Admittedly the debate around GMOs is complex and raises concerns from many quarters worldwide. Ethical aspects play a major role in the evaluation of how one should deal with this issue. With ethics being influenced by cultural and religious factors, the debate does not get any easier. It is therefore with satisfaction that I can register a number of points of agreement with the previous speaker. These are in particular:
In spite of this basic agreement, I see the need to stress a number of points that the speaker may have overlooked or that he sees differently. My first point concerns the ethical responsibility to deal with scientific uncertainty:
We need to make the scientific uncertainties around GMOs explicit to all decision makers. These uncertainties relate both to the lack of knowledge and to the inherent uncertainties of complex natural systems, including their use in the socio-economic context. Therefore we need to employ an adequate framework to represent scientific uncertainty. Frameworks to this effect have been worked out in the recent past. In this respect I want to recommend for instance the following contribution: Walker, W.E., Harremoes, P. et al. (2003) ”Defining uncertainty: A conceptual basis for uncertainty management in model-based decision support” Integrated Assessment 4 (1), 5-17.
Furthermore, since GMOs so far are beset with major uncertainties, we have to consider applying the Precautionary Principle. It is a major misconception that this principle implies a total ban or a moratorium of an activity. There are a number of precautionary strategies that may be adequate, depending on the case at hand. A new definition of the Precautionary Principle and a discussion of its use can be expected in a forthcoming COMEST report on the subject. The major point in this discussion is that the Precautionary Principle provides for a way of dealing with scientific and technological uncertainties in an ethically responsible manner.
My next point concerns intrinsic concerns about biotechnology. While I agree that extrinsic concerns in the long run may be more important than intrinsic concerns, this does not relieve us from the duty to deal with these existing concerns in a responsible manner.
Intrinsic concerns about GMOs come traditionally in a variety of forms, some of them more based on religious beliefs, some of them more based on secular ideas. Typical intrinsic arguments are e.g.:
I happen to believe that all of these concerns face grave difficulties as soon as one tries to spell out the moral argument behind. I think it is more or less impossible to back them up by rational argument. There are several reasons for this. One reason is that even from a religious point the argument is not straightforward. Different religions see this issue differently, and even from within the tradition of Christianity there are many arguments to the contrary. Another reason is that these intrinsic concerns, once they are spelled out in greater detail, fail to address GMOs exclusively, but instead they seem to affect a great variety of activities that people in general evaluate as morally acceptable, e.g. common breeding practices. In other words, if one is clear on what the intrinsic concerns really are, then one also has to accept to condemn a lot of other human activities, like ordinary agriculture or health care, as likewise problematic from a moral point of view.
However, even if we cannot in general accept these concerns as rational arguments, we cannot simply overlook as irrelevant the strength with which they are felt by some people. Ethics demands a basic respect for people who feel and think differently from us. From this there are two very clear conclusions:
My third point concerns the need for transparency and independent expertise:
If one looks at some current debates about GMOs, what one often finds is a problem of getting good and reliable information. The information one gets is often biased in the one or other direction, and is often incomplete. Some information seems well guarded and intellectual property rights contribute to strong tendencies of secrecy around GMOs. From an ethical point of view, incomplete and biased information paves the way to bad moral judgement and decision making. Wise governance includes participatory processes of stakeholders and the public, but as long as information is unreliable such processes cannot be credible and cannot result in socially robust policies.
As a fourth point I want to raise a question about public surveys. There are indeed a number of surveys, like e.g. the Eurobarometer, that screen public attitudes to genetic engineering and GMOs. Many of these seem indeed to show that people have worries of an intrinsic kind. But it is far too easy to conclude from this that people are technophobic or in principle opposed to technological progress. When one engages people in consultation processes where there is opportunity for argumentation and where their voice is heard, one will often experience that people do not want trust mere gut-feelings and reject a new technology out of hand. Rather they question the framing of the issue at stake and they want to make sure that a technology by and large is put to a good end. They ask: is this really a benefit to mankind? Or: does this really contribute to a good life? Thus, I believe that many people tend to turn from mere intrinsic to extrinsic concerns provided that general ethical questions about the qualities of life are included.
As a final point I want to say something about the concrete difficulties in coming up with good assessments of GMOs. If some of the above points are correct, then we need to be explicit about the ethical aspects of GMOs. Ethics should then become an integral part of our standard assessments of GMOs and our laws and regulations need to reflect this. Yet, how can this be done? Can ethics really be made a part of a regulatory framework, given its plurality of viewpoints and theoretical approaches? I do not claim that there are "objective" ways to go about to find the best ethical outcome. I believe there will always be an element of judgement involved. But ethics can still be explored in a way that would bring out all or most of the relevant ethical concerns so that the final decision making will at least be well informed about the ethics involved in an issue like GMOs. Recently an expert consultation of the WHO/FAO on the safety assessments of foods derived from genetically modified animals, including fish (Rome 17-21 November 2003; ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/y5316E/y5316E00.pdf ) concluded in a similar vein.
One such tool is e.g. the ethical matrix that was developed by Ben Mepham (1996) and presented in the above expert consultation. An example of such a matrix may look like this in its initial stage:
| Ethical matrix for gm fish | Do not do harm | Do good / provide benefit | Respect dignity / autonomy | Justice / fairness |
| Small producers | Dependence on nature and corporations | Adequate income and work security | Freedom to adopt or not to adopt | Fair treatment in trade |
| consumers | Safe food | Nutritional quality | Respect for consumer choice/labels | General affordability of product |
| Treated fish | Proper animal welfare | Improved disease resistance | Behavioral freedom | Respect for natural capacities |
| biota | Pollution and strain on natural resources | Increasing sustainability | Maintenance of biodiversity | No additional strain on resources |
One can then in a next step evaluate how a given technology affects all of these specified concerns concretely. The ethical matrix approach has been tried out in many different settings (see e.g. Kaiser and Forsberg 2000) and is a promising tool for including ethical aspects in our assessments of new technologies. The debate around GMOs might profit from utilising such a tool.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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References:
Kaiser, M. & Forsberg, E.M. 2000: Assessing fisheries – Using an ethical matrix in a participatory process, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 14, 91-200
Mepham T B 1996: Ethical analysis of food biotechnologies: an evaluative framework, in Food Ethics, edited by T B Mepham, Routledge, London. pp. 101-119