

Sonderdrucke aus:

Jörg Hardy / George Rudebusch (eds.)

Ancient Ethics

V&R unipress

ISBN: 978-3-89971-972-7

Contents

Note on Conventions	5
Contributors	7
Jörg Hardy / George Rudebusch Ancient Ethics: Introduction	13
Eastern Traditions	
Lauren F. Pfister Classical Debates about the Moral Character of Human Nature in Ancient China	19
John Bussanich Ethics in Ancient India	33
Early Greek Thought	
Catherine Collobert Homeric Ethics: Fame and Prudence	57
Ruben Апресян Homeric Ethics: Prospective Tendencies	67
Plato	
Gerasimos Santas The Socratic Method and Ethics	85
Christopher Taylor The Ethics of Plato's <i>Apology</i>	107

Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith Socratic and Platonic Moral Psychology	121
Jörg Hardy Is Virtue Knowledge? Socratic Intellectualism reconsidered	141
George Rudebusch Knowledge Rules	171
May Sim The Divided Line and United <i>Psychê</i> in Plato's <i>Republic</i>	183
Mark L. McPherran Socrates and the Religious Dimension of Plato's Thought	197
Aristotle	
Mariana Anagnostopoulos Aristotle on the Nature and Acquisition of Virtue	215
Daniel C. Russell Deliberation and Phronesis in Aristotle's Ethics	227
Christopher Shields Goodness is Meant in Many Ways	243
Michael-Thomas Liske Bedeutet Aristoteles' <i>hexis</i> -Konzeption der Tugend eine ethisch-psychologische Determination?	259
Dorothea Frede Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der aristotelischen Tugendethik für das Leben	289
Hellenistic philosophy	
Julia Annas Ethics in Stoic Philosophy	309
Brad Inwood Moral Judgement in Seneca	333

Julie Piering	
Cynic Ethics: Lives Worth Examining	351
Plotinus	
Lloyd P. Gerson	
Being as Goodness	369
Sylvain Delcomminette	
Plotin et le problème de la fondation de la liberté	383
General Topics	
Christoph Halbig	
Die Einheit der Tugenden. Überlegungen zur Struktur eines Problems . . .	403
Wolfgang Detel	
Semantic Normativity and the Foundation of Ancient Ethics	425
Otfried Höffe	
Lebenskunst und Moral. Skizze einer Fundamentelethik	467
General Bibliography	479

Homeric Ethics: Prospective Tendencies

The *Iliad* starts with Homer's exclamation on Achilles' wrath: "The wrath sing, goddess, of Peleus' son, Achilles ...» (1, 1¹) – the wrath, which he is overtaken not in front of a battle with an enemy, but in a discord with Agamemnon, the King of Achaean kings and their military leader, because he arbitrarily decided to start repartition of prey degrading for Achilles.

However, at the last episode related to Achilles we discover him quite different. This episode is about a meeting with Priam, the King of Troy, who steals into Achilles' tents to get back for ransom the body of his beloved son Hector. Absolutely implacable until quite recently Achilles accepts Priam's supplication and shows amicability and careful regard for him.

Along with the epic narration Achilles is going through a *moral change* – from wrath to gracious compassion. This change occurs with one character, but inadmissibility of unbridled anger, anger in arbitrariness and the urgency of compassion is a dominating motif in both the *Iliad*, and the *Odyssey*. Achilles is in the focus of this emotional and communicative controversy.

Achilles' actions are by no means unusual either in the first episode, or in the second. And yet, his decisions in both cases are extraordinary. Achilles flew into a rage in a dispute with Agamemnon, because in violation of the existed order he decided to take away a lovely concubine Achilles had received in fair distribution of prey after a recent raid. Achilles rose against him and gave vent to his anger in drastic withdrawal from the battle. This decision jeopardized vast efforts attended by countless war losses, because without Achilles, and this had been definitely predicted sometime before, the Achaeans would not be able to take Troy. So, this decision doomed the Achaeans not only to trouble, but to numerous new sacrifices. As to Achilles he was willing to do everything possible to humiliate Agamemnon responsively to the caused disgrace.

Redemption of the body of a relative or friend perished in a battle was a common thing in the world of Homer, as well as a millennium later. The corpse of

1 Translations from Homer. *The Iliad*, tr. A. T. Murray, rev. W. F. Wyatt, Cambridge, Mass. 1999.

a fallen enemy, freed from the armor, was pulled off the battlefield in order to return for a ransom, or to dishonor. Priam did not just come with ransom, prostrated oneself before Achilles and begged him for mercy. This humble supplication was also a ritual act, which according to the standards of the Homeric society required to be positively responded. However, Achilles' favor towards Priam completely fell out of scope and internal logic of the situation – in particular configuration, taking into account the relationship of Achilles and Hector, and in general, making allowance the fact that Priam himself secretly appeared in Achilles' camp could be considered as a prey potentially much higher than the ransom he brought for his son's body.

Achilles acted partly in the logic of existed morals and partly in contradiction to them, completely relying on his own choice and his own will.

Still, Achilles' decisions and actions were neither unique, nor single. There are enough cases in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* positively echoing Achilles' decisions and actions proving the trends in value orientations, deeds, and relationship conjectured in the 'pleats' of the Homeric world.

In this chapter I would be interested to trace these trends, specifically those which were leading to the formation of the type of consciousness and social discipline later identified by philosophers in the terms of ethics and morality. Such presentation of the chapter's task makes clear that I consider the Homeric society as a society of *arising* morality. A different issue is how to distinguish in the Homeric ethos arising morality and what in this approach should be a subject matter for a researcher's consideration?

Method

The answer to this question depends upon a concept of morality a researcher relies on. The variety of research attitudes and thus interpretations of ethical or, broader, value-normative composition of the Homeric epic have been reflected quite well in the Homer studies of several recent decades. Since the 1950s value and ethical studies has been developed into a special, pretty impressive branch within Homer literature. Fundamental investigations by Moses Finley, John Ferguson, Arthur Adkins, Hugh Lloyd-Jones and others contributed a lot. Though one can trace different research programs in value-ethical studies in Homer, most of the authors have seen their task mainly in *reconstruction* of norms and values of the Homeric society (See Adkins 1965; Ferguson 1958; Finley 1977; Lloyd-Jones 1971; Yarkho 1963; Avanesov 2010).

Though the modern value and ethical studies in the Homeric epic have become more and more synthetic they are still different in methodology and the variety of approaches is determined by different scholarship background. Some

of them present purely literary analysis aimed to reconstruction of value or moral world of the Homeric epic as internally self-sufficient and concentrated in the *Iliad* and the *Odysseus* as great monuments of ancient literature. Other present a historical analysis aimed to detect in the text of the poems in relation to other literary sources and archaeological data the traces and evidence of existed mores and habits. Another approach presents a social-anthropological analysis based on the perception of the Homeric world as a particular socio-cultural formation comparable with typologically similar, though geographically and chronologically different societies. I remember warning expressed by a Russian classicists Victor Iarkho's pointed that the Homeric poems "should be understood as the masterpieces of their own time and the method of poetic depiction of reality [...] should be explained in terms [...] of the time, when they were created" (Iarkho 1962: 3). According to Iarkho it was inadmissible to introduce to an epic ideas and concepts emerged "at the later stages of cultural development" (Ibid.). However, one should take into consideration that we actually know very little about those times besides what we have been told by the epic itself.

Largely based on the results the Homer studies I am developing another research program aimed to restore an early genesis of moral forms at the level of behavioral and communicative practice. Morality is taken in a configuration known and familiar to the modern person of the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, though in a particular aspect of the content of decisions and actions (rather than forms of motivation and personal self-determination). This content is positively expressed in (a) refraining from causing unnecessary harm, (b) pursuit of justice, (c) benevolence, (d) cooperation, (e) friendly partnership, (f) thoughtful participation and negatively – in (a') indifference, (b') malevolence, (c') injustice, (d') destruction, (e') hostility, (f') ruthlessness. All these dispositions could be realized on different and not only categorical-imperative (in Kantian sense) basis. In terms of normativity this content is given in the Golden Rule, Lex Talionis, and the Commandment of Love as well as in derivative principles and rules. These principles and rules as such are absent in the texts of the Homeric epic. But they are present in them prospectively – in rudiment forms. Their identification is possible owing to a method of *conceptual explication of rudiment normative content*. I have already sampled this method in exploration the proto-forms of the Golden Rule thinking in different texts (See Apressyan 2009a, 2009b). The method is in an analysis of syncretic in their value-normative content and specifically conceptualized texts on the basis of modern ethical notions.

The proposed genealogical consideration is focused on dominant storylines of confrontation, firstly, between Achilles and Agamemnon, the King of Achaeans and, secondly, between Achilles and Hector, the military leader of

Toyans and Priam, his farther, the King of Troy. Although in one case we are talking about a fellow-companion and in the other about enemies, the value positive dynamics of these confrontations are basically similar and this very resemblance is ethically significant, indeed.

Discord and Reconciliation

The *Iliad* narration starts with the outbreak of hostility between Achilles and Agamemnon. The King of Achaeans is certainly guilty for this discord. He seems doubly responsible for what happened: by stubborn care of his own *timē*-honor he has caused untold disasters sent to Achaeans by Apollo and during the discussion of the possibility of getting rid of them struck a deep insult to Achilles, demanding redistribution of the loot. Still, the first words of Homer are on the Achilles' wrath and the innumerable sufferings he had brought the Achaeans. The injustices Agamemnon committed against Achilles actually touched Achilles only. Achilles' response aimed at Agamemnon touched everyone in the Achaean Army. Achilles' decision had its own terrible motive to humiliate Agamemnon as the King of kings and the leader of the Achaean army, to weaken Achaean army by his withdrawal and to bring it to the risk of "shameful ruin" (1, 341) to make all Achaeans understand Agamemnon's helplessness and feel necessity to approach Achilles with supplication to return to the battle.

Nestor, the oldest and most experienced among the Achaean kings well understands the fatal character of quarrel and the urgency of reconciliation. The quarrel has not erupted in its full measure while Nestor before the last accusations were hurled is trying to cool down leaders inflamed with emerging hostility. He encourages them to mutual indulgence, recognition of merits and reconciliation (1, 276). Nestor was not alone concerned with keeping peace between the Achaean leaders. Then, at the culmination point of the controversies, when Achilles in response to Agamemnon's another word bitter and painful for his *timē* is ready to grab the sword from its scabbard, Athene approaches him invisible to anyone else and on behalf of Hera translates Achilles her command: "But come, cease from strife, and do not grasp the sword with your hand. / With words indeed taunt him, telling him how it shall be" (210 – 211). Achilles, obeying without wrangling, leaves the sword in its scabbard, and continues a verbal duel with Agamemnon.² Though Athene could not stop the

2 The fact that Achilles was able to contain his anger and leave the sword in its scabbard, did not contradict his nature. In anger, he is awful (cf. 9, 426; 16, 654), but he is able to control his anger (22, 345 – 347). From different episodes one can conclude that he understands himself in a state of anger and depending on the circumstances allows himself to be given to it or not.

discord, she prevented bloodshed. And Nestor failed to gain reconciliation. However, the inadmissibility of discord and the need for restraint, mutual respect and the favor were definitely declared, and, in fact, entire subsequent epic narration confirmed the rightness of the wise elder's persuasion.

The flared up discord is really peculiar. Achilles is feeling deeply insulted and eager to punish Agamemnon to compensate himself. But his position is ambiguous. On the one hand, he became a victim of injustice, on the other hand, it was him, who initiated the discord. And breaking with Agamemnon he decides for himself the conditions of his possible return to the battle, one of which – Achaean's ignominious defeat – does not depend upon Agamemnon's will at all and even if does by its inner sense no way could be provided by him. Agamemnon's retribution is close. But at the same time, the events develop in a way, Achilles too had to pay for quarrel, for his unbridled anger, because of which it flared up, for his arrogant pride and stubbornness.

Achilles' stubbornness was in refusal to forget an insult and return to the battle to support the Achaeans, who were suffering in severe battles with the Trojans one defeat after another. He enjoyed observing Achaeans' troubles and imagining them appealing to him to return to the battle. Achilles continues persisting in his decisions even visited by an honorable embassy Agamemnon sent to him following Nestor's advise. The members of the embassy – the most respected kings Odysseus, Phoenix and Ajax – pass Achilles Agamemnon's proposal of "glorious gifts" (*apereisi' apoina*; 9, 121) in exchange to forgotten offences and return to the battle.

Agamemnon's gifts are indeed glorious, but Achilles rejects them suspecting Agamemnon in hidden desire to confirm his supreme status and thus to disparage Achilles. The conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles is aggravated by the fact that Agamemnon offering gifts and Achilles looking forward for the gifts see differently the nature and meaning of such compensation. Agamemnon was offering Achilles ransom-*apoina*. And this is what least suits Achilles: he expects reparation-*poinë*.³ Agamemnon's envoys feel well the ticklishness of the situation. But at the same time, Phoenix and Ajax act not only as envoys, but also as warriors – the recent cohorts of Achilles. They appeal to his fellow-feeling, mercy, compassion, and leniency for perishing under the pressure of the Trojans

3 The fundamental difference between these two types of compensation has been disclosed by Donna Wilson. General and functionally unspecified designation of transmitted good was the Greek word *dōra*. Both *apoina* and *poinë* may be translated as 'gift'. However, their semantics in the Homeric epic is more specific; they reflected different types of relations (see Donna 2002: 16). Thus in the conflict we are considering Agamemnon was offering *apoina*, though glorious, but did not wish anybody would think about it as reparation-*poinë* for Achilles. Such gifts Achilles could not accept because he was expecting reparation, which would have restored his honor and symbolized Agamemnon's recognition of his own wrong.

Achaean warriors, not tiring to reproach him for forgetting about the friendship for the insensibility of heart, for bringing “to fury the proud heart within him” (628 – 629) and for “a heart that is obdurate” (636 – 637). In order to touch the soul of Achilles Odysseus reminds him that his father, Peleus, seeing him on the battle admonished him to “curb thy proud spirit in thy breast, for gentle-mindedness is the better part; and withdraw thee from strife, contriver of mischief” (254 – 259). Phoenix, though in a somewhat different vein, also resorts to the theme of paternal care. Addressing Achilles as father⁴ Phoenix as a matter of fact repeats the Peleus’ admonition rendered by Odysseus: “Wherefore Achilles, do thou master thy proud spirit; / it beseemeth thee not to have a pitiless heart” (496 – 498). In other words, straightforward or for some clear pragmatic reasons either Odysseus, or Phoenix, or Ajax appeal to the sense of community, kinship, fellowship, point to the unacceptability of wrathfulness or arrogant pride in the relationship between friends and fellows, to the need of support them in trouble, and so forth. All of them, without saying a word, consider these arguments as the most powerful and by this way are trying to oppose resentment and bitterness suffered by Achilles because of unfairly trampled honor, a sense of community, kinship and co-fellowship.

The embassy comes to grief in the sense that it failed to realize the goal set before it by Agamemnon: to return Achilles to the battle offering him glorious gifts. But in general the envoys’ paraeneses do have consequences and appear to become a prerequisite (though not dominant) of changes in Achilles’ soul. As Samuel Basset emphasized, one of the undoubted success of the embassy was that Achilles refused the intention to leave the Achaeans and to sail back home, but left in the camp, even refraining until the time of the battle (Basset 2003: 201).

Meanwhile, Achilles’ disposition soon changed, because of a dramatic event for him. In a fierce battle in which Achilles himself equipped Patroclus heeding his persuasion, his friend was perished by the hands of Hector. Overwhelming Patroclus by a fatal blow, Hector captured the fallen armor Achilles had given to Patroclus for that very battle and vested in them. The news of the death of his friend that is what made Achilles to change his mind and return to battle. With the death of Patroclus Achilles comes to understanding that if no quarrel with Agamemnon, it could turn a different way: he would not have come out of the battle, Patroclus would not have appeared face to face with Hector, Achilles could help him, and not only him (18, 102 – 103). Just recently desiring the death of many Achaeans, Achilles, having lost his amiable friend, bitterly regrets not being able to protect Patroclus as well as many other Achaean warriors, his

4 On a role of fathers and farther analogy in the *Iliad* see Finlay 1980: 267 – 273.

recent companions.⁵ Through the death of Patroclus Achilles found commonality with those whom Patroclus had come out to defend and actually extended towards them the feelings he had in relation to his friend. With the death of Patroclus Achilles comes to understanding of how destructive was his quarrel with Agamemnon. Moreover, Achilles is condemned not only himself for the quarrel with Agamemnon, but damn *any* hostility, both among gods and among men, and anger, which generates it (18, 107 – 108). In measureless regret regarding Patroclus' death and completely determined to avenge him Achilles gets rid of his wrath toward Agamemnon and decides to reconcile.

Reconciliation with Agamemnon becomes a prelude to Achilles' return to the battle and its victorious fight with Hector, which radically changed the situation in the Trojan War.

Hatred and Condescension

However, Achilles is not relieved of anger. His soul is torn apart even greater anger – now against Hector who has slain Patroclus. Achilles is thirsty for revenge. And even if in the clash with Agamemnon his fellow in arms and the King over kings, it was not about the *proportionality* of retribution, then what to say on Achilles' retaliation to Hector for the blood spilled and the death of his friend?

Achilles's grief is understandable, and his desire to avenge for Patroclus is clear too. But Patroclus was killed in a battle. War is filled with the deaths of soldiers, thousands of soldiers. Patroclus is one of the war victims. But this is a tragic victim. But Patroclus joined the battle instead of Achilles, disguised as Achilles, as if replacing his friend. And before the battle, he begs Achilles in his armor certainly not because he has no his own, and not to show off. He wishes to look like Achilles, reasonably believing that the Trojans will take him for Achilles, stop fighting, and this will allow repelling them from the Achaean ships.

In the heat of the battle Patroclus delivers the Trojans blow by blow, hitting many soldiers and Sarpedon among them. Dying, he urges companion in arms to take revenge for himself. Hector enters into a battle with Patroclus, particularly being inclined to revenge for Sarpedon. A picture of Patroclus's death in some moments is very much similar to the death of Sarpedon (16, 559 – 561). The narratively mutual episodes indicate the essence of actions committed by heroes: they are reversible, they are reciprocal.

When Achilles "like a lion, a ravening lion" (20, 164 – 165) rushed in the

5 A little later Thetis will tell him: "Aye, verily, as thou sayest, my child, it is in truth no ill thing to ward utter destruction from thy comrades, that are hard beset" (18, 128 – 129).

battle, he directed primarily to a meet Hector strike him, but on his way he was hitting one after another numerous Trojans. Some of the Trojans fallen under Achilles' blows are mentioned by Homer by names, but many others fallen in Achilles' attack, which the poet compares with a terrible forest fire, have been left unknown. Achilles continues fighting, while in a deadly fight Hector himself was not struck by Achilles' decisive blow. These are not just particular episodes of individual fights in the battle. As a matter of fact a spiral of vendetta is unfolding in these episodes. Revenge for the killed fellow is a common thing, it is run either by Achaeans or by Trojans (13, 384; 402; 414; 446). Achilles was not the very one, who started it, and he was not the last one, who concluded it. Numerous participants of confrontation are reciprocal, often indirectly, and confidently respond evil for evil with single wish – *not to belittle* the damage *in response* to damage, but if possible, to exceed it.

However, the *reciprocity* between enemies may in exceptional cases be manifested in actions called to demonstrate the opposite relation to the enemy – the respect for his *timē*. In other words, along with reciprocity as a retribution-*nemēsis* there were possible different relationship of reciprocity in favor, even among enemies. Anyway, Hector admits it.

Coming out to the last personal battle with Achilles Hector proposes before starting fighting an agreement that the winner, whoever that was, does not dishonor the body of the vanquished one: “I will do unto thee no foul despite, if Zeus / grant me strength to outstay thee, and I take thy life; / but when I have stripped from thee thy glorious armour, / Achilles, I will give thy dead body back to the Achaeans; and so too do thou” (22, 252 – 259). Hector thus seems to be making some changes in the existing ethos of war and sets a new model of relations based on the specific type of reciprocity. There is no requirement, demand or expectation for the action. Hector enounces that in the case of his victory he will take the armor and will not dishonor the body. And only on the basis of this statement he expresses the expectation of similar conduct of Achilles if he were killed in the battle. By his proposal Hector tells, how he would like to be treated, and in the meantime he enounces that he will act in the same way – how he expects the other behaving towards him.

Hector's proposal is not a situational impromptu arose out of his incertitude in the result of the strike. He proposed the like idea a few days earlier, when in the middle of a suspended battle he invited someone from the Achaeans to come out to fight him one on one and offered almost the same: in case of a victory to take the trophy, and to return a body for a suitable burial (7, 76 – 86). Although this proposal is different in construction comparatively with the one suggested for Achilles – first he offers this model of behavior to the enemy, and then takes on the like commitments – in fact, it is identical to the above: Hector initiatively

proposes to arrange emerging relations according to a scheme that is different from the one habitual for the existing mores.

Apparently Hector does not represent a different ethos. He is a child of his time. In the confrontation with Achilles his proposal is situational. Even if it expresses the character of Hector, than only partly. Just the day before in the battle with Patroclus his behavior was absolutely ordinary: capturing the armor that had fallen from Patroclus, he was going to desecrate his body in a usual for that times manner (11, 125 – 127). But Hector and Patroclus had no prior agreement. And in general we do not know about other single case of the like proposal Hector made to his opponents. Achilles angrily rejects Hector's proposal (20, 253 – 267). This does not mean that Achilles is not capable of relating to the other *as to himself*. He is capable, but so far only if the other is a close friend, for instance, Patroclus (18, 81 – 82).

In a short fight Achilles delivers a deadly blow to Hector and triumphing revenge, previses him: "Thee shall dogs and birds rend in unseemly wise", but to Patroclus "shall the Achaeans give burial" (22, 336). Achilles rejects Hector's plea to return his body to the Trojans in exchange for a ransom more strongly than the agreement recently proposed by Hector. From defeated Hector Achilles tears armor returning of his own – the gift of Peleus. And Achaeans run up to the place of the fight, zealously strike their spears into the Hector's lifeless body as if continuing the act of retribution. This starts a series of actions taken by Achilles for the greatest possible humiliation of Hector in his death.

Owing to the gods' care Hector's body remains imperishable (23, 184 – 191), but this only aggravates the exorbitance of Achilles' outrage against Hector's body. Zeus lets Achilles know that he should leave the body of Hector in peace and sends Iris to tell Priam that he should go to Achilles with abundant ransom. And he adds about Achilles: "not without wisdom is he, neither without purpose, nor yet hardened in sin; / nay, with all kindness will he spare a suppliant man" (24, 157 – 158). Iris repeats the same words to Priam (186 – 187).

With the help of gods Priam steals into Achilles camp, and genuflected imploringly asks him to return Hector's body. Priam does not appeal to tradition, custom, or for patterns given by heroes. As an argument, he asks Achilles to remember his father Peleus and, therefore, to treat Priam as he himself would have to react to Peleus, were he in the same situation (24, 503 – 504). These words touch the heart of Achilles, who is, as we can see in a number of episodes, not strange to sympathy. Though Priam is the ruler of Trojans, his enemies, Achilles treats him like his father – he agrees to return Hector's body. Having accepted the gifts he entertains Priam and then puts him carefully on the night. Compassion

rather than ransom motivates Achilles to respond graciously to Priam's supplication⁶.

I find difficulty in sharing a view that Achilles agrees to return Hector's body, feeling guilty for outrage he committed Hector's body (See for example, Losev 1960: 97). This conclusion does not follow from the text of the poem. The guilt Achilles feels is only before Patroclus, that by the decision to return Hector's body, even for enormous ransom, and shared meal he as if would betray the memory Patroclus. I cannot accept a view that Achilles' conduct towards Priam "demonstrates a selfconscious abuse of the conventions of balanced reciprocity and an assertion of his own authority by means of generalized reciprocity" rather than altruism (Postlethwaite 1998: 93 – 94). No, Achilles is filled with compassion, which is caused by Priam's plea to treat him as his father. There is no reason to speak here about moral victory over Achilles of his enemies. The very situation, though localized in time, is such that hostility has been overcome – by genuflected Priam, his supplication to Achilles and by Achilles' own inclination. Though bent by Zeus, Achilles sincerely responds to Priam's plea, gives back Hector's body, and performs a series of actions that demonstrate not only his mercy, but also actual respect for Priam. As pointed out by Hektor Yan, in treatment of Priam Achilles behaved quite differently from what was expected by the heroic ethic of glory, honor, and the acquisition of the victories (See: Yan 2003: 24). It is suffice to compare the situation of Achilles and Priam (24, 509 – 512, 633) with the characteristics of friendship given by Aristotle (Aristotle, *EN* 1158a, 1) to understand that Achilles and Priam in this situation are friendly according the highest standards of classical Greece. It is obvious that Priam and Achilles are not equal, at least formally: while Priam is in a position of supplicant, kneeling, wick, he is, however, actually 'designates' the mode of behavior to Achilles – a strong, powerful, master of the situation. And this mode of behavior is the very one, which later would be enshrined in the formula of the Golden Rule.

Conclusions

The analysis of the epic plotlines of confrontation and reconciliation of Achilles, on the one hand, with Agamemnon and on the other hand, with Hector and Priam (in this case, confrontation and reconciliation are split in their personal focus), allows drawing some conclusions about the tendencies in the development of the archaic moral consciousness.

6 On supplication in Homer and, broader, Ancient Greek literature see Gould 1973, Naiden 2006.

First. The Homeric epic clearly insists on desirability of peace and undesirability of hostility. This thought largely trivial for the later developed moral systems is accentuated by Homer and passes through the *Iliad* as a single thread. Homer glorifies heroic warriors both, Achaeans and Trojans, but he never eulogizes the war. The descriptions of the Trojan War combats are expatiative and sometimes almost naturalistic detailed, but there is no admiration of fights, confrontation and hostility in these details. On the contrary, one can hear in the poem more than once the words of condemnation, direct or indirect, of discord and enmity.

To the igniting quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon Nestor responds not only trying to cool down the leaders and calling for their reconciliation, but also by admonition expressed in explicit universal modality: “A clanless, lawless, heartless man is he that loveth dread strife among his own folk” (9, 63 – 64). Here we can hear even double condemnation of discord: not only it is terrible in itself, but he, who is seduced by it and is ready to engage in it is inhumane. A similar condemnation we hear from Agamemnon’s lips, when in fierce altercation with Achilles he blames him “for always strife is dear to you, and wars and battles” (1,177). Internecine strife is not admitted. But enmity between strangers is also undesirable. The war is recognized as inadmissible in relations both between people and between nations. In bitter lamentations of Achilles over the death of Patroclus this thought is risen even to greater height: he curses every feud, both among gods and among men.

Second. The principle of retribution is fundamental for morality of the Homeric society. At that the reward is immediate and unrestricted. We have seen that all persuade Achilles to temper his anger, to cool down, to reconcile. But nobody, even Nestor, even Thetis and Athena, who often have given Achilles wise advises, do not blame him for redundancy response to injustice caused by Agamemnon. His anger and pride are excessive. But the measure of retribution is determined by Achilles according to his own feeling of the injury inflicted to him.

So, in the Homeric world we find a different ethos comparatively to the one we know from the Pentateuch. Here one can distinguish some hints of Lex Talionis (9, 613 – 615). But these resembling Lex Talionis features are a subordinate part of a different regulatory mechanism, namely, the mechanism of unmeasured revenge

Third. Although the principle of ‘evil for evil’ (specifically, unmeasured evil in response to committed evil) is common in the archaic Greek society, Homer describing the discord between Achilles and Agamemnon, in fact, cautions against the desire the other evil, particularly excessive *responsive* evil. Most notable in this regard are the words of Achilles recognized the loss of any sense of his reposal on Achaeans defeat, so far it turned into Patroclus’ death. With this

insight the story of his discord with Agamemnon is revealed in its deep ethical meaning. This meaning has not been purposefully articulated in the *Iliad*, much less it has become an occasion for didactic instruction.

However, not being formulated in the *Iliad* in *normative modality*, this meaning is revealed in a form of various maxims expressed on particular and partial occasions (14, 139, 141 – 142; 20, 250) and is implicitly present in epic, which by the very fact of its presentation played admonitory-moralistic role.

This moralistic theme – along the lines: *do not wish/cause evil and you will not suffer harm* – will be multiply rendered in the literature of different ancient peoples. Possibly it was present in the pre-Homeric epic tradition, which has not come down to us. However, from what we know, this is historically the earliest example of such narrative. And because the normative figures of this type are an essential intermediary link between the rule of reciprocity and the Golden Rule⁷, the presence of such narrative in the Homeric epic considering analytically the traced normative dynamics towards the Golden Rule should be recognized a fundamental fact for the epic as such and for historical genesis of moral consciousness.

Fourth. Retribution is a special case of a more general relationship, namely, reciprocity. Reciprocity is the dominant ethical orientation in the Homeric epics (See Zanker 1998: 73; Postlethwaite 1998: 105 – 126; Donlan 1982: 137 – 175). The relations of favor and benevolence like that, which Achilles demonstrated in his treatment of Priam are ethically the most significant, although partial, expression of reciprocity. Strictly speaking, the episode of the meeting of Priam and Achilles gives us a glimpse of a prototype of ‘the Golden rule’ in its behavioral and communicative, but normative version. Here is no rule as such, all the more, the Golden one, super-situationist or super-personal generalization of communicative experience. However, if we try to reconstruct the normative content of the emerging relationship, the latter is higher than just *quid pro quo* relation. We have here a kind of exteriorized Golden Rule. One can distinguish its varieties in Hector’s proposal to Achilles before the strike, as well as in Priam’s appeal to Achilles. Both cases present one’s attitude towards the other according to the pattern of other’s desired attitude towards oneself. But this relation is imaginary reciprocal. Its potential reciprocity is manifested in the kind of action Achilles committed in response to Priam’s plea and with full benevolence towards Priam.

Fifth. At the same time Achilles’ attitude toward Priam is by no means equal. According to the epic plot, Achilles knows that by perishing Hector he gives rise the foretold by gods prerequisite of his own death. In this sense this relation from

⁷ Logic of normative transition from Lex Talionis to the Golden Rule I reconstructed in (Apressyan 2002: 46 – 64).

the party of Achilles is higher than just an exchange of services or gifts. From the side of Priam we have a foretype of thinking in terms of the Golden Rule and from the side Achilles – an action in terms of *agapē*, generous mercy, the Commandment of Love. Achilles seems to be archetypical in this sense to ancient Greek mode of thinking. As Graham Zanker showed, disinterested, selfless behavior for the sake of others, usually relatives, one can easily see in various characters of Euripides and Sophocles. A theme of selfless behavior with reference to Achilles was touched by Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle (Zanker 1998: 76 – 77). In contrast to the later Christian ethics in Greek ethics the idea of *agapē* is often combined with the idea of *philia*. It is distinctive that in the Greek texts of classical period Achilles' self-sacrifice aimed to recover *timē* of fallen Patroclus is often presented as an example of selfless behavior. Meanwhile Achilles' treatment of genuflected Priam contradicting to adherence in friendship to the memory of Patroclus demonstrates a different pattern – benevolence to an alien and out of any hope for reciprocity⁸. According to Aristotle, such actions *inter alia* is an embodiment of the beauty and the noble, i. e. the good in itself, (Aristotle, *Rhet*, 1366a 33 – 34) namely, actions for the sake of others and not the one, who acts (Aristotle, *Rhet*, 1367a 4 – 5). As to benevolence Aristotle puts it more definitely in his *Ethics*, where it is limited by actions in relation towards ours – mainly friends. Achilles' behavior during the meeting with Priam falls out of this logic. Zanker pointing to extraordinary character of Achilles' behavior in the context of the *Iliad* (and, should be added, classical Greek thought till the Stoics) finds only one analogy to this episode, namely, the parable of the Good Samaritan, in which the beneficence was committed by a complete alien (Zanker 1998: 81).

Thus understood this episode leads to the conclusion regarding perhaps the highest ethical standard in the archaic moral thinking. But this conclusion must be limited in view of two conditions inherent to this very episode and the archaic thinking in general. First, the supposed scenario of thinking and behavior of Priam and Achilles not only heterogeneous in content (one actualizes the logic of the Golden Rule, the other – the Commandment of Love), but they are also different in reflective statuses of Priam and Achilles. The position of the former is reflexive, moreover, it is doubly reflexive (22, 419 – 420) and, hence, perhaps, is principled, too; but Achilles is just kindly sympathetic and generous and we can only guess regarding ethical reflexivity of the actions he commits. Second, neither the one nor the other position has not been generalized by the very agents – the participants of communication, or by gods or through gods, or by the epic poet himself and thus has not been brought up to the level a standard.

8 For the role of *eleos*-pity in warrior society and specifically the *eleos* motif in the plot of Priam's supplication see Crotty 1994.

This makes the episode essentially different from the parable of the Good Samaritan, which albeit is a narrative, but the narrative, which was originally built with admonitory purpose, with the possibility of prescriptive conclusion that seamlessly woven into the general normative context and the conceptual composition of the *Gospel of Luke*.

Sixth. Archaic moral consciousness that is the kind of moral consciousness revealed to us in the Homeric world is non-normative. And yet, it is intrinsically imperative. It is advisable to distinguish between a prescriptive function that performs some text (written or oral), and the ways in which it occurs. The moral imperativeness does not always function in normative form, i. e. being executed in the form of objective, or super-personal, universal, or addressed to all rules. It may be manifested in the form of a reaction to another person – through adaptation to the other, including the overcoming confrontation with the other. An epic singer is not the only one who acts as a ‘locutionary source’ of epic imperativeness. Epic is filled by imperativeness also at the level of particular narratives. Epic poet does not moralize, but epic characters – gods, heroes, noblemen-*agathoi* – constantly enounce addressing each other value and imperative (in its broadest sense, not specifically moral) judgments, expressing expectations, recollecting the past experience, recalling the existing traditions, giving examples of worthy deeds of great men. The imperativeness of archaic moral thinking is of narratively-situational nature, most judgments about what is preferred, expected or seemed appropriate are expressed regarding individual cases. Double-level nature of epic imperativeness – inner-epic and super-epic – reflects in its own way the structure of morality as such, presented, on the one hand, in a form of direct communicative reactions, and on the other – in a form of universalizable and rational norms. This is not directly related to the moral change in Achilles. But the mere fact of such character of epic imperativeness certifies ‘embryonic’ integrity of the Homeric morality, without which the representation and description of such moral change would be impossible.

References

- Adkins A. 1965. *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, Oxford.
- Apressyan R. 2002. “Talion and the Golden Rule: A Critical Analysis of Associated Contexts” (Translated by James E. Walker), in: *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 41, No. 1: 46 – 64.
- Apressyan R. 2009a. “Zolotoe pravilo v etike Aristotelia” (“The Golden Rule in Aristotle’s Ethics”), in: *Filosofia i etika (Philosophy and Ethics)*, Moscow, Alfa-M: 157 – 170;
- Apressyan R. 2009b. “Nastavlenia i istoria Ahikara” (“The Story and Precepts of Ahikar”), in: *Suschnost i slovo (The Essence and the Word)*, Moscow: 96 – 114.

- Aristotle 1991. *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, Newly translated with Introduction, Notes, and Appendixes by George A. Kennedy*, New York; Oxford.
- Aristotle 2000, *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translated and Edited by Roger Crisp*, Cambridge.
- Avanesov S. 2010. "Aksiologicheskie motivy v poemah Gomera" ("Value Motives in the Homeric epic"), in: *ΣΧΟΛΗ: Filosofskoe antikovedenie i klassicheskaya traditsia (ΣΧΟΛΗ: Classical Studies in Philosophy and Classical Tradition)*, [Yekaterinburh, Russia], 4. Issue. 2: 260 – 290.
- Bassett S. E. 2003. *The Poetry of Homer*, new ed. With an introd. by Bruce Heiden, Lanham et. al.
- Crotty K. 1994. *The Poetics of Supplication: Homer's Iliad and Odyssey*, Ithaca.
- Donlan W. 1982. "Reciprocities in Homer", in: *The Classical World* 75 No. 3: 137 – 175.
- Ferguson J. 1958. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*, London.
- Finlay R. 1980. "Patroklos, Achilleus, and Peleus: Fathers and Sons in the «Iliad»", in: *The Classical World* 73, No. 5: 267 – 273.
- Finley M. 1977. *The World of Odysseus*, [1956], 2nd ed., London.
- Gould J. 1973. "HIKETEIA", in: *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 93.
- Homer 1999. *Homer, Iliad, Translated by Augustus T. Murray*, Cambridge, Mass.
- Iarkho V. 1962. "Vina i otvetstvennost s gomerovskom epose" ("Guilt and responsibility in the Homeric epic ", in: *Vestnik drevney istorii (Bulletin of Ancient History)*, [Moscow, Russia] 2: 18 – 22.
- Iarkho V. 1963. "Problema otvetstvennosti i vnutrenniy mir homerovskogo cheloveka" ("The Problem of Responsibility and the Inner World of the Homeric Man"), in: *Vestnik drevney istorii (Bulletin of Ancient History)*, [Moscow, Russia], 2: 46 – 64.
- Lloyd-Jones H. 1971. *The Justice of Zeus*, Berkeley.
- Losev A. 1960. *Gomer (Homer)*, Moscow.
- Naiden F. 2006. *Ancient Supplication*, Oxford.
- Postlethwaite N. 1998. "Akhilleus and Agamemnon: Generalized Reciprocity", in: / C. Gill, / N. Postlethwaite / R. Seaford (eds.), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, Oxford: 93 – 104.
- Wilson D. 2002. *Ransom, Revenge, and Heroic Identity in the Iliad*, Cambridge.
- Yan H. 2003. "Morality and Virtue in Poetry and Philosophy: A Reading of Homer's Iliad XXIV", in: *Humanitas* 16, No.1: 24.
- Zanker G. 1998. "Beyond Reciprocity: The Akhilleus-Priam Scene in Iliad 24", in: C. Gill, / N. Postlethwaite / R. Seaford (eds.), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, Oxford: 73 – 92.