Dr. T. Govier (Canada)
Questions about the Unforgivable

Some wrongful acts, or moral mistakes, are regarded as so horrible that they are said to be unforgivable . Strictly speaking, however, it is persons , not actions, that are the objects of forgiveness or of lack of forgiveness. Forgiveness concerns our attitudes to people who have committed wrongs. When we think of some wrongs as unforgivable we are, in effect, thinking that the persons who have committed them should not be forgiven and are thus unforgivable . By saying that someone is unforgivable, we might simply mean that the victims are psychologically not able to give him or her. Or we might mean that because of certain circumstances (for example, the absence of remorse), it would be morally mistaken to forgive that person. In the most radical sense of unforgivability, what is claimed is that for moral reasons the unforgivable persons should never be forgiven in any circumstances . It is this radical sense of unforgivability that will be discussed.

It is often thought that atrocities are so extremely wrong that those who perpetrate them should never be forgiven. The most commonly cited example is acts of the Holocaust. These are famously discussed in Simon Wiesenthal's book, The Sunflower . Persons who have committed grievously wrong crimes of war or terrorism may also be examples.

Some of the arguments in favor of absolute unforgivability are:

(a)  to forgive P for extreme W is to excuse W, which would be incorrect.
(b)  to forgive P for extreme W is to condone W, which would be incorrect.
(c)  to forgive P for extreme W is to imply that one is willing to forget W, which would be incorrect.
(d)  to forgive P for extreme W is to diminish V, which would be incorrect.
(e)  to forgive P for extreme W is to neglect the atrocious nature of W, which would be incorrect.
(f)  only V1 can properly forgive W and, in the case of atrocities, all V1 are dead, so they cannot forgive W; consequently nobody can forgive W. Because forgiving is not the same as excusing, condoning, or forgetting, the arguments in (a), (b) and (c) can correctly be rejected.

Arguments (d), (e), and (f) merit more attention. To argument (d), it can be replied that there are ways of acknowledging and seeking to restore victims that do not entail preserving attitudes of animosity and resentment towards perpetrators. To argument (e) it can be responded, similarly, that there are legal and social ways of marking the extreme nature of moral mistakes that do not involve ongoing hostility towards perpetrators. To argument (f) it can be responded that primary victims are not the only victims. Where V1 cannot forgive because he or she is dead, V2 and V3 may remain with attitudes that significantly affect progress and relationships. The question of their forgiveness remains open.

Arguments in favor of forgiveness, even in the aftermath of extreme acts, rest on the distinction between agent and act and the moral status of the agent who, as a human being meriting respect as a person, is one with a capacity for reform and transformation.

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