not a mysterious nonnatural one - that we prefer our preferences to be impersonal basable, that we value intersubjectivity in our values. Our capacity for self-repect is bound up with notions of intersubjective respect-worthiness. Intersubjective value also informs our understanding of our welfare as something that matters and should matter to ourselves and others and of our lives as meaningful. Crucially it also informs the practice of rational appraisal which makes reference to norms taken as applicable to all agents. An internally self-identified subject of a system of rational norms is proximally motivated by the desire to act on the rational principles he recognizes but this desire in turn is motivated (and justified) by judgements about intersubjectively valid normative principles. We may think of such principles as those that would be chosen from behind a think veil of ignorance. The book contains useful discussions of, inter alia, Nagel, Gauthier and Baier.

"Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out" in Philosophical Studies 50, 1986
"Rational Agent, Rational Act" in Philosophical Topics 14, 1986
"How Nowhere Can You Get (and Do Ethics)?" in Ethics 98, 1987
"Moore to Stevenson", in Cavalier, Gouinlock and Sterba, Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy.
"Internalism and Agency" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.

142. Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard and Peter Railton

143. Donald Davidson
How is Weakness of the Will Possible?. in Feinberg (ed.): Moral Concepts.
Reflection on the structure of moral conflict and weakness show that we should not treat moral principles as universally quantified conditionals since the instantiation of the antecedent does not permit the detachment of the consequent. Rather we should construe such principles as denoting a relation between propositions along the lines of .x is F prima facie makes x right/good. (.pf(x is right/good, x is F)). That (a is right/wrong, e) where e is all the considerations known to the agent is never logically entailed by any more particular prima facie principle instantiated by a. Nor does it entail the unconditional judgement x is good/right.. Weakness of will is what occurs when I judge that pf(x is better than y, e) but I am led irrationally by some subset of e to the unconditional judgement (y is better than x) which issues in clear-eyed akatic action.

Expressing Evaluations The Lindley Lecture (monograph), University of Kansas, 1984.
"Objectivity and Practical Reasoning" in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.): Reasoning Practically
144. Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone
"Two Notions of Necessity" in Philosophical Studies 38, 1980
145. William H. Davis
146. Judith Wagner DeCew
"Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism" in Ethics 101, 1990.
Michael De Paul


"Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality" in Journal of Philosophy 40, 1943.
"Further as to Valuation as Judgment" in Journal of Philosophy 40, 1943.

"Ethical Subject-Matter and Language" in Journal of Philosophy 42, 1945

John Divers and Alexander Miller

There is, as Michael Smith claims, an analytic link between truth and belief. But, as his account of the distinct functional roles of belief and desire is not platitudinous and is disputed by anti-Humeans, minimalists need not accept it. So Smith cannot argue from moral beliefs not being even minimally beliefs to their not being minimally true for he is not entitled to that premise. Nor from their not being robustly beliefs to their not being minimally true for the analytic link supports no valid such argument. If his claim is that moral language is only minimally true but not robustly true that may be consistent with Wright's minimalism which is pluralistic about truth. Perhaps Smith is objecting to the claim that moral language is assertoric but then he needs to supply and argument against the claim that being minimally truth-apt suffices for being assertoric.

Julian Dodd and Suzanne Stern-Gillet
"The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Dialogue 34, 1995

Marinus C. Doesser
"Can the Dichotomy of Fact and Value be Maintained?" in Doesser and Kraay, Facts and Values

Marinus C. Doesser and John N. Kraay (Eds.) Facts and Values: Philosophical Reflections from Western and Non-Western Perspectives (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986)

Alan Donagan

Moral Rationalism and Variable Social Institutions" in Midwest Studies 7, 1982

Cian Dorr

This paper considers arguments of the form: 1. P 2. If P then Q Therefore: 3. Q where P is an evaluative sentence and Q a straightforwardly factual sentence. Suppose someone who accepts 2 comes to accept 1. This, we naturally think, can make it rationally appropriate to come to accept 3. But to do so, if 1 is given a noncognitivist interpretation, would be a case of wishful thinking: revising one's beliefs about the world in the interest of making them cohere with our desires and feelings. And that is never rationally appropriate. So a charitable approach to what we are naturally disposed to think demands that we reject noncognitivism.

Dale Dorsey

R. S. Downie
"The Hypothetical Imperative" in Mind 93, 1984

James Dreier

This important paper defends a form of relativism where "x is good" is taken to mean "x is approved by some standard M" where this standard is determined contextually. Foot-type constraints on what can count as a moral standard are one determining factor here but more central are the motivational/affective dispositions of the speaker so that normally, there is a conceptual linkage between one's moral beliefs and such dispositions. Dreier defends this modest internalism - "the principle that in normal contexts a person has some motivation to promote what he believes to be good". When stated in this modest way, he urges, internalism retains its plausibility but evades the sorts of counterexamples suggested by e.g. Stocker. Speaker relativism is defended as furnishing the best explanation of modest externalism (the main rivals here being Michael Smith's moral sense theory which has problems when the speaker's moral beliefs are false and noncognitivism which remains plagued by the embedding problem).


Dreier argues that, while Blackburn is right is supposing that for the moral dualist (nonnaturalist realist) the supervenience of the moral on the natural is left mysterious, his supervenience argument against realism is question begging against reductive naturalism (for reductive naturalists accept strong supervenience) and is unsuccessful against nonreductive
naturalists who have no trouble accepting weak and rejecting strong supervenience. At least they will reject strong supervenience when the latter is read as claiming that whenever a thing is M (where M is some moral predicate) it is analytically necessary that anything N is M (where N is some natural predicate). (If it were a case of metaphysical necessity rather than analytic necessity nonreductive naturalists would hold strong supervenience true and so, Dreier claims, they should.) However, Dreier goes on to argue, his own favoured indexical account of moral concepts, whereby these are understood as expressing properties relative to contexts of utterance, makes excellent sense of moral supervenience which operates in strikingly similar ways to the supervenience relations between indexical and non-indexical predicates.


Horwich and Stoljar have argued that truth-minimalism puts us in the way of a quick and dirty solution to the Frege-Geach problem. JD isn't having it, urging that expressivists must, as Blackburn puts it, earn the right to talk of even minimal truth by explaining how the various embedded contexts make sense on an expressivist reading of the embedded expressions. If we adopt a minimalist take on truth-conditions, knowing the truth conditions of moral claims don't suffice for this. JD's illustration: Stipulate that "Bob is hiyo" ↔ "Hiyo [i.e. Hi!], Bob!". This gives us embeddability and hence minimal truth. But we are still no distance towards making sense of "If a dingo is near, then Bob is hiyo." And merely to appeal here to the inference rule for the conditional is not much help.

"Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality" in Gauthier and Cullity, Ethics and Practical Reason.

It is false that there are no categorical imperative. The means-end rule: M/E -If you desire to F and believe that by Ging you will F, then you ought to G is one. Someone who failed to follow this rule would be irrational and what they are missing cannot be a desire: a desire to comply with M/E would only be any help if they were already disposed to do so. Dreier calls this the Tortoise argument given the analogy with Carroll's famous argument: we can't get someone who doesn't accept the validity of an instance of modus ponens to do so by getting them to accept more conditionals. Means/end rationality then has a special status: nothing could even count as a reason for someone who did not buy into it. But this special status is significant since instrumental reasons do seem always to be dependent on our contingent desires and the Tortoise argument gives us grounds to suppose that instrumental reasons are fundamental.

"Transforming Expressivism" in Nous 33, 1999.

Dreier first proposes a way of representing Gibbard's semantics from Wise Choices that treats content of a statement S as a function from systems of norms to sets of worlds specified as follows:
{n, W> : S, holds at w = w I W]

where Sn is the descriptive correlate, Gibbard-style, of S (obtained by replacing every normative predicate in S with its n-corresponding predicate, forbidden/required according to n). This is a function from systems of norms to propositions construed as per possible worlds semantics. But it can be generalized to view the content of a statement as a function from systems of norms to propositions construed in other ways. This way of formulating Gibbard's semantics makes it tractable for relatively fine-grained ways of individuating propositions and casts light on what is meant by calling a normative statement "true". However, JD goes on to suggest, this sort of expressivism, is starting to look very close to a form of cognitivism, one where normative statements are seen as having definite propositional content, where this is determined by the meaning of the statement (again a function from norms to propositions) and whichever norms are salient in its conversational content.


Michael Smith says that if externalism is true we must concede of good people either as motivated by a de re desire to do the right thing or a de dicto desire to do the right thing. The first would fail the tracking condition: such a desire would not be properly responsive to changes in moral beliefs. The second would be "fetishistic". Dreier argues this dilemma does not exhaust the possibilities. First, an agent might just be suggestible: changes in moral belief might just cause appropriate changes in de re desires. The suggestible agent however might still be morally defective for her motivation would not meet a variant of the tracking condition: her response to moral uncertainty might be defective, involving a reluctance to investigate moral arguments that might lead her to change her mind. Second an agent might have an effective second-order desire to come to desire noninstrumentally and de re to do the right thing. The resultant first order desire would be contingent on the second order desire in that the former would owe its existence to the latter. But the first order desire need not be conditioned on the second order desire in the sense that would make it instrumental. So Smith's argument by dilemma against externalism fails.


The expressivist analysis of normative judgements invokes ascriptions of beliefs and desires. But it is widely held that belief and desire are themselves normative concepts. If someone fears dogs they ought to flee them. If someone believes that P & Q they ought to believe that Q & P. This renders expressivism circular insofar as it seeks to explain normativity. Blackburn tries to 'de-fang' the worry by suggesting that in ascribing beliefs and desires we express "expectations" but without regarding these expectations as normative. This understates the problem as (1) the "ought" in talk of what we ought to believe seem paradigmatically normative; (2) the normative aspects of belief and desire seem to belong to them constitutively. JD's proposed solution is to exploit the way we can stand back from norms, speaking e.g. of 'so-called
virtues'. What he proposes the expressivist should say is that: "Saying what people ought to do expresses a so-called desire that such things be done."

"Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment" in Philosophical Issues 12, pp. 241-263.
"Troubling Developments in Metaethics" (Critical Study of Timmons, Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism in Nous 36, 2002
"Metaethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism" in PHilosophical Perspectives 18, 2004, pp. 23-44.
"Was Moore a Moorean?" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 191-217.
159. Elmer H. Duncan
"Has Anyone Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy?" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 8, 1970.
160. A. E. Duncan-Jones
"Good Things and Good Thieves" in Analysis 17, 1966.
161. Michael Durrant and Robin Attfield
"Prescriptivism and Justification" in Philosophical Papers 10, 1980.
162. R. G. Durrant
163. Gerald Dworkin
An excellent short paper on Scanlon which argues that Scanlon's invocation of considerations of justifiability to others need not leave all the work to be done by independent considerations which explain them. There might indeed be such independent considerations but for a Scanlonian contractualism, what would remain distinctive about considerations of justifiability of others would be their providing moral principles with their normative authority. They hypothetical character of the justification to which contractualism appeals does not undermine this authority so long as we share the ideal of human relationship to which the theory appeals. However Dworkin raises a different set of sceptical worry addressed to Scanlon's claim that moral reasons somehow apply even to those (the disaffected) who do not share this ideal.
164. Gerald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson
Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1968)
165. Ronald Dworkin
166. Susan Dwyer
"Moral Competence" in Murasugi and Stainton (eds.): Philosophy and Linguistics
167. Roy Edgley
168. Jon Elster and J. E. Roemer
(ed.s) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
169. David Enoch
"Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson" in Ratio 14, 2001
FJ claims that if someone believes that p and that if p then q then he ought to believe that q. The noncognitivist will accept this normative claim but may deny that, as a matter of conceptual truth, being subject to such a norm is a constitutive condition for being a belief. He may instead offer a nonnormative characterization of beliefs in terms of certain disposition of conceptual truth, being subject to such a norm is a constitutive condition for being a belief. He may instead offer a nonnormative characterization of beliefs in terms of certain dispositions. In this way a noncognitivist can sidestep Jackson's argument (in the latter's "Noncognitivism, Normativity, Belief").
A sharp and forceful paper urging against Rosati, Velleman and Korsgaard that the fact that some aim is constitutive of action does nothing by itself to endow it with normative significance for the agent.
170. A. C. Ewing
"Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics" in Mind 53, 1944.
"The Possibility of an Agreed Ethics" in Philosophy 21, 1946.
"Hare and the Universalisation Principle" in Philosophy 39, 1964.
171. W. D. Falk:
""Ought" and Motivation" in P.A.S. 48, 1947-8 and Ought, Reasons and Morality
"Moral Perplexity" in Ethics 66, 1956
"Moral, Self and Others in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
"Hume on Practical Reason" in Philosophical Studies 27, 1975
"Hume on "Is" and "Ought" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6, 1976

172. Jeremy Fantl
"Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, 2006, pp. 24-44.

173. Christoph Fehige
(ed.) Zum moralischer Denken (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995)

174. Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels
(eds.) Preferences (de Gruyter, 1998)

175. Joel Feinberg

176. Hartry Field

177. J. N. Findlay
Values and Intentions (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)

178. Kit Fine

179. Stephen Finlay

"Value and Implicature" in Philosophers' Imprint 5, 2005.


180. Roderick Firth

181. Mark Fisher

182. William J. Fitzpatrick
"The Practical Turn In Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity" in Ethics 115, 2005, pp. 651-691.

183. Owen Flanagan


"Quinian Ethics" in Ethics 93, 1982, pp. 56-74.

"Pragmatism, Ethics and Correspondence Truth: Response to Gibson and Quine" in Ethics 98, 1988.

"Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation" in Flanagan and Rorty, Identity, Character and Morality.


184. Owen Flanagan and Amelie O. Rorty

185. Philippa Foot
"Moral Beliefs" in P.A.S. 59, 1958 and Virtues and Vices

Two assumptions typically inform the rejection of naturalism: (1) "some individual may, without logical error, base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no one else would recognize as giving any evidence at all." and (2) "given the kind of statement which other people regard as evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw the conclusion because this does not count as evidence for him." Both (1) and (2) are false, Foot argues, for there is an internal relation between evaluations and their objects. Similar points apply to an attitude like pride or a judgement like the judgement that something is dangerous. You can't be proud of just anything (of the sky, say) or think dangerous something not connected with injury (and similarly not just anything can count as an injury). To say some action is good, in a moral context, is to bring it under the head of some duty or virtue and some actions (like clapping ones hands three times in an hour) have no such connection - at least absent some special background. Nothing can be counted a virtue if not connected with human good or harm. Judgements about moral goodness have an action-guiding character because of the sorts of things that are good. Thus we have a reason to pursue courage and temperance because of the sorts of things they are, because they speak to human needs. Having the virtues benefits the possessor. It is hard, Foot concedes, to show that justice is a benefit to its possessor but only if this can be done (and she thinks it can) can we count justice a virtue at all.

"Moral Arguments" in Mind 67, 1958 and Virtues and Vices.

Foot denies the view that moral arguments are liable to breakdown where the disputants simply take opposing attitudes such that no appeal to evidence can gain purchase on the position of either. "Anyone who uses moral terms at all... must abide by the rules for their use, including rules about what shall count as evidence for or against the moral judgement concerned." She begins with a consideration of "rude". Something is rude is it "causes offence by indicating lack of respect". It may be used to condemn but can be used only when certain descriptive conditions apply. Someone couldn't just decide it was rude to act conventionally or approach a front door slowly. Likewise notions like goodness, obligation, virtue are conceptually tied to notions of harms, benefit, advantage: "a man cannot make his own personal decision about the considerations which are to count as evidence in morals." And the concept of "morality" itself is tied down to certain aspects of our practice. This is not to support a "verbal decision in favour of our own moral code". For we can accept with Foot that
moral concepts have descriptive anchorings while at the same time being open to the possibility that conventional morality may be subverted by argument. Such openness to argument is consistent with a recognition that there are constraints on what are to count as arguments.

"Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in Philosophical Review 81, 1972 and Virtues and Vices.
Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978)
"Moral Relativism" (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1979)
"Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, 1995

Subjectivists hold that there is some special essentially practical way of using language that characterizes moral language. Given this there is necessarily always a gap between the descriptive grounds of a moral judgement and the judgement itself. This supposition is the mistake Foot's title refers to. What makes it plausible is Hume's practicality requirement., that morality is essentially practical. Foot accepts this requirement but thinks its demand is best met simply by taking morality to be part of practical reasons. That is an unattractive view if practical rationality is conceived as grounded in an agent's desires; but she claims, following Quinn, that it should not be so conceived. Rather practical rationality concerns the goodness of human beings with respect to action where this is conceived as depending on essential features of human life. Given these facts of human life (what, following Anscombe, Foot calls Aristotelian necessities) considerations of e.g. the honouring of promises can be connected to action, as Hume's requirement demands, by acquiring the status of practical reasons. These are reasons every individual has though there is no requirement that every individual should recognize them.

"Rationality and Virtue" in Pauer-Studer (ed): Norms, Values, and Society

The rationality of moral action should not be understood in terms of some independently conceived notion of rationality in terms of self-interest or desire. Rather, something, justice say, being a virtue just is for it to consist in sensitivity to a certain range of reasons. The central question here will then be whether some candidate virtue really is a virtue and we answer it by inquiring whether actions that accord with it are good human actions. And this, Foot argues, is something we ascertain by consideration of the way of life of our species and our characteristic needs if we are to flourish.

186. Eckart Förster

187. Bas C. van Fraassen

188. W. Frankena
"The Naturalistic Fallacy" in Mind 48, 1939.

This is not the supposed fallacy of inferring 'ought's from 'is's but that of thinking 'good' can be defined. For Moore, naturalists commit what WF calls the definist fallacy of defining one property by another. But if this were generally fallacy all definition would be impossible. It is a fallacy only where the properties in question are indeed distinct. It is precisely this that is at issue between naturalists and intuitionists so the latter cannot appeal to the supposed fallacy from the outset as a weapon in controversy but only after the issue is settled. And if the intuitionist proves right, the mistake of which naturalists stand convicted is that of confusing two properties, or perhaps of blindness to one of them. These are both mistakes, certainly, but not logical fallacies, properly speaking.

"Ewing's Case Against Naturalistic Theories of Value" in Philosophical Review 57, 1948.
"Arguments for Non-Naturalism about Intrinsic Value" in Philosophical Studies 1, 1950.
"Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century" in Philosophical Review 60, 1951
"Sellers' Theory of Valuation" in PPR 15, 1954
"Ethical Naturalism Renovated" in Review of Metaphysics 10 1957
"Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy" in A. I. Melden, Essays in Moral Philosophy, pp. 40-81.
"Broad's Analysis of Ethical Terms" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of C. D. Broad.
Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963)
"Recent Conceptions of Morality" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
"Is Morality a Purely Personal Matter?" in Midwest Studies 3, 1978
"Is Morality a System of Ordinary Oughts?" in The Monist 63, 1980
"Has Morality an Independent Bottom?" in The Monist 63, 1980
"Concepts of Rational Actions in the History of Ethics" in Social theory and Practice 9, 1983
"Moral-Point-of-View Theories" in Bowie, Ethical Theory
"Hare on the Levels of Moral Thinking" in Scanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
"Hare on Moral Weakness and the Definition of Morality" in Ethics 98, 1988.

189. Samuel Freeman
A very nice critique of naturalism. It's often thought the Open Question Argument is evaded by forms of naturalism that propose a synthetic \textit{a posteriori} identity between goodness and some natural property, much as we find with natural kind terms. But natural kind terms are rather special. With them, speakers intend to refer to whatever is actually causally responsible for whatever phenomena 'fix the reference'. So this question is not open: "X has a high M[ean] K[inetic] E[nergy] and having such an MKE is what explains all the causal roles of high temperature in the actual world..., but is X hot?" In ethics however speakers do not have such intentions. So this question is open: "A is N and being N is what explains the causal role of right acts in the actual world..., but is A right?" If the naturalist says he is offering reforming definitions we should plausibly reject these on ethical grounds. These questions should remain open. Causal-explanatory role is not what we should appeal to in determining the answers to ethical questions.


\textbf{194. J. L. A. Garcia}


\textbf{195. Richard T. Garner}


\textbf{196. Eve Garrard and David McNaughton}


\textbf{197. Jon Garthoff}


\textbf{198. Gerald Gaus}


\textbf{199. Berys Gaut}

"The Structure of Practical Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, \textit{Ethics and Practical Reason}.

\textbf{200. David Gauthier}


"Reason to be Moral?" in \textit{Synthese} 72, 1987.


"Value, Reasons and the Sense of Justice" in Frey and Morris, \textit{Value, Welfare and Morality}.


"Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins" in Fehige, \textit{Preferences}.

\textbf{201. R. Gay}


\textbf{202. Peter Geach}

"Good and Evil" in \textit{Analysis} 17, 1956.

"Good" is always attributive never predicative. Le "is a good A" does not decompose logically into "is an A" and "is good". Failure to see this leads to error. Thus "Objectivists", seeing the difficulty in understanding "good" as a descriptive predicative adjective, imagine it might somehow help to see it as a descriptive predicative adjective standing for non-natural property. And "Oxford Moralists" see it as not descriptive at all but commendatory. It is a fallacy to think that this makes "good" ambiguous. There is a connection, and not an empirical one, between goodness and choice but it is one that holds \textit{normally} and \textit{other things being equal}. Normally and other things being equal someone who wants an A will choose a good A -this is part of the "ratio" of "want". The case of good action is special because this is something at which everyone aims. Without contextual clue as to what substantive is intended talk of "good things" or "good events" is just unintelligible.
"Imperative and Deontic Logic" in Analysis 18, 1957-8 and in Logic Matters
"Ascriptivism" in Philosophical Review 69, 1960 and in Logic Matters

Ascriptivism is the view that calling an action voluntary is not to describe it at all but to ascribe it to some person, holding that person responsible for it. Geach thinks this representative of a fashion for reading apparently descriptive uses of language as nothing of the kind, another such being prescriptivism. Such non-descriptive theories offer accounts of what it is to call something P, but collapse cases where we predicate P of something without calling it P as we do in embedded contexts such as "If gambling is bad, inviting people to gamble is bad." A quite separate story might be told about what "bad", "voluntary" or whatever mean in such contexts but then modus ponens arguments in which such conditionals feature would be convicted of equivocation. And so the "Frege-Geach" argument against expressivism is born.

"Imperative Inference" in Analysis 23, Supplement, 1963 and in Logic Matters

"Kenny on Practical Reasoning" in Analysis 26, 1966

The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)
(ed.)Logic and Ethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991)

"Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic?" in Logic and Ethics

203.   **George R. Geiger**
   "Can We Choose Between Values?" in Journal of Philosophy 41, 1944.
"A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Philosophy of Science 16, 1949.

204.   **Harry J. Gensler**
"The Prescriptivism Incompleteness Theorem", in Mind, 1976
"Prescriptivism and Incompleteness", in Mind, 1981
"How Incomplete Is Prescriptivism?", in Mind 93, 1984


205.   **Joshua Gert**
"Practical Rationality, Morality and Purely Justificatory Reasons" in American Philosophical Quarterly 37, 2000

206.   **Alan Gewirth**
"Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics" in Mind 69, 1960.
"Categorial Consistency in Ethics" in Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1967.
"Metaethics and Moral Neutrality" in Ethics 78, 1968.
Reason and Morality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978)
"Limitations of the Moral Point of View" in The Monist 63, 1980.

Human Rights (Chicago: Chcago University Press, 1982)
"The Rationality of Reasonableness" in Synthese 57, 1983
"Can Any Final Ends be Rational?" in Ethics 102, 1991.
"Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge" in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge

207.   **Allan Gibbard**
Nor...
Morality is concerned with norms for anger and guilt but a broader range of emotions, sentiments in particular of benevolence, fairness and respect inform reflection on what the content of such norms should be. Normative inquiry into what our feelings should be has tentative beginnings in views which are a mixture of substantive (it makes sense to be sad when someone dies); formal (if it makes sense for me to be sad at something, it makes sense for you to be sad at similar things) and epistemological (views of what makes sense that result from careful thought carry some authority). Adam Smith was right to appeal to the gains from coordination in our feelings though coordination is often best served when our feeling mesh rather than simply matching up. Such pragmatic considerations favour in particular that our norms for guilt and anger should mesh and that we should conform our actions to them. Consistency in normative thought is not demanded of us, as cognitivists would suppose, as a condition for truth; but normative thought and discussion would lose much of its point without a tendency on our part to seek to arrive at moral understandings that secure both conviction and consensus.

Highly demanding and hugely rewarding, this is surely the most important work on metaethics since at least The Language of Morals.

"Precis of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992
"Reply to Blackburn, Carson, Hill, and Railton" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 1992
"Preference and Preferability" in Fehige and Wessels, Preferences
Thinking how to Live (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

"Normative Properties" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 319-337.
208. Roger F. Gibson
"Flanagan on Quinean Ethics" in Ethics 98, 1988, pp. 534-540.
209. Margaret Gilbert
"Vices and Self-Knowledge" in Journal of Philosophy 68, 1971

210. Michael B. Gill
211. Norman Gillespie
212. Lou Goble
"The Logic of Obligation, 'Better' and 'Worse'" in Philosophical Studies 70, 1993, pp. 133-163
213. Peter Goldie
214. Alan Goldman
"Red and Right" in The Journal of Philosophy 84, 1987

"Global Moral Commitment" in American Philosophical Quarterly 25 1988
"Legal Reasoning as a Model for Moral Reasoning" Law and Philosophy 8, 1989

215. A. I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim
(ed.) Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978)
216. D. Goldstick
"The Causal Argument Against Ethical Objectivity" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification
217. Robert M. Gordon

"The Circle of Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire
218. Luke Gormally
(ed.) Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe (Four Courts Press, 1994)

219. J. C. B. Gosling
220. Jorge Gracia
(ed.): Philosophical Analysis in Latin America (Boston: Reidel, 1984)
221. Selwyn A. Grave
"Too Good a Reason to be a Reason" in Analysis 20, 1959
222. Patricia S. Greenspan
223. G. R. Grice
224. James Griffin
"Are There Incommensurable Values?" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, 1977
"Well-Being and Interpersonal Comparability" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
"Values: Reduction, Supervenience and Explanation by Ascent" in Charles and Lennon, Reduction, Explanation and Realism
"How We Do Ethics Now" in Griffiths, Ethics
225. A. Phillips Griffiths
226. Carlos Gutiérrez
(d.) El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (Bogotá: Editorial ABC, 1995)
227. W. Haas
"Value Judgments" in Mind 62, 1953.
228. Ian Hacking
229. Mane Hajdin
"External and Now-for-Then Preferences in Hare's Theory" in Dialogue 29, 1990.
The Boundaries of Moral Discourse (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1994).
230. Alan Hajek and Philip Pettit
"Desire Beyond Belief" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 2004, pp. 77-92
231. John Haldane and Crispin Wright
232. Bob Hale
"Can There be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Haldane and Wright, Reality, Representation and Projection pp. 337-363.

Confronted with the Frege-Geach problem, quasi-realists face a dilemma. Either they read evaluative conditionals as involving a dominant conditional operator, in which case it is hard to sustain an expressive construal of their components. Or they view them as involving a dominant attitude operator, in which case it is hard to do justice to our intuitions about validity. Blackburn's STW account falls foul of horn 2 as it misdiagnoses a moral failing (holding a combination of attitudes of which I disapprove) as a logical one. His AC account, on the other hand, falls foul of horn 2. Blackburn understands 'If p then Hq' in terms of the tableau rule for the conditional as committing us to either denying p or insisting on q. But he does not see the commitment as distributing across the disjunction. But something must so distribute if the tableau rule is to make sense. And what if not truth? If, on the other hand, we try to understand conditionals as expressing higher-order attitudes but stick with the AC logic, we are threatened by the unacceptable consequence that cases of modus ponens involving mixed conditionals (If Fred stole the money he should be punished, and such like) come out invalid.
"Postscript" in Haldane and Wright, ibid.
"Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege's Abyss?" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, pp. 144-149.
233. Everett Hall
234. Richard J. Hall
235. Stuart Hampshire
"Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" in Mind 58, 1949.
"Fallacies in Moral Philosophy: A Reply to Mr Baier" in Mind 59, 1950.
Morality and Pessimism (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972)
"Morality and Convention" in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond

A fine paper on relativism. Do our moral responses spring from nature or convention - nomos or physis - like standards of dress or standards of health? Both, says Hampshire, and these two sources of moral norms are related in complex ways. It is natural to human beings to value love and friendship but the norms that sustain thee values may differ in different social contexts. There are some norms that we take seriously in ways that survive critical reflection. But these may be local norms and we need not insist on understanding them as universally binding. The latter insistence is most appropriate in the domain of justice where the need for convergence is most pressing. Here Rawls applies a form of "stripping down"
argument, stripping away particular cultural factors to reveal a core of shared rationality. But it is inappropriate, Hampshire urges, to apply such procedures in ethical thinking across the board.  

*Morality and Conflict* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1983)

236. **Jean Hampton**  
"Should Political Philosophy be Done without Metaphysics?" in Ethics 99, 1989  
"Rethinking Reason" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29, 1992  
"Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?" in *Hume Studies* 21, 1995


237. **Roger Hancock**  
"The Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare" in *Journal of Philosophy* 57, 1960.  
Argues that Moore and Hare's arguments fail. Moore claims for any non-ethical F we can significantly ask "Are F's good?" But what does "significantly ask" mean here? If the point is that "F's are not good" is never self-contradictory the question again naturalism is begged. If it is that "F" and "good" designate two distinct properties, Moore must at least say more to defend what he claims. Hare's version assumes that all ethical sentences are used to guide choices in ways non-ethical sentences are not and that equivalent action-guiding significance is a necessary condition for synonymy and both assumptions are deniable by the naturalist.  

238. **Rollo Handy**  
"Ethics, Human Needs and Individual Responsibility" in *Humanist* 27, 1967

*Value Theory and the Behavioural Sciences* (Springfield, 1969)

*The Measurement of Value: Behavioural Science and Philosophical Approaches* (Louis-Green, 1970)

239. **Marsha Hanen**  
"Justification, Coherence and Feminism" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification* 240. **Edward Harcourt**  
"Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances" in *Mind* 114, 2005, pp. 249-275.

241. **R. M. Hare**  

Evaluative language, like imperative language, is primarily used not descriptively, to say what is the case but prescriptively, to guide action. Like imperatives, value judgements cannot be deduced from factual, descriptive premises alone (exceptions being hypothetical imperatives and certain very unassumimg judgements in which function words like 'auger' feature). Nonetheless value judgements are responsive to the character of the things valued. A word such as 'good' or 'ought' is a *supervenient* epithet. If two things differ in goodness or rightness, they must differ also in some other respect. For in applying a value term to something a speaker expresses his acceptance of a certain standard for things of that kind and a failure of supervenience would signal that the standard was an inconsistent one. This standard will vary from one comparison class to another: it provides, in the context of any such class, the *criteria of application* of a value term but, being thus variable, does not constitute its *meaning*. At the heart of Hare's analysis is his claim that "Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of any other words which themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are deprived of a means of performing this function." (p. 91) Value words have a further element of *descriptive* meaning but, with the more general value words, their *evaluative* meaning is primary as it is constant across all comparison classes and because it may drive changes in descriptive meaning. Value judgements, insofar as they have such evaluative meaning, entail imperatives governing choice and action and applicable across all relevantly similar cases. This is not true of ordinary language imperatives, which are not properly universal. But if we live with a certain artificiality in the construction of imperatives such as:  

All P's being Q, please.  
we could treat the latter as equivalent to the evaluative element in the meaning of:  
All P's ought to be Q.  
And we could then reconstruct (near enough) ordinary evaluative language on that basis. Only by treating evaluative meaning as primary can we understand why different people (the missionary and the cannibals with their contrasting moral standards) can communicate about and disagree over evaluative matters. There is a way of using value words without commendatory force but only in an "inverted commas" sense where we make no value judgement but merely allude to the value judgements of others. This commendatory use of moral language must again be seen as primary given that the inverted commas use is parasitical on the genuinely evaluative use - we must appeal to the latter in order to explain the content of the former. Moral judgements implicate principles: they are to be justified by reference to the speaker's standards as they apply to the facts of the case. When justification is sought of a complete set of standards determining fully a way of living no further justification can be given and it is a matter simply of our willingness to live in such a way. But this ultimate unjustifiability does not make our judgements arbitrary. It is too easy to forget just how good this ground-breaking book is.
Hare here develops further the universal prescriptivism argued for in *The Language of Morals* which the opening chapters briefly recapitulate. "Ought", he then argues, implies "can" albeit not strictly logical sense, but rather much as, on Strawson's account, "The king of France is bald" implies "There is a king of France" - a case of certain judgements presupposing that certain questions arise. Prescriptive questions, questions about what one ought to do only arise when the corresponding practical questions, questions about what to do, arise. And the latter only arise with respect to actions within our control. "Within our control" here can be understood in a compatibilistic manner for practical questions will arise whether or not determinism is true. Given his prescriptiveism, Hare denies that we can sincerely accept a moral judgement that we are able to act in accordance with and yet act contrary to it, seeking to explain cases of weakness of will either in terms of psychological impossibility or of subtle failures to mean what we profess to in a fully prescriptive way. In the light of universal prescriptivism, ethical theorizing is to be understood as the search for principles that we are able to commit ourselves to where that commitment is a universal one. We need to be able to accept the consequences of our moral judgements and we need to be able to accept them whichever roles we occupy in the circumstances to which they apply. Our inclinations determine what moral judgements we can accept on these terms by constraining which universal prescriptions we can assent sincerely to. This role is not played by hypothetical inclinations but by our actual inclinations albeit to a large extent with reference to hypothetical cases. Thinking in this way often calls on us to balance the interests of many people and universalizability demands that the interests of all should receive equal consideration. For we can only give special treatment to certain people on the basis of some ground that we are willing to universalize. For most of us, Hare suggests, thinking in this way will issue in acceptance of a utilitarian ethic that seeks maximally to advance the satisfaction of desires. Nonmoral ideals - such as aesthetic ideals - may be pursued without this concern for balancing competing interests in cases where the interests of others are not at stake. But, where the interests of others are involved, moral considerations override considerations of other kinds. This thought can be avoided. It is avoidable in particular by the fanatic, by someone who is willing to prescribe that some people's interests, including in certain hypothetical circumstances his own, be subordinated to some ideal or other. But people who are willing clear-headedly to do this are, Hare suggests, extremely rare. This possibility of clear-headed fanaticism means that Hare's route from universalizability to utilitarianism is not a logically compulsory route. But it is a route, he urges, almost all of us will in fact, if we think clearly and rationally, freely elect to follow.

"The Promising Game" in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1964
"Geach, Good and Evil" in *Analysis* 17, 1967.

Geach thinks 'good' can be given a common descriptive meaning such that the descriptive characteristics it specifies are determined in each case by the meaning of the word or phrase it qualifies. This has some truth but only when we restrict our consideration to functional words and 'good' is often, and especially in moral contexts, applied other than to functional words. In such cases the being standard being applied cannot at all be read off from the meaning of the word or phrase qualified. Perhaps Geach could insist on a functional interpretation for expressions like 'man' and 'human action' but then he could not insist, as in effect he does, that 'human action' is a comparison class within which we have always no option but to choose. Understanding 'human action' functionally one might perfectly well have simply no interest in performing good human actions.

"The Argument from Received Opinion" in *Essays in Philosophical Method* (London: Macmillan, 1971)
Practical Inferences (London: MacMillan, 1971)
"Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" in H. D. Lewis, *Contemporary British Philosophy*
"Some Confusions about Subjectivity" in J. Bricke, Freedom and Morality
"Relevance" in Goldman and Kim, *Values and Morals.*

Hare recommends that we distinguish two levels of moral thinking: the intuitive level where we follow a set of simple prima facie principles and the critical level that makes no appeal to intuition and which should guide us both in the selection of intuitive principles and in resolving conflicts between them. In elaborating an account of how critical thinking works, Hare again seeks to build a case for utilitarianism from the requirements of universalizability and prescriptivity. The version of utilitarianism that results is less accommodating to the possibility of fanaticism than that of Freedom and Reason. There Hare allowed that someone, the fanatic, might universally prescribe the subordination of all, even his own, interests, to some ideal. However universalizability is now understood to work in a way that rules this out. A crucial role is played by the following claim about preferences: for me to know that, were I in your shoes I would have preference set S - which is just a matter of knowing that you have preference set S - is necessarily myself actually to have preference set S with the respect to the eventuality that I am circumstanced as you are. Universalizability then demands that when I make a decision that bears on your preferences I give the latter equal weight, as I am required to prescribe whatever I prescribe no less for the circumstance where I am in my actual situation than for the circumstances where I am in yours. Therefore, in deciding what should be done when preferences conflict, I must represent fully to myself the preference sets of all the people concerned and thereby acquire motivations corresponding in strength to all these, relative to all the various hypothetical circumstances.

Universalizability requires me to keep in view, i.e. to those circumstances where I occupy the positions of each one of those
concerned. This disallows any privileging of my own preferences vis-à-vis my actual circumstances, including my own moral convictions. So the only kind of ‘fanatic’ now allowed as possible is the very unlikely one whose moral convictions are so extremely strong as to outweigh any preferences that oppose them. (This picture of how moral thinking works has the advantage of reducing problems over the interpersonal comparisons of utility to a problem merely about intrapersonal comparisons: for it renders moral thinking not a matter of comparing my preferences to yours but one of comparing my preferences relative to my circumstances with those I have for the hypothetical case where I am circumstanced just as you are.) The consistent amoralist who refuses to make any moral judgements at all remains conceivable and this, Hare urges, saves his view from collapsing into a form of naturalism. There are strong objections to a consistent amoralism: for, taking the world as it is, an informed concern for the welfare of one's children would speak strongly against inculcating it. But these objections are prudential, not logical.

"Ontology in Ethics" in Honderich, Morality and Objectivity
"Comments" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
"Universal Prescriptivism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics
"Objective Prescriptions" in Griffiths, Ethics.
Replies (in German) to Birnbacher, Corradini, Fehige, Hinsch, Hoche, Kusser, Kutschera, Leist, Lampe, Lenzen, Lumér, Millgram, Moscher, Nida-Rumelin, Roh, Schaber, Schöne, Siefert, Stranzinger, Trapp, Vogler and Wolf in Fehige, Zum moralischer Denken.
"Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, Moral Knowledge.
"Off on the Wrong Foot" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics.

4.24 Gilbert Harman

This book is rather like Mackie's Ethics: everybody has read the massively influential first chapter but the rest is a bit neglected. Harman's title hints at the naturalism that sets his agenda: Either moral facts are a part of nature ("naturalism") or there are no such facts ("nihilism"). Moore's open question argument, though often thought to refute naturalism fails, Harman urges, to do so - parallel reasoning would show that water was not H2O. Emotivism is characterized as a form of "moderate nihilism" that seeks to understand moral language as serving some non-fact-stating role (while "extreme nihilism" simply rejects morality.) But Harman is dissatisfied with emotivism, reading it as a view that identifies moral judgements with attitudes of some special kind but fails to specify what kind that is in any adequate and nontrivial way. A similar problem bedevils the ideal observer theory, a theory some form of which emotivists are under some pressure to adopt in order to make sense of the possibility of moral error. Moral facts, Harman famously argues in chapter 1, play no role in explaining our observations. A scientist's observations are explained (on a good day) by the facts of scientific theory; but moral facts are irrelevant to explaining our moral "observations" and moral judgements. Harman's metaethics is not however anti-realist so much as reductionist: the central kind of moral facts expressed by moral "ought" statements can be analysed as relational facts about reasons. To say P ought to do D is to say that P has good reasons, relative to certain conventional principles P and myself both endorse, to do D. Unlike moral facts, facts about reasons do play a role in explaining observations, in particular psychological observations. Accordingly their status is not problematic (Harman sketches an account of reasons in terms of good reasoning and of good reasoning in terms of how an ideally functioning reasoner would reason.). So while there are no absolute facts about right and wrong, there are relative facts about right and wrong, the relativity kicking in with respect to particular conventions. So a form of relativism is true: moral principles apply to us in virtue of conventions in force in our society. This does not make moral criticism of our conventional morality impossible as certain of our principles may be open to objection in the light of certain others. The conventionism is given a psychoanalytic twist in Harman's suggestion that members of each generation internalises the moral standards of their parents in the form of the superego which operates as a key source of moral motivation. Harman also anticipates Williams in his defence of a strong form of internalism about moral reasons: our conventions simply do not apply to outsiders who fail to satisfy them.

"Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 3, 1978
"What Is Moral Relativism?" in Goldman and Kim, Values and Morals
"Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty" in PPA 12, 1983.
Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator (Kansas: The Lindley Lecture, 1986).
"Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism" in Odegard and Stewart, Perspectives on Moral Relativism.
"Desired Desires" in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality.

Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson
244. **J. Harrison**
"The Importance of Being Important" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978
"Deontic Logic and Imperative Logic", in Geach, *Logic and Ethics*

245. **John C. Harsanyi**

246. **Begum Hasna**

247. **Helen Haste**

248. **Anthony Hatzimoysis**

249. **S. Hauerwas and A. MacIntyre**

250. **William H. Hay**
"C. L. Stevenson and Ethical Analysis" in Westphal, *Pragmatism, Reason and Norms*

251. **Joseph Heath**

252. **John Heil**

253. **Bennett Helm**
"Freedom of the Heart" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 77, 1996.

254. **Ulrike Heuer**

255. **John Hill**

256. **Thomas E. Hill Jr.**
"Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 66, 1985, pp. 3-23.
"Kantian Constructivism in Ethics" in *Ethics* 99, 1989
"Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, 1992
"Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

257. **Risto Hilpinen**

258. **Wilfred Hodges**
"Logic, Truth and Moral Judgements" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

259. **Richard Holton**
"Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps" in *Philosophical Studies* 97, 2000

260. **S. Holzman and C. Leich**

261. **Ted Honderich**
(eds.) *Morality and Objectivity* (London: Routledge, 1985)

262. **Brad Hooker**
"Williams' Argument Against External Reasons" in *Analysis* 44, 1987
"Theories of Welfare, Theories of Good Reasons for Action, and Ontological Naturalism" in *Philosophical Papers* 20, 1991
(eds.) *Truth in Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell 1996)

263. **Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little**

264. **Brad Hooker, Elonor Mason and Dale E. Miller**

**Christopher Hookway**

"Is' and 'Ought' in *Philosophical Quarterly* 14, 1964.


"The 'Is'- 'Ought' Problem Resolved" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*.

"The Development of Hare's Moral Philosophy" in Seantor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*.

**Michael Huemer**

"Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, 2000


**Douglas Huff and Omar Prewett**


"Hypothetical Motivation" in *Noos* 30, 1996, pp. 31-54.


**Donald C. Hubin and Michael Perkins**


**W. D. Hudson**


"Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 14, 1964.


"The 'Is'- 'Ought' Problem Resolved" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*.

"The Development of Hare's Moral Philosophy" in Seantor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*.

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"Hypothetical Motivation" in *Noos* 30, 1996, pp. 31-54.


**Donald C. Hubin and David Drebushenko**


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"Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 14, 1964.


"The 'Is'- 'Ought' Problem Resolved" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*.

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**Michael Huemer**

"Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, 2000


**Douglas Huff and Omar Prewett**


"Hypothetical Motivation" in *Noos* 30, 1996, pp. 31-54.


285. **Terence Irwin**

"Practical Reason Divided: Aquinas and his Critics" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

286. **Frank Jackson**


Someone who believes that p and that if p then q ought to believe that q. This is a normative constraint on whether something counts as a belief and there are others. But if noncognitivism about normativity is correct there can be no such thing as satisfying a normative constraint and hence no such thing as a belief. This is a reductio of noncognitivism about normativity. As noncognitivism about ethics and about rationality plausibly stand or fall together, being supported by effectively the same strategies of argument, this is bad news too for noncognitivism about morality.

"Non-Cognitivism, Validity and Conditionals" in Jamieson, *Singer and his Critics*

An ingenious and attractively simply attempt to address the Frege-Geach problem. Suppose non-cognitivism is right: ethical sentences express non-cognitive attitudes and so are never true. But say that they are q-true if the things said to be e.g. good or right have in fact the properties at which the correlative attitudes are directed. Then say a sentence is *true* if it is true or q-true. Now say that an argument is *valid* if its conclusion's *truth follows from that of its premises. *Validity is the extension of the notion of validity the non-cognitivist needs; it makes good sense, has an intimate connection to meaning, confers validity on what, intuitively, we want it to, and, given our interest in ethical consistency, is something there is a clear point to our being interested in.

287. **Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy and Michael Smith**


Truth-aptness, argue J, O and S, is not minimal in the way Crispin Wright supposes because of the platitudinous link between truth and *belief*, where beliefs are states with a certain functional role that contrasts with that of desire. A truth-apt sentence is one that can give the content of a belief and it is just this condition which, according to non-cognitivists, moral sentences do not satisfy.

288. **Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit**

"Moral Functionalism, Suervenience and Reductionism" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 46, 1996

Expressivists deny that ethical sentences report beliefs. Rather they express attitudes. But for ethical language, so characterised, to be possible these must be attitudes that we are able to recognize and we must be prepared sincerely to utter a moral sentence only when we believe we have the corresponding attitude. But that is just to say that moral sentences serve to report just these beliefs and are true when and only when these beliefs are true. And that is what expressivism denies.


289. **Rockney Jacobsen**

"Semantic Character and Expressive Content" in *Philosophical Papers* 26, 1997

290. **Dale Jacquette**


291. **Dale Jamieson**


292. **Nicholas Jardine**

"Science, Ethics and Objectivity" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*

293. **Christopher Johnson**


294. **Oliver A. Johnson**

"Ethical Intuitionism: A Restatement" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 7, 1957.
"On Moral Disagreements” in *Mind* 68, 1959
"Aesthetic Objectivity and the Analogy with Ethics" in Vesey, *Philosophy and the Arts*
"Blanshard's Critique of Ethical Subjectivism" in *Idealistic Studies* 1990.
""Is” and "Ought": A Different Connection” in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 1991.

295. **Robert Johnson**

"Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57, 1997
"Minding One’s Manners: Revisiting Moral Explanations”, Philosophical Studies90, 1998
"Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy” in *The Philosophical Quarterly* 49, 1999, pp. 53-71.
296. Mark Johnston

"Objectivity Refigured" in Haldane and Wright, *Reality, Representation and Projection*
"The Authority of Affect" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63, 2002

A defence of realism about "sensory values", values Johnston takes to be immediately disclosed to us in experience. We should, argues Johnston, bedetectivists and not projectivists about these because the detectivist can explain the "authority" of effect and the projectivist cannot. Action motivated by affectless desire is more or less unintelligible to us. Adopting a dispositional, response-dependence account of sensory value doesn't lessen these worries about projectivism as the only forms which even pretend to do so turn out to be incoherent in various ways. Accepting projectivism shifts our attention away from the affective authority of other people and things in the world, focusing instead simply on their agreeableness to us. As such it sustains a deep evaluative egocentricity and is nothing less than "the ideology of the pornographic attitude." Etc., etc.


297. J. Jorgensen

"Imperatives and Logic" in *Erkenntnis* 7, 1938

298. Richard Joyce

*The Myth of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
"Expressivism and Motivational Internalism" in *Analysis* 62, 2002.

Expressivism, the view that moral judgements function to express certain pro attitudes - does not imply the motivational internalist claim that necessarily if x judges that y is right x is motivated in favour of performing y. Compare apologies. Apologies, inter alia, function to express regret. But I can apologize while not feeling regret at that time. (I can even sincerely apologize while not feeling regret at the time.) Nor does the reverse entailment hold. For just because some sort of expression is necessarily linked to some sort of mental state does not imply that the former functions to express the latter.


299. Shelly Kagan

The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)
"Thinking about Cases" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

300. Mark Eli Kalderon


301. Abraham Kaplan

"Are Moral Judgements Assertions?" in *Philosophical Review* 51, 1942
"Logical Empiricism and Value Judgements" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*

302. Abraham Kaplan and Benbow Ritchie


303. Toomas Karmo
"Some Valid (but no Sound) Arguments Trivially Span the "Is"-"Ought" Gap" in *Mind* 97, 1988

304. **Gregory Kavka**

"the Reconciliation Project" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*

305. **Jason Kawall**


306. **John Kekes**

"Pluralism and the Value of Life" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*
"The Emergence of Morality in Personal Relationships" in Wren, *The Moral Domain*

307. **John Kemp**

"Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 1, 1951.

308. **Samuel J. Kerstein**

"Reason, Sentiment and Categorical Imperatives" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*

309. **Jaegwon Kim**

"Concepts of Supervenience" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45, 1984

310. **Simon Kirchin**

"Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory and Ethical Relativism" in *Inquiry* 43, 2000

311. **Philip Kitcher**

"Essence and Perfection" in *Ethics* 110, 2000

312. **J. C. Klagge**

"An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties" in *Mind* 93, 1984

313. **Lawrence Kohlberg**

"A Reply to Owen Flanagan's "Virtue, Sex and Gender" and Some Comments on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange" in *Ethics* 92, 1982.

314. **Max Köbel**

The scope of this clear and enjoyable short book is wider than simply metaethics but given its concern with what we can best say about truth and objectivity in contexts where objectivity is problematic, among which contexts evaluative contexts feature saliently, it is highly relevant to metaethical concerns. Objectivity is understood as a property a claim has if we cannot disagree about its truth without at least one of us making a mistake. Köbner rejects an expressivism which denies truth-evaluability to propositions of such problematic sorts on the grounds that the only ways to solve the Frege-Geach problem commit us to a radical expressivism that would generalize this denial in implausible ways. He also denies revisionism which reinterprets such sentences along the lines of reading liquorice is tasty as I find liquorice tasty. Such views solve the problem of disagreement without mistake by reinterpreting such cases, highly implausibly, as involving no real disagreement at all. He denies however that truth requires objectivity. Truth on a deflationary understanding is perfectly compatible with a lack of objectivity. (In the long and fascinating fifth chapter he argues that the widespread supposition that truth in some robust or indeed in any - sense is a central explanatory concept in the theory of meaning rests on a misunderstanding.) Truth he argues is relative to perspectives. In some areas of discourse, there is objectivity where that is a matter of any proposition that is true in anyone's perspective necessarily being true in everyone's perspective. In other areas there is non-objectivity where that is a matter of it being possible that what is true in one person's perspective is not true in another's. (Some areas, including perhaps ethics, may be complex insofar as some propositions within them may be objective while others are not.)

315. Aurel Kolnai

"Contrasting the Ethical with the Aesthetical" in British Journal of Aesthetics 12, 1972.
Ethics, Value and Reality (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1978)

316. Niko Kolodny


317. Christine Korsgaard

"Two Distinctions in Goodness" in The Philosophical Review 91, 1983 and Creating the Kingdom of Ends.

Namely: that between instrumental and final and that between intrinsic and extrinsic. CK warns against confusing them by seeing intrinsic and instrumental as correlative. This can lead to a false dichotomy between a subjectivism that sees our making something an end as conferring intrinsic value and an objectivism whereby it is things with intrinsic value that ought to be our ends. For Kant only a good will has intrinsic ("unconditioned") goodness but the goodness of our rationally chosen ends is both extrinsic and final. His theory is good (and better than Moore's theory of organic wholes) at dealing with messy cases of mixed goods - thus a mink coat or a good meal may be valued partly for their own sakes (final) but only under certain conditions of life (extrinsic).

"Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value" in Ethics 96, 1986 and Creating the Kingdom of Ends.

Instrumental reason, taking the means to one's ends, is not just a matter of getting the right beliefs about what these means are. One must also, given these beliefs, be motivated to act accordingly. We may be expected to do this only insofar as we are rational. This qualification, essential here, may plausibly be understood as generally applicable to Williams' central claim - the internalism requirement - that reasons for action must be capable of motivating us - True, says CK, but only insofar as we are rational. Once the qualification is in place, the status as principle of rationality of e.g. some principle of prudence depends merely on how we rate it qua rational principle. If we take it to constitute such a principle, then, insofar as someone is rational, we will expect him to be motivated accordingly. There is no further difficulty for skepticism about the force of reason as a motive to bring to the scene. Williams is right to argue that all reasons are internal reasons if this is read as CK would have it - they must be capable of motivating a rational person. But this cuts no ice against the Kantian, as Williams is wrong to take it there is a problem here with universal reasons binding on any rational being as such. There may or may not be but if there are, there is no problem with their satisfying the internalism requirement.

What in the world, asks Korsgaard, in this published version of her 1992 Tanner Lectures, could possibly ground the supposition that we are, as we take ourselves to be, obligated to do things? She considers four answers to this, the normative question. (1) The first is the kind of voluntarism typified by Pufendorf and Hobbes. This takes obligation to stem from the commands of some legitimate authority. The "legitimate" is essential as mere power could not robustly obligate us - if we could contrive to evade its sanctions the obligation would evaporate. But, as the notion of legitimacy presupposes normativity, this gets us nowhere. (2) The second is substantive moral realism, so called to distinguish it from the sort of Kantian constructivist view (procedural moral realism) CK endorses. Substantive moral realism takes there to be a domain of moral facts independent of the procedures by which we seek to reach answers to moral questions, characterizing ethics, erroneously, as a theoretical inquiry. As an account of the source of normativity, this is empty, offering no insight into why we should care about these putative moral facts. There is no reason to believe in such facts other than our confidence in the reality of obligation and hence the former belief can offer no sort of ground to the latter confidence. (3) This leads CK to consider a Humean reflective endorsement approach that appeals to this very confidence to answer the normative question, one whereby the demand morality make on us meet with approval when we reflect on them from the standpoint of our natural human motivations of sympathy and self-love and this is taken to be all the warrant we can intelligently demand. This is close to correct, argues CK, but she insists that normativity only gets into the picture when these demands and these motivations are seen, not simply as forces operating on us but as reasons. To make this insistence is to move from a Humean picture to (4) a Kantian one that grounds obligation in autonomy. In autonomous deliberation, we conceive of ourselves as standing above our various motivations and choosing which of them to act on and this requires that we have some conception of ourselves that our choices express. To be understood as furnishing us with reasons, this conception of ourselves must be a conception in terms of which we value ourselves. An autonomous agent must have some conception of himself in terms of which he values himself and which he sees as expressed in his actions and choices in such a way as to give rise to obligations, demands he makes on himself not to betray this value-laden self-conception: this is Korsgaard's understanding of how integrity is fundamental to a proper understanding of obligation. There are many possible such self-conceptions varying from person to person. But there is also the noncontingent conception of oneself as a creature that can be described in these terms, "a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live." This conception of ourselves as human stands behind all our more contingent and particular identities which we can only take seriously insofar as we take our identities as human seriously by valuing our humanity. This does not get us all the way to the moral law for, even if I must value my own humanity, why must I value yours? This worry is addressed in the fourth lecture where she argues, following Wittgenstein that reasons are essentially public: to recognize my reasons is to have at least a capacity to recognize yours. I might nonetheless think I can just disregard your reasons, taking as normatively significant the fact that I am me but, following Nagel, she argues that I cannot intelligibly do this if I am understand you, if I am to hear your words as speech and not merely as noise. This Kantian picture is, she concludes by arguing, consistent with a broad philosophical naturalism. But it answers Mackie's worry about how, consistently with such naturalism, there could possibly be "intrinsically normative" entities in the world. From the standpoint of practical reason (which is not the standpoint of science), we ourselves are such entities.


For Hume we do not take the means to the ends we rationally ought to pursue as there are no such ends; and we cannot but take the means to the ends we are going to pursue. So for Hume there can be no such thing as instrumental practical reason. For the dogmatic rationalist there are facts independent of my will about what there is reason to do. But what would these facts have to do with me, why should I care about them? Perhaps they speak to ends I must, if I am rational, have, so I must act as they prescribe as a means to these ends. But that already presupposes an instrumental rationality that is not independent of my will. The dogmatic rationalist thus admits a gap between willing the ends and willing the means that he has then no resources to close. The Humean identifies them and so makes instrumental reason something trivial that we cannot fail to satisfy. The solution is to see willing an end not merely as desiring it but as a commitment to do what it takes to attain it: in willing something I make a law for myself, taking my act of will as normative for me. Only thus does what I do take on the unity required to make these doings agency and their doer a person.


318. Julian Kovesi

"Against the Ritual of "Is" and "Ought"" in Midwest Studies3, 1978
319. **R. W. Krutzen**


320. **Chandran Kukathas**


321. **Bruce Kuklick**


322. **Joel J. Kupperman**

"Ethics for Extraterrestrials" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28, 1991
"Axiological Realism" in *Philosophy* 71, 1996.
*Value... And What Follows* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

323. **J. Ladd**

*The Structure of a Moral Code* (Cambridge, Ma.:Harvard University Press, 1957)

324. **Hugh LaFollette**


325. **W. D. Lamont**


326. **Gerald Lang**


This paper is valuable for its singularly lucid and clear-headed reconstruction of the McDowellian argument from the Wittgensteinian Rule Following Considerations to moral realism. This is followed by a critique the central point of which is that even granting the central morals McDowell draws from the RFC still allows clear distinctions to be drawn between discourses admitting of greater or lesser degrees of objectivity, the RFC as such doing nothing to settle where on this spectrum moral discourse is best positioned.

327. **Marc Lange**


328. **Charles Larmore**

"Pluralism and reasonable disagreement" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*

329. **Jonathan Lear**

"Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism" in *Mind* 92, 1983.
"Moral Objectivity" in S. C. Brown, *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*
330. J. E. Ledden

"Mr Rynin on Definitions of "Value" in Journal of Philosophy 45, 1948.
"On the Logical Status of Value" in Philosophical Review 59, 1950

331. Richard Lee

"Preference and Transitivity" in Analysis 44, 1984
"Williams, Ought, and Logical Form," Analysis, 47, 1987

332. Brian Leiter

(Ed.) Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
"Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals

333. James Lenman


Following Nagel, a number of writers, while conceding that desires must always play a part in the rational motivation of action, insist that these in turn may be motivated simply by beliefs. However, the same teleological considerations that inform the concession are shown to tell equally against this sophisticated anti-Humean strategy. There might certainly be a causal process that took us from beliefs, and only beliefs, to desires but this could not be a rational process of motivation by reasons. This defence of a Humean position is developed with reference to work by Darwall, Wallace and Smith.


For an externalist like Brink, someone - an amoralist - can be coherently imagined who make moral judgements that leave her indifferent. Internalists such as Hare and Smith deny this, claiming that such a person fails to make genuine, full blooded moral judgements. Here I defend internalism, focusing on the case of a whole society who make moral judgements but take no practical interest in them. This thought experiment, I claim, makes little sense and its absurdity supports the view that the amoralist's moral judgements invite an "inverted commas" reading that sees them as parasitical on the full-blooded moral judgements of others.


Smith has defended the rationalist's conceptual claim that moral requirements are categorical requirements of reason, arguing that no status short of this would make sense of our taking these requirements as seriously as we do. Against this I argue that Smith has failed to show either that our moral commitments would be undermined by possessing only an internal contextual justification or that they need presuppose any expectation that rational agents must converge on their acceptance.

"Preferences in their Place" in Environmental Values 9, 2000

In at least some of their forms, Cost-Benefit techniques for the evaluation of environmental projects and policies treat the preferences of citizens as the sole determinants of the value of outcomes. There are two salient ways in which this supposition might be defended. The first is metaethical and appeals to considerations about how we must understand talk of environmental and other values. The second is political and appeals to considerations about proper democratic legitimacy and the proper aims of public policy. Metaethical considerations, I argue, are something of a red herring here. Roughly subjectivist understandings of our talk of values may be appealingly metaphysically unassuming, but in their most plausible formulations they do not support a view of preferences as the sole determinants of value. Political considerations, on the other hand, are to be taken very seriously. They offer, however, no straightforward rationale for any crudely preferentialist measure of social value. Findings obtained from the use of cost-benefit techniques might sometimes have a legitimate role as an input into, but not as a substitute for, political deliberation. Questions about the scope and limits of such legitimacy are properly addressed in political and not in metaethical terms.

Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntactician, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntactician must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View, is described and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed.


This paper argues that if the externalist moral realist is a naturalist about moral value, he faces familiar difficulties about making clear sense of moral disagreement. If, on the other hand, he is a nonnaturalist about moral value, a rather less familiar difficulty looms: such a position leaves conceptual space not only for an "amoralist" but for an amoralist whose amoralism is no kind of moral defect and consistent with moral sainthood. This serves to reinforce the suspicion that "morality" as the externalist moral realist understands it has remarkably little to do with morality.


Michael Smith has cooked up an argument against noncognitivism urging that noncognitivists cannot capture the way evaluative judgements differ in the contrasting dimensions of certitude, importance and robustness. I show here how they can.

"Noncognitivism and Wishfulness" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6, 2003, pp. 265-274.

In response to Dorr's "Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking", I argue that noncognitivists can in fact make excellent sense of inferences to factual conclusions from premises at least one of which is moral as involving no irrational wishful thinking.


The early part of this paper criticizes Anscombe and Quinn on the relationship between value and desire. Their influential discussions of strange and unusual desires do not, I argue, show what they are intended to show. The remainder focuses primarily on the views of foot, discussing her objections to subjectivism and in particular expressivism. The expressivist, she claims, can not make adequate sense of the way we apply evaluative terms to nonsentient living things such as plants. I argue to the contrary and urge that the metaethical significance of such applications is greatly exaggerated by foot and other neo-Aristotelian naturalists.

334. Ray Lepley

"The Verifiability of Different Kinds of Facts and Values” in Philosophy of Science 7, 1940.
"The Identity of Fact and Value" in Philosophy of Science 10, 1943.
"Three Relations of Facts and Values" in Philosophical Review 52, 1943.
"Fact, Value and Meaning” in Philosophical Review 54, 1945.
(ed.)The Language of Value (New York: Columbia U.P., 1957)

335. Isaac Levi

"Perception as Input and as Reason for Action” in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics

336. Margaret Levi and Valerie Braithwaite
337. Jerrold Levison


338. Casimir Lewey


339. C. I. Lewis

An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill., Open Court, 1946)

340. David Lewis

"Desire as Belief" in Mind 97, 1988, pp. 323-332
"Dispositional Theories of Value" in P. A. S. S. 1989, pp. 113-137.
"Desire as Belief II" in Mind 105, 1996, pp. 303-313.

341. H. D. Lewis


342. Marcel Lieberman

Commitment, Value and Moral Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

343. Hallvard Lillehammer

"Normative Antirealism" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 37, 1999

344. Margaret Olivia Little

"Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology" in Hypatia 1995
"Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind" in Nous 1997, pp. 59-79.
"Moral Generalities Revisited" in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, pp. 276-304.

345. Don Locke

"The Trivializability of Universalizability" in Philosophical Review 78, 1968
"Beliefs, Desires and reasons for Action" in American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982

346. Robert Lockie

"What's Wrong With Moral Internalism?" in Ratio 11, 1998

347. Don Loeb

"Must a Moral Irrealist be a Pragmatist" in American Philosophical Quarterly 33, 1996
"Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement" in Philosophical Studies 90, 1998
348. Sabina Lovibond

*Realism and Imagination in Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)
"Ethical Upbringing: From Connnivance to Cognition" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

349. Sabina Lovibond and Stephen Williams


350. J. R. Lucas

"Ethical Intuitionism II" in *Philosophy* 46, 1971
"Dubious Doubts" in Doeser and Kraay, *Facts and Values*

351. W. G. Lycan

"How to Derive 'Ought' from 'May'" in *Ratio* 19, 1977.

352. David Lyons

"Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence" in *Ethics* 86, 1976, pp. 107-121.

353. H. J. McCloskey

"Towards an Objectivist Ethic" in *Ethics* 73, 1962.
"Objectivism in Aesthetics" in *Ethics* 74, 1963.

354. Terrance C. McConnell


355. Graham MacDonald and Crispin Wright


356. John McDowell

"Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following" in Holzmann and Leich, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule
"Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World" in Schaper, *Pleasure, Preference and Value*
"Values and Secondary Qualities" in Honderich, *Morality and Objectivity*

We need to distinguish two senses of the "objective"/"subjective" distinction. In one some property is objective if "what it is for something to have it can be adequately understood otherwise than in terms of dispositions to give rise to certain subjective states" and otherwise subjective. In the other a property is objective if it is "there to be experienced, as opposed to being a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience of it" and otherwise subjective. Colours and other secondary qualities exemplify for McDowell the combination of subjectivity in the first sense with objectivity in the second. After a lengthy defence of this realist understanding of secondary qualities, he
suggests that we think of value as analogous in similar terms. There is nonetheless a crucial disanalogy. Values are not merely such as to elicit the relevant response from us but such as to merit that response. We make sense of our responses in terms of their being merited by their objects. This is certainly not causal explanation - and McDowell thinks values have no role to play in causal explanation. But it is certainly explanation and explanation which requires us to accept values as objectively (sense 2) there. When we can offer such explanation of our responses, showing that their objects merit such responses and how they do, we vindicate our claims to knowledge of moral properties. Blackburn’s projectivism, like Mackie's presupposes a false picture of an external value-free reality onto which value is imposed by our psychological processing mechanism. This is metaphysically objectionable, thinks McDowell. It is also objectionable in terms of ethics as it implies the possibility of a detached external understanding of this mechanism. And that would require us to think of our ethical competence as captureable by some set of principles in a way uncongenial to the particularism McDowell favours.

Projection and Truth in Ethics (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1987)

For the realist intuitionist moral attitudes are responses to properties. For the projectivist the properties are projections of the attitudes. McDowell tries here to articulate a middle position. He denies that we can get a conceptual purchase on the attitudes in question without exploiting the concepts of the properties in question. Hence, he thinks, the former cannot be explanatorily prior to the latter. We "earn" truth for ethical claims by locating them in the "space of reasons" rather than by trying to "place" them within a metaphysical perspective external to them. The projectivist wants to deny there are ethical facts and then earn a notion of ethical truth. But the question what to count as facts cannot be viewed as prior to and independent of the question what to count as truths. What we need to place are not just sentiments but pairs of sentiments and features, "an interlocking complex of subjective and objective, of response and feature responded to".

Mind and World (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996), especially Lecture IV "Might There Be External Reasons" in Altham and Harrison, World, Mind and Ethics "Two Sorts of Naturalism" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Virtues and Reasons

357. D. McFarland and A. Miller


358. James W. McGray


359. Alastair MacIntyre

"What Morality is Not" in Philosophy 32, 1957.
Against the Self-Images of the Age (London: Duckworth, 1971)
"Relativism, Power and Philosophy," in Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 59, 1985
"Reply to Dahl, Baier and Schneewind" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, 1991

360. J. L. Mackie

*Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Harmonsworth, Penguin, 1977)

361. J. Cameron MacKenzie

"Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 18, 1968.
"Moral Skepticism and Moral Conduct" in *Philosophy* 59. 1984

362. Jefferson McMahan

"Moral Intuition" in LaFollette, *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*

363. David McNaughton

*Moral Vision* (Blackwell 1988)
"An Unconnected Heap of Duties?" *Philosophical Quarterly* 46, 1996

364. David McNaughton and Piers Rawling

"Honoring and Promoting Values", *Ethics* 102, 1992
"Deontology and Agency", *Monist* 76, 1993
"Value and Agent-Relative Reasons", *Utilitas* 1995

365. J. D. Mabbott

"Reason and Desire" in *Philosophy* 28, 1953

366. Tibor Machan

"A Note on Independence" in *Philosophical Studies* 30, 1976
"Epistemology and Moral Knowledge" in *Review of Metaphysics* 36, 1982
"Why it Appears that Objective Ethical Claims are Subjective" in *Philosophia* 26, 1998.

367. Tito Magri

"Freres Ennemis: The Common Root of Expressivism and Constructivism" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

Magri notes that moral expressivism and neo-Kantian constructivism share an insistence that morality can only be made intelligible from a distinctively practical standpoint and a tendency to regard questions of correctness and justification as arising within our moral practice and answerable to criteria internal to it. However both views, Magri suggests, while they give an account of how moral justification is possible within our moral practices fail somehow to explain how it is possible for there to be practices like that and in the absence of such an explanation leave open the possibility that the authority we attach to certain moral claims is simply an illusion.

368. Stephen Maitzen

"Closing the 'Is'-'Ought' Gap" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982

369. Ruth Barcan Marcus

"More about Moral Dilemmas" in Mason, *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*

370. Patricia Marino

371. Joel Marks


372. H. Mason


373. G. M. Matthews

"Evaluative and Descriptive" in Mind 67, 1958.

374. Wallace I. Matson

"The Expiration of Morality” in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge

375. Bernard Mayo

"Mr Hampshire on Fallacies in Moral Philosophy” in Mind 59, 1950.
"Objectivity in Morals” in Philosophy 26, 1951.
"Commitments and Reasons” in Mind 64, 1955.

376. Gay Meeks

(ed.) Thoughtful Economic Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

377. A. I. Melden

(ed.) Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: 1958)

378. Alfred R. Mele


379. Joseph Mendola


380. Peter Menzies and Graham Oddie


381. Hugo Meynell


382. Alexander Miller
Millgram notes the widespread belief that there is an argument from our mastery of thick ethical concepts (TECs) to the failure of the fact-value distinction (FVD) but contends that no such argument has ever really been made. Williams challenges advocates of the FVD to explain how to distinguish the descriptive and evaluative components of thick concepts but offers little by way of convincing argument to persuade us that the challenge cannot be met (Millgram describes a way of meeting it adapted from Hare). McDowell considers the idea of factoring out the meaning of thick concepts in terms of some descriptive concept plus some rule and claims that the rules in question are uncodifiable. But this argument is only effective if we (incorrectly) suppose grasping and applying a TEC fully and unequivocally to determine how one will act in the situation it applies to. Virtue concepts are special for McDowell as their full mastery confers moral infallibility. But if we understand virtue concepts like that, there is no reason to suppose anyone has ever mastered one. Putnam’s arguments against the FVD make no essential reference to TECs and are based less on the uncontroversial premise that we are masters of such concepts than on his "internal realism". And Murdoch’s rejection of the FVD was motivated by considerations about moral psychology, not language. (A neat paper that deserves to be better known: someone should publish an English version.)

We couldn’t just get ourselves to desire things by e.g. taking pills that made do so. For desires with such a poor inferential pedigree would be unstable. The unity of agency, presupposed by practical reasoning’s having any point, demands that one’s practical and other judgements be structured by a complex array of potential and actual inferential links, in particular "upsteam" links that furnish our desires with rational underpinning and the possibility of defeat; such links also furnish these things to those "somewhat general" practical judgements with which we connect and prioritise among our desires. What we find when we follow such links backwards to their most fundamental source is a practical form of observation, more specifically pleasure: “the rock-bottom judgment of desirability of an object of present experience.” A key role is also played by the practical judgements of others, and in particular of our friends, judgements to which we accord a status close to our own as inputs into in practical reasoning. This practical learning from experience, generalizing from relatively particular practical observations and testimony to relatively general practical judgements, is what Millgram understands by “practical induction”, the capacity for which he argues is indispensable given the complexity of the world and the pervasive novelty we encounter there. In the light of this picture of practical reason we may reject an instrumental understanding of practical reasoning as responsible simply to antecedently given desires. Suggestive, engaging and original.

An ingenious reconstruction and criticism of Mill’s Proof. Millgram seeks to generalize his criticism to all who combine (a) an instrumentalist view of practical reason whereby practical reasoning is exhausted by means-end reasoning with
(b) a privileging of the desires of people who meet a certain standard (the desires of Mill’s experienced judges or - on more modern accounts - of fully informed and rational agents). (b) only makes much sense if there is a story to be told about why desires that meet the standard are somehow correct ones to have. But successfully to tell that story would be to engage in a piece of noninstrumental practical reasoning of the sort forbidden by (a).


386. Elijah Millgram and Paul Thagard


387. Ronald D. Milo

"Moral Deadlock" in Philosophy, 1986
"Rights and Wrongs' in American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 1986
"Skepticism and Moral Justification" in The Monist 76, 1993

Recommends the adoption of an ideal hypothetical agreement understanding of ethics as a metaethical position that avoids implausible metaphysical commitment but allows us to make good sense of moral judgements as true and, at least sometimes, as objectively true in a way which may be evidence transcendent but which is also stance-dependent in that moral properties are constituted by an attitude, real or hypothetical, held towards their bearers. In order to secure for the theory the correct subject matter the idealizing conditions of the contracting parties must be chosen with a view to the principles on which they agree embodying genuine impartiality of some sort and including such paradigmatic moral principles as prohibitions on lying, cheating and stealing. Beyond that these conditions should be maximally normatively neutral. If the upshot is a significant degree of indeterminacy with respect to what such contracting parties can agree that is acceptable: once a core of objective moral truth is secure, Milo is happy to accept a relativistic understanding of other parts of the moral domain.

388. Joe Mintoff


389. Cheryl Misak

"Pragmatism, Empiricism and Morality" in Lovibond and Williams, Identity, Truth and Value

390. Dorothy Mitchell

"Some Comments on Ethical Distinctions" in Philosophical Quarterly 13, 1963.
"Must we Talk about 'Is' and 'Ought'?" in Mind 77, 1968.
"Why Should I be Moral?" in Ratio 12, 1970.

391. Michelle M. Moody-Adams


392. A. W. Moore

"On There Being Nothing Else to Think, or Want, or Do" in Lovibond and Williams, Identity, Truth and Value

393. G. E. Moore
Principia Ethica (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1903)
Ethics (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912)

394. Mary Mothersill

"Moral Philosophy and Meta-Ethics" in Journal of Philosophy 49, 1952
"The Moral Dilemmas Debate" in Mason, Moral Dilemmas

395. John J. Mulhern

"Moral Arguments and Moral Beliefs" in Logique et Analyse 17, 1974.

396. Kumiko Murasugi and Robert Stainton

(eds.) Philosophy and Linguistics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999)

397. James Bernard Murphy


398. Robert H. Myers

"On the Explanation, the Justification and the Interpretation of Action" in Nous 29, 1995

399. Thomas Nagel

"The Foundations of Impartiality" in Seanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics
"Universality and the Reflective Self" in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity

For Nagel the detached character of the view we take of ourselves in reflection is such that in valuing myself I thereby accord authority equally to my own reasons and those of others. Korsgaard's Kantian argument, on the other hand only establishes, in the first instance, egoistic reasons and a second Wittgensteinian step is required to take us further. But the second step does not work and her reliance on it makes her theory unattractively egoistic.

400. George Nakhnikian

"An Examination of Toulmin's Analytical Ethics" in Philosophical Quarterly 9, 1959.
"On the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, Morality and the Language of Conduct
"Generalization in Ethics" in Review of Metaphysics 17, 1964.
"Kantian Universalizability and the Objectivity of Moral Judgments" in Potter and Timmons, Morality and Universality

401. Mark Nelson

"Intuitionism and Conservativism" in Metaphilosophy 21, 1990
"Intuitionism and Subjectivism" in Metaphilosophy 22, 1991.
"Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values from Facts?" in Argumentation, Vol.9 1995
"Morally Serious Critics of Moral Inuitions" in Ratio 12, 1999
402. Kai Nielsen

"On Moral Truth" in Rescher, Studies in Moral Philosophy
"On Refusing to Play the Sceptics' Game" in Dialogue 11, 1972.
"Considered Judgments Again" in Human Studies 5, 1982.
"Against Ethical Rationalism" in Regis, Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism
"Universalisability and the Commitment to Impartiality" in Potter and Timmons, Morality and Universalizability
"In Defence of Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in Odegard, Ethics and Justification.
Why Be Moral? (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1989)
"Relativism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in The Monist 76, 1993

403. Mordecai Nisan


404. Robert Noggle

"The Nature of Motivation (And Why It Matters Less to Ethics than One Might Think)" in Philosophical Studies 87, 1997, pp. 87-111.

405. Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West


406. Richard Norman

Reasons for Action (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971)

407. Gertrud Nunner-Winkler

"Moral Relativism and Strict Universalism" in Wren, The Moral Domain

408. Martha Nussbaum

"Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Philosophy and the Moral Task of Literature" in Cascardi, Philosophy and the Moral Task of Literature.

409. Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover

410. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen


411. Ken O'Day

"Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1, 1998

412. Graham Oddie

Value, Reality and Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

413. Douglas Odegard

Ethics and Justification (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988)

414. Douglas Odegard and Carole Stewart

(ed.) Perspectives on Moral Relativism (Lilliken: Agathon, 1991)

415. Harald Ofstad

"Broad on Ought and Can" in Theoria 21, 1955
"The Functions of Moral Philosophy” in Inquiry 1, 1958.
"Frankena on Ought and Can” in Mind 68, 1959.
"A Note on John Searle's Derivation of 'Ought'from 'Is" in Inquiry 8, 1965

416. R. G. Olson

"Emotivism and Moral Skepticism" in Journal of Philosophy 1959

417. John O'Leary Hawthorne and Graham Oppy

"Minimalism and Truth" in Nous 31, 1997

418. John O'Leary-Hawthorne and Huw Price


O’L & P distinguish semantic characterizations of noncognitivism (in terms of truth-aptness) and psychological ways (in terms of belief). Both views are threatened by minimalist positions that reject thick or substantial notions of truth and/or belief. Jackson, Oppy and Smith, O’L & P argue stand up for noncognitivists the wrong way, appealing to ‘platitudes’ about motivation less explicitly embodied in folk practice than is what the noncognitivist is denying. They argue that noncognitivists should explore a ‘third-leg’ strategy, one that focuses on the diversity of function found in different parts of language but without insisting on a substantial notion of truth.

419. Derek Parfit

Parfit seeks to show that Williams' arguments that there could not be external reasons are inconclusive. We should accept that reasons are such that, if we are rational and know the facts, we will be motivated accordingly. But this does not show that reasons must be internal reasons if we reject, as he thinks we should, a Humean theory of motivation; or if we gloss "rational" as having a substantive and not merely procedural sense. He concedes that it is hard to give a clear sense to external reason statements, but urges that, whatever reasons are, they cannot be understood in the reductive way Williams proposes - or in any other reductive way. Normative facts are too radically different from facts of other kinds for any form of reductionist or naturalist account of them to be credible. To see this, he urges, it is important we distinguish certain facts which are normatively significant from the fact that they are normatively significant. Once we deny reductionism, he then claims, internalism about reasons is no more plausible than externalism.


420. H. J. Paton

*The Good Will* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927)

421. Herlinde Pauer-Studer


422. Ellen Frankel Paul


423. Christopher Peacocke


424. Martin Perlmutter

"Moral Intuitions and Philosophical Method" in Westphal, *Pragmatism, Reason and Norms*

425. R. B. Perry

*General Theory of Value* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1926)

426. Philip Pettit

"Evaluative "Realism" and Interpretation" in Holzmann and Leich, *Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule*
"Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives" in *Ethics* 100, 1990
"Practical Beliefs and Philosophical Theory" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76, 1998
"Two Sources of Morality" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

427. Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, Michael Smith and Jay Wallace


428. Philip Pettit and Michael Smith


Among the most important recent contributions to moral psychology. Pettit and Smith argue that we can insist that desire always have a motivational role in human decision-making - figuring in the background of decision - without always appearing in the content of deliberation - figuring in the foreground. (They call this the strict background view of
Deliberation, they contend, always features some representation of the proposed action or outcome as having some desirable property. It would be implausible to suppose that this property is always just the property of being desired for that would leave us unable to make sense of desires that lack a "desire-related scope", categorical desires not conditional on their own existence. Because desires that figure only in the background need not be phenomenologically salient this understanding of decision-making undermines phenomenological objections to a Humean theory of motivation. Because the fact that an action will satisfy a desire of mine is often nothing to do with my deliberative reason for doing it, we can resist the Harean argument from universalizability to utilitarianism. Because I can take my own desires particularly seriously in deliberation without necessarily taking them seriously qua my desires we can endorse Williams integrity-objection to utilitarianism without integrity seeming just to be "a questionable partiality to self". Because the desires on which we act are not always in the foreground we should not conceive of the autonomous agent as one who always endorses these desires but rather as one whose stable desires for certain kinds of action and outcome are not undermined by pathological-capricious or compulsive-desires. And because we need not foreground the desires on which we act, we can understand the prudent agent as sensitive in deliberation to the facts about what she will desire in a way not mediated by consideration of his now-for then desires without following Nagel in putting an anti-Humean gloss on such an understanding.

"Embracing Objectivity in Ethics" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals

429. David Phillips


430. Paul M. Pietroski

"Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory" in Ethics 103, 1993, pp. 489-515.

431. Charles R. Pigden

"Geach on Good" in Philosophical Quarterly 40, 1990.
"Naturalism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics

432. Christian Piller

"Doing What is Best" in Philosophical Quarterly 50, 2000

433. Adrian Piper

"Instrumentalism, Objectivity and Moral Justification" in American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 1986

434. Mark Platts

"Hume and Morality as a Matter of Fact" in Mind 97, 1988
Moral Realities (London: Routledge, 1992)

435. Louis P. Pojman

(ed.) Ethical Theory (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1988)

436. B. C. Postow
Moral Relativism Avoided” in Personalist 60, 1979
"Werner's Ethical Realism" in Ethics 95, 1985

437. Nelson Potter and Mark Timmons

(Eds.) Morality and Universality (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985)

438. A. W. Price

“Varieties of Objectivity and Values” in P. A. S. 82, 1983

439. H. H. Price


440. Huw Price


441. H. A. Prichard

"Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake" in Mind 21, 1912

442. Arthur Prior

Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948)

443. Hilary Putnam

"The Place of Facts in a World of Values” in Huff and Prewett, The Nature of the Physical Universe and Realism with a Human Face
"Beyond the Fact-Value Dichotomy” in Critica 14, 1982 and Realism with a Human Face
How Not to Solve Ethical Problems (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1983) reprinted in Realism with a Human Face
"The French Revolution and the Holocaust: Can Ethics be Ahistorical?” in Elliot Deutsch, Culture and Modernity, reprinted as "Pragmatism and Relativism: Universal Values and Traditional Ways of Life" in Words and Life
Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1990)
Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, Ma.:Harvard University Press, 1992), especially chapter 5,
"Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction” in Nussbaum and Sen, The Quality of Life and Realism with a Human Face
"Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity” in Words and Life and Nussbaum and Glover, Women, Culture and Development
Words and Life (Cambridge, Ma.;Harvard University Press, 1994)
"Are Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered” in Legal Theory 1, 1995, pp. 5-19.

444. Ruth Anna Putnam


Moral values are constructed in our choices but they are not arbitrary. Like other things we construct they answer to our needs. Which lacks are needs is itself a morally loaded question but the mutual entanglement of the factual and the normative is entirely pervasive. Given their place in a web of facts and values, our values can be evaluated in holistic ways and, insofar as our various webs intersect, they can be argued about.

445. W. V. Quine
Quinn argues that if we understand desires simply as states of being disposed to act in certain ways, they can carry no normative significance and so the instrumentalist conception of practical reason to which he sees subjectivist (by which he means noncognitivist) views as committed can make no sense. To desire a thing, in this sense, gives us no reason either to pursue it or to pursue the means to it. Desire, however, can rationalize choice but only in virtue of the fact that, when it is conceived in a more adequate way inconsistent with subjectivism, as typically involving an evaluation of the desired object as good. Practical rationality is thinking effectively about how we should obtain what is good. But it is not ethically fundamental in the way the human good is ethically fundamental.

Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen


James Rachels

"Wants, Reasons and Justifications" in Philosophical Quarterly 18, 1968.
Can Ethics Provide Answers?" Hastings Centre Report 10, 1980
"The Elements of Moral Philosophy" (New York: Random House, 1986)
"Subjectivism" in Singer, A Companion to Ethics
"Naturalism" in LaFollette, The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory

Elizabeth Radcliffe


Linda Radzik

"A Normative Regress Problem" in American Philosophical Quarterly 36, 1999
"Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority" in Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, 2000

Peter Railton

"Facts and Values" in Philosophical Topics 14, 1986.

An extremely influential defence thereof. The fact/value distinction is not well motivated by appeal to an instrumental understanding of reason once it is granted, as PR does, that moral facts are not necessarily reason-providing. I do not always have instrumental reason to be moral but that no more makes morality arbitrary and subjective than analogous considerations make logic arbitrary and subjective. The strategy is to employ the sort
of argument to best explanation that appeals to realists vis à vis the external world. For such an argument to be effective, we need reason to suppose the domain of moral facts is independent of what we think about it and yet able to interact causally with us in ways that shape our thought. To this end, PR first characterizes a notion non-moral goodness in terms of a person's objective interests, the things that, in ideal epistemic circumstances, he would want for his (actual) self. Objective interests may play an explanatory role, in particular in the evolution of desires via the wants/interests mechanism whereby we learn about our interests through experience and in other ways, not necessarily conscious or rational. It could be argued that the explanatory work such value does is fundamentally being done just by its supervenience base, but if this consideration undermined realism about goodness it would do the same for, say biology. In the case of moral right and wrong we might be sceptics about whether "ought" can feature in explanation. They can, argues PR, when we are concerned with critical, explanations - explanations that make implicit reference to some contextually fixed goal. Moral norms may be supposed to reflect what is rational from the social point of view, what would be rationally approved were everyone's interests counted equally given full information. Such social rationality may play a role in critical explanations: arguably, e.g., departures from it may generate pressures that may serve to lessen the extent of departure. Moral rightness, thus naturalistically understood, does not give categorical reasons and need not always motivate but connects clearly with "what characteristically would motivate individuals who are prepared to submit themselves to relevant sorts of scrutiny."

"Some Questions About the Justification of Morality" in Philosophical Perspectives 6 1992.
"Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative" in Villanueva, Naturalism and Normativity, pp. 36-52.
"What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us To See The Naturalist Must Help Us To Explain" in Haldane and Wright, Reality, Representation and Projection

Of the three features of moral discourse that seem to favour noncognitivism, the supposed oddness of moral facts, the persistence of moral disagreement and the normativity of moral judgement, the trickiest for the naturalist is normativity. The noncognitivist's problem here is capturing what makes some but not all non-hypothetical evaluative attitudes moral. If he appeals to their descriptive content, his position loses its distinctness as a wise cognitivist will allow moral language some noncognitive functions. And appeal to a distinction between the meaning and grounds of judgements of goodness works the analytic-synthetic distinction very hard. We often want to say not only the wrongness of an action but the independence of this from my attitudes have their basis in the character of the action itself. Here too a distinction between the content and the characteristic grounds of moral judgement is possible but problematic. The naturalist, by characterizing moral goodness as that which contributes to wellbeing, impartially considered, can explain both the distinctive importance we accord morality and its independence from my attitudes. Morality standards are neither hypothetical nor based on prudence but epistemic standards can be like this too and it doesn't worry us much. The naturalist can characterize and explain a strong tie between moral judgement and motivation but this will be a contingent, empirical matter, not one of conceptual necessity.

"Reply to David Wiggins" in ibid.

Substantive naturalism is a view which proposes a semantic interpretation of concepts in some area in terms of properties that pull their weight in science. Analytic naturalism that did this on a priori grounds would be vulnerable to Moore-type Open Question Argument objections. But a substantive naturalist might alternatively claim a synthetic identity on a posteriori grounds. If continuity with linguistic usage were claimed the OQA might be evidence against such a view but could not refute it. Such an account need not be reductionist though PR's sympathies lie with versions that are - these need not be eliminativist. A naturalistic account is sketched on which moral norms develop in response to real, empirically accessible properties. This goes some way to capturing the normativity of ethics. Discussing Wittgenstein's famous example, PR notes that lying, unlike bad tennis-playing, can impact significantly on human wellbeing. This explains why, for most people, it is motivationally significant. Though not necessarily for all people - moral reasons are not categorical. If, like Wiggins, we tie our understanding of morality to the sentiments of a socially situated agent we risk an unwelcome relativism. "Objective vindication" is possible if we can show our moral judgements to track features of the world that contribute to human wellbeing, impartially considered. PR finds it obscure how treating moral concepts as sui generis would be helpful in this context.

"In Search of Nonsubjective Reasons" in Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society
"Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics
"The Diversity of Moral Dilemmas" in Mason, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory
Railton in this interesting and suggestive paper develops an account of aesthetic objectivity via a reconstruction of the argument of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste". On this Humean picture certain widespread commonalities among humans make possible what Railton calls the infrastructure of a suitable field of value in virtue of a pervasive conformity relation or match between things in the world and our sensibilities. Beauty is constituted by (though not to be analysed or defined in terms of) the properties of things that make for such a match and these beauty-constituting properties are explanatory of our favourable responses. This infrastructure is the basis for a standard of taste as particular sensitivity to such generally appreciated properties is the hallmark of aesthetic expertise and explains why we should and do defer to it. These reflections on aesthetics are then extended into moral value where, Railton suggests, we can view Mill's account of the settled preferences of experienced judges as articulating a standard of desirability analogous to Hume's standard of taste.

Plausibly the extension of colour terms is fixed rigidly by actual perceptual experience but, Railton argues, the same is plausibly not true of values. Consideration of an imaginary variant form of humanity for whom biological kinship relations had no special normative significance does not encourage the thought that such hypothetical humans would be acting and judging inappropriately given the kind of creatures they are. Intrinsic good should be thought of, not as relative but as relational. In this and in the way our classifications by value are plausibly driven by our practical concerns, values do indeed plausibly resemble certain secondary qualities: not those of colour but qualities of taste such as bitter or sweet.

These are Rawls' rich and very demanding Dewey Lectures. According to KC we view principles of justice (to which Rawls' account is limited) as the outcome of a constructive procedure, in the "original position", whereby agreement on such principles is arrived at by a body of notional persons characterized in terms of a conception of "rational autonomy". That is, they act, in the light of sound principles of rational choice with a view to securing their highest-order interests in being able to advance their moral powers (the capacity for a sense of justice and for some conception of the good) but unconstrained by an prior conception of justice. The
constructive procedure represents an ideal of free persons conceived as "self-originating sources of claims" by not requiring the parties to justify the claims they advance. It represents an ideal of equality by situating the parties symmetrically and it represents the central ideal of fairness by imposing a veil of ignorance on their deliberations that deprives them of knowledge of their position in society and their particular conceptions of the good. In these and other ways the characterization of the original position and the parties to it is intended to model a certain moral ideal, a conception of moral persons as free and equal, that Rawls takes to be implicitly affirmed within democratic societies. Procedures by which principles are selected must thus "be suitably founded on practical reason, or, more exactly, on notions which characterize persons as reasonable and rational and which are incorporated into the way in which, as such persons, they represent to themselves their free and equal moral personality." The aim is that we can so adequately represent this ideal within the original position that we may take the procedure carried out within it as definitive of that conception of justice that best organizes our considered convictions. If this is so, a conception of justice so defined is authoritative for us as being the best workable basis available to us for public justification. An ideal of how moral persons conceived as free and equal should relate to one another as citizens is modelled by the notion of a "well-ordered society", a society effectively regulated by the principles of justice that the parties to an original position, the characterization of which is motivated by a desire adequately to represent such a conception of the person, would choose. Because the citizens of a well-ordered society all effectively affirm a shared conception of justice, their autonomy is "full autonomy". They thus recognize the overriding force of reasons determined by a public conception of justice, reasons whose status as such is determined by the choice of principles by the parties to the original position. Ethical inquiry is not, as rational intuitionists would have it, a matter of our finding out a body of moral facts prior to and independent of that inquiry: on such a view there is no role for any conception of the person richer than a very bare conception of the person as knowing subject. Rather, according to KC, the pursuit of moral justification is a practical and political rather than epistemological or metaphysical problem. We thus need to arrive at a conception precise enough to serve its practical purposes and not so complex as to defeat them. So not all moral questions need be supposed to have answers. We aim to settle the most fundamental issues of justice and other moral conflicts may be simply left as arenas for compromise. The principles of justice recommended by "justice as fairness" are subject to a certain contingency insofar as the constructive procedure is informed by various general facts about people and society, most notably the fact that the circumstances of justice (moderate scarcity and a divergence in conceptions of the good), whose contingency they inherit.

"Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy" in Forster, *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* and in *Collected Papers*

On Rawls' reading as articulated here, "an essential feature of Kant’s constructivism is that first principles of right and justice are seen as specified by a procedure of construction" (the Categorical Imperative Procedure). The procedure is to express the requirements of practical reason as embedded in our conception of ourselves as reasonable, rational responsible moral agents. The CI procedure itself is not constructed but "simply laid out": for Kant in the 2nd Critique, the moral law can have no deduction but rests on the Fact of Reason. This "is the fact that in our common moral consciousness we recognize and acknowledge the moral law as supremely authoritative and immediately directive for us." By giving practical reality to the idea of freedom the moral law obtains all the authentication possible and necessary, Kantian constructivism conceives of objectivity differently from rational intuitionism. For Kant a correct moral judgement is one conforming to the relevant criteria of reasonableness and rationality. Our common practical reason is the source of our agreement in judgements. And because of this commonality the CI procedure will yield the same results whoever applies it. The upshot, according to Rawls, is at once a constructivist conception of practical reason and a coherentist account of its authentication.

*Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.)


457. *Joseph Raz*

"Reasons for Action, Decision and Norms" in *Mind* 84, 1975


"Value Incommensurability" in P. A. S. 86, 1986


"Mixing Values" in P. A. S. 65, 1991


"The Moral Point of View" in Schneewind, *Reason, Ethics and Society*,

"The Amoralist" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

"Incommensurability and Agency" in Chang, *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason*
Raz claims that incommensurability is widespread by opposing the "rationalist" conception of human agency which counts an agent's own desires as reasons for action. Desires, he argues, are responsible to but do not themselves constitute reasons. Given that desires do not provide a source of commensurating values and given the lack of other credible candidates for this role, widespread incommensurability is inevitable.

"When We are Ourselves: The Active and The Passive" in P. A. S. S. 91, 1997 and in Engaging Reason, pp. 5-21.
"Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason" in Ratio 12, 1999
"Notes on Value and Objectivity" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals
"The Truth in Particularism" in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism.

458. Edward Regis Jr.

(ed.): Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)

459. Donald Regan

Against Evaluator Relativity: A Response to Sen" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 1983

"How to be a Moorean" in Ethics 113, 2003, pp. 651-677.

460. Nicholas Rescher

"Reasonableness in Ethics" in Philosophical Studies 5, 1954

461. David A. J. Richards


462. I. A. Richards


463. Robart J. Richards

"A Defence of Evolutionary Ethics" in Biology and Philosophy 1, 1986.
"Dutch Objections to Evolutionary Ethics" in Biology and Philosophy 4, 1989

464. Michael Ridge

"Humean Intentions" in American Philosophical Quarterly 35, 1998

For Scanlon an act is wrong if (roughly) it would be unreasonable for anyone to reject it. Scanlon's critics construct a dilemma. If the reasons for which a principle is rejectable are moral reasons then the appeal to reasonable rejection is otiose, a pointless epicycle. A more economical theory would simply ground the ineligibility of the principles in question on these very moral reasons. But if they are non-moral reasons, the theory cannot succeed as an account of moral reasons. In fact it is Scanlon's view that the reasonable rejection he has in mind is based on agent-relative reasons. Such rejection can still ground moral reasons given the constraint that rejection must be (morally) reasonable. This does not make the theory circular, but merely embodies a holism about moral justification. So the pointless epicycle, objection to contractualism fails.

"Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's 'Do so as well!'" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, 2003, pp. 563-574.
"Why Must We Treat Humanity With Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument," in European Journal of Analytic

**465. Arthur Ripstein**

"Explanation and Empathy" in *Review of Metaphysics* 40, 1987
"Foundationalism in Political Theory" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 16, 1987
"Questionable Objectivity" in *Nous* 27, 1993.

**466. H. M. Robinson**

"Imagination, Desire and Prescription" in *Analysis* 41, 1981.
"Is Hare a Naturalist?" in *Philosophical Review* 91, 1982

**467. John Robertson**


**468. Emily Robertson**

"Practical Reasons, Authority and Education" in *Philosophy of Education* 39, 1983.

**469. Richard Robinson**


**470. Mark van Roojen**

"Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism," *Philosophical Quarterly* 46, 1996

Focusing on Blackburn and Gibbard, van Roojen argues that the main attempts at solving the Frege-Geach Problem by expressivists fail to distinguish as they must between strict logical inconsistency and the sort of pragmatic incoherence involved in e.g. accepting both
It is wrong for me to believe that my father is unfaithful to my mother.
and
My father is unfaithful to my mother.
Such accounts thus seem committed to finding inconsistency where there is none. He also worries that Blackburn's and Gibbard's accounts beg certain question about moral dilemmas in making it a truth of logic that what is forbidden can never be required.

"Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Account" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 50, 1999
"Should Motivational Humeans be Humeans about Rationality?" in *Topoi* 21, 2002
"Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic" in *Ratio* 18, 2005, pp. 190-205.

**471. Connie S. Rosati**
"Internalism and the Good for a Person" in Ethics 106, 1996.
"Brandt's Notion Of Therapeutic Agency" in Ethics 110, 2000
"Personal Good" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics after Moore, pp. 107-131.

472. Gideon Rosen

"Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism" in Nous 32, pp. 386-405.

473. Michael Rosen

"Must We Return to Moral Realism?" in Inquiry 34, 1991.

474. Adina Roskies


475. Alf Ross

"On the Method of Ethics" in Journal of Philosophy, 1948

476. David Ross


477. Jacob Ross

"Rejecting Ethical Deflationism" in Ethics 116, 2006, pp. 742-768

478. Peter W. Ross

"Explaining Motivated Desires" in Topoi 21, 2002

479. Steven Ross


480. William A. Rottschaefer

"The Limitations of Ethical Theory" in Zygon 18, 1983.

481. William A. Rottschaefer and David L. Martinsen

"Really taking Darwin Seriously: An Alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian Metaethics" in Biology and Philosophy 5, 1990

482. J. W. Roxbee Cox

"From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism" in Philosophical Quarterly 36, 1986.
Moral hypotheses and properties plausibly require validation by figuring in the best explanations of our observations. It does not suffice, as Sturgeon claims, that they be relevant to explaining our observations. For hypotheses about witches might pass this test if witch-invoking explanations were widespread in our practice and if we accepted a supervenience account of witchhood. The worry is not irrelevance but impotence. what moral hypotheses and properties would lack if the observations we can explain by invoking them could be explained every bit as well without invoking them. But GSM thinks certain moral properties, notably virtue properties, will plausibly pass this test on any plausible interpretation of it as they will feature in certain genuine and general regularities that we cannot identify and explain with invoking them. But that would not close off the possibility that such properties lacked any normative significance. We need to show not only that moral properties have explanatory force but also that they have justificatory force. Reflection on parallels with the normative significance of epistemological hypotheses might, GSM suggests, be a fruitful avenue to explore here.

"Deception and Reasons to be Moral," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1989
"Functional Explanations and Reasons as Causes," Philosophical Perspectives 1990
"Being a Realist about Relativism," Philosophical Studies 1991
Sayre McCord distinguishes between conventional rules - laws etc. - and trans-conventional rules of morality and morality which at least seem less dependent on social contingencies. The former, he argues, can sometimes play an explanatory role, even one unmediated by beliefs about them (notably sometimes in explaining these beliefs themselves). The latter may also plausibly be thought to do explanatory work. To make this thought good, given some normative theory (of rationality or morality) we need to identify and describe some feedback mechanism whereby actions that violate the rules may carry individual or social costs, those that comply with them benefits, and these costs and benefits have causal impacts. Plausibly, he suggests, just this can be made good in the cases of utilitarian and contractarian understandings of moral rules.

"On Why Hume's General Point of View Isn't Ideal -- and Shouldn't Be," in Paul, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Social Philosophy and Policy 1994
"'Good' on Twin Earth" in Philosophical Issues 8, 1997.

492 T. M. Scanlon

"Preference and Urgency" in Journal of Philosophy 72, 1975
"Rawls' Theory of Justice" in Daniels, Reading Rawls
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism" in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond.
"Levels of Moral Thinking" in Scanor and Fotion, Hare and Critics

Objections to both the aims and the methods of moral theory are apt to be based on overstating its ambitions. Moral theory comprises two interrelated activities: Philosophical Enquiry which concerns itself with explaining what sort of things moral principles are, in what sense they can be held to be correct and how we can know that they are. And Moral Enquiry, which looks at the defensibility of particular claims and the reasons we offer for them. The principles Moral Enquiry aims to uncover through the method of Reflective Equilibrium need not be comprehensive in scope, unifying the entire moral domain, nor need they be strict principles from which particular moral conclusions can be derived with no residual need for judgement. It is the aim of neither kind of enquiry to offer some external justification for morality. Rather they seek to depend our understanding of the reasons for accepting morality we are already in possession of. There is only a deep, general and independent sceptical threat to morality to the extent that Philosophical Enquiry underwrites -- as Scanlon believes it does not -- an e.g. platonistic understanding of the correctness of moral claims that would leave us with worries about how we could ever know them.

"Fear of Relativism" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Virtues and Reasons
"Self-anchored Morality" in Schneewind: Reason, Ethics and Society
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), especially chapters 1, 2 and 8.
"Reasons and Passions" in Buss and Overton, Contours of Agency.

Those elements of someone's mental life which are attributable to them as a basis for moral appraisal should be identified, Scanlon argues, with all their judgement-sensitive attitudes. Certain kinds of conflicts, conflicts between seemings (it seems to me that something is a reason to do something) and assessments (I judge however that it is not) can only be understood as involving desire at all if, as Scanlon urges we should, we understand desires as seemings in this sense: cases of it appearing to us that we have a reason to do something.

"Rawls on Justification" in Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls.

A magisterial account of three of Rawls' central metaethical ideas: reflective equilibrium, the original position and the idea of public reason. The first is elaborated and defended from the common charges of relativism. Scanlon then explains how the structure of the original position is itself subject to justification in the light of the method of reflective equilibrium and how the idea of public reason originates in Rawls' dissatisfaction with his treatment of stability and congruence in theory as insufficiently alive to the fact of pluralism, a fact which requires that political justification in the sphere of constitutional essentials depend on nothing outside what can be a subject of overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines.

493. **E. Schaper**


494. **Samuel Scheffler**

"Moral Skepticism and Ideals of the Person" in *The Monist* 62, 1979
"Ethics, Personal Identity and Ideals of the Person" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982
"Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality and the Virtues" in *Mind* 94, 1985

495. **Stephen Schiffer**

"A Paradox of Desire" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, 1976
"Meaning and Value", in *Journal of Philosophy* 87, 1990

496. **Paul A. Schilpp**

(ed.) *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (La Salle: Open Court, 1942)
(ed.) *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad* (La Salle: Open Court, 1959)
(ed.) *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap* (La Salle: Open Court, 1964)

497. **Paul A. Schilpp and Lewis E. Hahn**

(eds.) *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989)

498. **Moritz Schlick**

*Problems of Ethics* (New York: Dover, 1962)

499. **David Schmidtz**

"Rationality Within Reason" in *Journal of Philosophy* 89, 1992
"Choosing Ends" in *Ethics* 104, 1994

500. **P. F. Schmidt**

"Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1955

501. **J. B. Schneewind**

"Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles" in Hauerwas and MacIntyre, *Revisions,*
(ed.) *Reason, Ethics and Society: Themes from Kurt Baier and His Responses* (La Salle: Open Court, 1996)

502. **Dieter Schönecker**

"How is a Categorical Imperative Possible" Kant's Deduction of the Moral Law in *Groundwork III" in Horn and Schönecker, *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.*

503. **Mark Schroeder**

"Instrumental Mythology" in *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 1, 2005.

504. François Schroeter


505. Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter


506. G. F. Schueler

"Why Oughts are not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me about Practical Reasoning)" in *Mind*, 1995

507. Gerhard Schurz


508. Robert B. Scott Jr.

"Five Types of Ethical Naturalism" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 17, 1980

509. Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion


510. John Searle

"How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"" in *Philosophical Review* 73, 1964.

511. Torgny T. Segerstedt

"Imperative Propositions and Judgements of Value" in *Theoria* 11, 1945

512. Roy Wood Sellars

"Can a Reformed Materialism do Justice to Values?" in *Ethics* 55, 1944.

513. Wilfrid Sellars
"Obligation and Motivation" in *Philosophical Studies* 2, 1951.
"Imperatives, Intentions and the Logic of “Ought”” in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, *Morality and the Language of Conduct*
"On Reasoning about Values" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 17, 1980.

514. **Amartya K. Sen**

"Hume's Law and Hare's Rule" in *Philosophy* 41, 1966.
"Well-being, Freedom and Agency" in *Journal of Philosophy* 82, 1985
"Positional Objectivity" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22, 1993

515. **Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams**

(eds.) *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)

516. **Stefan Sencerz**

"Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics" in *Philosophical Studies* 50, 1986.

517. **Russ Shafer-Landau**

"Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 32, 1995

518. **Yonatan Shemmer**

"Instrumentalism and Desiring at Will” in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 35, 2005

519. **George Sher**

"But I Could Be Wrong" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

520. **Roger Shiner**

"Ethical Justification and Case-by-Case Reasoning” in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

521. **Robert Shope**


522. **David Sidorsky**


523. **Caroline Simon**

"On Defending a Moral Synthetic A Priori” in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1988
524. Evan Simpson

"Between Internalism and Externalism" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 49, 1999.

Internalists believe (a) there is a conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation whereby (b) such that moral beliefs necessarily motivate. Externalists deny both (a) and (b). Simpson's proposed middle ground is to accept (a) but not (b): the connection is conceptual but defeasible. A psychological motivation for this view is sketched in terms of a relationship of logical dependency whereby someone cannot have a certain sort of belief who is never subject to a certain sort of "concern". For example one could never have the beliefs about dangerousness implicated in fear if one were never afraid. For what I identify as dangerous depends on what I am disposed to fear and so, Simpson reasons, if I fear nothing, I cannot master the concept. Analogous things he suggests, are true of the relation between moral beliefs and the moral emotions such as pity that implicate them.

525. Neil Sinclair


526. M. G. Singer

"Moral Scepticism" in Carter, *Skepticism and Moral Principles*
"Gewirth's Ethical Monism" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*

527. Peter Singer

"Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium" in *The Monist* 57, 1974
"Is There a Universal Moral Sense?" in *Critical Review* 9, 1995

528. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

"Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas" in *Journal of Philosophy* 84, 1987
"Moral Skepticism and Justification" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge?*
"From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology" in *Argumentation* 14, 2000.

529. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons


530. John Skorupski

"Reasons and Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*
"Irealist Cognitivism" in *Ratio* 12, 1999.
"The Ontology of Reasons" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

531. Aaron Sloman
"How to Derive 'Better' From 'Is'" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 6, 1969

**532. Michael Slote**

"Morality not a System of Imperatives” in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19, 1982

**533. David Slutsky**


**534. J. J. C. Smart**


**535. Holly M. Smith**

"Moral Realism, Moral Conflict and Rational Choice” in *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 1986
"Deriving Morality from Rationality” in Vallentyne, *Contractarianism and Rational Choice*

**536. Michael Smith**

"Should We Believe in Emotivism?” in MacDonald and Wright, . *Fact, Science and Morality*, pp. 289-310.
"Realism” in Singer (ed), *A Companion to Ethics*
"Valuing: Desiring or Believing?” in Charles and Lennon, *Reduction, Explanation and Reason*
"Objectivity and Moral Realism: on the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience” on Haldane ansd Wright , *Reality, Representaion and Projection*

The problem that is of reconciling (1) the Humean theory of motivation, (2) internalism and (3) a realist understanding of moral commitments as beliefs. Smith first defends (3) arguing that the open question argument against naturalism is weakened by reflection on the paradox of analysis. He rejects however the idea that we can find explicit or reductive naturalistic analyses of moral concepts - Jackson-style network analyses in particular are vulnerable to permutation problems - but holds out hopes for a non-reductive, summary-style but still naturalistic analysis. He then turns to (2), arguing, against externalism, that the externalist must see the good person as motivated to do what is right on a de dicto reading of what is right and that this involves a 'fetishistic' attitude to morality. Internalism, read as the claim that judgements about rightness motivate us *where we are not practically irrational* is seen as a corollary of the rationalist's conceptual claim: that moral requirements are requirements of reason, a claim Smith defends. We should also, he argues, accept (3), accept, that is, that motivating reasons consist, at least in part of desires, given the teleological character of motivating reasons. In spite of accepting (2) and (3), Smith wants to understand value-judgements as beliefs, beliefs about what it would be rational to do - more precisely what, in conditions of ideal rationality we would wish our (actual, imperfectly rational) selves to do. This, dispositional, theory, is the promised non-reductive summary style analysis promised earlier. It can be seen as naturalistic insofar as fully rational agents can be a part of the natural world. If we are rational we will have desires that cohere with our beliefs about what is rational and these desires will motivate us to act accordingly but we should not see the desires as *motivated* by the normative beliefs. In this way (1), (2) and (3) can be reconciled. This widely discussed book is impressive in the clarity and forcefulness of its argument. It also contains useful discussion of the views of, inter alia, Ayer, Foot, Mackie, Williams, Nagel, Gauthier, Harman, McDowell, Brink, Jackson and David Lewis.

Expressivists and minimalists can agree that truth has an analytic tie to belief. Given this the Expressivist can argue that moral claims are expressive of desires and desires are, given their functional roles, disjoint from beliefs. Hence moral beliefs are non-truth-assessable. A minimalist might do a Horwich and insist that expressions of desire may be truth-assessable. But this, given the analytic tie, would make them beliefs and folk-psychology, as Smith reads it, rules out any single state being both these things. Minimalist arguments do not show expressivism is false but merely the need for the expressivist to provide an explanation of the cognitive surface syntax of evaluation.

"Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude and Belief" in Analysis 54, 1994

Divers and Miller, like Horwich, want to allow that there can be minimal beliefs, beliefs that are not distinct from states of desiring. But there are arguments to the effect that this does not make good folk-psychological sense and his critics do not address these. That the matter is, as D & M observe, controversial is not to the point.

"Internal Reasons" in PPR 55, 1995
"The Argument for Internal Reason: Reply to Miller" in Analysis 56, 1996
"Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton" in Analysis 56, 1996
"A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility" in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Response-Dependence Without Reduction" in Casati and Tappolet, Response-Dependence
"The Definition of Moral" in Jamieson, Singer and his Critics
"The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman" in Utilitas 11, 1999
"Search for the Source" in Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999
"Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?" in Crisp and Hooker, Well-being and Morality
"Moral Realism" in LaFollette(ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory
"Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics" in Ratio 14, 2001

Evaluative judgements can vary in the dimensions of 1. Certitude: the confidence a subject has in her evaluative judgements; 2. Robustness: the stability of this confidence in the light of new information; and 3. Importance: the strength of the relative desirabilities we impute to things. The strength of the motivation it is rational to have in the light of an evaluative judgement covaries independently with both certitude and importance in ways, Smith argues, his own cognitivist theory of evaluative judgement is well placed to explain. Not so for noncognitivism which identifies evaluations with desires. Desires can vary in strength both with each other and over time. This does not seem like enough structure to accommodate all three structural features that evaluative judgements have. Suppose more structure is importuned by saying that valuing e.g. pleasure is a matter of desiring to desire it. We might then identify certitude with the strength of the second order desire and importance with the strength of the desired first-order desire. But this assignment seems arbitrary. Why is it superior to the converse assignment? Moreover when the second order desire to desire to F is stronger than the second order desire to G the agent will always, on this account, be rational to desire to F more no matter how strong the desired first-order desire to G. Noncognitivism is thus, Smith concludes, ill-suited to capture both the structure evaluative judgements enjoy and the motivational significance of this structure.


Expressivists have to (1) say which subset of desires and aversions are those we express when we make normative claims (2) explain why normative judgements are, functionally speaking, similar to beliefs as well as to desires: for they are linked by support relations to a whole network of other attitudes. To do this, they must acknowledge that the relevant desires belong to sets of such desires which meet a certain standard of coherence, unity and informedness. But in doing that, they acknowledge that normative judgements are responsible to standards of coherence, unity and informedness. Hence normative judgements implicate beliefs about what we would desire were our desires maximally informed, coherent and unified. But there is now reason not to take the small step to saying normative judgements just are such beliefs. That they have the content they do suffices to explain, insofar as our psychologies tend towards coherence. why such beliefs are functionally similar to desires.


537. Quentin Smith

"Concerning the Absurdity of Life" in Philosophy 1991.
538. **Tara Smith**


539. **Francis Snare**

"Externalism in Ethics" in *Philosophical Quarterly*, 24, 1974
"The Open Question as a Linguistic Test" in *Ratio* 1975
"Three Sceptical Theses in Ethics" in *APQ* 14, 1977
"The Diversity of Morals" in *Mind* 89, 1980
*Morals, Motivation and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
*The Nature of Moral Thinking* (London: RKP, 1992)

540. **David Sobel**

"Full Information Accounts of Well-Being" in *Ethics* 104, 1994
"Explanation, Internalism and Reasons for Action" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001
"Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," *Ethics* 111, 2001

541. **David Sobel and David Copp**

"Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire" in *Analysis* 61, 2001, pp. 44-53

542. **Jordan Howard Sobel**

"On Michael Smith's Internalisms" in *Erkenntnis* 54, 2001

543. **Wm. David Solomon**

"Moral Realism and the Amoralist” in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988

544. **David Sosa**

"Pathetic Ethics” in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*

545. **Ernest Sosa**

"Moral Relativism, Cognitivism, and Defeasible Rules” in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*

546. **Francis Sparshott**

"On Metaethics: A Reverie” in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*

547. **W. T. Stace**

*The Concept of Morals* (New York: MacMillan, 1937)

548. **R.F. Stalley**

"Intentions, Beliefs and Imperative Logic”, in *Mind*, 81, 1972
549. Dennis W. Stampe

"Defining Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire.

550. Cynthia A. Stark

Hypothetical Consent and Justification. in Journal of Philosophy 97, 2000

The standard indictment of hypothetical-consent-based contractualism is that hypothetical consent cannot obligate anybody. Stark argues that this indictment fails when we are concerned with moral principles as opposed to political obligation. While it is problematic how hypothetical consent could justify a political authority in coercing me into obedience to some principle, it is less problematic to suppose it could give me a reason to abide by it. Indeed hypothetical consent can furnish the basis of a justification of political obedience provided we understand the justification of the obligation to obey some principle or institution as independently motivated and not simply as falling, as a matter of conceptual necessity, out of the justification of the principle or institution's legitimacy. Appeal to hypothetical consent need not be, moreover, otiose when it features in a theory that regards correct moral principles as constituted by the outcome of an ideal procedure in which consent essentially features.

551. James Sterba

"Justifying Morality" in Synthese 72, 1987

552. Charles L. Stevenson

"Ethical Judgements and Avoidability" in Mind 47, 1938 and Facts and Values
"Persuasive Definitions" in Mind 47, 1938 and Facts and Values
"Moore's Arguments Against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism" in Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore

The reading of "X is right" as "I approve of X" has the consequence that we may express moral judgements differing both with those of others and with our own at other times and all parties be correct. This, urges Moore, is incoherent. Not so, replies Stevenson, when we relativize to speakers and times in the appropriate ways. But then how are we to understand the parties as differing in opinion if what they say is not incompatible? Here, urges CS, we need a notion of disagreement in attitude which focuses on their incompatible purposes with respect to the influence of what they say.

 Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1944)
"Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive" in Philosophical Review 57, 1948
"The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications" in Philosophical Review 59, 1950

Practical reason is properly responsive to facts, but which facts are relevant to it depends on what our substantive ethical views are, what we approve and disapprove of. There is nothing very special here about specifically moral thinking which can be roughly demarcated in terms of the involvement of particular kinds of feeling such as guilt and remorse and the role played by second-order approvings whereby we approve of our own first order approvings. Emotivism is preferable to naturalistic cognitivism in not narrowly circumscribing in advance the range of facts that can be ethically relevant. In particular we see here the advantage of construing ethical terms as expressing rather than designating our attitudes, thus avoiding the implausible upshot that ethical thought is "an exercise in introspective psychology". For emotivism, beliefs mediate between attitudes. Reasons for ethical judgements deal in such beliefs but "remain cognitive statements, open to all the tests of inductive or deductive logic." And there is no reason not to see this as exhausting the cognitive dimension of ethical judgement, favouring "an analysis that delegates all the relevant beliefs to the reasons, allowing the judgment to keep none of them." The relationship between reasons, so understood and expressions of attitude is however causal and not logical. Appeal to such reasons may resolve disagreements but we can't count on this. The cognitivist can't improve on this story by building some descriptive subject matter into the very meaning of ethical terms for any ethical significance attaching to any subject matter he so builds in the emotivist can recognize among the reasons for ethical judgements. As it will always be a contingent matter whether we approve or disapprove of any such subject matter, cognitivism as such does nothing to enhance the prospects of a "rationally obtainable convergence of attitudes".
"Brandt's Questions about Emotive Ethics" in Philosophical Review 59, 1950.
Facts and Values (New Haven: Yale U. P. 1963)
"Value Judgments: Their Implicit Generality" in Bowie, Ethical Theory

553. Robert M. Stewart and Lynn L. Thomas


554. A. Stigen

"Mrs Foot on Moral Arguments" in Mind 69, 1960.

555. Michael Stocker

"Agent and Other: Against Ethical Universalism" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54, 1976
"The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" in Journal of Philosophy 73, 1976
"Akrasia and the Object of Desire" in Marks, The Ways of Desire
"Emotional Thoughts" in American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1987
"Emotions and Ethical Knowledge: Some Naturalistic Connections" in Midwest Studies 19, 1994
"Parfit and the Time of Value" in Dancy, Reading Parfit

556. Daniel Stoljar


557. Philip Stratton-Lake


Why should I care that I ought to ϕ? What makes the judgement that I ought to ϕ normatively significant? What make it action-guiding? It might be thought that being a belief internalist about morality makes such questions easier. But Stratton-Lake argues that it does not. That I do care does not entail that I should. That a judgement is normatively significant depends simply on whether it contains normative concepts and - where a stronger sort of significance is at issue - on whether it is true. And internalism only helps with action-guidingness if we confuse empirical and normative senses of action-guidingness. The only linkage between judgements and motivations that plausibly holds platitudeously is one whereby the holder of a moral judgement is typically and not necessarilymotivated. And any worry - à la Smith - about moral fetishism is alleviated when we understand that while the morally good agent must, for the externalist be suppose to have an nonderivative de dicto desire to do what is right, this is not the whole story about his nonderivative desires


558. Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker

"Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics After Moore, pp. 149-168.

559. Sharon Street


560. A. Stroll

The Emotive Theory of Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954)
561. Barry Stroud

"Practical Reasoning" in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.): Reasoning Practically

562. Sarah Stroud


563. Nicholas Sturgeon

"Altruism, Solipsism and the Objectivity of Reasons" in Philosophical Review 83, 1974
"Moral Explanations" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth, pp. 49-78.
"Harman on Moral: Explanations of Natural Facts" in Gillespie, Moral Realism
"What Difference does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True" in Gillespie, Moral Realism
"Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn" in Philosophical Studies 61, 1991
"Nonmoral Explanations" in Philosophical Perspectives 6, 1992.
"Anderson on Reason and Value" in Ethics 106, 1996
"Evil and Explanation" in Couture and Nielsen, On the Relevance of Metaethics
"Moore on Ethical Naturalism" in Ethics 113, 2003, pp. 528-556.
"Ethical Naturalism" in Copp, The Oxford Companion to Ethical Theory, pp. 91-121.

564. L. W. Sumner

"Normative Ethics and Metaethics" in Ethics 77, 1967.
"Hare's Arguments Against Ethical Naturalism" in Journal of Philosophy 1967
"Value Judgements and Action" in Mind 77, 1968.
"Welfare, Preference and Rationality" in Frey and Morris, Value, Welfare and Morality

565. Sigrun Svarasdottir


SS argues that moral judgements are not necessarily motivating - they motivate only when supplemented with a desire to be moral. Like Brink she appeals to cases where people seem not to be motivated by sincere moral judgements they make. When it is a question what explanatory hypotheses are on the table to explain such cases, she suggests the burden of argument must rest with those who want to restrict the hypotheses so available. She stresses that the internalist must not support internalism in circular ways - by appealing to an account of the meaning of moral judgements that internalism is itself invoked in support of. There may, it is granted to Hare, be cases where cynical, sceptical or alienated people are best understood as using moral language "in inverted commas". But she sees no non-question-begging grounds to insist that we must always so explain the sort of cases of motivational failure she appeals to. The paper closes with a lengthy discussion of Smith's "fetishism" argument. She grants that the morally good person's moral judgements motivate via a de dicto desire to be moral but thinks this is neither implausible nor reprehensible when we sketch a full picture of how such a person's motivation might function. In particular there is no reason to suppose de re desires to act in morally required ways are not also abundant and do not carry independent motivational weight.

"Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?" in Leiter, Objectivity in Law and Morals
"Evaluations of Rationality" in Horgan and Timmons, Metaethics after Moore, pp. 61-78.
"How Do Moral Judgements Motivate?" in Dreier, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 163-181

566. Kyle S. Swan
"Emotivism and Deflationary Truth" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 83, 2002

567. **Christine Swanton**

"Is the Moral Problem Solved?" in *Analysis* 56, 1996.

568. **Sharon E. Sytsma**

"Ethical Internalism and Moral Indifference" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 29, 1995

569. **John Tasioulas**

"Relativism, Realism and Reflection" in *Inquiry* 41, 1998

570. **Charles Taylor**

"A Most Peculiar Institution" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*.  
"Justice After Virtue" in Horton and Mendus *After MacIntyre*.  
"Ethics and Ontology" in *Journal of Philosophy* 100, 2003, pp. 305-320

571. **Daniel Taylor**

"Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" in *Mind* 60, 1951.

572. **Jacqueline Taylor**

"Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

573. **Paul W. Taylor**

"C. I. Lewis on Value and Fact" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 14, 1953  
"Four Types of Ethical Relativism" in *Philosophical Review* 63, 1954  
"Social Science and Ethical Relativism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1958  
"NeedStatements" in *Analysis* 19, 1959.  
"On Taking the Moral Point of View" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978

574. **Jenny Teichmann**


575. **Larry Temkin**

"Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning" in Dancy, *Reading Parfit*

576. **Sergio Tenenbaum**

"Realists without a Cause: Deflationary Theories of Truth and Ethical Realism" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1996.  
"Ethical Internalism and Glaucon's Question" in *Nous* 34, 2000  
577. Folke Tersman


578. Paul Thagard


579. Alan Thomas

"Minimalism versus Quasi-Realism: Why the Minimalist has a Dialectical Advantage" in *Philosophical Papers* 26, 1997.

580. Laurence Thomas

"Morality and Psychological Development" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*

581. James Thomson and Judith Jarvis Thomson

"How Not to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'" in *Philosophical Review* 1964.

582. Judith Jarvis Thomson

"Practical Reasoning" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 1962.
*The Realm of Rights* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Introduction

583. Crystal Thorpe

"A New Worry for the Humean Internalist"


584. Valerie Tiberius


A rich and suggestive development of a Humean understanding of normative reasons. Desire-based accounts of normativity are typically rejected because there are so many desires that we don't regard as providing reasons. Quite so, says VT, but some desires (broadly construed) plausibly do provide reasons. In particular what she calls value commitments do. I have a value commitment to X when I have a pro-attitude to X, intend to continue to have this pro-attitude and take this pro-attitude to be justified by some good reason. I take a pro-attitude P to be justified by a reason R if R is constituted by certain considerations C such that I have a further pro-attitude
whereby I approve of the state of affairs in which I stably continue to hold \( P \) when I reflect upon \( C \) (where there are no further defeating considerations \( D \)). Value commitments are things we allow a central role in planning our lives and assessing how they are going. For them to enjoy the requisite authority for this, they must be stable and we must believe them to be justified; and value commitments, as VT characterizes them, do enjoy just these features. A person has normative reason to pursue some end, VT then proposes, when her value commitments direct her to that end. This account allows for there to be standards for the evaluation of commitments but does not guarantee that such standards apply universally. In the case of personal commitments we might plausibly live with this. Moral commitments are more problematic. But the account proposed can still, VT suggests, do justice to the way we experience these as non optional given, firstly, that it is far from an "anything goes" account and, secondly, that it is, so far, silent on how we should regard the value commitments of others.

"Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

If we are to deliberate successfully at all, we need stability in our commitments, both synchronic (whereby not all our commitments are brought into question at once) and over time if we are to carry out extended courses of action. This gives us reason to cultivate a kind of character such that we are disposed not to reconsider our commitments except in certain, quite circumscribed, circumstances. Given this, we should not be impressed by the claim that normative authority could not derive from passions and sentiments as Humeans urge but must stem from principles binding on all rational agents as Kantians urge. For someone with the character trait in question would not be disposed to see themselves as having any reason to question their commitments even if they failed to believe that there were any Kantian-style rational sanctions to ground the authority of these commitments. And the robustness of their normative commitments would be apt to defeat any philosophically motivated conclusion that only Kantian-style rational principles could deliver normative authority (or at least to defeat any application of those philosophical conclusions to the practical deliberative perspective.


The stability standard is a regulative ideal for practical reason that we meet when our confidence in our choices is supported by reasons in which we feel a confidence that we would maintain were we to engage in appropriate reflection on them. The notion of appropriate reflection here in ineliminably normative and must be understood in terms of normative standards the agent himself would be disposed to endorse. To reject the stability standard would be to think that, were appropriate reflection to render a practical commitment unstable, that would be no reason to change it. And that would be incoherent. To reject the stability standard, Tiberius suggests, would be to fail to count as engaged in practical reasoning at all. Appreciating the role of the stability standard allows us to see how we may reject the unattractive instrumentalist thought that reason has nothing to contribute to the evaluation of our ends while remaining consistent with the plausible instrumentalist thought that reason alone does not prescribe ends.


The goal that our choices should be acceptable in the light of standards we take it we ought to hold and continue to hold is not a rationally compulsory goal. But it is a necessity for human flourishing of a sort for whose value only someone who shared almost nothing of our ethical practices would feel a need to offer justificatory support. Given this understanding of deliberation, Tiberius develops an account of deliberative stability as a virtue: the virtue, roughly, of sticking to the practical commitments one has made (though not in stubborn or foolish ways). She also seeks to make sense of other normative standards of practical reasoning, notably the virtue of self-knowledge, the Rawlsian principles of postponement and inclusiveness and coherence.

585. J. Tilley

"Two Kinds of Moral Relativism" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 29, 1995

586. Mark Timmons


We can be foundationalists about ethical justification in the sense of holding some ethical beliefs basic and justifying the others with reference to them consistently with denying that any ethical beliefs are immediately
justified. This is possible is the justification of the basic ethical beliefs makes reference only to non-ethical beliefs. Daniels has objected to this way of proceeding by questioning whether the non-ethical background beliefs that might look most promising in informing our choice of moral beliefs - beliefs about the nature of persons - cannot themselves be justified except by reference to ethical beliefs. Timmons argues that this worry is inadequately supported by argument in particular when we focus on views of the nature of persons that recognize the plasticity of persons and that avoid rashly universalistic claims.

"Putnam's Moral Objectivism" in Erkenntnis 34, 1991
"Necessitation and Error in Kant's Ethics" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1992

587. William Tolhurst

"Supervenience, Externalism and Moral Knowledge" in Gillespie, Moral Realism

588. James Tomberlin

(ed.) Hector-Neri Castaneda (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986)

589. Christopher Tollefson


590. V. Tomas

"Ethical Disagreement and the Emotive Theory of Values" in Mind, 1951.

591. S. E. Toulmin

The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950)

592. Jon Tresan

"De Dicto Internalism Cognitivism" in Nous 40, 2006, pp. 143-165.

593. Roger Trigg

Reason and Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)

594. Savas Tsouhatzidis


595. Edna Ullmann-Margalit


596. Nicholas Unwin
Blackburn has no adequate account of how to understand the negation of an evaluative sentence. If we allow him the equivalence:

E. A accepts H!p = A hoorays that p.

We get this

N1. A does not accept that H!p = A does not hooray that p
N2. A accepts not H!p = ???

But it is quite mysterious how we should fill in N2. Absence of an attitude is no good. accepting the negation of a sentence must be something positive. The model-set semantics to which Blackburn appeals imports a structure that Blackburn is not entitled to prior to an explanation of how evaluative talk of perfect worlds can be understood when embedded in the context of both a conditional and a universal quantifier. An alternative strategy that focuses on higher order attitudes gives us more structure but makes mixed contexts seriously intractable.

Gibbard, like Blackburn, has no adequate account of how to understand the negation of an evaluative sentence. He tries to unpack this in terms of the ruling out of factual-normative worlds. However if we understand this in terms of ruling out one.s acceptance of certain combinations of normative and factual claims, it will fail adequately to distinguish between denial and mere neutrality. And we cannot understand it in terms of directly ruling out the context of such claims unless we already understand what it is to negate them. In the case of Gibbard.s fully opinionated goddess, Hera, who is never neutral, there will be no space between not accepting some normative claim and accepting its negation. But for us imperfectly opinionated beings there is such a space and there is no satisfactory way to explain what it is for us to rule out some evaluative content understood as Gibbard recommends.

597. J. O. Urmson

"On Grading" in Mind 59, 1950
"Some Questions Concerning Validity” in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1953
The Emotive Theory of Ethics (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968)
"A Defence of Intuitionism” in P. A. S. 75, 1975

598. Peter Vallentyne


599. Pekka Väyrynen


600. J. David Velleman

"The Guise of the Good” in Nous 26, 1992
"What Happens When Someone Acts?” in Mind 101, 1992
"The Story of Rational Action” in Philosophical Topics 21, 1993
"The Possibility of Practical Reasoning” in Ethics 106, 1996
"Deciding how to Decide” in Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason
"Motivation by Ideal” in Philosophical Explorations 5, 2002, pp. 89-104.

601. Godfrey Vesey
602. Enrique Villanueva


603. Bart Voorzanger


604. C. H. Waddington


605. James Wallace


606. R. Jay Wallace


"Reason and Responsibility" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*


607. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler and Michael Smith


608. Margaret Urban Walker

"Feminism, Ethics and the Question of Theory" in *Hypatia* 7, 1992

609. Bruce Waller

"Noncognitivist Moral Realism" in *Philosophia* 24 1994

610. Geoffrey Warnock


*The Object of Morality* (London: Methuen, 1971)


611. Mary Warnock

*Ethics Since 1900* (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1960)

612. R. Wasserstrom


613. Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley

614. Ralph Wedgwood

"Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation" in European Journal of Philosophy 3, 1995
"Non-Cognitivism, Realism and Truth" in Philosophical Studies 69, 1997, pp. 73-91.

If Gibbard's normative logic has the resources to handle the Frege-Geach problem, RW argues, it is at the cost of going cognitivist. For it is only by going cognitivist that Gibbard can expect to explain the point of consistency and conformity to warrant in normative contexts. For motivating these notions requires us to introduce into Gibbard's story the notion of a "winning" world/norm system pair that is a suitable idealization of the speaker's community's norms where the property of holding at a winning world/norm pair (a) is normatively significant and (b) disquotes and these together, urges RW, suffice to make it truth.

"The Essence of Response-Dependence" in Casati and Tappolet, Response-Dependence
"The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism" in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2, 1999

There are two views of practical reasoning: the constructivist view whereby what makes a choice correct is that it is the outcome of the right sort of mental procedure and the recognitional view where the correctness of a choice is determined independently of the mental procedure by which it is arrived at. On the recognitional view, procedural or internal norms for mental procedures for choosing are to be explained in terms of their reliability in arriving at independently correct choices. On the constructivist view there is no procedure-independent understanding of a correct choice to be had. Substantive versions of the recognitional view specify some substantive feature F and urge that we choose acts that have it. But, for any F, there is plausibly no non-question-begging answer to Korsgaard.s normative question: Why take being F as rationally decisive and not some other feature of the act? This is taken by some as a fatal problem for the recognitional view. However the very same problem bedevils constructivism. For any mental procedure P one can always raise the question: Why take being an outcome of P as rationally decisive and not some other feature of the action? We can however escape the problem by accepting a version of the recognitional view that is not substantive but formal: such a view says simply that we should make correct choices, choosing things that are good or choiceworthy. Here it does fail to make any sort of sense to ask: Yes, but why take this feature as rationally decisive? The view might seem vulnerable to a charge of triviality, of telling us nothing at all about how we may determine what is the correct thing to do. By itself, Wedgwood concedes, the view does indeed tell us nothing of this sort but the objection is defused if it nonetheless has . as he briefly argues it does - nontrivial consequences when conjoined with other plausible claims.


A clear and effective response to Johnston's "Authority of Effect". RW argues that said authority is less hard to square with either projectivism or dispositionalism than Johnston urges and that even if we were to accept Johnston's realism about the values affect is supposed to "disclose", that would fall far short of warranting an understanding of effect as a kind of sensory perception.


615. Ota Weinberger

"'Is' and 'Ought' Reconsidered" in Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie 71, 1984
"The Expressive Conception of Norms" in Law and Philosophy 4, 1985

616. C. Wellman

The Language of Ethics (Cambridge, Ma.; Harvard University Press, 1961)
"Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity" in Journal of Philosophy 1963
"Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity" in American Philosophical Quarterly 1968
Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971)
"Ethical Disagreement and Objective Truth" in American Philosophical Quarterly 12, 1975

617. W. K. Werkmeister

Theories of Ethics (Lincoln, Nebraska: Johnsen, 1961)

618. Richard Werner

"Ethical Realism" in Ethics 93, 1983
"Ethical Realism Defended" in Ethics 95, 1983

619. Edward Westermarck

Ethical Relativity (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932)

620. Jonathan Westphal


621. Kenneth R. Westphal


622. J. Wheatley

"A Note on the Emotive Theory" in Philosophy, 1959

623. Morton White

"Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology and Quine's Holism" in Schlipp and Hahn, The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, pp. 649-662.

624. Warner A. Wick

"Generalization and the Basis of Ethics" in Ethics 72, 1962.

625. David Wiggins

"Deliberation and Practical Reason" in P. A. S. 76, 1976
"Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life" in Proc Brit Ac. 62, 1976 and Needs, Values Truth
"Weakness of Will, Commensurability and the Objects of Desire" in P. A. S. 79, 1979
"Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements" in ibid.
"Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity: A Reply to Peter Railton" in Haldane and Wright Reality, Representation and Projection

DW distinguishes an explanatory Humean naturalism consistent both with noncognitivism and with recognizing the sui generis character of moral concepts and the kind of naturalist cognitivism that was the target of Moore's Open Question Argument. This argument can be read as raising a puzzle about the content of moral judgements, naturalistically understood, can be normative. It can be improved by drawing attention to "the difference between conceptualising our experience in a manner that is conditioned by the ethical and conceptualising it in a scientific manner." Normativity is glossed in terms of being categorical: moral judgements give all who accept them a reason that is independent of their desires. It is something that must surely to the content of moral
judgement and it's hard to see how it could so accrue to naturalistic content. Both the noncognitivist and the nonnaturalist cognitivist are better placed than Railton's naturalist to make sense of normativity. But the nonnaturalist cognitivist can also find room for the possibility of objective vindication: we may think something is obligatory because it really is. He can allow a conceptual connection between moral judgement and the will to act accordingly but "only a presumptive and normal connection", a connection required if I am to grasp "the sense of the distinctively moral and political language that sustains the practices in which I participate."

"A Neglected Position" in ibid.

Because it is not always transparent which properties are natural, Railton's substantive naturalism is at least a "starter". But there are qualititative differences between the aspirations of science and those proper to human interpretative understanding. If V is some value property and X some natural property, the only adequate way to characterize V is in terms of the proper, engaged response to it. V must connect with the will in ways empirical engagement with a natural property does not require. With a fixed number of cases we might hope to find an X coextensive with V but given indefinitely many new cases, any understanding of value in terms of X would have to catch onto the point of attributions of V, make the interests that drive such attributions its own. This might be a proper aspiration but only insofar as it involves an aspiration to humanize our understanding of the natural. Such a study might advance our understanding of our evaluative practices and make us alive to possible alternatives but would always work from the inside. It is from such an internal perspective that the only vindication these practices stand in need of should proceed.

"Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn Virtues and Reasons
"Objective and Subjective in Ethics, With Two Postscripts on Truth" in Ratio 1995.
"Replies" in Lovibond and Williams, Identity, Truth and Value

626. Eric Willand

"Is there Ethical Knowledge?" in Southwestern Philosophical Review 14, 1998
"Advice and Moral Objectivity" in Philosophical Papers 29, 2000
"Good Advice and Rational Action" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 2000
"Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument" in Journal of Medical Ethics 26, 2000
"On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden" in Analysis 62, 2002

Smith has defended the practicality requirement: You are practically rational is you don't desire to do what you believe you have reason to do; while meeting objections by contending that practical reason is self effacing. Sometimes you should not believe you have reason to do what you in fact have reason to do. Suppose this is true. There can then plausibly be counterexamples to the PR: cases where you should desire to do what you in fact have reason to do but you should not believe you have reason to do it. EW's example is this: a couple with a declining sex life consult a marital therapist who wisely advises them to refrain from sex for a week. Believing (rationally but falsely) that they have reason to refrain from sex endows sex with all the attraction of the forbidden and reawakens their desire for it (which was the therapist's cunning plan all along). So they desire (rationally) to do what they in fact have reason to do (have sex) but (rationally) do not believe that they have reason to do it.

"Theories of Practical Reason" in Metaphilosophy 33, 2002

627. John T. Wilcox

"From "Is" to "Ought" Via Psychology" in Review of Metaphysics 18, 1964.

628. Hugh T. Wilder

"Practical Reason and the Logic of Imperatives" in Metaphilosophy 11, 1980.

629. Bernard Williams
"Ethical Consistency" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 39, 1965 and *Problems of the Self*

Classic paper on dilemmas. When beliefs conflict I want to find the wrong one and lose it, without residue or regret. When desires conflict things are different. BW argues here that moral conflicts are more akin in these respects to conflicts of desire in a way that is awkward for the cognitivist. We should not think of the "ought" judgement that is decided against as inapplicable or eliminated. Rather we should accept that sometimes we have Op and Oq where ~◊ (p & q), maintaining coherence by rejecting the agglomeration principle: Op & Oq → O(p & q).

"Consistency and Realism" in P.A.S.S. 40, 1966 and *Problems of the Self*


All normative reasons, argues BW, are internal reasons. More precisely, if some agent A has a normative reason to φ then a decision by A to φ can be reached by him via some sound deliberative route from the motivations he has in his actual subjective motivational set. By an internal reason, he means any normative reason which satisfies this condition - as he thinks all normative reasons must. By the agent's subjective motivational set, Williams means the set of his existing motives. By a sound deliberative route, he means not merely the correction of one's beliefs and sound means-end reasoning but also such things as: ascertaining how best to satisfy some element in one's set in the light of other elements; deciding which of conflicting elements one attaches most weight to; finding constitutive solutions - e.g. deciding what would make for entertainment given that that is what one wants; exercises of the imagination. The likes of brainwashing, hypnotism or deceit are ruled out. He argues that that to come to accept that I have a normative reason to φ is to acquire a motivating reason to φ. My accepting the normative reason claim can feature in an explanation of my subsequently φing. But he can make no sense of how accepting that I have an external reason might be supposed to motivate me.


"Ethics and the Fabric of the World" in Honderich, *Morality and Objectivity*

"The Scientific and the Ethical" in Brown, *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*


"The Structure of Hare's Theory" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

To say someone has a reason to j makes little sense unless it is possible for them to j for that reason. Hence it is obscure what reasons could be if they are not internal reasons in Williams sense. The constraints Williams places on what can count as sound deliberation reflect what an agent already has in his S and, so conceived, cannot without argument be extended to include moral and prudential constraints. Talk of blame, like talk of reasons, makes little sense unless the agent could have acted in the way she is blamed for failing to act. Hence it is unclear how we can sensibly blame those who lacked an internal reason for acting in the way we wish they had. The picture is complicated somewhat by the way blame, like advice, presents a consideration that contributes to what it is talking about. There is a degree of indeterminacy in when we may say someone has an internal reason and consequently in when someone is properly blamed but this is less a problem than a way the account is true to the phenomena, an intelligible obscurity. far to be preferred to the unintelligible mystery of externalism.

"Who Needs Ethical Knowledge?" in Griffiths, *Ethics and Making Sense of Humanity*


"Replies" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics.*

"Truth in Ethics" in *Ratio*, 1995

"History, Morality and the Test of Reflection" in Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*

630. Timothy Williamson

631. **Theo van Willigenburg**


632. **J. Wilson**

*Reason and Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)

633. **Peter Winch**

"The Universalizability of Moral Judgments" in *The Monist* 49, 1965


634. **Ludwig Wittgenstein**


635. **David Wong**


"Castaneda's theory of Deontic Meaning and Truth" in Tomberlin, Hector-Neri Castaneda


"Relativism" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*.

636. **Allen Wood**

*Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

637. **Michael Woods**


638. **Thomas E. Wren**


639. **Crispin Wright**


"Realism, Antiralis, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism" in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988, pp. 25-49.

*Truth and Objectivity* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1992)


640. **Darryl F. Wright**


641. **Georg Henrik von Wright**

*Norm and Action: A Logical Inquiry* (London: RKP, 1963)

"Is and Ought" in Bulygin, Gardies and Niiniluoto, *Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life*

"Is There a Logic of Norms?" in *Ratio Juris* 4, 1991
Concerns Blackburn's quasi-realist treatments of the Frege-Geach problem. Discussing the Hale-Wright objection that moral modus ponens on SB's account is not valid as a matter of logic, NZ argues that the issue is whether we are in a position to explain why our thought involving attitudes should have a causal structure that mimics our that of our thought involving beliefs. Given such an explanation, it would be no big deal if the obligation binding us to the causal transitions in question were not strictly logical. Worries NZ takes more seriously are: how the quasi-realist is to explain the sameness of meaning of ethical propositions in embedded and unembedded contexts and whether the sort of story SB tells about conditionals can be extended to other embedded contexts (propositional attitude contexts for example).

Zangwill argues, against Jackson, that moral platitudes will not help us bridge the fact-value gap. Because there are no moral platitudes. Those who disagree profoundly with our basic moral beliefs - those such as Herman Goring - are certainly mistaken but the mistake they perpetrate is not a conceptual mistake.

644. Paul Ziff

Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), especially chapter VI.

645. David Zimmerman

"Force and Sense" in Mind, 89, 1980
"The Force of Hypothetical Commitment" in Ethics 93, 1983
"Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity" in Copp and Zimmerman, Morality, Reason and Truth

646. Michael J. Zimmerman

The "Is-Ought": An Unnecessary Dualism" in Mind 1962.

647. Sidney Zink

"Warranted Judgments in Dewey's Theory of Valuation" in Philosophical Review 51, 1942.
"The Good as Harmony" in Philosophical Review 53, 1944.
"Methodological Guidance and Ethical Detachment" in Philosophical Review 61, 1952.
"Objectivism and Mr Hare's Language of Morals" in Mind, 1961
The Concepts of Ethics (New York: St Martin's Press, 1962)