Mr. Suhkit Phaosavasdi in the concluding section of his paper appeals the COMEST to “try its best to persuade people to think and constantly behave ethically to animals”. From moral point of view this sounds absolutely clear: there is no doubt that humans should in principle treat animals ethically. But what does ethical treatment mean regarding human attitude towards animals?
The answer to this question given in the paper is not quite clear for me. From one side, Mr. Phaosavasdi points out that “we treat animals” in a way slaves were treated in the past. Being developed this statement could lead us to a conception proclaimed by Peter Singer in his famous essay “All Animals are Equal” published in a book with symbolic title Animal Rights and Human Obligations (2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, entice Hall, 1989). According to Peter Singer animals have a right for equal respect. Mr. Phaosavasdi distinguishes animal slavery in various phenomena of using or exploiting (as Peter Singer would strongly call it) animals:
- pets for pleasure
- dogs as watchdogs
- animals for food
- hunting as business
- research
- entertainment
- transportation
- biomaterial
- agriculture
- etc.
But from another side, Mr. Phaosavasdi reasonably accepts laboratory animal research and recognizes the danger of numerous diseases caused by animals. SARS andBird Flu are mentioned as the most impressic\ve examples.
Peter Singer is more consistent. He refers to a criterion proposed by Jeremy Bentham. This is a criterion of “capacity for suffering – or more strictly for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness. A species’ capacity according Singer following Bentham is a sufficient criterion for recognizing a species’ right to be treated equally in the sense like humans are treated. And later Singer adds: “If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment, or happiness then is nothing to be taken into account”. He gives an example of a stone: “” A stone does not have interest because it cannot suffer”.
May be stone cannot suffer. We don’t know. But what do we know about bacteria, plants, insects? De we exactly know that they do not suffer? What ever do we know about their feeling of satisfaction and dissatisfaction? Speculatively reasoning I would assume that any creature, including plants, with a function for reproduction has its own positive and negative reactions to external influences which could be interpreted in analogy with suffering and happiness.
So, to be consistent starting talking about the rights of animals we one should continue with the rights of any living creature.
Do you remember the title of the book, where Peter Singer’s essay appeared - Animal Rights and Human Obligations. The mode od such thinking is clear: every any right should have corresponfing obligation and no right without obligation. Two approaches in thinking about rights and duties are known. According to conservative approach, one’s rights correspond to one’s obligations. According to liberal approach one’s rights correspond to other’s obligation and partly guaranteed by one’s obligations corresponding to other’s rights.
It is clear that the right-obligation model in regard to human – animal relation should be different. There is no animal mutuality in human – obligation relations and, hence, no equity in moral sense, at least so far moral equity in its most simple form is set up by the Golden Rule (Treat the others as you wish they treat your).
I would like to put the initial issue in another way. I shared earlier my uncertainty about the substantial meaning of the requirement to treat animals ethically. What ethical language should we speak? It is not correct to consider morality as a homogeneous phenomenon with unified language, for instance the language of rights and obligations, equity, justice and mutuality. Peter Singer consider human attitude towards animals as unequal to them as a kind of prejudice. Referring to this I would consider as another prejudice a reduction of morality to equity and the limited variety of moral languages to the language of rights.
I will give you two examples from the history of ideas. One example is from a philosopher scarcely known here. I mean the most eminent Russian philosopher of the 19th century Vladimir Soloviev. In his treaty, Justification of the Good, actually of more than 800 pages he argued that there were three types of moral relation: a) towards inferior, b) towards equal, c) towards superior. We can find such types of relation between humans, but most typically they can be revealed in one’s attitude towards animals (inferior), towards humans (equal), and towards supreme power (superior). Vladimir Soloviev gave a profound justification of ethically just attitude towards animals but as inferiors.
Another example is Kohlberg–Gilligan antithesis. Lawrence Kohlberg (now late) is an American psychologist known for his research on moral development and his stage theory of moral development, justice and rights. In the 1970s Carol Gilligan worked with Kohlberg and applied his theory to the research of moral development of girls. Owing to her study of moral consciousness of girls and then women by the method of personal interview, she explored quite different value universe, which didn’t fit Kohlberg’ conception of morality. She published the results of her research in 1982 in her most famous book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, which became a starting point for a so called “difference feminism”. She argued there that women morality is based on the concept of or care and unilateral giving, rather than right, justice, and mutuality. The like views were later developed by another American political scientist Sara Ruddick in her book, Maternal Thinking: Towards A Politics Of Peace (1986). She also argued for another kind of morality demonstrated by maternal paradigm of ethical thinking.
Now I have no enough time to apply this approach to our issue, but I want to stress the mere possibility of different modes of moral thinking and, hence, discussing the normative basis of human relation towards animals.
Out of the distinction between masculine and feminine moralities I would highlight the following basing features of morality and what could be considered as an appropriate interpretation of Mr. Phaosavasdi proposal to the COMEST to “try its best to persuade people to think and constantly behave ethically to animals”. To put it in simple way there are actually three level of moral attitudes and moral relation, which may be expressed in three principles:
1) Do not cause harm to others, do not hurt others (what means do not oppress others’ needs and interests).
2) Respect others (what means consider their needs and interests).
3) Take care of others (what means help others, promote and contribute their needs and interests).
The first principle is a minimal condition for being moral and it is the most obligatory. To take care of others is the highest principle (regarding treating others) and at the same time it is the less obligatory.
The first principle is the most universal. It is not absolute, but not fully impartial. Just compare Mother’s care towards her child and employer’s care towards her/his employee. And, then, compare the care realized towards human with the care realized towards any living creature.
I have to leave out of my discussion many important arguments. Some of them were proposed yesterday during the discussion on environmental ethics. I completely agree with Professor de Silva from Brazil, by the way he is a Professor of Parasitology. His yesterday argument has significant moral consequences specifically that hierarchy is needed in human relation towards animals and there is actually no room for equality among living creatures in human attitude.