

Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft 69



THE
ARCHITECTURE OF
THE COSMOS

ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR
NEW PERSPECTIVES

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The Architecture of the Cosmos

St Maximus the Confessor
New Perspectives

Edited by
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with the collaboration of
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Contents

Acknowledgements 7

Contributors..... 8

ANTOINE LÉVY, OP

A polycentric introduction 11

Chapter One: Contextualization

PETER VAN DEUN

Building the Architecture of the Cosmos: the Maximian Bricks..... 27

CHRISTIAN BOUDIGNON

Pseudo-Macarius as source of the *Mystagogy* of Maximus
the Confessor..... 39

Chapter Two: Philosophical Approaches

CHRISTOPHE ERISMANN

Maximus the Confessor on the logical dimension of the
structure of reality..... 51

TORSTEIN THEODOR TOLLEFSEN

The Concept of the Universal in the Philosophy of St Maximus 70

VALERY V. PETROFF

Ἐπίστωμι and ὑπίστωμι in Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua* 93

GRIGORY BENEVICH

Maximus Confessor's teaching on God's Providence..... 123

PASCAL MUELLER-JOURDAN The Metaphysical Position of the Divine as ‘Desirable’ in Proclus’ <i>Platonic Theology</i> and Maximus Confessor’s Thought.....	141
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Chapter Three: Theological Approaches

ANTOINE LÉVY, OP Γωνία: Looking into the Corners of St Maximus’ Cosmic Architecture.....	153
NIKOLAOS LOUDOVIKOS Acting Upon God: Maximus the Confessor’s Eucharistic Gnosiology.....	175
VLADIMIR CVETKOVIĆ The Mystery of Christ as Revived Logos Theology.....	189
ISTVÁN PERCZEL St Maximus on the Lord’s Prayer: An Inquiry into his relationship to the Origenist tradition	221
PAULI ANNALA From the Exterior to the Interior, and Beyond: Spiritual Topography in St Maximus’ <i>Mystagogia</i>	279

Chapter Four: Modern Approaches

ALEXEI V. NESTERUK The Sense of the Universe: St Maximus the Confessor and Theological Consummation of Modern Cosmology.....	298
<i>Bibliography</i>	345
<i>Auctores antiqui</i>	348

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Ὑπάρχω and ὑφίστημι in Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua**

VALERY V. PETROFF

Maximus the Confessor composed two works dedicated to the interpretation of difficult passages (ἄπορα) in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory of Nazianzus¹: the earlier collection of ἄπορα (628–630) is entitled *On various difficulties to John* (περὶ διαφόρων ἀπόρων πρὸς Ἰωάννην, 1061–1418), and the second collection, finished in 634 (or somewhat later) is named *On various difficulties to Thomas* (περὶ διαφόρων ἀπόρων πρὸς Θωμᾶν, 1031–1060)². Maximus' Ἄπορα or *Ambigua* are chosen for examination since, on the one hand, this is one of the most important of his works and, on the other hand, it is extremely rich in theological and metaphysical ideas.

1. ΥΠΑΡΧΩ

Let's examine the way Maximus applies ὑπάρχω to various levels of ontological hierarchy. The derivatives of ὑπάρχω occur in the *Difficulties* almost 200 times, and all of these instances have been analysed in our study. The verb is applied to all modes of being and often has no ontological meaning at all serving as a syntactic copula in a sentence. However, in most cases it carries theological and philosophical meaning.

* Editors note: In this article the numeration of *Ambigua* differs from the other contributions. However, the passages referred to can be easily accessed through passus numeration in *PG*.

¹ Maximus' works are cited in the translations of A. Louth, J. Lollar, P. M. Blowers and R. L. Wilken. If the translator's name is not indicated, the translation is mine.

² On the title, division and composition of the *Ambigua* see JANSSENS 2003, 281–286; PETROFF 2005, 47–49; PETROFF 2007b, 126–129; BENEVICH 2007, 111–117. Complete Russian translation of all the *Ambigua* and the *Second Letter to Thomas* see in ISPOVEDNIK 2006.

1.1. *God in general*: God is above the being itself (ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι), he is beyond everything (ἐπέκεινα).³ On the other hand, it is impossible for God not to be,⁴ although he exists (ὑπάρχων) before the being of particular beings (τὰ ὄντα).⁵ There is a significant lexical detail: Maximus never speaks of προῦπαρξις in application to God: this term is reserved for the discussions on the pre-existence of the *logoi* or the souls.⁶ The opposition God / the created world finds its correspondence in a lexical pair ὑπάρχω / ὑφίστημι: “[God]... who exists (ὑπάρχων) above every nature, distributed the hypostasis of [all] beings according to each species”.⁷

Maximus uses ὑπαρξις in application to God in epistemological context too. This tradition goes back to Philo of Alexandria who had recourse to the Aristotelian distinction between the knowing that something exists (ὄτι ἔστι) and knowing what it is (τί ἐστι).⁸ According to Philo, it is impossible to pursue investigations into God’s essence or distinctive qualities (ὡς περὶ οὐσίας ἢ ποιότητος ζητεῖν).⁹ One can only learn (καταμαθεῖν) that there is and actually exists (ἔστι τε καὶ ὑπάρχει) the Cause of all things. God is incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος) by direct and immediate intuition (προσβολή), which could reveal what kind of being he is (οἷος ἦν). But he is known indirectly, by means of observation of the powers that are

³ *Amb. Io.* 5, 1180B: τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μόνου, τοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι κυρίως ὑπάρχοντος; *Amb. Io.* 5, 1188D: εἷς... Θεὸς... πάσης ἀπειρίας ὑπάρχων ἐπέκεινα.

⁴ *Amb. Io.* 24, 1273A: τοῦ ἀνυπάρκτου εἶναι.

⁵ *Amb. Io.* 13, 1233BC: Θεὸν... πρὶν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὑπάρχων.

⁶ Cp. *Amb. Io.* 10, 1220C: τὴν προῦπαρξιν τῶν ψυχῶν; *Amb. Io.* 37, 1329A: πάντων οὖν τῶν κατ’ οὐσίαν ὑπαρκτικῶς ὄντων... ἐν τῷ Θεῷ προῦπαρχοῦσι γαγίως ὄντες οἱ λόγοι.

⁷ *Amb. Io.* 36, 1277B: διορίσας καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶδος τὴν τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασιν, ὑπὲρ φύσιν... ὑπάρχων.

⁸ ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* II, 1, 89 b 24–35: “We seek four things: the fact (τὸ ὄτι), the reason why (τὸ διότι), if something is (εἰ ἔστι), what something is (τί ἐστίν)... We seek... if a centaur or a god is or is not. I mean if one is or is not simpliciter (ἀπλῶς) and not if one is white or not. And having come to know that it is (ὄτι ἔστι), we seek what it is (τί ἐστι), e.g.: Then what is a god? or What is a man?” (tr. Barnes). See PÉPIN 1994, 71.

⁹ PHILO ALEXANDRINUS, *Quod Deus sit immutabilis* 62, 4: “But [God] is not even comprehensible by the intellect, except the fact only that he is (κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον); for his existence (ὑπαρξις), indeed, is a fact which we do comprehend concerning him, but beyond the fact of his existence (ὑπάρξεως), we can understand nothing” (tr. Yonge, slightly modified). Cf. PHILO ALEXANDRINUS, *De opif. mundi* 170: “Moses teaches us... that the Divinity has a real being and existence (ἔστι καὶ ὑπάρχει)” (tr. Yonge).

subsequent to him and follow him: they do not declare his essence but reveal his existence (ὑπαρξιν) through the works accomplished by him.¹⁰

Maximus the Confessor follows in this approach:

He [Gregory of Nazianzus] did not say that... the [divine] nature we are speaking about... is incomprehensible in relation to its *existence* (ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει), but [he insisted on the impossibility to know] what exists (τί ὑπάρχει)... There is a great difference between believing that something exists and the exact knowledge that comprehends this essence.¹¹

Maximus went even further expanding the concept of incomprehensibility of essence to the created world as a whole, arguing that the creature is ignorant not only of what is related to God's essence but also has no knowledge of the essence of created things, be it its own essence or the essence of some other creature.¹²

1.2. *The divine Trinity*: When Maximus speaks of God not in general but more specifically, discussing the divine Trinity, he writes about the three modes (τρόποι) of its subsistence.¹³ In application to the pair “divine essence / divine hypostases” the ὑπαρξις signifies being in general, while hypostatic differentiation related to the transition from the essence to the

¹⁰ PHILO ALEXANDRINUS, *De posteritate Caini*, 167–169.

¹¹ *Amb.Io.* 12, 1229C: Οὐκ ἔφην ἄληπτον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν φύσιν, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος, ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὶ ὑπάρχει... πολλὴ πρόσεστιν ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι περὶ τίνος ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀκριβῆ τῆς οὐσίαςτούτου κατάληψιν. Cf. *Amb.Io.* 13, 1233A: εἶναι μὲν καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Θεῖον, τὶ δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν μηεἰδέναι; *Amb.Io.* 29, 1288B: Ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τουτέστι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, ὁ Θεὸς οὐδέποτε τι ὑπάρχων γινώσκεται; *Amb.Io.* 12, 1229C: [φύσιν] ἄληπτον... εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπαρξιν.

¹² *Q. Thal.* LX, 120–130: Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἑαυτὸ τὸ παράπαν ἢ ἄλλο γινώσκει ὁ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τὴν πρόγνωσιν, πλην τοῦ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα θεοῦ, τοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν γινώσκοντος ὃ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεποιημένων καιρὶν γενέσθαι προεγνωκότος τὴν ὑπαρξιν, καὶ μέλλοντος κατὰ χάριν φιλοτιμείσθαι τοῖς οὐσι τὴν ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων ὃ τιποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι γνῶσιν καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ μονοειδῶς προόντας τῆς αὐτῶν γενέσεως φανερωῖσαι λόγους.

¹³ Cf. *Amb.Io.* 18, 1261A: καθ' ὃν ὑπάρχει τρόπον [ἢ Θεότης].

hypostases finds its lexical expression in participles derived from ὑφίστημι and such later forms of it as ὑφιστάω and ὑφιστάνω. One divinity “is” (οὔσα) monadically, while “subsisting” (ὑφισταμένη) or “having received subsistence” (ὑφέστηκεν) triadically:

Triad... is essential *existence* (ἐνούσιος ὕπαρξις) of the tri-hypostatic monad... The monad is truly Triad, since thus it subsists (ὑφέστηκεν). Indeed, the divinity is one, having its being monadically, and subsisting triadically (οὔσα τε μοναδικῶς, καὶ ὑφισταμένη τριαδικῶς).¹⁴

It follows, therefore, that in application to the Trinity ὕπαρξις serves as more or less a synonym of εἶναι. An adverb “monadically” (μοναδικῶς) that corresponds to the abiding of the divinity, serves as a term too: elsewhere Maximus uses it in application to one composite hypostasis of the incarnate Word, emphasizing the contrast between the unity of the one hypostasis and the two natures, as also between the two activities and wills of the God-man.

In the *Difficulties to Thomas* the movement from the divine essence to the three hypostases is represented by Maximus as a shift from simple and undifferentiated being (εἶναι) to the being-in-some-manner, to the “how”-being or more exactly to the “how”-subsisting (πῶς ὑφεστάναι).¹⁵ *Therefore, the being of the Trinity epistemologically (that is, in our cognitive process), but not ontologically (which is dogmatically forbidden), is thought to precede the “how”-being, that is, the hypostatical subsistence.*

The Triad is truly monad, since thus it is (οὕτως ἐστί), and the Monad is truly triad, since thus it subsists (οὕτως ὑφέστηκεν). Indeed, the divinity is one, existing (οὔσα) monadically, and subsisting (ὑφισταμένη) triadically... We *first* (πρῶτον) are illuminated with respect to the *logos* of its being (εἶναι), and *thus* (οὕτω) are enlightened with respect to the “how”-subsistence (πῶς ὑφεστάναι),

¹⁴ *Amb. Th.* 1, 26–29 . Cf. *Amb. lo.* 62, 1400D: τὴν τρισυπόστατον ὕπαρξιν.

¹⁵ *Ep. sec. Th.* 1, 22–23: “...vision of both the *logos* of divinity’s being and the tropos of its ‘how’-subsistence”, ἰδεῖν τὸν τε τοῦ εἶναι λόγον, καὶ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑφεστάναι τῆς θεότητος τρόπον.

for it is obvious that being (εἶναι) is observed before (προεπινοεῖται) the “how”-subsistence (πῶς ὑφεστάναι). And so, movement of divinity, which comes about through the elucidation concerning its being and its “how”-subsistence, is established... as knowledge.¹⁶

Here “simple being” corresponds to a *logos* and “how”-being to a *tropos*, to a hypostasis. In the earlier set of difficulties, the *Difficulties to John*, Maximus formulates the same idea by means of ὑπάρχω and not ὑφίστημι, writing that the divinity is Monad according to *logos* of essence (being) and it is Triad according to the *tropos* of existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως):

Monad is Triad being perfect in three perfect hypostases that is, according to the *tropos of existence* (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως), and Triad is truly Monad according to the *logos* of its essence that is, being (εἶναι).¹⁷

Thus, in application to the Trinity οὐσία is a synonym of εἶναι, while ὑπόστασις is understood to be a mode of its being – its “how”-subsisting (πῶς ὑφεστάναι) and *tropos* of existence (ὑπαρξίς).

Maximus also describes the being of the divine hypostases in relation to each other by means of the verb ὑπάρχω.¹⁸ Since the ὑπάρχω etymologically possesses inchoative sense, the formula τὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπον as applied to the Trinity could from the time of Gregory of Nazianzus not only signify a manner of being of each of the divine hypostases but also announce their mode of origin, which was reflected in such hypostatical attributes as

¹⁶ *Amb. Th.* 1, 1036C, Μονὰς γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἡ Τριάς, ὅτι οὕτως ἐστὶ, καὶ Τριάς ἀληθῶς ἡ μονὰς, ὅτι οὕτως ὑφέστηκεν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ μία θεότης οὐσά τε μοναδικῶς, καὶ ὑφισταμένη τριαδικῶς... πρῶτοντὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον αὐτῆς ἐλλαμπομένων, καὶ οὕτω τὸν τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι τρόπον φωτιζομένων, εἴπερ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ πῶς εἶναι πάντως προεπινοεῖται. Κίνησις οὖν θεότητος ἢ δι' ἐκφάνσεως γινομένη περὶ τε τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι... καθέστηκε γινώσις (tr. Lollar, slightly modified).

¹⁷ *Amb. Io.* 62, 1400D–1401A: τριάς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ μονὰς ὡς ἐν τελείαις οὐσα τελεία ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν, ἡγουν τῷ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπῳ, καὶ μονὰς ἐστὶν ἡ τριάς ἀληθῶς τῷ τῆς οὐσίας, ἡγουν τῷ τοῦ εἶναι λόγῳ.

¹⁸ *Amb. Io.* 20, 1264C: οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑπάρχοντος; *Amb. Io.* 26, 1268B: ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ ... ὑπαρξίν τοῦ Μονογενοῦς.

ἀγεννησία (unbegottedness) of the Father, γέννησις (begottedness) of the Son and ἐκπόρευσις (procession) of the Holy Spirit.¹⁹

1.3. *The supreme Logos*: The verb ὑπάρχω plays an important role in the discussions of the being of the Logos, the divine hypostasis. There, the presence of ὑπάρχω emphasizes that the the Logos's being is essential:

The Word of God *exists* as a full, complete essence, for he is God, and as an undiminished hypostasis, for he is Son;²⁰

the one Logos... who *exists* in himself without confusion, the essential and individually istinctive God, the Logos of God the Father;²¹

Since [the Word of God] always *exists* the same in himself".²²

The verb ὑπάρχω, describing the presence of the divine Logos in the created world, can express the idea (as an additional shade of meaning) that God, descending into the created world, remains the same in his essential being:

God who in the greatest things... truly *exists* and is understood.²³

The Logos *subsists* (ὑφεστώς) himself as a divine hypostasis and *gives subsistence* (ὑφιστῶν) to all the created: "The Word that subsists and brings subsistence to everything".²⁴

¹⁹ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1136BC: καὶ τὸν περὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος... ἐδιδάχθησαν λόγον, καθ' ὄνου τὸν τοῦ εἶναι μόνον ἀπλῶς τοῦ αἰτίου λόγον μυστικῶς ἐφωτίσθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπον εὐσεβῶς ἐμυήθησαν. It is possible to point out the transposition of inchoative sense from the formula τρόπος ὑπάρξεως to formula τρόπος τῆς ὑποστάσεως. Gregory of Nyssa writes about Christ's coming-to-be (that is, about his birth from the Virgin): "In this way the truly man was created, who was the first and the only one to reveal through himself this manner of *coming-to-be*, who was created according to God and not according to man", οὕτως ἐκτίσθη ὁ καινὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καταδείξας, ὁ κατὰ θεὸν κτισθεὶς, οὐ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον. *Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium* 223, 30 – 224, 2.

²⁰ *Amb.Th.* 2, 6–7: Ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος ὅλος οὐσία πλήρης ὑπάρχων, Θεὸς γάρ, καὶ ὑπόστασις ὅλος ἀνελλιπής, Υἱὸς γάρ.

²¹ *Amb.Io.* 2, 1077C: ἕνα... δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀσυγχύτως ὑπάρχοντα, ἐνούσιόν τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς Θεὸν Λόγον.

²² *Amb.Io.* 16, 1256A: Ὡσαύτως γὰρ ὑπάρχων αἰεὶ δι' ἑαυτόν...

²³ *Amb.Io.* 35, 1304A: ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις... κυρίως ὑπάρχων καὶ γνωσκόμενος.

²⁴ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1132C: τοῦ ὑφεστῶτος καὶ ὑφιστῶντος τὰ πάντα Λόγου.

1.4. *The logoi of beings*: Maximus' doctrine of the *logoi* of beings has already been treated in detail,²⁵ so I will address only two points of it. The first remark relates to the abiding of the divine *logoi* in the supreme Logos, the second hypostasis of the divine Trinity. Maximus writes that the one beginning of the being (εἶναι) of the *logoi* is the Wisdom: the *logoi* exist (ὑπάρχουσι) from it and through it, and by it they receive the ability to exist:

the *logoi*... have the Wisdom as the only beginning of their being; they exist (ὑπάρχουσι) from it and through it, and they have the power to be (πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δύνασθαι) immovably by it.²⁶

The list of prepositions used by Maximus (ἐξ, διὰ, ὑπό) presupposes – if only in theory – a distance between the supreme Logos and the *logoi*, as also their hierarchical subordination to it. This is the relation between the cause and its effects.

In one passage, the verb ὑφίστημι is applied at once to the coming-to-be of the non-created *logoi* and to their “parts”, that is, to the created things:

[God the Father] who before the ages possesses the *logoi* of the created things, *logoi* that *have come in subsistence* (ὑφεστῶτας), also *gave subsistence* (ὑπεστήσατο) out of non-being to all things visible and invisible. By his Word and his Wisdom, he in due time had made (ποιήσας) all things and [still] is making (ποιῶν) them, universals as well as particulars... Because a *logos* precedes the making... of everything that receives its being from God.²⁷

²⁵ See EPIFANOVICH 2003, 62–64; DALMAIS 1952, 244–249; SHERWOOD 1955, 166–180; BALTHASAR 2003, 115–136; THUNBERG 1965, 76–84; KARAYANNIS 1993, 201–231; TOLLEFSEN 2000, 83–173; LARCHET 2004, 276–283; ROSSUM 1993, 213–217; PETROFF 2007a, 112–128; PETROFF 2009, 16–25.

²⁶ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1329C: οἱ λόγοι... μόνην ἔχοντες ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν, ἐξ ἧς καὶ δι' ἣν ὑπάρχουσι, καὶ ὑφ' ἧς τὴν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δύνασθαι παγίως δύναμιν ἔχουσιν.

²⁷ *Amb.Io.* 2, 1080A: Τοὺς γὰρ λόγους τῶν γεγονότων ἔχων πρὸ τῶν αἰῶνων ὑφεστῶτας... κατ' αὐτοὺς τὴν τεόρατὴν καὶ ἀόρατον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑπεστήσατο κτίσιν, λόγῳ καὶ σοφίᾳ τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὸν δέοντα χρόνον ποιήσας τε καιποῖων, τὰ καθόλου τε καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον. Λόγον γὰρ... δημιουργίας προκαθηγεῖσθαι... παντὸς τῶν ἐκ Θεοῦ τὸ εἶνα λαβόντων (tr. Blowers & Wilken, slightly modified). Cf. *Amb.Io.* 37, 1328AB, 1329BC.

Derivatives of the same verb ὑφίστημι describe both God the Father's giving subsistence to the divine and non-created *logoi* and to the created things. Significantly, in the *Mystagogia* Maximus even said that the *logoi* have their Maker which means they were created: "The soul is safely and comformably carried to the very Holder and Maker of each *logos* and each cause".²⁸

Maximian perception of the divine *logoi* is similar to the Proclean Neoplatonic vision of the henads: both *logoi* and henads receive their subsistence, that is, some mode of existence, but both are actually above the being in its proper sense.²⁹ Proclus frequently describes the action, in which the higher being gives subsistence to the lower being, by means of the derivatives from the verb ὑφίστημι, but this does not imply the coming-to-be of a being in a strict Plato's sense of the word, since the Neoplatonic metaphysics cannot be reduced to the ontology of essence.³⁰

The two quotations given above demonstrate also that a straightforward identification of the divine *logoi* with the divine energies (interpreted in the light of the later Palamite theology) simplifies and deforms the Maximian sophisticated and diverse vision of the *logoi* of being.

The *logoi* subsist in the one supreme Logos but they are also inserted into the existence of each being,³¹ defining the being of the created things that exist in accordance with their *logoi*,³² Particular beings come to be in due time and exist for a period given as actualized being (as hypostases), but since the divine providence concerning them precedes ages, it follows that the created things potentially exist already in their *logoi*.³³

²⁸ *Myst.* 5, 483–485: σωστικῶς... ἐναρμονίως πρὸς αὐτὸν φερομένη, τὸν παντὸς λόγουκαὶ πάσης αἰτίας περιεκτικόν τε καὶ ποιητήν.

²⁹ PROCLUS, *Theologia Platonica* III, 14, 17–19: "Each henad is one and it initially received subsistence because of the One (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ὑφέστηκεν)... They received subsistence (ὑφεστήκασιν) because of the first cause". Cf. PROCLUS, *Theologia Platonica* I, 115, 7–10: "Sometimes [Plato] calls the gods demons, who according to their essence (κατ' οὐσίαν) are second after the gods and received their subsistence (ὑφεστήκασιν) after them".

³⁰ See STEEL 1994, 79–100.

³¹ *Amb.Io.* 12, 1228A: οἱ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων τῇ ὑπάρξει πρώτως ἐγκαταβληθέντες λόγοι, καθ' οὓς καὶ ἔστι καὶ πέφυκε τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον.

³² *Amb.Io.* 37, 1329C: Ὡν δὲ οἱ λόγοι μονίμως ὑπάρχουσι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ... τούτων ἀναμνηρίστως αἰνπαρξείεις σαφῶς εἰσὶν ἀδιάφθοροι.

³³ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1328CD: Ὅστις δυνάμει μὲν ἐν τῷ πατριάρχη Ἀβραάμ ὑπάρχων.

1.5. *The God-man*: Ὑπάρχω is frequently used when Maximus discusses the God-man in whose hypostasis two natures were united without confusion.³⁴ The God-man whose existence combines transcendency and immanence in relation to the world “*exists* beyond every age and nature, even if now he has... come to be subject to both”.³⁵ In the incarnation the Word of God became hypostasis of two natures:

The Word of God *exists* (ὕπαρχων) entirely as a complete essence (for he is God), and entirely as an undiminished hypostasis (for he is Son). But when he emptied himself, he became the seed of his own flesh, and when he was composed in an ineffable conception, he became the *hypostasis* of the very flesh that was assumed. Having truly become, without change, in this new mystery, entirely a human being, he was himself the *hypostasis* of two natures, of the uncreated and the created... He became composite by the hypostatic assumption of the flesh.³⁶

Discussing the mystery of the Incarnation, Maximus writes: “[the Son] *exists* as one with the holy Trinity even after the Incarnation”.³⁷ Remaining true God, he is true man³⁸, truly demonstrating in himself the natural existence (ὕπαρξις) of both natures, while acting already as neither bare God, nor a mere human being.³⁹ When interpreting Dionysius the Areopagite’s

³⁴ *Amb.Io.* 22, 1269B: διὰ τὴν ἀσύγχυτον ὑπαρξιν... αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις θεωροῦνται.

³⁵ *Amb.Th.* 3, 13–15: παντὸς αἰῶνος... καὶ πάσης δι’ ἑαυτὸν ὑπάρχων ἐπέκεινα φύσεως, κἄνυτ’ ἄμφω νῦν... γεγένηται. Cp. *Amb.Io.* 32, 1296D: ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχων, καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ὀνόματι ἀνθρωπότητά τε καὶ θεότητα; *Amb.Io.* 5, 1129BC: Λόγος κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχων ἀόρατος.

³⁶ *Amb.Th.* 2, 6–7: Ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος ὅλος οὐσιαπλήρης ὑπάρχων, Θεὸς γάρ, καὶ ὑπόστασις ὅλος ἀνελλιπής, Υἱὸς γάρ, κενωθείς μὲν σπορὰ γέγονε τῆς οἰκείας σαρκὸς, ἀρρήτην δὲ συλλήψει συντεθείς αὐτῆς ὑπόστασις γέγονε τῆς προσληφθείσης σαρκὸς. Καὶ τούτῳ τῷ καινῷ μυστηρίῳ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἀτρέπτως ὅλος γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος, δύο φύσεων ἀκτίστου τε καὶ κτιστῆς... ὁ αὐτὸς ὑπόστασις ἦν... αὐτῷ συνθέτω γενομένῳ τῇ προσλήψει τῆς σαρκὸς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν (tr. Lollar, slightly modified).

³⁷ *Amb.Io.* 22, 1268B: ἐνὸς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος ὑπάρχοντος καὶ μετὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν. Cf. *Amb.Th.* 2, 18–19: “the flesh exists from him, and he truly exists according to it”, αὐτοῦ τὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἀληθῶς ὄντι...”

³⁸ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1320B: φύσει Θεὸς ὑπάρχων; ἄμφω φυσικῶς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχων.

³⁹ *Amb.Th.* 5, 32–36: “He exists neither as a mere human being, nor as bare God”, μὴ ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος μῆτε γυμνὸς ὑπάρχει Θεός.

statement concerning the “new theandric activity” of the incarnate Word, Maximus argues that this theandric activity is neither something simple (belonging to only one nature, divine or human), nor something synthetic (as belonging to some composite nature). It exists “by God having become human” and belongs neither to naturally bare divinity, nor to mere humanity alone.⁴⁰ Maximus also adds that it would be dangerous to think that the incarnation came about as though the assumed human nature were vanquished by the greater divine nature, leaving no distinctive mark of its proper existence.⁴¹ Besides, as he does it in relation to God in general, Maximus uses the *ὑπάρχω* in an epistemological context, discussing the possibilities to comprehend “what and how” of the God-man’s existence.⁴²

1.6. *The rational soul*: The verb *ὑπάρχω* also describes the existence of the rational soul.⁴³ As an ontological term, the *ὑπάρχω* is used by Maximus when he argues that neither does the human soul pre-exist temporally the body, nor does the body precede the soul,⁴⁴ but that they both co-exist, coming into being at once and together (*ἅμα*). Thus, Maximus sometimes uses the formula *κατὰ τὴν ἅμα συνύπαρξιν*, “according the simultaneous co-existence”.⁴⁵ Besides, Maximus also applies such verb derivatives

⁴⁰ *Amb. Th.* 5, 225–233: μένων Θεὸς ἀληθῆς, ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς; ἄμφω δεικνὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρξει φυσικῆ... Θεανδρικτὴν... οὐχ... μόνης γυμνῆς κατὰ φύσιν θεότητος, ἢ μόνης ψιλῆς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀνθρωπότητος.

⁴¹ *Ep. sec. Th.* 2, 35–37: μηδὲν τῆς οἰκειᾶς τεκμήριον παρεχομένην ὑπάρξεως.

⁴² *Amb. Th.* 5, 135–137: Τί τε καὶ τίς ὑπάρχων γνωσθήσεται;

⁴³ *Amb. Io.* 2, 1092B: “the rational and intelligent soul which exists in the image of its maker”, λογικὴν τε καὶ νοεράν ψυχὴν, ἅτε δὴ κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὴν ὑπάρχουσιν.

⁴⁴ *Amb. Io.* 10, 1220C: τὴν προὑπαρξίν τῶν ψυχῶν; *Amb. Io.* 2, 1100C: “since they are parts of man it is impossible for either soul or the body to exist before the other or indeed to exist after the other in time” (tr. Blowers & Wilken), ψυχὴν ἅρα καὶ σῶμα, ὡς μέρη ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλήλων προὑπάρχειν χρονικῶς ἢ μεθὑπάρχειν ἀμήχανον; *Amb. Io.* 37, 1321D–1324A: “they (soul and body, I mean) exist simultaneously, and come into being at the same time, neither one... preexisting or post-existing the other as far as their origin is concerned” (tr. Blowers & Wilken), ἅμα κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἀμοτέρων, ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ σώματος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως χρόνος, οὐδενὸς τοῦ ἑτέρου προὑπάρχοντος... κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἢ μεθὑπάρχοντος; *Amb. Io.* 37, 1336C: “to say that souls post-exist their bodies”, τὸ μεθὑπάρχειν τῶν σωμάτων τὰς ψυχὰς ... λέγειν.

⁴⁵ *Amb. Io.* 37, 1325B: “according to their coexistence as parts simultaneous with each other, I mean the soul and the body”, τοῦ συναμοτέρου κατὰ τὴν ἅμα τῶν μερῶν ἀλλήλοις συνύπαρξιν, ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ σώματος.

as προὔπαρξιν (προὔπαρχειν), μεθύπαρξιν (μεθυπάρχειν), συνὔπαρξιν (συνυπάρχειν).⁴⁶ Maximus states that already at the first moment of conception the soul coexists with the body, the latter being merely semen outflow at that time.⁴⁷ Dogmatic prohibition against postulating the separate existence of either the soul or the body is reflected in his vocabulary: ὑπάρχω completely replaces ὑφίστημι in the corresponding contexts.⁴⁸ However, ὑφίστημι reappears in discussions concerning the generation of the human beings. Maximus explains that the body receives *co-subsistence* with the soul exactly at the moment of their coming into being, and that the human nature (consisting of soul and body) is to receive its perfect *subsistence* simultaneously with its coming into being, at the moment of its birth.⁴⁹

1.7. *The created being*: The verb ὑπάρχω is frequently applied by Maximus to the created world. The created being is existence (ὑπαρξίς) that has its order and position.⁵⁰ The joining of form and matter results in the formation of particular subsistence (hypostasis, ὑφέστηκεν) which in its turn possesses its own existence (ὑπαρξίς).⁵¹ The hypostasis of the whole creation in its turn has the existence (ὑπαρξίς)⁵² received from its Creator.⁵³

⁴⁶ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1325D: τινές μὲν γάρ φασιν... προὔπαρχειν τῶν σωμάτων τὰς ψυχὰς, τινές δὲ τόεναντίον, τῶν ψυχῶν προὔπαρχειν τὰ σώματα. Ἡμεῖς δὲ... οὔτε προὔπαρξιν οὔτε μεθύπαρξιν ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, συνὔπαρξιν.

⁴⁷ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1340B: "coexistence [of the soul] with the outflow and filthy pleasure", βέουσι καὶ ἡδονῇ ῥυπαρᾷ συνυπάρχειν; *Amb.Io.* 42, 1340C: "coexistence of the rational and intelligent soul with the body at conception", συνυπάρχειν τῷ σώματι κατὰ τὴν σύλληψιν τὴν λογικὴν τε καὶ νοερὰν ψυχὴν.

⁴⁸ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1332C: μετὰ τοῦ σαρκωθέντος καὶ τελείως ἐνανθρωπήσαντος Θεοῦ Λόγου εἶναι τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν... τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν ληφθὴν καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἠνωμένον αὐτῷ καθ' ὑπόστασιν.

⁴⁹ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1337B: οὐπίνος γὰρ τῷ χωρισμῷ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκε τὸ σῶμα, τούτου δηλαδὴ τῇ ὑπάρξει κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν εὐλόγως ἂν πάντως καὶ συνυφέστηκεν; *Amb.Io.* 37, 1341B: αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς φύσεως ποιητὴν... τῷ καθ' ἑαυτὸν μυστηρίῳ τῆς ἐνσωματώσεως... τὴν φύσιν τελείως ἔχουσαν ὅμα τῷ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν ὑφίστασθαι δι' ἑαυτοῦ βεβαιωσάμενον.

⁵⁰ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1185D: τῆς κατὰ θέσιν ὑπάρξεως.

⁵¹ *Amb.Io.* 25, 1273C: "from which [matter and form] the existence of the beings has received its subsistence", ἐξ ὧν ἢ τῶν ὄντων ὑπαρξίς ὑφέστηκεν; *Amb.Io.* 5, 1140A: "existence of everything material and immaterial", πάσης ὑλικῆς καὶ ἀύλου οὐσίας τὴν ὑπαρξίν.

⁵² *Amb.Io.* 36, 1312AB: "the whole creation exists as one... inclined towards itself in the integrity of its existence", μιαν ὑπάρχουσαν τὴν ἅπασαν κτίσιν... πρὸς ἑαυτὴν νεύουσαν τῇ ὁλότῃ τῆς ὑπάρξεως.

⁵³ *Amb.Io.* 41, 1357A: "God deigned to give essence to the beings and to give existence to the non-beings", εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεὸς οὐσιῶσαι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν ὑπαρξίν δοῦναι.

God is immanent in the world: Maximus the Confessor compares it to the divine fire that exists inside (ἐνυπάρχον) the essence of beings as in the burning bush (cf. Ex 3:2).⁵⁴ Each being has its existence (ὑπαρξιν) in accordance with God's thoughts and willings (*logoi*) pertaining to that being.⁵⁵ The essential existence of beings is existence in accordance with their *logoi* and by means of their *logoi*.⁵⁶ After the resurrection, the man will become unchangeable in his existence.⁵⁷

Besides, the verb ὑπάρχω can be used in application to created existence in general. For instance, Maximus speaks of essential existence of beings: κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπαρξιν τῶν ὄντων.⁵⁸

A remarkable combination of altogether three derivatives of the verbs εἰμί, ὑπάρχω, and ὑφίστημι occurs in a phrase:

the artisans by no means have their being – in a substantial and hypostatical manner (κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ὑποστατικῶς) – as enclosed in the products of their craft.⁵⁹

Maximus wants to say that the artisans as human beings possess their own real existence (ὑπαρξιν) as particular hypostases, like Peter, Paul, James. Besides, he may imply that the artisans also have some derivative lesser being in the things they make. Significantly, the formula κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν had been used in the earlier philosophical tradition before Maximus, namely in the discussions of the modes of existence of the sensible beings. Proclus dedicated a special paragraph to it in his *The Elements of Theology*. According to him, if there are three levels of being arranged hierarchically: some particular thing – its cause – and an image of this

⁵⁴ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1148CD: ὡσπερ θάμνω τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν ὄντων ἐνυπάρχοντος θείου πυρός.

⁵⁵ *Amb.Io.* 15, 1241C: τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὐσι καθ' ἣν αἰτίαν ὑπάρχουσιν; *Amb.Io.* 37, 1345B: φύσις... κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον ὑπάρχουσα. Cp. *Amb.Io.* 37, 1349A: τὸν προηγούμενον τῆς φύσεως λόγον.

⁵⁶ *Amb.Io.* 17, 1257A: τοὺς οἷς κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι λόγου; *Amb.Io.* 17, 1257A: ἐν... καθ' οὗς ὑπάρχουσι τὰ πάντα λόγοις.

⁵⁷ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1349A: "through the resurrection by means of which man is born into immortality as unchangeable in his existence", διὰ τῆς... ἀναστάσεως, εἰς ἀθανασίαν γεννώσης τὸν ἄνθρωπον καθ' ὑπαρξιν ἀναλλοίωτον.

⁵⁸ *Amb.Io.* 2, 1077A.

⁵⁹ *Amb.Io.* 13, 1233BC: οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τεχνητοῖς πάντως τὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ὑποστατικῶς ἔχουσινοι τεχνῆται περιγεγραμμένον.

thing, then existence of the thing in its cause is existence by participation (κατὰ μέθεξιν), existence of the thing in its image is causal, and the thing's existence by itself is substantial (καθ' ὑπαρξιν).⁶⁰ According to Proclus, Maximian artisans would possess three modes of existence: potential existence in their *logoi*, substantial (hypostatical) existence (καθ' ὑπαρξιν), and some lesser derivative existence in the products of their art. Elsewhere Maximus himself discusses the two first modes and perhaps here he alludes to the third one. The formula καθ' ὑπαρξιν does not belong to his usual ontological vocabulary and appears as borrowed from some other source. Speaking of the substantial existence, Maximus would usually use the term hypostasis, as he actually does even here, since he explains the καθ' ὑπαρξιν by means of the adverb ὑποστατικῶς, placing it immediately after the formula κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν.

2. ΥΦΙΣΤΗΜΙ

The verb ὑφίστημι and its derivatives in application to God were under consideration in 1.2. Here we will treat semantics of ὑφίστημι when applied to various aspects of the created being.

2.1. The prevailing meaning of ὑφίστημι in relation to the sensible and composite things is “to receive subsistence”, “to come into being”, “to be composed”.

2.1.1. Thus, the sensible world “has received subsistence” (ὑφέστηκε) from the bodies and in the bodies (ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς) of which it has been composed (συνέστηκε),⁶¹

2.1.2. and the existence (ὑπαρξις) of beings “has received subsistence” from matter and form.⁶²

⁶⁰ Cf p. PROCLUS, *The Elements of Theology*, prop. 103, 93, 17–18: “each being may exist either in its cause, or substantially, or by participation”, ἕκαστον ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν ἔστιν ἢ καθ' ὑπαρξιν ἢ κατὰ μέθεξιν; *The Elements of Theology*, prop.140, 17–18: “each being has three [modes of existence]: in its cause, substantially, and by participation”, τριχῶς γὰρ ἦν ἕκαστον, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν ἢ καθ' ὑπαρξιν ἢ κατὰ μέθεξιν.

⁶¹ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1169C.

⁶² *Amb.Io.* 25, 1273C: ἡ τῶν ὄντων ὑπαρξις ὑφέστηκεν.

2.1.3. The verb ὑφίστημι is also engaged in a passage that treats the problem of the universals. Maximian view in this case differs from the standard Platonic and Aristotelian approach:

Universals are disposed by nature to be composed (συνίστασθαι) from particulars... Universals *have come into subsistence* (ὑφέστηκεν) in particulars, assuming by no means the *logos* of separate being and *subsistence* (λόγον τοῦ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι τε καὶ ὑφεστάναι). If particulars should perish, then universals will not withstand. The parts are and *have come into subsistence* (εἰσι καὶ ὑφεστήκασι) in the wholes and the wholes – in the parts... Universals have their permanence and *hypostasis* (διαμονὴ καὶ ὑπόστασις) in particulars.⁶³

[The whole] receives everything that is naturally present in its parts, from which [parts] it has received *subsistence* (ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὑφέστηκε).⁶⁴

First Maximus states that universals have come into subsistence (ὑφέστηκεν) in particulars but this is not a subsistence (ὑφεστάναι) of a separate being on its own. Significantly, Maximus makes use of the formula καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι here, that means “separate being” in Aristotle.⁶⁵ After that, Maximus explains that particulars, in their turn, “have come into subsistence” (ὑφεστήκασι) in universals. And again, it is not a separate being but potential existence (particulars possess their actual separate subsistence as individual hypostases). As it was with the being of the divine *logoi* (see 1.4), “subsistence in the other” does not signify any separate, “real” being.

⁶³ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1189CD: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κατα μέρος τὰ καθόλου συνίστασθαι πέφυκε... τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ὑφέστηκεν, οὐδαμῶς τὸ παράπαν τὸν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι τε καὶ ὑφεστάναι λόγον ἐπιδεχόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος διαφθειρομένων παντὶ που δήλον ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ καθόλου στήσεται. Τὰ μέρη γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὁλότησι, καὶ αἱ ὁλότητες ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ εἰσι καὶ ὑφεστήκασι... ἐν οἷς ἡ τῶν καθόλου διαμονὴ καὶ ὑπόστασις.

⁶⁴ *Amb.Io.* 22, 1268D: ἐπιδεχομένου πάντα κυρίως τὰ φυσικῶς προσόντα τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὑφέστηκε.

⁶⁵ Indeed, Aristotle discusses various meanings of the formula τὸ καθ' αὐτό. In the fifth and the last sense, it can signify “whatever attributes belong to a thing alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of itself considered *apart by itself* (ἔτι ὅσα μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἢ μόνον δι' αὐτὸ κεχωρισμένον καθ' αὐτό), see ARISTOTELES, *Met.* IV, 18, 1022a 36–37. Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima* III, 8, 432a 3–4: ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, “There is *no actual thing* which has *separate existence*, apart from, as it seems, magnitudes which are objects of perception”; “according to common agreement there is nothing outside and *separate in existence* from sensible spatial magnitudes”.

It is obvious, that in 1189CD the existence of universals in particulars (which is hypostatical and actualized) and the existence of particulars in universals (which is unmanifested and potential)⁶⁶ do not oppose one another but mirror each other in perfect counterbalance. This can be explained, if we take into account that the major tension between the intelligible and the sensible realms was no longer essential to Maximus: after he had introduced divine *logoi* as a layer of reality, the *logoi* took place of the intelligible in the standard two-part Plato's scheme of the universe (consisting of the intelligible and the sensible) and changed the two-part system into a three-part one.⁶⁷ Besides, 1189CD seems to be a reworking of a passage from Nemesius of Emesa,⁶⁸ further developed in the light of Maximus' favorite "περιχώρησις approach". This approach is manifest in a discussion from Maximus' *Mystagogia*, which presented the created universe as two interwoven and interpenetrated hemispheres, the sensible and the intelligible, existing in each other like "a wheel in the middle of a wheel":

The world (κόσμος) too is one, non split between its parts; on the contrary, it circumscribes (περιγράφων) the difference of its parts, [originated] from their natural specificity, and carries them back to its own unity and indivisibility. It makes clear that these parts are alternately the same with the world and are the same with each other without confusion; and that each is wholly fixed in the whole of the other (ὅλον ὄλω); and that both parts complete the whole world as parts complete the unity, and that the universe completes the parts in accordance to itself as the whole and unified and entirely. For the whole intelligible world appears to those who have eyes to

⁶⁶ *Amb.lo.* 2, 1081AB: "God is the maker always and actually, but the created beings [when they are in God] are in potentiality but not yet in actuality", ὁ μὲν αἰεὶ κατ' ἐνέργειάν ἐστι Δημιουργός, τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μὲν ἔστιν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐκ ἔτι.

⁶⁷ On this see PETROFF 2009, 16–25.

⁶⁸ Cf. NEMESIUS, *De natura hominis* 42, 157–162 "when all the particulars are destroyed, the whole will be destroyed too, since the whole is composed from all the particulars. Indeed the species are equal to all the particulars [gathered] together and *vice versa*, and the whole is destroyed or preserved together with the particulars", ὡς τῶν κατὰ μέρος πάντων διαφθειρομένων, καὶ τὰ καθόλου διαφθαρήσεται; ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πάντων τὰ καθόλου συνίσταται. ἐξισάζειγόν τὰ εἶδη πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ συνδιαφθίρεται καὶ συνδιασφύζεται.

see as impressed *through mystery* in symbolic forms by the whole sensible world. And the whole sensible world *exists* (ἐνυπάρχων) in the whole intelligible world through knowledge (γνωστικῶς) when it is simplified by intellect in the *logoi*. For this sensible world is in the intelligible world by means of *logoi*; and the intelligible world is in the sensible one by means of its symbols (τύποις). And their work is all one, “as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel,” says Ezechiel (Ez 1:16)... The symbolical contemplation of the intelligible through the visible is the spiritual knowledge of the visible through the invisible. It is necessary that things which reveal each other contain clear and perfectly true reflections of each other, and a flawless relation to them.⁶⁹

Maximus’ concept of universal reciprocity is reminiscent of the Proclean discussion of the universal sympathy, resulting in the mutual mirroring of heaven and earth.⁷⁰ It was believed that the sympathy could be triggered by means of sacred action, which activated latent links between the higher and the lower realms. This Neoplatonic doctrine was inherited by Dionysius the Areopagite, who used it as the basis of his liturgical theology.⁷¹ In the *Mystagogia* passage Maximus combined the Dionysian principle, – according to which the sensible sacral objects participate in the intelligible, divine reality and are, using the terminology of Karl Rahner, its “Realsymbol”,⁷² – with the concept of περιχώρησις crucial for Christological doctrine. Although the general context of this Maximian

⁶⁹ *Myst.* 2, 233–257.

⁷⁰ Cf. PROCLUS, *De sacrificio et magia* 148, 3–21.

⁷¹ Cf. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia* II, 3, 2, 74, 7–11, 397C: “The sacred, [given to us in a] perceptible way, is representation of the intelligible, to which it leads and shows the way, and the intelligible is the principle and science of this which is perceptible in the hierarchies”, Ἔστι γάρ... τὰ μὲν αἰσθητῶς ἱερὰ τῶν νοητῶν ἀπεικονίσματα καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτὰ χειραγωγία καὶ δόξ, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ τῶν κατ’ αἴσθησιν ἱεραρχικῶν ἀρχῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Still later this principle would be adopted in alchemy in the form of “what is below is that which is above”: “quod est inferius, est sicut [id] quod est superius, et quod est superius, est sicut [id] quod est inferius, ad perpetranda miracula rei unius” *Tabula Smaragdina* 2. See PETROFF 2013, 305–307 [264–308].

⁷² RAHNER 1959, 461–505, reprinted in RAHNER 1967, 275–313. On this see PETROFF 2013, 309–317.

passage is rather epistemological than ontological, his general approach belongs to the Neoplatonic framework in what concerns the balance between the two interacting levels of created being: they exist in each other.

2.1.4. Maximus uses the *υφίστημι* in the discussion of *creation out of nothing*: God brings the beings out of non-beings, letting them come into subsistence⁷³. The creature received subsistence (*υποστήναι*) out of non-beings.⁷⁴ God created (*πεποίηκεν*) everything; he endowed human beings with subsistence, having given them essence.⁷⁵ God the Father with his Wisdom gave subsistence (*υποστήσας*) to every nature.⁷⁶

2.1.5. The existence (*υπαρξις*) of the created things has received its essential subsistence after their coming into being.⁷⁷ All created beings received their *subsistence and being* (*υπέστησάν τε και εισι*) in accordance with their *logos*.⁷⁸

2.1.6. The human body received co-subsistence with the soul's existence (*υπαρξει*) at the coming into earthly being. The divine nature received co-subsistence with the human nature in the God-man.⁷⁹

2.1.7. The earthly being subsists (*υποστήσαι*) and persists (*μειναι*).⁸⁰ The verb *υφίστημι* describes the earthly subsistence of the sensible and corruptible things.⁸¹

⁷³ *Amb.Io.* 30, 1289A: "God brings the beings (*υποστήσασθαι*) out of non-beings, letting them come into subsistence, granting them ability to be and persist (*το ειναι και διαμεινεν*)".

⁷⁴ *Amb.Io.* 23, 1272BC: *το εκ μη οντων υποστηναι*.

⁷⁵ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1116B: *ουσιωσας υπεστησατο*.

⁷⁶ *Amb.Io.* 43, 1361A: *ο πασαν μετα σοφιας φύσιν υποστησας Θεός*.

⁷⁷ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1329C: "on coming into generation... the existence has acquired essential subsistence", *μετατην γενεσιν... η κατ' ουσιαν υφεστηκεν υπαρξις*.

⁷⁸ *Amb.Io.* 10, 1217AB: *καθ' ον μεν υπεστησαν τε και εισι λογον*.

⁷⁹ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1337B: *τη υπαρξει κατα την γενεσιν συνυφεστηκεν*. Cf. *Amb.Th.* 5, 280–284, 1060A: "In the divine incarnation, the divine and the human... were composed and received co-subsistence (*της συγκειμενης και συνυφεστωσης*)".

⁸⁰ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1336D.

⁸¹ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1336CD.

2.1.8. Sinners give subsistence to non-being in themselves because of their disposition to it.⁸² On the contrary, one may give subsistence to virtue.⁸³

2.1.9. The verb ὑφίστημι may have no ontological sense at all (as in 1.4 and 2.1.3) and imply merely logical postulation⁸⁴ or refer to a result of a mathematical operation.⁸⁵

2.2. “To complete” can mean “to receive subsistence”: In other Maximus’ writings “completion” (συμπλήρωσις) is connected to actualization of hypostasis.⁸⁶

2.3. *The created beings subsists in the logoi*: Discussing divine providence and judgement, Maximus writes that God’s providence initially gave subsistence (προηγουμένως ὑπέστη) to the universe⁸⁷ and to each being (ὑπέστησαν ἕκαστα)⁸⁸ in accordance with the *logoi*. From the beginning (ἐξ

⁸² *Amb.Io.* 15, 1237BC: τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ διάθεσιν ἑαυτοῖς ὑποστήσαντας; *Amb.Io.* 16, 1252B: “the disposition of the soul which gave subsistence to non being (ὑποστήσασαν τὸ μὴ ὄν)”.

⁸³ *Amb.Io.* 16, 1248D: ἐκάστην ἀρετὴν ὑποστήσασα.

⁸⁴ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1340C: “The Manichaeans postulated two beginnings”, δύο ἀρχὰς ὑποστησάμενους.

⁸⁵ *Amb.Io.* 62, 1404B: “thousand times a four yields (ὑφίστησιν) four thousand”.

⁸⁶ *Ep.* 15, 552C: “Things that are united in respect to one and the same hypostasis or person, that is, the things that are completed in the unity of the one and the same hypostasis, are of the same hypostasis in relation to each other but of different essences. They are of the same hypostasis by the *logos* of the personal and indivisible monad, monad which *becomes completed* when they are united. In accordance with this *logos*, the specific properties separated from each other in the [hypostatical] novelty of their proper essences, create specific features of the one hypostasis which *becomes completed* from them at their reciprocal coming together that happens simultaneously with [hypostasis] coming into being”, ὁμοὑπόστατα μὲν, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς καθ’ ἑνωσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένης προσωπικῆς ἀδιαίρετου μονάδος· καθ’ ὃν τὰ διαίρουντα θάτερον τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν οικείας καινότητος ιδιώματα, κατὰ τὴν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα σύνοδον, ποιεῖται χαρακτηριστικὰ τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένης μίας ὑποστάσεως. Cf. *Q. Thal.* 2, 7–12. See note 90.

⁸⁷ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1133D: “Providence... of the mind... holding together the universe and preserving it in accordance with the *logoi* by which providence initially *gave subsistence* to the universe...” (tr. Louth), πρόνοιαν... νοῦ... τήνσυνεκτικὴν τοῦ παντός, καὶ καθ’ οὗς τὸ πᾶν προηγουμένως ὑπέστη λόγους συντηρητικῆν... Cf. *Amb.Io.* 10, 1217AB: πάντα τὰ ὄντα καθ’ ὃν μὲν ὑπέστησάν τε καὶ εἰσι λόγον, στάσιμά τε παντελῶς εἰσι καὶ ἀκίνητα.

⁸⁸ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1133C: “[The ineffable One that] holds together and protects... everything in accordance with the *logoi* by which it gave subsistence to each being” (tr. Louth), τὸν συνέχοντα καὶ φυλάττοντα... τὰ πάντα καθ’ οὗς ὑπέστησαν ἕκαστα λόγους.

ἀρχῆς) God's act of judgment defines not only the creature's being in its *logoi* but also its hypostatical temporal being, the "how"-being.⁸⁹

Although God's providence and judgement pertain to the dispensation (οἰκονομία), this does not prohibit them to perform "before the ages". Hence, προηγουμένως ὑπέστη is synonymous with the ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπεστήσατο. The world receives subsistence not at the moment when it comes to be in time and space, but when the Lord makes his judgement concerning it – at the initial establishing of the *logoi* of the world. On the level of the non-created reality it happens at the primordial coming into subsistence of the *logoi* of the world, while on the level of the created being it occurs at the moment of producing the created intelligible being: "in the ages" but before time. Elsewhere Maximus says that God at once "makes completed" the non-created *logoi* and the created universal natures.⁹⁰ No nature is able

to receive the beginning of its generation towards the being (πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχήν) from its parts or to *subsist* (ὑφίστασθαι) as half of itself. If the nature is composite, then it *receives co-subsistence* (ἀθρόως συνυφίσταται), as a complete and whole entity, collectively with all its complete parts, without any temporal gap (κατὰ τὸν χρόνον διάστασιν) in respect to itself or to its reciprocal parts of which it is constituted. If the nature is simple, that is, intelligible, it is in the same way disposed by nature to *receive co-subsistence*, as a complete entity, collectively (ἀθρόως), at once (ἅμα) and

⁸⁹ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1133D–1136A: "each of the things that has come to be, connected with the *logoi* in accordance with which it came into generation, has an inviolable and unalterable constitution in its natural identity, just as *from the beginning* the Maker had judgement concerning each one and *gave subsistence* to it in relation to its being, and what it was to be, and how and how much it was to be" (tr. Louth, slightly modified), τῶν γεγονότων ἕκαστα τοῖς καθ' οὐς γεγένηται συνημμένα λόγοις ἀπαράβατον ἔχει τὴν ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ ταυτότητι ἀναλλοίωτον νομιμότητα, καθὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀδημιουργὸς περὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τι εἶναι καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅποιον ἕκαστον ἔκρινε τε καὶ ὑπεστήσατο. Cf. *Amb.Io.* 12, 1228D: ὁ λόγος τῆς τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον οὐσίας, φύσεως, εἶδους, σχήματος, συνθέσεως, δυνάμεως, ἐνεργείας, πάθους.

⁹⁰ *Q.Thal.* 2, 7–12: "Having completed at once the first *logoi* of the created things and the universal essences of the beings (τοὺς μὲν πρώτους τῶν γεγονότων λόγους ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὰς καθόλου τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας ἅπασας... συμπληρώσας)... God performs now not only the preservation of all those in existence, but produces the actual making, coming to be and constitution of the parts that abide in them potentially".

unintermittently (*ἀπαρλείπτως*) with its complete *logoi*, without any temporal difference separating the whole of it (*σύνολον*) from its proper *logoi*.⁹¹

Here Maximus speaks of co-subsistence of the parts and the whole, of intelligible natures and their *logoi*. Since the simple intelligible nature receives co-subsistence at once (*ἅμα*) with its complete *logoi*, it receives its subsistence already in its *logoi* – completely and before the ages, and this coming into subsistence does not occur later, in time. However, as in some cases considered above, this “subsistence” does not imply any substantial, separate being.

2.4. *Hypostasis*: The noun *ὑπόστασις* is one of the most important derivatives of the verb *ὑφίστημι*. There is no place for comprehensive analysis of its conceptual content, and we confine ourselves to some brief observations only. Following his predecessors, Maximus calls individual created nature “created hypostasis”. Since he interprets the term “nature” mostly as the essence of a species and not of an individual, a particular being (Aristotle’s first essence) is almost always called “hypostasis” (and rarely – “an individual”, *ἄτομος*).⁹² Hypostasis is always a manifestation of some universal nature or essence, and always abides in this essence (it is *ἐνούσιον*).⁹³ Maximus defines hypostasis in several ways: 1) as the nature of a species circumscribed by a set of hypostatical qualifications (approach from logic); 2) as a being that has separate existence, *καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι* (Aristotelian approach); 3) as a particular mode of existence received by the nature of a species, so called *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως*; or 4) as a qualified being of the nature of a species, so called “how”-existence, *πῶς εἶναι* (the approach that goes back to the Stoics).

⁹¹ *Amb. Io.* 37, 1345B (tr. Blowers & Wilken, slightly modified), ἐκ μέρους τὴν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχήν, οὐδέποτε δέχεται, οὔτε μὲν ἐξ ἡμισείας μοίρας ὑφίστασθαι δύναται. Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν σύνθετος φύσις ἐστίν, ὅλη τελεία τελείους τοῖς οικείους μέρεσιν ἀθρόως συνυφίσταται, μὴ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐξ ὧν ἐστιμερῶν τὴν οἰανοῦν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον διάστασιν. Εἰ δὲ ἀπλή φύσις ἐστίν, ἦγουν νοητή, ὡσαύτως ἅμα τοῖς ἑαυτῆς ἀπαρλείπτως λόγους τελεία τελείους ἀθρόως συνυφίστασθαι πέφυκε, χρόνον τινὸς τὸ σύνολον αὐτὴν τῶν οικείων λόγων, οὐδαμῶς διακρίνοντος.

⁹² See PETROFF 2007b, 17–19.

⁹³ *Opusc.* 16, 205AB.

Created hypostasis may be *composite*, that is, it may consist of two or more natures: as a hypostasis, “human being” is composed from body and soul; Christ’s hypostasis consists of two natures – human and divine. Therefore, hypostasis not only delineates and circumscribes the nature of a species but also unites different natures. Eventually “hypostasis” may include in itself the entire creature. In this case, “hypostasis” becomes a synonym of “created being”. A similar *usus loquendi* is found in Proclus, who writes about ἡ τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασις,⁹⁴ implying by this the totality of beings, which have received their existence from the first principle. It occurs also in Dionysius the Areopagite, who mentions “the hypostasis of all beings” (ἡ τῶν ὅλων ὑπόστασις).⁹⁵ Maximus too writes about the hypostasis of all beings⁹⁶ or hypostasis of everything that came into being.⁹⁷ If the formula “hypostasis of everything that came into being” is a synonym of “the created nature”, then “hypostasis” is not merely something “particular” but functions as equivalent of “being” in general, the “essence” in the sense of the highest genus in the Porphyrian tree.⁹⁸

2.5. *Subsistence by grace of the created being in God*: The creature that has already received its subsistence as a created hypostasis can by divine grace acquire subsistence in God.⁹⁹ This becoming established in God can be seen as receiving a quasi-hypostasis in God.

Maximus speaks of human nature united with the divinity in the hypostasis of the God-man:

Let [the nature] remain possessing properly and entirely its own existence (τὸ ἐαυτῆς ὄν) immutable by the *logos* of being, in accordance with which it came into generation and exists, but let

⁹⁴ PROCLUS, *In Parmenidem* 839, 4: τῆς τῶν ὄντων ὑποστάσεως; PROCLUS, *In Parmenidem*, 1034, 27–28: τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ὑπόστασις; PROCLUS, *In Parmenidem*, 1068, 34–1069, 12: πάσης τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ὑποστάσεως.

⁹⁵ DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus* I, 5, 117, 11–118, 1.

⁹⁶ *Amb.Io.* 26, 1280A: διορίσας καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶδος τὴν τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασιν, ὑπὲρ φύσιν... ὑπάρχων.

⁹⁷ *Amb.Io.* 36, 1304D: τὴν πάντων τῶν γεγονότων ὑπόστασιν.

⁹⁸ On this kind of essence see *Q.Thal.* 48, 180–184. See note 108.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Amb.Io.* 31, 1289C, see note 100. Cf. *Scholium* 1 to *Q.Thal.* 60, 52–62. See note 104.

it divinely receive *subsistence* (τὸ ὑφεστάναι) by the *logos* of “how”-being.¹⁰⁰

Remarkably, since human nature, which was part of the hypostasis of the God-man, never existed as a separate entity, Maximus – in order to say that nature does not lose its “existence” within the hypostasis – expresses this by means of τὸ ὄν, and not ὑπαρξις or τὸ ὑποστῆναι / ὑφεστάναι.

A similar idea of human nature – or rather human beings – that “receives subsistence in God” occurs in Maximus’ *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* LX, where he considers the mystery of the Incarnation as “hypostatical union of the divinity and humanity”. First, he speaks of the nature of a species (human nature) that was united with the divine nature in the hypostasis of Jesus Christ, the God-man, and then writes about individuals who receive subsistence in God by grace. Maximus starts from the historical event of the Incarnation that was “manifested in Christ in the last times” (cf. 1 Peter 1:20) and then discusses the pre-creation plan and the goal of this mystery: the Incarnation is the limit (πέρας) in accordance with which “there is a recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) in God of the beings that were created by him”.¹⁰¹ It is not the mystery that happened for the sake of the creation but, on the contrary, the beings were created for the sake of this mystery.¹⁰² Maximus continues:

¹⁰⁰ *Amb. Io.* 31, 1289C: ἵνα τῷ μὲν τοῦ εἶναι λόγῳ, καθ’ ὄν γεγένηται καὶ ἔστι, διαμένοι τὸ ἑαυτῆς ὄνκυριῶς ἔχουσα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀμείωτον, τῷ δὲ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγῳ τὸ ὑφεστάναι θεϊκῶς λαβοῦσα. Eriugena reads here τὸ ὑφεστάναι θεϊκῶς (*subsistendi divinitus*), but this is rather θεϊκῶς λαβοῦσα, cf. κατὰ χάριν θείαν in scholium to *Q. Thal.* 60; see note 104. Cf. *Myst.* 23, 849–850: τριάδα δὲ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὑφεστάναι λόγον, “Triad by the logos of existence and subsistence”.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Eph 1:10: “that in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might sum up all things in Christ”, εἰς οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν, ἀνακεφαλαίωσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ. On the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις see JOANNES CHRYSOSTOMUS, *In epistulam ad Ephesios* 16, 12–32; CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS, *Glaphyra in Pentateuchum* 16, 32–46.

¹⁰² *Q. Thal.* 60, 34–37: “It is the divine purpose conceived before the beginning of created beings... this is the preconceived end for the sake of which everything exists, but which itself exists for the sake of nothing. With a clear view to this end, God created the essences of created beings” (tr. Blowers & Wilken, slightly modified), τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων προεπινοούμενος θεῖος σκοπός... προεπινοούμενον τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκα μὲντὰ πάντα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκεν· πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος ἀφορῶν τὰς τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεὸς παρήγαγεν οὐσίαις.

The union of the finitude and infinity, the measure and the unmeasured, the limit and the unlimited, the Creator and the creation, the rest and the movement, was conceived before the ages. This is the union that was manifested in Christ in the last times, being in itself the fulfilment of God's pro-knowledge, in order that the movable by nature would stay (σῆ) around the one who is totally immovable in his essence... in order that they would receive by experience (τῆ πείρα) the actualized (κατ' ἐνέργειαν) knowledge of him, in whom they were deemed worthy to stay (σῆναι), while possessing that knowledge as unchangeable and the same, the knowledge that grants them the pleasure of enjoying him, whom they came to know (τοῦ γνωσθέντος).¹⁰³

Maximus speaks of the union with God granted to the worthy and the elected, the union achieved in the eschatological perspective. A scholium of uncertain authorship to this passage – which is a paraphrase of *Difficulty to John* 36 (1289C) – plays up the consonance and similarity of the verb ending between σῆναι and ὑποσῆναι, commenting the former by means of the latter:

He says that their hypostatical union with him, from whom they came to be, had been conceived before in accordance with providence, in order that both the essential being of the beings was preserved as disposed by nature, and their *subsistence* (τὸ ὑποσῆναι), that is, their “*how*”-being (πῶς εἶναι) was revealed by divine grace,

¹⁰³ *Q. Thal.* 60, 51–62: “Ἐνωσις γὰρ προεπενοήθη τῶν αἰώνων ὄρου καὶ ἀοριστίας, καιμέτρου καὶ ἀμετρίας, καὶ πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρίας, καὶ κτίστου καὶ κτίσεως, καὶ στάσεως καὶ κινήσεως· ἦτις ἐν Χριστῷ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν χρόνων φανερωθεῖσα γέγονεν, πλήρωσιν δοῦσα τῇ προγνώσει τοῦ θεοῦ δι' ἑαυτῆς, ἵνα περὶ τὸ πάντῃ κατ' οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον σῆ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενα... καὶ λάβῃ τῇ πείρα τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν γνώσιν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ στήναικατηξιώθησαν ἀναλλοίωτον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν τὴν τοῦ γνωσθέντος αὐτοῖς παρεχομένην ἀπόλασιν. Cf. *Q. Thal.* 60, 49–51: “For it is through Christ, or the mystery of Christ, that all the ages and those that exist in the ages have received the beginning and the end of their being in Christ”, Διὰ γὰρ τὸν Χριστὸν, ἦγουν τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστήριον, πάντες οἱ αἰῶνες καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰῶσιν ἐν Χριστῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τέλος εἰλήφασιν.

by the union with God of all those who have been remade in unchangeability.¹⁰⁴

The creature that came into the generation and subsistence as a created hypostasis is able to acquire still better subsistence in God, which resembles the receiving of a hypostatical being in him. However, Maximus never uses the term hypostasis in application to acquiring the subsistence in God, limiting himself to such substantives as τὸ ὑφεστάναι and τὸ ὑποστῆναι derived from ὑφίστημι. Even the formula πῶς εἶναι, by which Maximus sometimes defines divine or created hypostases, occurs in an anonymous scholiast only. Maximus prefers to say that God exists in the creature as ἐνυπάρχων,¹⁰⁵ while the creature exists in God as ἐνυπόστατον:

Since through God's goodness human beings were created of soul and body ... the soul wisely takes care of the body... to assimilate it to God (οἰκειῶσαι Θεῷ)... So that things that are by nature separated from each other return to unity as they converge together in the one human being. When this happens God will be *all in all* (1 Cor 15:28), permeating all things and giving them *subsistence* in himself (ἐνυποστήσας ἑαυτῷ), then no being will wander aimlessly or be deprived of God's presence.¹⁰⁶

However, this subsistence in God, – similarly to the subsistence of the *logoi* in the supreme Logos – is not considered by Maximus as a hypostatical existence in the proper sense.

We may say that in application to the universe in its totality the ὑπόστασις and ὑπαρξις can acquire an additional “existential” meaning,

¹⁰⁴ *Scholium* 1, 6–11 to *Q. Thal.* 60, 52–62: Τούτων ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν προεπενοήθη, φησίν, κατὰ πρόνοιαν πρὸς τὸν ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα γεγονάσιν, ἵνα καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων φυλαχθῆ κατ' οὐσίαν, ὡς πέφυκεν, καὶ τὸ ὑποστῆναι, ἦγουν πῶς εἶναι, κατὰ χάριν δέξηται θεῖαν τῇ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐνώσει πάντων πρὸς ἀτρεψίαν μεταποιηθέντων.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *Amb. Io.* 5, 1148D, see note 54; *Amb. Io.* 30, 1289A: ἀναλόγως ἐκάστῳ τῶν κτισμῶν τῶν κατὰ τινὰ λόγον ἀπόρρητον σοφίας ἁμειώτως ἐνυπάρχειν.

¹⁰⁶ *Amb. Io.* 2, 1092C: ὁ Θεός, πάντα παραλαβὼν καὶ ἐνυποστήσας ἑαυτῷ; Cf. *Myst.* 20, 753–755: “the ἐνυπόστατος and ἐνυπαρκτος adoption as sons, to be given through the gift and grace of the Holy Spirit”, τῆς δοθησομένης ἐνυποστάτου τε καὶ ἐνυπαρκτου κατὰ δωρεάν καὶ χάριν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος νιοθεσίας.

according to which to come into subsistence (τὸ ὑποστῆναι) in God means to exist (ὑπάρχειν) supernaturally in him. The language of existence is manifest, when Maximus writes in *Difficulty to John* 41 about the result of successive syntheses achieved by (and in) the Son of God, that is, about the unions that bridge the five universal divisions:

[The Son of God] recapitulates the universe in himself, showing that the whole creation *exists* (ὑπάρχουσιν) as one, like *another human being*, completed by the gathering together of its parts one with another in itself, and inclined towards itself by the whole of its *existence* (ὑπάρξεως), in accordance with the one, simple, undifferentiated and indifferent notion of production from the non-being, in accordance with which the whole of creation admits of one and the same undiscriminated *logos* and possesses “it was not” as having precedence over “it is”.¹⁰⁷

Here Maximus postulates the creation of a new quasi-hypostasis, which is not ontological reality but a new “creation” that not only regained its primordial state but acquired a higher quality of existence which it never had before (the five universal divisions were healed). This became possible when the God-man himself surpassed them through a series of syntheses.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ *Amb.Io.* 36, 1312AB: τὰ πάντα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνεκεφαλαιώσατο, μίαν ὑπάρχουσιν τὴν ἄπασανκτίσιν δεῖξας, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον, τῆ τῶν μερῶν ἑαυτῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα συνόδῳ συμπληρουμένην καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴννεύουσιν τῆ ὁλότῃ τῆς ὑπάρξεως, κατὰ τὴν μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν καὶ ἀπροσδιόριστον, τῆς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγωγῆς καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἔννοιαν, καθ’ ἣν ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν πᾶσα ἢ κτίσις ἐπιδέξασθαι δύναται λόγον παντελῶς ἀδιάκριτον, τὸ “Ὅτι ἦν” τοῦ “εἶναι” πρὸςβῦτερον ἔχουσα.

¹⁰⁸ The syntheses achieved by the God-man are the unions of the natures belonging to different species. This is not climbing the Porphyrian tree, and Maximus is fully aware of it, explaining this elsewhere, cf. *Q. Thal.* 48, 180–189: “A *corner* is not only union, in accordance with the same *logos* of being, of the parts and the wholes, that belong to the same nature as, for instance, the union of individuals and the species to which they belong, and [union of] the species and the genera, and [union of] the genera and the essence.... but the *corner* is also the union of the intellect and the sense, heaven and earth, the sensible and the intelligible, and the nature with the Logos”, Γωνία ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ἢ τῶν μερῶν πρὸς τὰ καθόλου κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον ἔνωσις, ὡς φέρε εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὰ εἶδη τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτὰ ἄτομα καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὰ εἶδη καὶ πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ γένη... ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ οὐρανοῦ πρὸς γῆν καὶ αἰαίσθητων πρὸς νοητὰ καὶ φύσεως πρὸς λόγον. Nevertheless, he points out that the succession of the five universal unions receives its objective ontological foundation in the *logos* of “production from the non-being”.

The comparison of the universe with “another human being”, that is, with the being combining in its hypostasis two different natures, soul and body, confirms the assumption that Maximian language here is close to the “hypostasis discourse”. This is also suggested by similarities in his vocabulary.¹⁰⁹ The composite quasi-hypostasis, which comes to be as the result of universal unions, possesses its own ὑπαρξις; the completed creature subsists in the totality of its existence (τῆ ὁλότητι τῆς ὑπάρξεως).

We may say that *Difficulty to John* 41 starts with observation of the universal ὑπόστασις which is an ontological “given” or *factum*, being an analogue of the essence, and concludes with a discussion of an existential subsistence (ὑπαρξις) in the form of “how”-being, that is, the being that was gathered together in its completeness and exists not by nature any more but by divine grace. This is the existence of the being which has reached its subsistence in God.

2.6. *Some lexical observations:* In conclusion, a few additional remarks concerning the ontological vocabulary of Maximus the Confessor.

Ὑπαρκτικῶς: Maximus carries a subtle terminological distinction. The created beings exist hypostatistically (ὑποστατικῶς), that is, as separate individuals who have their actual existence. But when Maximus writes about Origenian henad of the intellects which have not yet received their hypostatical subsistence together with their bodies, he says that “they at once and altogether (ἅπαξ) came into being in God *existentially*”,¹¹⁰ making use of the adverb ὑπαρκτικῶς which is a ἅπαξ λεγόμενα.

The same ὑπαρκτικῶς is used in application to the totality of those who have already received actual existence (and, therefore, exist ὑποστατικῶς) and those who still remain in their *logoi* and causes (potentially and only ὑπαρκτικῶς yet). Accordingly, the *logoi* too pre-exist in the supreme Logos not ὑποστατικῶς but ὑπαρκτικῶς.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Amb.Io.* 36, 1312AB: καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον, τῆ τῶν μερῶν ἐαυτῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα συνόδῳ συμπληρουμένην, and *Ep.* 15, 552C: κατὰ τὴν... πρὸς ἄλληλα σύνοδον, ποιεῖται χαρακτηριστικὰ τῆς ἐξαυτῶν συμπληρουμένης μίας ὑποστάσεως.

¹¹⁰ *Amb.Io.* 2, 1089B: τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ὑπαρκτικῶς γενομένους. Sherwood, and then Blower and Wilken translate ὑπαρκτικῶς here as “actually”.

¹¹¹ *Amb.Io.* 37, 1329A: “The *logoi* of everything that by nature existentially is and will be, and came to be or will come to be, or appears or will appear, *pre-exist* firmly in God”, Πάντων οὖν τῶν κατ’ οὐσίαν ὑπαρκτικῶς ὄντων τε καὶ ἐσομένων, ἢ γενομένων, ἢ γενησομένων ἢ φαινομένων, ἢ φανησομένων, ἐν τῷ Θεῷ προϋπάρχουσι παγίως ὄντες οἱ λόγοι.

The formula εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν: Maximus the Confessor sometimes uses a pair εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν. Mostly, this formula is a hendiadys used in the context that goes back to Philonian distinction between the knowing that something exists and knowing what it is: “[to know] that the divinity *is and exists*, and not to know what it is and what exists”.¹¹²

The pair εἶναι καὶ ὑφίστημι: Similarly, εἶναι and ὑφίστημι can make a pair. Sometimes the pair is applied to the Trinity: the divinity has being and “how”-subsistence (τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ πῶς ὑφεστάναι) in the divine hypostases.¹¹³ In some cases, it is applied to the created being.¹¹⁴ Mostly, the pair is simply a couple of synonyms,¹¹⁵ being hendiadys that serve semantic intensification, a rhetorical figure which Maximus frequently uses¹¹⁶ (as Proclus had used it before him¹¹⁷).

Conclusion

Maximus the Confessor applies ὑπάρχω and ὑφίστημι to all levels of ontological hierarchy: both to God and to the created world. In general, ὑπάρχω has an inchoative sense and presupposes some “primary” existence;

¹¹² *Amb.Io.* 13, 1233A: εἶναι μὲν καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Θεῖον, τὶ δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν μὴ εἶδέναι. Cf. also *Amb.Io.* 5, 1161B: “the symbols (τύπους) of the mysteries *are and exist* (εἶναι τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν) with reference to (κατ’ ἀναφοράν) the Logos”; *Amb.Io.* 17, 1257C: “the beings are and exist”, ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπάρχει; *Amb.Io.* 37, 1332C: “the body is and exists”, εἶναι τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν.

¹¹³ *Amb.Th.* 1, 1036C: “the divinity is one, existing (οὐσα) monadically, and subsisting (ὑφισταμένη) triadically”.

¹¹⁴ *Amb.Io.* 5, 1108D: “virtue and knowledge is and subsists (ἐστὶ καὶ ὑφέστηκεν); *Amb.Io.* 10, 1217AB: “all the beings are unalterable in reference to their logos in accordance with which they received their subsistence and they are (ὑπέστησάν τε καὶ εἰσὶ λόγον)”.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *Amb.Io.* 5, 1189D: “Both the parts in the whole and the whole in the parts are and subsist (εἰσὶ καὶ ὑφεστήκασιν)”; *Amb.Io.* 2, 1101A: “one may say that if, after the death and corruption of the body, the soul is and subsists (ἐστὶν καὶ ὑφέστηκε), then it could be possible for the soul to be and subsist (εἶναι καὶ ὑφεστάναι) before the body”.

¹¹⁶ Cf. various pairs, for instance, *Amb.Io.* 31, 1289C: “to come into existence / to be”, γεγένηται καὶ ἐστὶ (see note 100); *Amb.Io.* 5, 1189D: “remaining / subsistence”, διαμονή καὶ ὑπόστασις; *Amb.Io.* 30, 1289A: “to be / to remain”, τὸ εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν. See note 73.

¹¹⁷ PROCLUS, *Theologia Platonica* 1, 115, 7–10: “Sometimes [Plato] calls the gods demons who according to their essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν) are the second after the gods and received their subsistence (ὑφεστήκασιν) after them”; PROCLUS, *In Alcibiadem* I, 76, 20: “all the demons exist (ὑφεστήκασιν) at the level of the souls and are (εἰσὶ) the second after the divine souls”.

even its etymology (ὑπο + ἄρχω) points to it.¹¹⁸ Maximus employs the entire semantic range of the ὑπάρχω: from a colloquial verb meaning “to begin” to a theological term describing divine existence. Maximian vocabulary is frequently dogmatically conditioned. Speaking of the two natures of the God-man, of which the human one never existed as hypostasis before their unconfused union, Maximus uses ὑπάρχω and not ὑφίστημι (1.5). Similarly, when he postulates the impossibility of the soul’s pre-existence to the body and the opposite (since neither human body nor soul had existed as separate beings before man came into existence), he uses exclusively ὑπάρχω and not ὑφίστημι.

Speaking of the created being, Maximus, in some cases, prefers ὑφίστημι (ὑπο + ἴστημι) to describe the formation of the “how”-being, that is, the qualified and specific being. Thus, ὑπόστασις signifies a certain circumscription of pure existence (ὑπαρξις represents more general being), one of its actualizations and instantiations. In trinitarian argumentation the ὑπάρχω describes the monadic being of the Trinity, while the ὑφίστημι is applied to its triadic subsistence.

When Maximus speaks of the “being in the other”, ὑφίστημι acknowledges a certain subsistence, which is not a separate being. Such is the subsistence of universals and particulars in each other (2.1.3), the subsistence of the divine *logoi* in the supreme Logos (1.4), the essential (κατ’ οὐσίαν) subsistence of created beings in God’s providence and the *logoi* (2.3), or their eschatological eternal subsistence (ἀεὶ εἶναι) by grace in God (2.5). Although in the last case Maximus’ discourse becomes almost “hypostatical” in its vocabulary and context, the eschatological subsistence in God is not essential but existential, surpassing the natural abilities of the creature.

¹¹⁸ See *Amb. Th.* 4, 104–105: “starting from this thought, and confirming it by the things that follow”, ταύτης ὑπάρχων τῆς ἐνοίας, τοῖς ἐξῆς αὐτὴν βεβαιῶν. (Although in some instances ὑπαρξις apparently does not possess inchoative sense, cf. *Amb. Io.* 37, 1337AB: “the beginning of existence”, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑπάρξεως). Cf. also DAMASCIUS, *De principiis* I, 312, 15–22: “[Ἵπαρξις], as the word [ὑπο + ἄρχω] itself indicates, signifies the first beginning of every hypostasis. It is, as it were, a sort of foundation or substructure previously established for the structure as a whole and for each part... *Hyparxis* is the simplicity anterior to all things... It is the One itself, which pre-exists beyond all things and is the cause of every essence (οὐσία) but is not yet itself essence” (tr. Shaw).

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