R.L. Holmes
THE DEATH PENALTY

1. What is punishment? Our concern is with punishment as an institutionalized practice in society. As such it may be defined as follows:

PUNISHMENT: The premeditated infliction of prescribed pain, deprivation, or death upon persons for perceived offenses by them or persons associated with them.

As such, punishment is distinguished from revenge, which is retaliation for injury or wrong received (by oneself or those one identifies with). Revenge may be a measured retaliation, but it need not (one may inflict greater harm than received). Revenge is distinguished from Lex Talionis, measured or proportionate retaliation in kind for harm or injury received ("An eye for an eye…" Leviticus ).

2. Punishment is usually justified either on consequentialist or retributivist grounds. The consequentialist grounds are forward looking, the retributivist grounds backward looking.

The typical consequentialist justification of societal punishment is that it promotes a social good, namely, deterrence of similar offenses by others. But consequentialist justifications may appeal to the promotion of a good for the victims of crime or for the offenders themselves, as Plato did.

Consequentialist Justifications:
1. The good of society
2. The good of victims
3. The good of offenders

Retributivist theories justify punishment by appeal to the nature of the offense, or the character of the offender, or both, irrespective of the consequences of the punishment. Thus, the heinousness of a crime, or the evil or malicious nature of the offender, might be taken to require punishment. Hegel thought the death penalty showed respect for the offender as a rational being by holding him accountable for what he had done.

3. Can the death penalty be justified on grounds of deterrence? Deterrence is causing people to refrain from something because of the expected retaliation. It presupposes, that but for the expected retaliation, persons would perform the act in question. Problem: it is difficult to know whether the death penalty deters in this sense (though we can know that the death penalty fails to deter every times there is a murder).

4. Can the death penalty be justified on retributive grounds? We can know whether crimes are heinous. It is less easy to be certain of the character of those committing the crimes. Problem: The possibility of penitence (a moral good) must be weighed against the retributivist goods of accountability and respect for rational beings.

Readings: Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty (eds.), Social Ethics, 6th ed.(McGraw Hill), Chapter 3.